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Today's Daf Yomi

April 30, 2019 | ื›ืดื” ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ืชืฉืขืดื˜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bekhorot 13

If one redeems a donkey with a lamb and the lamb dies before it was given to the priest, is the owner responsible to replace it? What if the donkey died before the lamb was given? If one doesn’t redeem the donkey, one needs to break its neck – however redeeming is optimal. Other cases are brought where the Torah gives a number of possibilities but one option is more optimal. The second chapter deals with the firstborn of a kosher animal. Also exemptions are made if the fetus has some connection to non-Jewish ownership. The gemara digresses to discuss how acquiring movable items (kinyanim) fromย non-Jews is different from acquiring items from Jews.


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ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžืจ ืœื•ืžืจ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื•

Rav Sheshet says: The mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey takes effect immediately after it is born, as is stated in the first baraita. The second baraita, which states that it applies only after thirty days, means to say that until that time, one does not transgress a prohibition if he has not yet performed the redemption. After thirty days, though, one transgresses a prohibition if he still has not redeemed his firstborn donkey.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ืžืฆื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืื™ืœืš ืื• ืคื•ื“ื”ื• ืื• ืขื•ืจืคื• ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืฉื”ื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืœื ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืคื“ื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection to Rav Sheshet from a baraita: The mitzva of a firstborn donkey applies throughout the period of thirty days from its birth; from that point forward he must either redeem it immediately or break its neck. What, does it not mean that there is a mitzva to wait to redeem it until all thirty days have passed? The Gemara answers: No, it means that there is a mitzva to redeem it throughout the period of thirty days, and after that point one has transgressed a prohibition.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืื™ืœืš ืื• ืคื•ื“ื”ื• ืื• ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ืžืงืฉื™ ื”ื ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืœื ืžืงืฉื™

The Gemara asks: If so, it should have stated: From that point forward, either he redeems it or he transgresses a prohibition, rather than stating: From that point forward he must either redeem it or break its neck. Rather, Rava says: The contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult, as this baraita, which states that the redemption is performed after thirty days, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who compares the redemption of a firstborn donkey to the redemption of a womanโ€™s firstborn son, where it is stated: โ€œFrom a month old shall you redeem themโ€ (Numbers 18:16). That baraita, which states that one must perform the mitzva immediately, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not compare the two mitzvot of redemption.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืœื ืจืฆื” ืœืคื“ื•ืชื• ืขื•ืจืคื• ืžืื—ื•ืจื™ื• ื•ืงื•ื‘ืจื• ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ืคื“ื™ื™ื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ืขืจื™ืคื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื ืœื ืชืคื“ื” ื•ืขืจืคืชื•

MISHNA: If one did not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he breaks its neck from behind and buries it. The mitzva of redeeming the firstborn donkey takes precedence over the mitzva of breaking the neck, as it is stated: โ€œIf you will not redeem it, then you shall break its neckโ€ (Exodus 13:13).

ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ืขื™ื“ื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื”ืคื“ื™ื™ื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืืฉืจ ืœื ื™ืขื“ื” ื•ื”ืคื“ื”

The mishna proceeds to enumerate other mitzvot in which one option takes precedence over another. The mitzva of designating a Hebrew maidservant to be betrothed to her master takes precedence over the mitzva of redeeming the maidservant from her master with money, as it is stated: โ€œIf she does not please her master, who has not betrothed her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8).

ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ื™ื™ื‘ื•ื ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื‘ืจืืฉื•ื ื” ืฉื”ื™ื• ืžืชื›ื•ื•ื ื™ืŸ ืœืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ื•ืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื•ื ื™ืŸ ืœืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ืืžืจื• ืžืฆื•ืช ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื

The mitzva of levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of แธฅalitza, which dissolves the levirate bond, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if the man does not wish to take his brotherโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:7). The mishna adds: This was the case initially, when people would intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva. But now that they do not intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva, but rather for reasons such as the beauty of the yevama or for financial gain, the Sages said that the mitzva of แธฅalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage.

ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ื’ืื•ืœื” ื‘ืื“ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืงื•ื“ื ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ืื ืœื ื™ื’ืืœ ื•ื ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืขืจื›ืš

With regard to a non-kosher animal that was consecrated to the Temple, the mitzva of redemption by the owner who consecrated it takes precedence over redemption by any other person, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if it is of a non-kosher animalโ€ฆand if it is not redeemed, it shall be sold according to your valuationโ€ (Leviticus 27:27).

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื•

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ืฉืœ ื ื›ืจื™ ื•ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืฉืื™ ื•ื”ืžืฉืชืชืฃ ืœื• ื•ื”ืžืงื‘ืœ ืžืžื ื• ื•ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื‘ืงื‘ืœื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื‘ืื—ืจื™ื

MISHNA: With regard to one who purchases the fetus of a cow that belongs to a gentile; one who sells the fetus of his cow to a gentile, even though one is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile; one who enters into a partnership with a gentile with regard to a cow or its fetus; one who receives a cow from a gentile to tend to it in exchange for partnership in its offspring; and one who gives his cow to a gentile in receivership, so that the gentile owns a share of the cowโ€™s offspring; in all of these cases, one is exempt from the obligation of redeeming the firstborn offspring, as it is stated: โ€œI sanctified to Me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and animalโ€ (Numbers 3:13), indicating that the mitzva is incumbent upon the Jewish people, but not upon others. If the firstborn belongs even partially to a gentile, the sanctity of firstborn does not apply to it.

ื”ื›ื”ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืœื•ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ื ืฉืœื ื ืคื˜ืจื• ืžื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื˜ื”ื•ืจื” ืืœื ืžืคื“ื™ื•ืŸ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื•ืžืคื˜ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ

The mishna continues: The priests and the Levites are obligated in the mitzva, i.e., their animals have firstborn sanctity, as they were not exempted from the mitzva of the male firstborn of a kosher animal; rather, they were exempted only from redemption of the firstborn son and from the redemption of the firstborn donkey.

