Bekhorot 3
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Masechet Bekhorot is sponsored by Ahava Leibtag in loving memory of her father, Arthur Aaron, Asher ben Yaakov Yehuda v’Esther on his first yahrzeit. “You always said Talmud Torah was the best s’char. This one’s for you, Daddy.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Marvin Stokar z”l. An avid Daf learner and our honorary Zeidy, he and תלחט״א his cherished Fran fulfilled their life long dream when they made aliya. How proud he would be of his grandchildren and great grandchildren – biological and adopted- who have followed in his footsteps! יהי זכרו ברוך”
Bekhorot 3
מַאי לָאו אַבְּהֵמָה? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
What, is the baraita not referring to the animal when it prohibits giving it in receivership? If so, the baraita prohibits giving it to the gentile in exchange for half the rights to future fetuses, and certainly giving the gentile rights to all the future fetuses would be forbidden. The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a case of an existing fetus, as the animal is pregnant, and therefore it is prohibited to sell it. It is permitted to sell to a gentile an animal that is not yet pregnant, for the rights to the fetuses alone.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמָיו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara comments: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches: The Sages penalize him up to ten times its value [damav], in masculine form, indicating that it is referring to the fetus and not the mother. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is correct, and it cannot be proven from the baraita that it is forbidden to sell rights to a future fetus to a gentile.
מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ.
The Gemara comments that the language of the baraita: The Sages penalize him up to ten times its value, supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish says: In the case of one who sells large livestock to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase it from the gentile for up to ten times its value.
דַּוְקָא אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמָיו! שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּכׇל יוֹמָא וְיוֹמָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ מִמִּצְוֹת.
The Gemara asks: Does the phrase: For up to ten times its value, mean specifically this amount and no more, or does it not mean specifically this amount? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: In the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase the slave from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value. It is therefore evident that the phrase: For up to ten times its value, is not precise. The Gemara responds: A slave is different, as each day that he works for the gentile, the gentile restricts him from performing mitzvot. Therefore, one who sells a slave is penalized more severely than one who sells his animal to a gentile.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמֶיהָ. תְּנַן: וְהַנּוֹתֵן לוֹ בְּקַבָּלָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ!
And there are those who say that there is another version of the previous discussion: Reish Lakish says that in the case of one who sells large livestock to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase it from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value. We learned in a baraita: And in the case of one who gives the gentile an animal in receivership even though he is not permitted to do so, the Sages penalize him by requiring that he purchase the gentile’s portion of the animal for up to ten times its value. This contradicts the statement of Reish Lakish.
מְכִירָה — פָּסְקָה מִינֵּיהּ, קַבְּלָנוּת — לָא פָּסְקָה מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara responds: The penalties in these two cases are not the same, as in a case of a sale, the animal is entirely separated from the Jew, while in the case of receivership, it is not entirely separated from him, as the animal still belongs to the Jew. Therefore, the penalty in this case is not as severe.
דַּוְקָא אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמָיו! שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּלָא הָדַר לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: Does the amount of one hundred times its value stated by Reish Lakish mean specifically this amount and no more, or does it not mean specifically this amount? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: In the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase the slave from the gentile for up to ten times its value. Apparently, the number one hundred is not meant literally. The Gemara responds: A slave is different, since the Sages already penalized the owner in that the slave does not return to him. Since the slave will be emancipated once the master redeems him, it may be that the Sages would not penalize him to such a great extent.
בְּהֵמָה מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא הָדְרָא לֵיהּ, נִיקְנְסֵיהּ טְפֵי חַד! אֶלָּא, עֶבֶד — מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא, וְכׇל מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא לָא גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara challenges: Rather, what is the reason that he is penalized in the case of an animal more so than in the case of a slave? Is it because of the fact that it returns to him? If so, he should be penalized only one additional amount. If the difference is that an animal returns to its owners and a slave does not, then the difference in penalties should be reflective of this, and he should have to purchase the animal for no more than eleven times its value. Rather, the Gemara offers a different distinction: The sale of a slave is an uncommon matter, and the Sages did not issue a decree with regard to an uncommon matter. Therefore, one cannot compare the penalty in the case of selling a slave to the penalty in the case of selling an animal.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁיַּד הַגּוֹי כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: וּשְׁנֵיהֶם מִקְרָא אֶחָד דָּרְשׁוּ, ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״.
§ A previously cited baraita (2b) states that if one receives an animal from a gentile to care for and receives a portion of the offspring in exchange, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the Jew’s portion is sanctified with firstborn status. And the Rabbis say that as long as the ownership of the gentile is involved, i.e., he owns a portion of the firstborn animal, it does not have firstborn status. Rabbi Yehoshua said: And both of them interpreted the same one verse in accordance with their opinions. The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” (Exodus 13:2).
רַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: ״בְּכוֹר״ — מִקְצָת בְּכוֹר מַשְׁמַע, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל״ — עַד דְּאִיכָּא כּוּלֵּיהּ. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: ״בְּכוֹר״ — כּוּלֵּיהּ בְּכוֹר מַשְׁמַע, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל״ — דַּאֲפִילּוּ כׇּל דְּהוּא.
The Rabbis hold that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that even when a Jew owns part of the firstborn, it is subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote: “All the firstborn,” which teaches that it is not subject to the obligations of firstborn status unless the entire animal is owned by a Jew. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that only if the entire firstborn is owned by a Jew would it be subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote the word “all” to demonstrate that even if any amount of the animal belongs to a Jew, it has firstborn status.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא ״בְּכוֹר״ רוּבָּא מַשְׁמַע, מָר סָבַר: ״כׇּל״ מַשְׁמַע לְמַלּוֹיֵי אֲתָא, וּמָר סָבַר: לְגָרוֹעֵי אֲתָא.
If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that if the majority of the animal belongs to the Jew, it is subject to the obligations of firstborn status. One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that the word “all” indicates that it comes to fill the Jewish portion of ownership, meaning that it has firstborn status only if the entire animal belongs to a Jew. And one Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the word “all” comes to detract from the necessary Jewish ownership, indicating that the animal has firstborn status even if it is partially owned by a Jew.
וְכַמָּה תְּהֵא שׁוּתָּפוּת שֶׁל גּוֹי, וּתְהֵא פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֲפִילּוּ אׇזְנוֹ. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: ״שְׁקֵיל אׇזְנָךְ וְזִיל״!
§ The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, how much should the gentile’s partnership in the animal be in order for it to be exempt from being counted a firstborn? Rav Huna says: It is sufficient even if the gentile owns only its ear. Rav Naḥman objects to this: Let the animal have firstborn status, and let the priest say to the gentile: Take your ear and go, as a blemished firstborn animal belongs to the priesthood.
אִיתְּמַר, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ נְבֵלָה, וְרָבָא אָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ טְרֵיפָה.
It was stated that the amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning this question: Rav Ḥisda says that if the gentile is a partner in an item, i.e., a part of the body, that renders the animal a carcass, meaning if that limb were removed the animal would die immediately, the animal is exempt from the obligations of firstborn status. And Rava says it is exempt if the gentile is a partner in an item that if removed renders the animal a tereifa, meaning the animal will die but not immediately.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בִּטְרֵיפָה חַיָּה. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ טְרֵיפָה — קָסָבַר טְרֵיפָה אֵינָהּ חַיָּה, וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ נְבֵלָה — אֲבָל טְרֵיפָה חַיָּה.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers that they disagree about whether a tereifa can live for an extended period of time. According to the one who says that a gentile’s partnership in an item that renders the animal a tereifa exempts him from the obligations of firstborn status, it is because he holds that a tereifa cannot live, and therefore the gentile owns an essential portion of the animal. And according to the one who says that the gentile must be a partner in an item that renders the animal a carcass, this is because he holds that it cannot live without this part, but a tereifa can live for an extended period of time without those missing limbs.
אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא וְרָבָא — לָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא בּוֹ, הָא בְּאִמּוֹ.
The Sages said before Rav Pappa: That which Rav Huna said, that even if the gentile’s share of the animal is only its ear it does not have firstborn status, and that which Rav Ḥisda and Rava said, that the animal does not have firstborn status only if the gentile is a partner in the primary limbs of the body on which its life is dependent, do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to it, i.e., the fetus, while that ruling of Rav Ḥisda and Rava is referring to its mother.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב פָּפָּא: מַאי שְׁנָא בּוֹ, דְּבָעֵינַן ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״ וְלֵיכָּא? אִמּוֹ נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן ״כׇּל מִקְנְךָ תִּזָּכָר״ וְלֵיכָּא! אֶלָּא, לָא שְׁנָא.
Rav Pappa said to them: What is different about the case of the fetus, where owning a portion of its ear exempts the Jew from the obligations of firstborn status? It is because we require the fulfillment of the verse “all the firstborn,” i.e., that all of it be owned by the Jew, and that is not the case. If so, with regard to its mother as well we require the fulfillment of the verse: “From all your livestock you shall take the males” (Exodus 34:19), which also indicates that all the livestock, including the mother, must belong to the Jew, and this is not the case. Rather, there is no difference, and they disagree both in the case of the fetus and in that of the mother.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִנְּפָלִים, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּתָא נִינְהוּ קָדְשִׁי, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״פֶּטֶר שֶׁגֶר בְּהֵמָה״ — שֶׁגֶר בִּבְהֵמָה!
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: Why does gentile partnership in an essential limb of the fetus exempt the Jew from the obligations of firstborn status? In what way is this animal different from non-viable newborns, which are sacred even though they are not viable? As the Master said in reference to the verse: “Every firstborn that emerges from [sheger] an animal” (Exodus 13:12), any fetus that dwells [shegar] inside an animal, i.e., inside the mother’s womb, even one that is non-viable, is also sanctified as a firstborn.
הָתָם, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עָרִיבוּ בְּהוּ חוּלִּין — קָרֵינָא בְּהוּ בִּבְהֵמָה ״כָּל בְּכוֹר״, הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעָרִיבוּ בְּהוּ חוּלִּין — לָא קָרֵינָא בְּהוּ ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״.
The Gemara responds: There, in the case of non-viable newborns, since there is no non-sacred element mixed in with them, we apply to the animal the phrase “all the firstborn.” But here, in the case where a gentile owns a portion of the fetuses, since a non-sacred element is mixed in with them, we do not apply to them the phrase: “all the firstborn.”
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לָא עַל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַסִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר רַבָּנַן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ:
The Gemara relates that one day Rabbi Elazar did not enter the study hall. Rabbi Elazar then found Rabbi Asi, and said to him: What did the Sages say in the study hall? Rabbi Asi said to him:
הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ מוּם קַל. וְהָדִתְנַן: רָחֵל שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין עֵז וְעֵז שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין רָחֵל — פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ מִקְצָת סִימָנִין — חַיָּיב. מוּם קָבוּעַ הָוֵי לִשְׁחוֹט עָלָיו.