ื’ืžืณ ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื• ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ื“ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื• ื“ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ื“ืžื™ื ื”ื•ื

GEMARA: The first chapter of this tractate began with the halakhot pertaining to a firstborn donkey. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna specifically teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey first, and only then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow? Let him first teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow, as it is a case of inherent sanctity, i.e., the animal cannot be redeemed and is sacrificed upon the altar, and let him then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey, as it is a case of sanctity that inheres in its value.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื—ื‘ื™ื‘ื ืœื™ื” ื›ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื•ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื–ื•ื˜ืจืŸ ืžื™ืœื™ื” ื“ื‘ื”ืžื” ื˜ืžืื” ืคืกื™ืง ื•ืฉื“ื™ ืœื”

They said in the West, Eretz Yisrael: If you wish, say that the halakhot of a firstborn donkey were taught first since they are dear to the tanna, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi แธคanina (5b) that donkeys helped the Jews when they departed from Egypt, as the Jews loaded their gold and silver on donkeys. And if you wish, say that these halakhot were taught first since the matters pertaining to a non-kosher animal are relatively few, and therefore the tanna completes its treatment and sets it aside.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื ื—ืžื ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืฉืขื™ื ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ืช ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ื•ื’ื•ื™ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื”

ยง With regard to the mishnaโ€™s discussion of sales involving Jews and gentiles, Rabbi Yitzแธฅak bar Naแธฅmani says that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentileโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, as explained further on, even though the Jew did not pull the animal in the manner of a formal acquisition, as required by halakha, he has legally acquired it, and the Jewish owner is obligated to give the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest. And in the case of a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jewโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ืช ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื”

The Master said: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentileโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though he did not pull the animal he has legally acquired it, and the Jew is obligated to give the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest.

ืžืื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืื™ ื ื™ืžื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ื“ืืชื™ ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืื ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืœืจืฉืช ืื—ื–ื”

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: According to their laws? If we say that it is referring to the laws relating to the purchase of a gentileโ€™s person as a slave, i.e., the halakhot of purchasing gentiles themselves rather than the methods by which gentiles can acquire property, this must be based on the assumption that the halakha with regard to the purchase of a gentileโ€™s animal is derived by the following a fortiori inference: If a gentileโ€™s person is acquired by a Jew as a Canaanite slave through payment of money, as it is written: โ€œAnd you may make them an inheritance for your children after you, to hold for an ancestral possessionโ€ (Leviticus 25:46), the same halakha should apply to acquiring a gentileโ€™s property.

ื”ืงื™ืฉื• ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืœืื—ื•ื–ื” ืžื” ืื—ื•ื–ื” ื ืงื ื™ืช ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื•ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ื–ืงื” ืืฃ ืขื‘ื“ ื›ื ืขื ื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื•ื

The Gemara elaborates: The verse thereby compares a gentile slave to an ancestral possession, i.e., land: Just as an ancestral possession is acquired by the transfer of money, or with a bill of sale, or through taking possession, so too, a Canaanite slave is acquired by the transfer of money. If this is the halakha with regard to a gentileโ€™s person, is it not all the more so reasonable that a gentileโ€™s property is acquired through the transfer of money?

ืื ื›ืŸ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ื–ืงื” ื ืžื™ ื•ืขื•ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื”

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: If so, then according to halakha it should be possible to acquire a gentileโ€™s property even with a bill of sale or by taking possession, which is not so. The Gemara adds: And furthermore, the halakha pertaining to a Jew purchasing goods from a Jew proves that the entire premise of the a fortiori inference is false, as he acquires a Jewโ€™s person with money alone, but he acquires his property only by pulling. It is therefore evident that the ability to acquire oneโ€™s person with money does not indicate that his property can be purchased in the same manner.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืฉืคืกืงื” ืœื”ื ืชื•ืจื” ืื• ืงื ื” ืžื™ื“ ืขืžื™ืชืš ืžื™ื“ ืขืžื™ืชืš ื”ื•ื ื“ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื”ื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

Rather, Abaye says that the term: Their laws, is referring to their laws that the Torah prescribed for their methods of purchase, by stating: โ€œOr buy of your counterpartโ€™s handโ€ (Leviticus 25:14), which teaches that it is only from the hand of your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, that property is acquired by the formal act of acquisition of pulling. This indicates that acquiring property from the hand of a gentile is accomplished through payment of money.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืืžืจื™ ืœื ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื•ื ื” ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara raises an objection: But one can say that it should be inferred from the verse that one cannot purchase anything at all from the hand of a gentile. The Sages said in response: That cannot enter your mind, as there is an a fortiori inference which indicates otherwise: If a Jew can purchase a gentileโ€™s person as a slave, is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase a gentileโ€™s property?

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ืขื“ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™ ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืคื• ื‘ืื—ืช ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืฉืชื™ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืขืžื™ืชืš

The Gemara raises another objection: But one can say that the verse teaches that whereas a Jewโ€™s property is acquired through pulling, property purchased from the hand of a gentile is not acquired until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed, both pulling and payment of money. The Sages said in response: Isnโ€™t it indicated otherwise by an a fortiori inference: If his person is acquired through only one act of acquisition, could it be that his property must be acquired through two acts? The Gemara further suggests: But one can say that it is derived from the verse that one can acquire property from a gentile either through this method of pulling or through that method of money. The Gemara explains: The halakha derived from the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ must be similar to an acquisition from your counterpart:

ืžื” ืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ื—ื“ื ืืฃ ืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื—ื“ื

Just as from the hand of your counterpart it is with one act, with pulling, so too, from the hand of a gentile, it is also with one act, with money.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื•ืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืžืื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืืชื™ ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืžื›ืกืฃ ืžืงื ืชื• ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara discusses the statement of Rabbi Oshaya. The Master said: And a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jewโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest. The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of according to their laws? If we say that it means: According to their laws of the person of the Jew himself, i.e., the manner in which he purchases the person of a Jew with money, and it is reasonable to say so, as it may be derived through an a fortiori inference: If a gentile acquires the body of a Jew with money, as it is written in that regard: โ€œFrom the money of his purchaseโ€ (Leviticus 25:51), then with regard to the property of a Jew, is it not all the more so reasonable that the gentile can acquire it with money?

ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ื“ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื ื™ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืฉืคืกืงื” ืœื”ื ืชื•ืจื” ื•ื›ื™ ืชืžื›ืจื• ืžืžื›ืจ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื”ื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

This can be rejected, as the acquisition of a Jew from a Jew will prove that the inference is not valid, as the person of a Hebrew slave one acquires with money, while the property of a Jew can be acquired only by pulling. Rather, Abaye said: That which it states, that a gentile purchases an animal with money according to their laws, means: With the acts of acquisition that the Torah prescribed to gentiles, the manner in which they acquire items from Jews, i.e., with money, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if you sell a sale item to your counterpartโ€ (Leviticus 25:14), from which it may be inferred: To your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, property is acquired by pulling, but property from the hand of a gentile is acquired with money.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืืžืจื™ ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื ื” ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara suggests: But say that the inference should be: To a gentile, not at all, i.e., neither with money nor with pulling can a gentile acquire an item from a Jew. The Sages said in response: But isnโ€™t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If a gentile can purchase a Jewโ€™s person as a slave, then is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase the Jewโ€™s property?

ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ืขื“ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™ ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืคื• ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืฉืชื™ื

The Gemara suggests: Say and infer as follows: To your counterpart you sell with pulling, but to a gentile you do not sell until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed: Pulling and money. The Sages said in response: But isnโ€™t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If the person of a Jew is acquired with one act of acquisition, is it reasonable that his property is acquired with two acts?

ื•ืื™ืžื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืขืžื™ืชืš

The Gemara further suggests: But say that a gentile acquires property from a Jew either with this act of pulling or with that act of paying money. The Gemara explains: The acquisition of the gentile must be similar to the acquisition of your counterpart, from which it is derived:

ืžื” ืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืื—ืช ืืฃ ื’ื•ื™ ื ืžื™ ื‘ืื—ืช

Just as property is acquired from your counterpart through only one act of acquisition, i.e., pulling, so too, property is acquired from a gentile through only one act of acquisition, i.e., payment of money.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœืืžื™ืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื‘ื’ื•ื™ ืงื•ื ื” ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืžืขื•ืช ืงื•ื ื•ืช ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœื ืื”ื ื™ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื”

The Sages said: And according to the opinion of Ameimar, who says that pulling effects acquisition in the case of a gentile, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, who says: By Torah law, money effects acquisition, but pulling does not. If Ameimar accepts Rabbi Yoแธฅananโ€™s opinion, then it can be derived from the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ that transactions with your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, are effected through payment of money, whereas transactions with a gentile are effected by pulling.

ืืœื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืžืคื•ืจืฉืช ืžืŸ ื”ืชื•ืจื” ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื•ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืžื” ืœื™

But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says: The act of acquisition of pulling is explicit in the Torah, then the halakha is that transactions with your counterpart are effected by pulling, and transactions with a gentile are also effected by pulling. Accordingly, why do I need the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€?

ืืžืจื™ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืืชื” ืžื—ื–ื™ืจ ืื•ื ืื” ื•ืื™ ืืชื” ืžื—ื–ื™ืจ ืื•ื ืื” ืœื’ื•ื™ ืœื’ื•ื™ ืžืืœ ืชื•ื ื• ืื™ืฉ ืืช ืื—ื™ื• ื ืคืงื

The Sages said in explanation: The phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ does not teach a halakha with regard to the method of acquisition. Rather, it is referring to the latter part of the verse: โ€œAnd if you make a sale to your counterpart, or buy of your counterpartโ€™s hand, a man shall not exploit his brotherโ€ (Leviticus 25:14). The verse is derived as follows: You must return the sum of exploitation to your counterpart, but you do not need to return the sum of exploitation to a gentile. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The exemption from returning the sum of exploitation to a gentile is derived from the latter part of the verse alone: โ€œA man shall not exploit his brother.โ€ A gentile is not included in the category of โ€œhis brother.โ€ Accordingly, the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ remains extraneous.

ื—ื“ ื‘ื’ื•ื™ ื•ื—ื“ ื‘ื”ืงื“ืฉ ื•ืฆืจื™ื›ื™ ื“ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืœื’ื•ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืื•ื ืื” ืื‘ืœ ื”ืงื“ืฉ ื™ืฉ ืœื• ืื•ื ืื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara responds: One phrase is required to exclude a gentile, and one serves to exclude consecrated property. And both derivations are necessary, as, had the Merciful One written only one exclusionary phrase, I would say: It is with regard to transactions with a gentile that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation; but with regard to transactions involving consecrated property, one is subject to the prohibition of exploitation. Therefore, the other derivation teaches us that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation with regard to transactions involving consecrated property either.

ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืืกื•ืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื“ืืฆื˜ืจื™ืš ืงืจื ืœืžื™ืฉืจื™ ืื•ื ืื” ืืœื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืฉืœ ื’ื•ื™ ืžื•ืชืจ ืื•ื ืื” ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืืžืจื™ ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืžื•ืชืจ ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื™ืš ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara remarks: This works out well according to the one who says that his robbery, i.e., robbing a gentile, is prohibited, as this is the reason that a verse is necessary to permit keeping the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile. But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, is it necessary to state that one may keep the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile? The Gemara accepts this reasoning: The Sages said: If Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, perforce he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan that money effects acquisition by Torah law, and therefore the difficulty does not arise.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ื’ืจื•ื˜ืื•ืช ืžืŸ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื ื•ืžืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ืื ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืžืฉืš ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื•ืื ืžืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืžืฉืš ื™ื•ืœื™ืš ื”ื ืื” ืœื™ื ื”ืžืœื—

ยง The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that property is acquired from a gentile by monetary payment. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels [gerutaot] made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idolโ€™s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea.

ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืžืขื•ืช ืงื•ื ื•ืช ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉืงื™ื‘ืœ ืขืœื™ื• ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžืขื•ืช ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืื™ ืžืฉื™ืš ืื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืœื ืœื

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if you say that payment of money acquires items from gentiles, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction adjudicated by Jewish law. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, why do I need the payment of money in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol? Pulling alone should be enough, in accordance with halakha. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita means: Even though the Jew gave money to the gentile, the halakha still depends on the act of pulling: If he pulled the broken vessels, yes, he has acquired them, and if not, he has not acquired them.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืจื™ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืกื™ืคื ืœื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช

The Gemara asks: If so, then the first clause of the baraita is difficult, as it states: If he pulled the object of idol worship before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. Evidently, pulling alone does not effect acquisition. Abaye said in explanation: The halakha in the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction, as the Jew did not wish to purchase the idol. Rava said to Abaye: You maintain that the halakha of the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction. Is that to say that in the latter clause there is no mistaken transaction? After all, the Jew does not wish to purchase the idol in either case.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืจื™ืฉื ื•ืกื™ืคื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืจื™ืฉื ื“ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืœื ืžื™ื—ื–ื™ ื›ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ื‘ื™ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืกื™ืคื ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืžื™ื—ื–ื™ ื›ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ื‘ื™ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where the Jew did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where the Jew did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.

ื•ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืžืจ ืœืš ืจื™ืฉื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ื“ืœื ื™ื“ืข ื“ื”ื ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืœื™ื” ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืกื™ืคื ืœืื• ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื›ื™ ืงื ืžืฉื™ืš ืื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืขื™ื•ื ื™ ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืžื™ืžืฉืš

And Abaye could have said to you: The first clause involves a mistaken transaction, as he did not know that the idol was included, as he did not give him the dinars and therefore had not yet inspected the property being purchased. Conversely, the latter clause is not a case of a mistaken transaction, as since he already gave the dinars to the seller, when he came to pull it, he should have inspected the property and then pulled it. Since the Jew did not bother to inspect the property even after paying, the transaction is valid.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืžื“ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืื™ื ื” ืงื•ื ื” ืกื™ืคื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืื™ื ื” ืงื•ื ื” ื•ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ืชื ื ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉืš ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉืš

The Gemara cites two more interpretations of the baraita. Rav Ashi says: The baraita is in fact discussing a case where the transaction was subject to gentile law, according to which only monetary payment effects acquisition, and as for the aforementioned difficulty raised to the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya from the latter clause: If so, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol; pulling is not in fact required. Rather, from the fact that in the first clause, pulling does not effect acquisition, in the latter clause too, pulling does not effect acquisition. But since the first clause taught the word: Pulled, in order to teach that this method is ineffective, the latter clause also taught the word: Pulled, despite the fact that its mention is unnecessary.

ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืžื“ืกื™ืคื ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืงื•ื ื” ืจื™ืฉื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืงื•ื ื” ื•ืจื™ืฉื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืื ืœื ื ืชืŸ ื•ืœื ืžืฉืš ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื

Ravina said: The baraita is discussing a case where it was agreed that the transaction would be subject to Jewish law. From the fact that in the latter clause, pulling effects acquisition, in the first clause too, pulling effects acquisition. And as for the difficulty with regard to the first clause, which states that the Jew may return the item even though he already pulled it, this is what the baraita is saying: If the buyer did not give the money to the gentile and also did not pull the item, he returns the item to the seller. The Gemara adds: What does the term: Returns, mean in this context? It means that the Jew returns, i.e., reneges, on his verbal commitment. In other words, he is not required to complete the purchase despite the fact he initially agreed to do so.

ืงืกื‘ืจ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ื ืžืฉื•ื ืžื—ื•ืกืจื™ ืืžื ื” ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื• ื‘ื“ื‘ื•ืจื™ื™ื”ื• ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื’ื•ื™ื ื“ืื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืงื™ื™ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื‘ื•ืจื™ื™ื”ื• ืœื

The Gemara elaborates: It was necessary for the tanna to teach this explicitly, as he holds: Reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition constitutes an act of bad faith between two parties. And he holds that this statement applies only to a case where a Jew purchases an item from another Jew, as they are assumed to uphold their verbal commitments. But in a case of a Jew who purchases an item from gentiles, as they are not assumed to uphold their verbal commitments, reneging on oneโ€™s word does not constitute an act of bad faith between the parties, since neither party relies upon the commitment of the other in the first place.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bekhorot 13

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bekhorot 13

ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืืžืจ ืœื•ืžืจ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื•

Rav Sheshet says: The mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey takes effect immediately after it is born, as is stated in the first baraita. The second baraita, which states that it applies only after thirty days, means to say that until that time, one does not transgress a prohibition if he has not yet performed the redemption. After thirty days, though, one transgresses a prohibition if he still has not redeemed his firstborn donkey.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ืžืฆื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืื™ืœืš ืื• ืคื•ื“ื”ื• ืื• ืขื•ืจืคื• ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืฉื”ื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืœื ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืคื“ื•ืชื• ื›ืœ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection to Rav Sheshet from a baraita: The mitzva of a firstborn donkey applies throughout the period of thirty days from its birth; from that point forward he must either redeem it immediately or break its neck. What, does it not mean that there is a mitzva to wait to redeem it until all thirty days have passed? The Gemara answers: No, it means that there is a mitzva to redeem it throughout the period of thirty days, and after that point one has transgressed a prohibition.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืื™ืœืš ืื• ืคื•ื“ื”ื• ืื• ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื• ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ืžืงืฉื™ ื”ื ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื“ืœื ืžืงืฉื™

The Gemara asks: If so, it should have stated: From that point forward, either he redeems it or he transgresses a prohibition, rather than stating: From that point forward he must either redeem it or break its neck. Rather, Rava says: The contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult, as this baraita, which states that the redemption is performed after thirty days, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who compares the redemption of a firstborn donkey to the redemption of a womanโ€™s firstborn son, where it is stated: โ€œFrom a month old shall you redeem themโ€ (Numbers 18:16). That baraita, which states that one must perform the mitzva immediately, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not compare the two mitzvot of redemption.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืœื ืจืฆื” ืœืคื“ื•ืชื• ืขื•ืจืคื• ืžืื—ื•ืจื™ื• ื•ืงื•ื‘ืจื• ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ืคื“ื™ื™ื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ืขืจื™ืคื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื ืœื ืชืคื“ื” ื•ืขืจืคืชื•

MISHNA: If one did not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he breaks its neck from behind and buries it. The mitzva of redeeming the firstborn donkey takes precedence over the mitzva of breaking the neck, as it is stated: โ€œIf you will not redeem it, then you shall break its neckโ€ (Exodus 13:13).

ืžืฆื•ืช ื™ืขื™ื“ื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื”ืคื“ื™ื™ื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืืฉืจ ืœื ื™ืขื“ื” ื•ื”ืคื“ื”

The mishna proceeds to enumerate other mitzvot in which one option takes precedence over another. The mitzva of designating a Hebrew maidservant to be betrothed to her master takes precedence over the mitzva of redeeming the maidservant from her master with money, as it is stated: โ€œIf she does not please her master, who has not betrothed her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemedโ€ (Exodus 21:8).

ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ื™ื™ื‘ื•ื ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ื‘ืจืืฉื•ื ื” ืฉื”ื™ื• ืžืชื›ื•ื•ื ื™ืŸ ืœืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ื•ืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืชื›ื•ื•ื ื™ืŸ ืœืฉื ืžืฆื•ื” ืืžืจื• ืžืฆื•ืช ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืงื•ื“ืžืช ืœืžืฆื•ืช ื™ื‘ื•ื

The mitzva of levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of แธฅalitza, which dissolves the levirate bond, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if the man does not wish to take his brotherโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:7). The mishna adds: This was the case initially, when people would intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva. But now that they do not intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva, but rather for reasons such as the beauty of the yevama or for financial gain, the Sages said that the mitzva of แธฅalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage.

ืžืฆื•ืช ื”ื’ืื•ืœื” ื‘ืื“ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ืงื•ื“ื ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ืื ืœื ื™ื’ืืœ ื•ื ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืขืจื›ืš

With regard to a non-kosher animal that was consecrated to the Temple, the mitzva of redemption by the owner who consecrated it takes precedence over redemption by any other person, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if it is of a non-kosher animalโ€ฆand if it is not redeemed, it shall be sold according to your valuationโ€ (Leviticus 27:27).

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื•

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ืฉืœ ื ื›ืจื™ ื•ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืจืฉืื™ ื•ื”ืžืฉืชืชืฃ ืœื• ื•ื”ืžืงื‘ืœ ืžืžื ื• ื•ื”ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื‘ืงื‘ืœื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื‘ืœ ืœื ื‘ืื—ืจื™ื

MISHNA: With regard to one who purchases the fetus of a cow that belongs to a gentile; one who sells the fetus of his cow to a gentile, even though one is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile; one who enters into a partnership with a gentile with regard to a cow or its fetus; one who receives a cow from a gentile to tend to it in exchange for partnership in its offspring; and one who gives his cow to a gentile in receivership, so that the gentile owns a share of the cowโ€™s offspring; in all of these cases, one is exempt from the obligation of redeeming the firstborn offspring, as it is stated: โ€œI sanctified to Me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and animalโ€ (Numbers 3:13), indicating that the mitzva is incumbent upon the Jewish people, but not upon others. If the firstborn belongs even partially to a gentile, the sanctity of firstborn does not apply to it.

ื”ื›ื”ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืœื•ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ื ืฉืœื ื ืคื˜ืจื• ืžื‘ื›ื•ืจ ื‘ื”ืžื” ื˜ื”ื•ืจื” ืืœื ืžืคื“ื™ื•ืŸ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื•ืžืคื˜ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจ

The mishna continues: The priests and the Levites are obligated in the mitzva, i.e., their animals have firstborn sanctity, as they were not exempted from the mitzva of the male firstborn of a kosher animal; rather, they were exempted only from redemption of the firstborn son and from the redemption of the firstborn donkey.

ื’ืžืณ ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื“ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื• ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื‘ืจื™ืฉื ืขื•ื‘ืจ ืคืจืชื• ื“ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ื”ื’ื•ืฃ ื”ื•ื ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื•ืจื• ื“ืงื“ื•ืฉืช ื“ืžื™ื ื”ื•ื

GEMARA: The first chapter of this tractate began with the halakhot pertaining to a firstborn donkey. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna specifically teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey first, and only then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow? Let him first teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow, as it is a case of inherent sanctity, i.e., the animal cannot be redeemed and is sacrificed upon the altar, and let him then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey, as it is a case of sanctity that inheres in its value.

ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื—ื‘ื™ื‘ื ืœื™ื” ื›ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื•ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ื–ื•ื˜ืจืŸ ืžื™ืœื™ื” ื“ื‘ื”ืžื” ื˜ืžืื” ืคืกื™ืง ื•ืฉื“ื™ ืœื”

They said in the West, Eretz Yisrael: If you wish, say that the halakhot of a firstborn donkey were taught first since they are dear to the tanna, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi แธคanina (5b) that donkeys helped the Jews when they departed from Egypt, as the Jews loaded their gold and silver on donkeys. And if you wish, say that these halakhot were taught first since the matters pertaining to a non-kosher animal are relatively few, and therefore the tanna completes its treatment and sets it aside.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื‘ืจ ื ื—ืžื ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืฉืขื™ื ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ืช ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ื•ื’ื•ื™ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื”

ยง With regard to the mishnaโ€™s discussion of sales involving Jews and gentiles, Rabbi Yitzแธฅak bar Naแธฅmani says that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentileโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, as explained further on, even though the Jew did not pull the animal in the manner of a formal acquisition, as required by halakha, he has legally acquired it, and the Jewish owner is obligated to give the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest. And in the case of a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jewโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ืช ื‘ื‘ื›ื•ืจื”

The Master said: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentileโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though he did not pull the animal he has legally acquired it, and the Jew is obligated to give the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest.

ืžืื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืื™ ื ื™ืžื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ื“ืืชื™ ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืื ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืœืจืฉืช ืื—ื–ื”

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: According to their laws? If we say that it is referring to the laws relating to the purchase of a gentileโ€™s person as a slave, i.e., the halakhot of purchasing gentiles themselves rather than the methods by which gentiles can acquire property, this must be based on the assumption that the halakha with regard to the purchase of a gentileโ€™s animal is derived by the following a fortiori inference: If a gentileโ€™s person is acquired by a Jew as a Canaanite slave through payment of money, as it is written: โ€œAnd you may make them an inheritance for your children after you, to hold for an ancestral possessionโ€ (Leviticus 25:46), the same halakha should apply to acquiring a gentileโ€™s property.

ื”ืงื™ืฉื• ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืœืื—ื•ื–ื” ืžื” ืื—ื•ื–ื” ื ืงื ื™ืช ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื•ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ื–ืงื” ืืฃ ืขื‘ื“ ื›ื ืขื ื™ ื ืงื ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื•ื

The Gemara elaborates: The verse thereby compares a gentile slave to an ancestral possession, i.e., land: Just as an ancestral possession is acquired by the transfer of money, or with a bill of sale, or through taking possession, so too, a Canaanite slave is acquired by the transfer of money. If this is the halakha with regard to a gentileโ€™s person, is it not all the more so reasonable that a gentileโ€™s property is acquired through the transfer of money?

ืื ื›ืŸ ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ื•ื‘ื—ื–ืงื” ื ืžื™ ื•ืขื•ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื”

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: If so, then according to halakha it should be possible to acquire a gentileโ€™s property even with a bill of sale or by taking possession, which is not so. The Gemara adds: And furthermore, the halakha pertaining to a Jew purchasing goods from a Jew proves that the entire premise of the a fortiori inference is false, as he acquires a Jewโ€™s person with money alone, but he acquires his property only by pulling. It is therefore evident that the ability to acquire oneโ€™s person with money does not indicate that his property can be purchased in the same manner.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืฉืคืกืงื” ืœื”ื ืชื•ืจื” ืื• ืงื ื” ืžื™ื“ ืขืžื™ืชืš ืžื™ื“ ืขืžื™ืชืš ื”ื•ื ื“ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื”ื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

Rather, Abaye says that the term: Their laws, is referring to their laws that the Torah prescribed for their methods of purchase, by stating: โ€œOr buy of your counterpartโ€™s handโ€ (Leviticus 25:14), which teaches that it is only from the hand of your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, that property is acquired by the formal act of acquisition of pulling. This indicates that acquiring property from the hand of a gentile is accomplished through payment of money.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืืžืจื™ ืœื ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื•ื ื” ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara raises an objection: But one can say that it should be inferred from the verse that one cannot purchase anything at all from the hand of a gentile. The Sages said in response: That cannot enter your mind, as there is an a fortiori inference which indicates otherwise: If a Jew can purchase a gentileโ€™s person as a slave, is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase a gentileโ€™s property?

ื•ืื™ืžื ืžื™ื“ ื’ื•ื™ ืขื“ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™ ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืคื• ื‘ืื—ืช ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืฉืชื™ื ื•ืื™ืžื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืขืžื™ืชืš

The Gemara raises another objection: But one can say that the verse teaches that whereas a Jewโ€™s property is acquired through pulling, property purchased from the hand of a gentile is not acquired until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed, both pulling and payment of money. The Sages said in response: Isnโ€™t it indicated otherwise by an a fortiori inference: If his person is acquired through only one act of acquisition, could it be that his property must be acquired through two acts? The Gemara further suggests: But one can say that it is derived from the verse that one can acquire property from a gentile either through this method of pulling or through that method of money. The Gemara explains: The halakha derived from the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ must be similar to an acquisition from your counterpart:

ืžื” ืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ื—ื“ื ืืฃ ืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื—ื“ื

Just as from the hand of your counterpart it is with one act, with pulling, so too, from the hand of a gentile, it is also with one act, with money.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื•ืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื‘ื”ืžืชื• ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ืžืฉืš ืงื ื” ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจื” ืžืื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ืื™ืœื™ืžื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื“ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืืชื™ ื‘ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืงื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืžื›ืกืฃ ืžืงื ืชื• ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara discusses the statement of Rabbi Oshaya. The Master said: And a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jewโ€™s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animalโ€™s firstborn offspring to a priest. The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of according to their laws? If we say that it means: According to their laws of the person of the Jew himself, i.e., the manner in which he purchases the person of a Jew with money, and it is reasonable to say so, as it may be derived through an a fortiori inference: If a gentile acquires the body of a Jew with money, as it is written in that regard: โ€œFrom the money of his purchaseโ€ (Leviticus 25:51), then with regard to the property of a Jew, is it not all the more so reasonable that the gentile can acquire it with money?

ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—ื• ื“ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื ื™ ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืฉืคืกืงื” ืœื”ื ืชื•ืจื” ื•ื›ื™ ืชืžื›ืจื• ืžืžื›ืจ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื”ื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื‘ื›ืกืฃ

This can be rejected, as the acquisition of a Jew from a Jew will prove that the inference is not valid, as the person of a Hebrew slave one acquires with money, while the property of a Jew can be acquired only by pulling. Rather, Abaye said: That which it states, that a gentile purchases an animal with money according to their laws, means: With the acts of acquisition that the Torah prescribed to gentiles, the manner in which they acquire items from Jews, i.e., with money, as it is stated: โ€œAnd if you sell a sale item to your counterpartโ€ (Leviticus 25:14), from which it may be inferred: To your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, property is acquired by pulling, but property from the hand of a gentile is acquired with money.

ื•ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ื›ืœืœ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืืžืจื™ ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ืื ื’ื•ืคื• ืงื ื” ืžืžื•ื ื• ืœื ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ

The Gemara suggests: But say that the inference should be: To a gentile, not at all, i.e., neither with money nor with pulling can a gentile acquire an item from a Jew. The Sages said in response: But isnโ€™t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If a gentile can purchase a Jewโ€™s person as a slave, then is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase the Jewโ€™s property?

ืื™ืžื ืœืขื•ื‘ื“ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื ืขื“ ื“ืื™ื›ื ืชืจืชื™ ืœืื• ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื•ื ื’ื•ืคื• ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžืžื•ื ื• ื‘ืฉืชื™ื

The Gemara suggests: Say and infer as follows: To your counterpart you sell with pulling, but to a gentile you do not sell until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed: Pulling and money. The Sages said in response: But isnโ€™t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If the person of a Jew is acquired with one act of acquisition, is it reasonable that his property is acquired with two acts?

ื•ืื™ืžื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ืื• ื‘ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืขืžื™ืชืš

The Gemara further suggests: But say that a gentile acquires property from a Jew either with this act of pulling or with that act of paying money. The Gemara explains: The acquisition of the gentile must be similar to the acquisition of your counterpart, from which it is derived:

ืžื” ืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืื—ืช ืืฃ ื’ื•ื™ ื ืžื™ ื‘ืื—ืช

Just as property is acquired from your counterpart through only one act of acquisition, i.e., pulling, so too, property is acquired from a gentile through only one act of acquisition, i.e., payment of money.

ืืžืจื™ ื•ืœืืžื™ืžืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื‘ื’ื•ื™ ืงื•ื ื” ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืžืขื•ืช ืงื•ื ื•ืช ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœื ืื”ื ื™ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ื›ืกืฃ ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื”

The Sages said: And according to the opinion of Ameimar, who says that pulling effects acquisition in the case of a gentile, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan, who says: By Torah law, money effects acquisition, but pulling does not. If Ameimar accepts Rabbi Yoแธฅananโ€™s opinion, then it can be derived from the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ that transactions with your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, are effected through payment of money, whereas transactions with a gentile are effected by pulling.

ืืœื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืžืคื•ืจืฉืช ืžืŸ ื”ืชื•ืจื” ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ื•ืœื’ื•ื™ ื‘ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืœืžื” ืœื™

But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says: The act of acquisition of pulling is explicit in the Torah, then the halakha is that transactions with your counterpart are effected by pulling, and transactions with a gentile are also effected by pulling. Accordingly, why do I need the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€?

ืืžืจื™ ืœืขืžื™ืชืš ืืชื” ืžื—ื–ื™ืจ ืื•ื ืื” ื•ืื™ ืืชื” ืžื—ื–ื™ืจ ืื•ื ืื” ืœื’ื•ื™ ืœื’ื•ื™ ืžืืœ ืชื•ื ื• ืื™ืฉ ืืช ืื—ื™ื• ื ืคืงื

The Sages said in explanation: The phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ does not teach a halakha with regard to the method of acquisition. Rather, it is referring to the latter part of the verse: โ€œAnd if you make a sale to your counterpart, or buy of your counterpartโ€™s hand, a man shall not exploit his brotherโ€ (Leviticus 25:14). The verse is derived as follows: You must return the sum of exploitation to your counterpart, but you do not need to return the sum of exploitation to a gentile. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The exemption from returning the sum of exploitation to a gentile is derived from the latter part of the verse alone: โ€œA man shall not exploit his brother.โ€ A gentile is not included in the category of โ€œhis brother.โ€ Accordingly, the phrase โ€œof your counterpartโ€ remains extraneous.

ื—ื“ ื‘ื’ื•ื™ ื•ื—ื“ ื‘ื”ืงื“ืฉ ื•ืฆืจื™ื›ื™ ื“ืื™ ื›ืชื‘ ืจื—ืžื ื ื—ื“ ื”ื•ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืœื’ื•ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืื•ื ืื” ืื‘ืœ ื”ืงื“ืฉ ื™ืฉ ืœื• ืื•ื ืื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara responds: One phrase is required to exclude a gentile, and one serves to exclude consecrated property. And both derivations are necessary, as, had the Merciful One written only one exclusionary phrase, I would say: It is with regard to transactions with a gentile that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation; but with regard to transactions involving consecrated property, one is subject to the prohibition of exploitation. Therefore, the other derivation teaches us that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation with regard to transactions involving consecrated property either.

ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืืกื•ืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื“ืืฆื˜ืจื™ืš ืงืจื ืœืžื™ืฉืจื™ ืื•ื ืื” ืืœื ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืฉืœ ื’ื•ื™ ืžื•ืชืจ ืื•ื ืื” ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืืžืจื™ ืื™ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื’ื–ื™ืœื• ืžื•ืชืจ ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื™ืš ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื™ื”

The Gemara remarks: This works out well according to the one who says that his robbery, i.e., robbing a gentile, is prohibited, as this is the reason that a verse is necessary to permit keeping the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile. But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, is it necessary to state that one may keep the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile? The Gemara accepts this reasoning: The Sages said: If Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, perforce he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan that money effects acquisition by Torah law, and therefore the difficulty does not arise.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ื’ืจื•ื˜ืื•ืช ืžืŸ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื ื•ืžืฆื ื‘ื”ืŸ ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ืื ืขื“ ืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืžืฉืš ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื•ืื ืžืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืžืฉืš ื™ื•ืœื™ืš ื”ื ืื” ืœื™ื ื”ืžืœื—

ยง The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that property is acquired from a gentile by monetary payment. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels [gerutaot] made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idolโ€™s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea.

ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืžืขื•ืช ืงื•ื ื•ืช ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉืงื™ื‘ืœ ืขืœื™ื• ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืžืขื•ืช ืœืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ืชืŸ ืžืขื•ืช ืื™ ืžืฉื™ืš ืื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืœื ืœื

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if you say that payment of money acquires items from gentiles, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction adjudicated by Jewish law. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, why do I need the payment of money in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol? Pulling alone should be enough, in accordance with halakha. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita means: Even though the Jew gave money to the gentile, the halakha still depends on the act of pulling: If he pulled the broken vessels, yes, he has acquired them, and if not, he has not acquired them.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืฉื™ื ืจื™ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืกื™ืคื ืœื™ื›ื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช

The Gemara asks: If so, then the first clause of the baraita is difficult, as it states: If he pulled the object of idol worship before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. Evidently, pulling alone does not effect acquisition. Abaye said in explanation: The halakha in the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction, as the Jew did not wish to purchase the idol. Rava said to Abaye: You maintain that the halakha of the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction. Is that to say that in the latter clause there is no mistaken transaction? After all, the Jew does not wish to purchase the idol in either case.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืจื™ืฉื ื•ืกื™ืคื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ืจื™ืฉื ื“ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืœื ืžื™ื—ื–ื™ ื›ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ื‘ื™ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืกื™ืคื ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืžื™ื—ื–ื™ ื›ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ื‘ื™ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where the Jew did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where the Jew did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.

ื•ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืžืจ ืœืš ืจื™ืฉื ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ื“ืœื ื™ื“ืข ื“ื”ื ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืœื™ื” ื–ื•ื–ื™ ืกื™ืคื ืœืื• ืžืงื— ื˜ืขื•ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื›ื™ ืงื ืžืฉื™ืš ืื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืขื™ื•ื ื™ ื•ื”ื“ืจ ืžื™ืžืฉืš

And Abaye could have said to you: The first clause involves a mistaken transaction, as he did not know that the idol was included, as he did not give him the dinars and therefore had not yet inspected the property being purchased. Conversely, the latter clause is not a case of a mistaken transaction, as since he already gave the dinars to the seller, when he came to pull it, he should have inspected the property and then pulled it. Since the Jew did not bother to inspect the property even after paying, the transaction is valid.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืžื“ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืื™ื ื” ืงื•ื ื” ืกื™ืคื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืื™ื ื” ืงื•ื ื” ื•ืื™ื™ื“ื™ ื“ืชื ื ืจื™ืฉื ืžืฉืš ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉืš

The Gemara cites two more interpretations of the baraita. Rav Ashi says: The baraita is in fact discussing a case where the transaction was subject to gentile law, according to which only monetary payment effects acquisition, and as for the aforementioned difficulty raised to the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya from the latter clause: If so, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jewโ€™s acquisition of the idol; pulling is not in fact required. Rather, from the fact that in the first clause, pulling does not effect acquisition, in the latter clause too, pulling does not effect acquisition. But since the first clause taught the word: Pulled, in order to teach that this method is ineffective, the latter clause also taught the word: Pulled, despite the fact that its mention is unnecessary.

ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืืžืจ ืžื“ืกื™ืคื ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืงื•ื ื” ืจื™ืฉื ื ืžื™ ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืงื•ื ื” ื•ืจื™ืฉื ื”ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืื ืœื ื ืชืŸ ื•ืœื ืžืฉืš ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื‘ื“ื‘ืจื™ื

Ravina said: The baraita is discussing a case where it was agreed that the transaction would be subject to Jewish law. From the fact that in the latter clause, pulling effects acquisition, in the first clause too, pulling effects acquisition. And as for the difficulty with regard to the first clause, which states that the Jew may return the item even though he already pulled it, this is what the baraita is saying: If the buyer did not give the money to the gentile and also did not pull the item, he returns the item to the seller. The Gemara adds: What does the term: Returns, mean in this context? It means that the Jew returns, i.e., reneges, on his verbal commitment. In other words, he is not required to complete the purchase despite the fact he initially agreed to do so.

ืงืกื‘ืจ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื™ืฉ ื‘ื”ื ืžืฉื•ื ืžื—ื•ืกืจื™ ืืžื ื” ื•ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ื“ืงื™ื™ืžื• ื‘ื“ื‘ื•ืจื™ื™ื”ื• ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืžื’ื•ื™ื ื“ืื™ื ื”ื• ืœื ืงื™ื™ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื‘ื•ืจื™ื™ื”ื• ืœื

The Gemara elaborates: It was necessary for the tanna to teach this explicitly, as he holds: Reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition constitutes an act of bad faith between two parties. And he holds that this statement applies only to a case where a Jew purchases an item from another Jew, as they are assumed to uphold their verbal commitments. But in a case of a Jew who purchases an item from gentiles, as they are not assumed to uphold their verbal commitments, reneging on oneโ€™s word does not constitute an act of bad faith between the parties, since neither party relies upon the commitment of the other in the first place.

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