This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if only a slight blemish would result from the removal of the portion of the animal owned by the gentile, the animal still does not have firstborn status. And in addition, Rabbi Yoḥanan also commented on that which we learned in a mishna (16b): A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated, i.e., subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Rabbi Yoḥanan commented: Nevertheless, it may not be sacrificed on the altar because this is a permanent blemish. Therefore, a priest is permitted to slaughter it outside of the Temple.
בִּשְׁלָמָא מוּם קַל — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַב הוּנָא, וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב חִסְדָּא וְרָבָא.
The Gemara asks: Granted that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s first statement that the animal does not have firstborn status even if it has a slight blemish is necessary, as he teaches us that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said previously (2b) that even if the gentile owns only the ear of the firstborn it does not have firstborn status, and his statement is to the exclusion of the opinions of Rav Ḥisda and Rava, who said the gentile must own a portion of the fetus that would render it a carcass or a tereifa if it were removed.
אֶלָּא מוּם קָבוּעַ — מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי הָוֵה לֵיהּ מוּמָא? תְּנֵינָא: וּפִיו דּוֹמֶה כְּשֶׁל חֲזִיר — הֲרֵי זֶה מוּם!
But with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s second statement that a goat of sorts that was born to a ewe but has some characteristics of the mother is considered to have a permanent blemish, what is it teaching us? Is it teaching that since it looks different from the normal appearance of a sheep this appearance is considered a blemish? We already learned this in the mishna (40a): Or with regard to a lamb whose mouth is similar to that of a pig, that is a blemish that enables slaughter of the firstborn.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָתָם נִשְׁתַּנָּה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, הָכָא נִשְׁתַּנָּה בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: עֵינוֹ אַחַת גְּדוֹלָה וְאַחַת קְטַנָּה.
And if you would say that there, where the animal’s mouth is similar to that of a pig, its appearance was altered into a being in whose species there is no sanctity of the firstborn, while here, where it looks like a goat, its appearance was altered into a being in whose species there is sanctity of the firstborn, and Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches that this animal too is considered to be blemished, we already learned this, too, in the subsequent mishna (40b): An animal with one of its eyes large and one small is also considered blemished.
וְתַנָּא גְּדוֹלָה — גְּדוֹלָה כְּשֶׁל עֵגֶל, וּקְטַנָּה — קְטַנָּה כְּשֶׁל אַוָּוז. בִּשְׁלָמָא קְטַנָּה כְּשֶׁל אַוָּוז, אֵין בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלָה כְּשֶׁל עֵגֶל — יֵשׁ בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי הָוֵה לֵיהּ מוּמָא?
And a tanna taught in explanation of the mishna: A large eye is referring to one as large as that of a calf, and a small eye is referring to one as small as that of a goose. Granted, in the case of an eye as small as that of a goose the reason it is considered a blemish is that there is no sanctity of the firstborn among its species, i.e., that of a bird. But in the case of an eye that is as large as that of a calf there is sanctity of a firstborn among its species. Rather, is it not considered blemished because we say that since it has changed from the appearance of a sheep it is considered a blemish? Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement has still not introduced any novelty.
לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ ״שָׂרוּעַ״. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: מוּמִין אֵלּוּ, בֵּין קְבוּעִין בֵּין עוֹבְרִין — פּוֹסְלִין. יָתֵר עֲלֵיהֶן אָדָם: עֵינָיו שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת.
The Gemara responds: No, an eye as large as that of a calf is considered a blemish because the animal is one that has a limb that is too large [sarua], which is listed in the Torah as one of the blemished animals (see Leviticus 22:23). The Gemara comments: This, too, stands to reason, as we learned in a mishna (43a): Concerning these blemishes that were taught with regard to an animal, whether they are permanent or transient, they also disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service. And the subsequent mishna (44a) adds: Beyond those are additional blemishes that apply exclusively to a person, i.e., a priest: If both of his eyes are large, or both of them are small.
גַּבֵּי אָדָם הוּא דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן״, דְּבָעֵינַן אִישׁ שָׁוֶה בְּזַרְעוֹ שֶׁל אַהֲרֹן, אֲבָל בְּהֵמָה, שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת — נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי מוּמָא.
The reason for the latter halakha is that it is with regard to a person that it is written: “Any man from the offspring of Aaron” (Leviticus 22:4), which indicates that we require a man who is equal to the seed of Aaron, i.e., he has an ordinary appearance like other priests; but with regard to an animal, if both eyes are big or both eyes are small, it is also not a blemish.
אַחַת גְּדוֹלָה וְאַחַת קְטַנָּה, מַאי טַעְמָא? אִי מִשּׁוּם שִׁינּוּי — אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת נָמֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ ״שָׂרוּעַ״?
Accordingly, if one of the animal’s eyes is big or one is small, what is the reason that it is considered a blemish? If it is due to the deviation in appearance, meaning it does not look like a sheep, then even if both eyes are big or both are small it should be considered a blemish. Rather, is it not because it is an animal with a limb that is too large?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מִשּׁוּם שִׁינּוּי, שִׁינּוּי הָוֵי מוּמָא. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת? הָתָם, אִי מֵחֲמַת בְּרִיּוּתָא יַתִּירָא — תַּרְוַויְיהוּ בָּעֵי לְמִיבְרָא, אִי מֵחֲמַת כְּחִישׁוּתָא יַתִּירָא — תַּרְוַויְיהוּ בָּעֵי מִיכְחַשׁ.
The Gemara responds: No, actually I will say to you that the reason an animal with one big eye and one small eye is considered blemished is because of its deviation, as a deviation is considered a blemish. And as for that which is difficult for you, that if it is due to an anomalous appearance then even if both are big or both are small it should be considered a blemish, there it is not considered a deviation. This is because a particularly healthy animal has large eyes, while a particularly weak animal has small eyes. Therefore, only an animal with one large eye and with one small eye is considered to be blemished, as if the large eye is due to extreme health both should have been healthy, and if the small eye is due to extreme weakness both should have been weak.
הָהִיא גִּיּוֹרְתָּא דַּהֲווֹ מָסְרִין לַהּ אַחֵי חֵיוְתָא לְפַטּוֹמַהּ, אֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לַהּ: לֵית דְּחַשׁ לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: שׁוּתָּפוּת גּוֹי חַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה.
§ In connection with the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis whether an animal owned in partnership with a gentile has firstborn status, the Gemara relates the following incident: There was a certain female convert whose gentile brothers would give her animals to fatten and would then divide the profits with her. She came before Rava to ask whether firstborn status applies to the firstborn of these animals. Rava said to her: There is no one who is concerned with this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda, who says an animal owned in partnership with a gentile is obligated, i.e., subject to counting its first offspring a firstborn.
רַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל הַוְיָא לֵיהּ הָהִיא חֵיוָתָא, הֲוָה מַקְנֶה לְאוּדְנַיְיהוּ לְגוֹי, וְאָסַר לְהוּ בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָהֵיב לְהוּ לְכֹהֲנִים, וּכְלַאי חֵיוָתָא דְּרַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל.
The Gemara relates another incident: Rav Mari bar Raḥel had a certain flock of animals. He would transfer ownership of the ears of the firstborn fetuses to a gentile in order to exempt them from the obligations of firstborn status. But nevertheless he prohibited them from being sheared and used for labor, and gave them to the priests, halakhot that apply to a standard firstborn animal. And ultimately, the animals of Rav Mari bar Raḥel died.
וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּאָסַר לְהוּ בְּגִיזָה וַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָהֵיב לְהוּ לְכֹהֲנִים, אַמַּאי מַקְנֶה לְהוּ לְאוּדְנַיְיהוּ לְגוֹי, דִּלְמָא אָתֵי בְּהוּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה? אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא כְּלוֹ חֵיוָתָא דְּרַב מָרִי? מִשּׁוּם דְּמַפְקַע לְהוּ מִקְּדוּשְׁתַּיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: But since he prohibited them from being sheared and used for labor and also gave them to the priests, why did he initially transfer ownership of their ears to the gentile, abrogating their firstborn status? The Gemara answers that he did so lest the priests come to experience a mishap with them, improperly shearing them or using them for labor. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason that the animals of Rav Mari died as a punishment? The Gemara answers: It was because he abrogated their sanctity by selling their ears.
וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לְהַטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם! הָתָם מִקְּדוּשַּׁת מִזְבֵּחַ קָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ, מִקְּדוּשַּׁת כֹּהֵן לָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ. הָכָא אֲפִילּוּ מִקְּדוּשַּׁת כֹּהֵן קָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say it is permitted for a person to inflict a blemish on a firstborn animal fetus before it emerges into the air of the world? Here, too, Rav Mari abrogated his firstborn animals’ sanctity by selling their ears before their birth. The Gemara answers: There, when one inflicts a blemish on a firstborn animal, he abrogates the animal’s sanctity of the altar, as it is no longer fit for an offering, but does not abrogate its sanctity of the priest, as it is still given to the priest. Here, by contrast, when Rav Mari sold his animals’ ears to a gentile, he abrogated even their sanctity of the priest, as the partnership exempts the animals from the obligations of firstborn status entirely.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל יָדַע לְאַקְנוֹיֵי קִנְיַן גָּמוּר, וְחָזֵי לֵיהּ אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא, וְאָזֵיל וְעָבֵיד, וְסָבַר רַב מָרִי מִילְּתָא הוּא דַּעֲבַד, וְאָתֵי בָּהּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה.
And if you wish, say instead that the reason the animals of Rav Mari bar Raḥel died is that he himself knew that is was necessary to transfer ownership of the ears of the fetus to the gentile through a complete transaction. And another person would see him transferring ownership of the ears to a gentile and would go and do it himself but not perform a complete transaction, and would think that Rav Mari performed the same matter in abrogating its firstborn status, and would come to experience a mishap with his animal by not treating it with the sanctity of firstborn status. Due to this concern, Rav Mari should not have transferred ownership of the ears to a gentile, and consequently his animals died.
מַתְנִי׳ כֹּהֲנִים וּלְוִיִּם פְּטוּרִין, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: אִם פָּטְרוּ אֶת שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּמִּדְבָּר, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּפְטְרוּ אֶת שֶׁל עַצְמָן.
MISHNA: Priests and Levites are exempt from the obligation to redeem a firstborn donkey; this is derived from an a fortiori inference: In the wilderness the firstborn were redeemed in exchange for the Levites, as it is stated: “Take the Levites in exchange for all the firstborn among the children of Israel and the animal of the Levites in exchange for their animals” (Numbers 3:45). If the priests and Levites rendered exempt the firstborn children and donkeys of the Israelites in the wilderness from being counted firstborns, it is only logical that the priests and the Levites should render the firstborn of their own donkeys exempt from being counted firstborns.
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Bekhorot 3
מַאי לָאו אַבְּהֵמָה? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
What, is the baraita not referring to the animal when it prohibits giving it in receivership? If so, the baraita prohibits giving it to the gentile in exchange for half the rights to future fetuses, and certainly giving the gentile rights to all the future fetuses would be forbidden. The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to a case of an existing fetus, as the animal is pregnant, and therefore it is prohibited to sell it. It is permitted to sell to a gentile an animal that is not yet pregnant, for the rights to the fetuses alone.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמָיו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara comments: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches: The Sages penalize him up to ten times its value [damav], in masculine form, indicating that it is referring to the fetus and not the mother. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is correct, and it cannot be proven from the baraita that it is forbidden to sell rights to a future fetus to a gentile.
מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ.
The Gemara comments that the language of the baraita: The Sages penalize him up to ten times its value, supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish says: In the case of one who sells large livestock to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase it from the gentile for up to ten times its value.
דַּוְקָא אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמָיו! שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּכׇל יוֹמָא וְיוֹמָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ מִמִּצְוֹת.
The Gemara asks: Does the phrase: For up to ten times its value, mean specifically this amount and no more, or does it not mean specifically this amount? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: In the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase the slave from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value. It is therefore evident that the phrase: For up to ten times its value, is not precise. The Gemara responds: A slave is different, as each day that he works for the gentile, the gentile restricts him from performing mitzvot. Therefore, one who sells a slave is penalized more severely than one who sells his animal to a gentile.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמֶיהָ. תְּנַן: וְהַנּוֹתֵן לוֹ בְּקַבָּלָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ!
And there are those who say that there is another version of the previous discussion: Reish Lakish says that in the case of one who sells large livestock to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase it from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value. We learned in a baraita: And in the case of one who gives the gentile an animal in receivership even though he is not permitted to do so, the Sages penalize him by requiring that he purchase the gentile’s portion of the animal for up to ten times its value. This contradicts the statement of Reish Lakish.
מְכִירָה — פָּסְקָה מִינֵּיהּ, קַבְּלָנוּת — לָא פָּסְקָה מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara responds: The penalties in these two cases are not the same, as in a case of a sale, the animal is entirely separated from the Jew, while in the case of receivership, it is not entirely separated from him, as the animal still belongs to the Jew. Therefore, the penalty in this case is not as severe.
דַּוְקָא אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי — קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמָיו! שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּלָא הָדַר לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: Does the amount of one hundred times its value stated by Reish Lakish mean specifically this amount and no more, or does it not mean specifically this amount? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: In the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, the Sages penalize him, requiring him to repurchase the slave from the gentile for up to ten times its value. Apparently, the number one hundred is not meant literally. The Gemara responds: A slave is different, since the Sages already penalized the owner in that the slave does not return to him. Since the slave will be emancipated once the master redeems him, it may be that the Sages would not penalize him to such a great extent.
בְּהֵמָה מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא הָדְרָא לֵיהּ, נִיקְנְסֵיהּ טְפֵי חַד! אֶלָּא, עֶבֶד — מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא, וְכׇל מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא לָא גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara challenges: Rather, what is the reason that he is penalized in the case of an animal more so than in the case of a slave? Is it because of the fact that it returns to him? If so, he should be penalized only one additional amount. If the difference is that an animal returns to its owners and a slave does not, then the difference in penalties should be reflective of this, and he should have to purchase the animal for no more than eleven times its value. Rather, the Gemara offers a different distinction: The sale of a slave is an uncommon matter, and the Sages did not issue a decree with regard to an uncommon matter. Therefore, one cannot compare the penalty in the case of selling a slave to the penalty in the case of selling an animal.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁיַּד הַגּוֹי כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: וּשְׁנֵיהֶם מִקְרָא אֶחָד דָּרְשׁוּ, ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״.
§ A previously cited baraita (2b) states that if one receives an animal from a gentile to care for and receives a portion of the offspring in exchange, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the Jew’s portion is sanctified with firstborn status. And the Rabbis say that as long as the ownership of the gentile is involved, i.e., he owns a portion of the firstborn animal, it does not have firstborn status. Rabbi Yehoshua said: And both of them interpreted the same one verse in accordance with their opinions. The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” (Exodus 13:2).
רַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: ״בְּכוֹר״ — מִקְצָת בְּכוֹר מַשְׁמַע, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל״ — עַד דְּאִיכָּא כּוּלֵּיהּ. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: ״בְּכוֹר״ — כּוּלֵּיהּ בְּכוֹר מַשְׁמַע, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל״ — דַּאֲפִילּוּ כׇּל דְּהוּא.
The Rabbis hold that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that even when a Jew owns part of the firstborn, it is subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote: “All the firstborn,” which teaches that it is not subject to the obligations of firstborn status unless the entire animal is owned by a Jew. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that only if the entire firstborn is owned by a Jew would it be subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote the word “all” to demonstrate that even if any amount of the animal belongs to a Jew, it has firstborn status.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא ״בְּכוֹר״ רוּבָּא מַשְׁמַע, מָר סָבַר: ״כׇּל״ מַשְׁמַע לְמַלּוֹיֵי אֲתָא, וּמָר סָבַר: לְגָרוֹעֵי אֲתָא.
If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the words “the firstborn, whatever opens the womb, among the children of Israel” indicate that if the majority of the animal belongs to the Jew, it is subject to the obligations of firstborn status. One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that the word “all” indicates that it comes to fill the Jewish portion of ownership, meaning that it has firstborn status only if the entire animal belongs to a Jew. And one Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the word “all” comes to detract from the necessary Jewish ownership, indicating that the animal has firstborn status even if it is partially owned by a Jew.
וְכַמָּה תְּהֵא שׁוּתָּפוּת שֶׁל גּוֹי, וּתְהֵא פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֲפִילּוּ אׇזְנוֹ. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: ״שְׁקֵיל אׇזְנָךְ וְזִיל״!
§ The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, how much should the gentile’s partnership in the animal be in order for it to be exempt from being counted a firstborn? Rav Huna says: It is sufficient even if the gentile owns only its ear. Rav Naḥman objects to this: Let the animal have firstborn status, and let the priest say to the gentile: Take your ear and go, as a blemished firstborn animal belongs to the priesthood.
אִיתְּמַר, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ נְבֵלָה, וְרָבָא אָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ טְרֵיפָה.
It was stated that the amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning this question: Rav Ḥisda says that if the gentile is a partner in an item, i.e., a part of the body, that renders the animal a carcass, meaning if that limb were removed the animal would die immediately, the animal is exempt from the obligations of firstborn status. And Rava says it is exempt if the gentile is a partner in an item that if removed renders the animal a tereifa, meaning the animal will die but not immediately.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בִּטְרֵיפָה חַיָּה. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ טְרֵיפָה — קָסָבַר טְרֵיפָה אֵינָהּ חַיָּה, וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ נְבֵלָה — אֲבָל טְרֵיפָה חַיָּה.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers that they disagree about whether a tereifa can live for an extended period of time. According to the one who says that a gentile’s partnership in an item that renders the animal a tereifa exempts him from the obligations of firstborn status, it is because he holds that a tereifa cannot live, and therefore the gentile owns an essential portion of the animal. And according to the one who says that the gentile must be a partner in an item that renders the animal a carcass, this is because he holds that it cannot live without this part, but a tereifa can live for an extended period of time without those missing limbs.
אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְרַב חִסְדָּא וְרָבָא — לָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא בּוֹ, הָא בְּאִמּוֹ.
The Sages said before Rav Pappa: That which Rav Huna said, that even if the gentile’s share of the animal is only its ear it does not have firstborn status, and that which Rav Ḥisda and Rava said, that the animal does not have firstborn status only if the gentile is a partner in the primary limbs of the body on which its life is dependent, do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to it, i.e., the fetus, while that ruling of Rav Ḥisda and Rava is referring to its mother.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב פָּפָּא: מַאי שְׁנָא בּוֹ, דְּבָעֵינַן ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״ וְלֵיכָּא? אִמּוֹ נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן ״כׇּל מִקְנְךָ תִּזָּכָר״ וְלֵיכָּא! אֶלָּא, לָא שְׁנָא.
Rav Pappa said to them: What is different about the case of the fetus, where owning a portion of its ear exempts the Jew from the obligations of firstborn status? It is because we require the fulfillment of the verse “all the firstborn,” i.e., that all of it be owned by the Jew, and that is not the case. If so, with regard to its mother as well we require the fulfillment of the verse: “From all your livestock you shall take the males” (Exodus 34:19), which also indicates that all the livestock, including the mother, must belong to the Jew, and this is not the case. Rather, there is no difference, and they disagree both in the case of the fetus and in that of the mother.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִנְּפָלִים, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּתָא נִינְהוּ קָדְשִׁי, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״פֶּטֶר שֶׁגֶר בְּהֵמָה״ — שֶׁגֶר בִּבְהֵמָה!
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: Why does gentile partnership in an essential limb of the fetus exempt the Jew from the obligations of firstborn status? In what way is this animal different from non-viable newborns, which are sacred even though they are not viable? As the Master said in reference to the verse: “Every firstborn that emerges from [sheger] an animal” (Exodus 13:12), any fetus that dwells [shegar] inside an animal, i.e., inside the mother’s womb, even one that is non-viable, is also sanctified as a firstborn.
הָתָם, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עָרִיבוּ בְּהוּ חוּלִּין — קָרֵינָא בְּהוּ בִּבְהֵמָה ״כָּל בְּכוֹר״, הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעָרִיבוּ בְּהוּ חוּלִּין — לָא קָרֵינָא בְּהוּ ״כׇּל בְּכוֹר״.
The Gemara responds: There, in the case of non-viable newborns, since there is no non-sacred element mixed in with them, we apply to the animal the phrase “all the firstborn.” But here, in the case where a gentile owns a portion of the fetuses, since a non-sacred element is mixed in with them, we do not apply to them the phrase: “all the firstborn.”
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לָא עַל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַסִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר רַבָּנַן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ:
The Gemara relates that one day Rabbi Elazar did not enter the study hall. Rabbi Elazar then found Rabbi Asi, and said to him: What did the Sages say in the study hall? Rabbi Asi said to him:
הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ מוּם קַל. וְהָדִתְנַן: רָחֵל שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין עֵז וְעֵז שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין רָחֵל — פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ מִקְצָת סִימָנִין — חַיָּיב. מוּם קָבוּעַ הָוֵי לִשְׁחוֹט עָלָיו.
This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if only a slight blemish would result from the removal of the portion of the animal owned by the gentile, the animal still does not have firstborn status. And in addition, Rabbi Yoḥanan also commented on that which we learned in a mishna (16b): A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated, i.e., subject to the obligations of firstborn status. Rabbi Yoḥanan commented: Nevertheless, it may not be sacrificed on the altar because this is a permanent blemish. Therefore, a priest is permitted to slaughter it outside of the Temple.
בִּשְׁלָמָא מוּם קַל — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַב הוּנָא, וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב חִסְדָּא וְרָבָא.
The Gemara asks: Granted that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s first statement that the animal does not have firstborn status even if it has a slight blemish is necessary, as he teaches us that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, who said previously (2b) that even if the gentile owns only the ear of the firstborn it does not have firstborn status, and his statement is to the exclusion of the opinions of Rav Ḥisda and Rava, who said the gentile must own a portion of the fetus that would render it a carcass or a tereifa if it were removed.
אֶלָּא מוּם קָבוּעַ — מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי הָוֵה לֵיהּ מוּמָא? תְּנֵינָא: וּפִיו דּוֹמֶה כְּשֶׁל חֲזִיר — הֲרֵי זֶה מוּם!
But with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s second statement that a goat of sorts that was born to a ewe but has some characteristics of the mother is considered to have a permanent blemish, what is it teaching us? Is it teaching that since it looks different from the normal appearance of a sheep this appearance is considered a blemish? We already learned this in the mishna (40a): Or with regard to a lamb whose mouth is similar to that of a pig, that is a blemish that enables slaughter of the firstborn.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָתָם נִשְׁתַּנָּה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, הָכָא נִשְׁתַּנָּה בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: עֵינוֹ אַחַת גְּדוֹלָה וְאַחַת קְטַנָּה.
And if you would say that there, where the animal’s mouth is similar to that of a pig, its appearance was altered into a being in whose species there is no sanctity of the firstborn, while here, where it looks like a goat, its appearance was altered into a being in whose species there is sanctity of the firstborn, and Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches that this animal too is considered to be blemished, we already learned this, too, in the subsequent mishna (40b): An animal with one of its eyes large and one small is also considered blemished.
וְתַנָּא גְּדוֹלָה — גְּדוֹלָה כְּשֶׁל עֵגֶל, וּקְטַנָּה — קְטַנָּה כְּשֶׁל אַוָּוז. בִּשְׁלָמָא קְטַנָּה כְּשֶׁל אַוָּוז, אֵין בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה, אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלָה כְּשֶׁל עֵגֶל — יֵשׁ בְּמִינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּאִישְׁתַּנִּי הָוֵה לֵיהּ מוּמָא?
And a tanna taught in explanation of the mishna: A large eye is referring to one as large as that of a calf, and a small eye is referring to one as small as that of a goose. Granted, in the case of an eye as small as that of a goose the reason it is considered a blemish is that there is no sanctity of the firstborn among its species, i.e., that of a bird. But in the case of an eye that is as large as that of a calf there is sanctity of a firstborn among its species. Rather, is it not considered blemished because we say that since it has changed from the appearance of a sheep it is considered a blemish? Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement has still not introduced any novelty.
לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ ״שָׂרוּעַ״. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: מוּמִין אֵלּוּ, בֵּין קְבוּעִין בֵּין עוֹבְרִין — פּוֹסְלִין. יָתֵר עֲלֵיהֶן אָדָם: עֵינָיו שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת.
The Gemara responds: No, an eye as large as that of a calf is considered a blemish because the animal is one that has a limb that is too large [sarua], which is listed in the Torah as one of the blemished animals (see Leviticus 22:23). The Gemara comments: This, too, stands to reason, as we learned in a mishna (43a): Concerning these blemishes that were taught with regard to an animal, whether they are permanent or transient, they also disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service. And the subsequent mishna (44a) adds: Beyond those are additional blemishes that apply exclusively to a person, i.e., a priest: If both of his eyes are large, or both of them are small.
גַּבֵּי אָדָם הוּא דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן״, דְּבָעֵינַן אִישׁ שָׁוֶה בְּזַרְעוֹ שֶׁל אַהֲרֹן, אֲבָל בְּהֵמָה, שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת — נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי מוּמָא.
The reason for the latter halakha is that it is with regard to a person that it is written: “Any man from the offspring of Aaron” (Leviticus 22:4), which indicates that we require a man who is equal to the seed of Aaron, i.e., he has an ordinary appearance like other priests; but with regard to an animal, if both eyes are big or both eyes are small, it is also not a blemish.
אַחַת גְּדוֹלָה וְאַחַת קְטַנָּה, מַאי טַעְמָא? אִי מִשּׁוּם שִׁינּוּי — אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת נָמֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ ״שָׂרוּעַ״?
Accordingly, if one of the animal’s eyes is big or one is small, what is the reason that it is considered a blemish? If it is due to the deviation in appearance, meaning it does not look like a sheep, then even if both eyes are big or both are small it should be considered a blemish. Rather, is it not because it is an animal with a limb that is too large?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מִשּׁוּם שִׁינּוּי, שִׁינּוּי הָוֵי מוּמָא. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן גְּדוֹלוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְטַנּוֹת? הָתָם, אִי מֵחֲמַת בְּרִיּוּתָא יַתִּירָא — תַּרְוַויְיהוּ בָּעֵי לְמִיבְרָא, אִי מֵחֲמַת כְּחִישׁוּתָא יַתִּירָא — תַּרְוַויְיהוּ בָּעֵי מִיכְחַשׁ.
The Gemara responds: No, actually I will say to you that the reason an animal with one big eye and one small eye is considered blemished is because of its deviation, as a deviation is considered a blemish. And as for that which is difficult for you, that if it is due to an anomalous appearance then even if both are big or both are small it should be considered a blemish, there it is not considered a deviation. This is because a particularly healthy animal has large eyes, while a particularly weak animal has small eyes. Therefore, only an animal with one large eye and with one small eye is considered to be blemished, as if the large eye is due to extreme health both should have been healthy, and if the small eye is due to extreme weakness both should have been weak.
הָהִיא גִּיּוֹרְתָּא דַּהֲווֹ מָסְרִין לַהּ אַחֵי חֵיוְתָא לְפַטּוֹמַהּ, אֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לַהּ: לֵית דְּחַשׁ לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: שׁוּתָּפוּת גּוֹי חַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה.
§ In connection with the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis whether an animal owned in partnership with a gentile has firstborn status, the Gemara relates the following incident: There was a certain female convert whose gentile brothers would give her animals to fatten and would then divide the profits with her. She came before Rava to ask whether firstborn status applies to the firstborn of these animals. Rava said to her: There is no one who is concerned with this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda, who says an animal owned in partnership with a gentile is obligated, i.e., subject to counting its first offspring a firstborn.
רַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל הַוְיָא לֵיהּ הָהִיא חֵיוָתָא, הֲוָה מַקְנֶה לְאוּדְנַיְיהוּ לְגוֹי, וְאָסַר לְהוּ בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָהֵיב לְהוּ לְכֹהֲנִים, וּכְלַאי חֵיוָתָא דְּרַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל.
The Gemara relates another incident: Rav Mari bar Raḥel had a certain flock of animals. He would transfer ownership of the ears of the firstborn fetuses to a gentile in order to exempt them from the obligations of firstborn status. But nevertheless he prohibited them from being sheared and used for labor, and gave them to the priests, halakhot that apply to a standard firstborn animal. And ultimately, the animals of Rav Mari bar Raḥel died.
וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּאָסַר לְהוּ בְּגִיזָה וַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָהֵיב לְהוּ לְכֹהֲנִים, אַמַּאי מַקְנֶה לְהוּ לְאוּדְנַיְיהוּ לְגוֹי, דִּלְמָא אָתֵי בְּהוּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה? אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא כְּלוֹ חֵיוָתָא דְּרַב מָרִי? מִשּׁוּם דְּמַפְקַע לְהוּ מִקְּדוּשְׁתַּיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: But since he prohibited them from being sheared and used for labor and also gave them to the priests, why did he initially transfer ownership of their ears to the gentile, abrogating their firstborn status? The Gemara answers that he did so lest the priests come to experience a mishap with them, improperly shearing them or using them for labor. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason that the animals of Rav Mari died as a punishment? The Gemara answers: It was because he abrogated their sanctity by selling their ears.
וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לְהַטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם! הָתָם מִקְּדוּשַּׁת מִזְבֵּחַ קָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ, מִקְּדוּשַּׁת כֹּהֵן לָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ. הָכָא אֲפִילּוּ מִקְּדוּשַּׁת כֹּהֵן קָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say it is permitted for a person to inflict a blemish on a firstborn animal fetus before it emerges into the air of the world? Here, too, Rav Mari abrogated his firstborn animals’ sanctity by selling their ears before their birth. The Gemara answers: There, when one inflicts a blemish on a firstborn animal, he abrogates the animal’s sanctity of the altar, as it is no longer fit for an offering, but does not abrogate its sanctity of the priest, as it is still given to the priest. Here, by contrast, when Rav Mari sold his animals’ ears to a gentile, he abrogated even their sanctity of the priest, as the partnership exempts the animals from the obligations of firstborn status entirely.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל יָדַע לְאַקְנוֹיֵי קִנְיַן גָּמוּר, וְחָזֵי לֵיהּ אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא, וְאָזֵיל וְעָבֵיד, וְסָבַר רַב מָרִי מִילְּתָא הוּא דַּעֲבַד, וְאָתֵי בָּהּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה.
And if you wish, say instead that the reason the animals of Rav Mari bar Raḥel died is that he himself knew that is was necessary to transfer ownership of the ears of the fetus to the gentile through a complete transaction. And another person would see him transferring ownership of the ears to a gentile and would go and do it himself but not perform a complete transaction, and would think that Rav Mari performed the same matter in abrogating its firstborn status, and would come to experience a mishap with his animal by not treating it with the sanctity of firstborn status. Due to this concern, Rav Mari should not have transferred ownership of the ears to a gentile, and consequently his animals died.
מַתְנִי׳ כֹּהֲנִים וּלְוִיִּם פְּטוּרִין, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: אִם פָּטְרוּ אֶת שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּמִּדְבָּר, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּפְטְרוּ אֶת שֶׁל עַצְמָן.
MISHNA: Priests and Levites are exempt from the obligation to redeem a firstborn donkey; this is derived from an a fortiori inference: In the wilderness the firstborn were redeemed in exchange for the Levites, as it is stated: “Take the Levites in exchange for all the firstborn among the children of Israel and the animal of the Levites in exchange for their animals” (Numbers 3:45). If the priests and Levites rendered exempt the firstborn children and donkeys of the Israelites in the wilderness from being counted firstborns, it is only logical that the priests and the Levites should render the firstborn of their own donkeys exempt from being counted firstborns.
