Bekhorot 34

אלא שלא יתן בו מום מנין שלא יביא דבילה ובצק ויניחנה על האוזן כדי שיבא כלב ויאכלנה תלמוד לומר כל מום אחד מום ואחד כל מום

only the prohibition that one may not directly cause a blemish. From where is it derived that one may not bring pressed figs or dough and place it on the animal’s ear so that a dog will come and eat it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), indicating that the same prohibition applies both when the blemish is caused directly and when it is any blemish, even one caused indirectly.

הכא בקראי פליגי דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל וכן אמר ריש לקיש וכן אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה ואני הנה נתתי לך את משמרת תרומתי

After demonstrating that the tanna’im in the baraita discussing the firstborn offering disagree with regard to the exposition of certain verses, the Gemara clarifies that the tanna’im here, in the baraita discussing teruma whose status concerning impurity is uncertain, also disagree with regard to the exposition of verses. As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says, and Reish Lakish likewise says, and Rav Naḥman likewise says that Rabba bar Avuh says: It is stated in a verse addressed to Aaron and his sons: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot [terumotai]” (Numbers 18:8), with “terumotai” written in plural.

רבי אליעזר סבר בשתי תרומות הכתוב מדבר אחת תרומה טהורה ואחת תרומה תלויה ואמר רחמנא עביד לה שימור ורבי יהושע תרומתי כתיב

Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the barrel of teruma must be safeguarded from ritual impurity, holds that the verse is speaking of two terumot: Both teruma that is definitely ritually pure and teruma that is in abeyance, i.e., teruma whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain. And based on the plural “My terumot,” it is understood that the Merciful One states: Make a protection for it, i.e., safeguard even teruma whose status concerning impurity is uncertain. And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that one may expose to ritual impurity the teruma contents in the barrel, holds that the term terumotai is written so that it can be read as terumati, meaning: My teruma, in the singular. Therefore, the requirement to safeguard teruma applies only to that teruma whose status is definitely pure.

למימרא דרבי אליעזר סבר יש אם למקרא ורמינהי בבגדו בה כיון שפירש טליתו עליה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה דברי רבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, i.e., one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita discussing a Hebrew maidservant’s return to her father’s house. The verse states, with regard to her master: “He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her [bevigdo bah]” (Exodus 21:8). The term “bevigdo” shares a root with a word for garment, beged. Therefore, the verse indicates that once the master has spread his garment over her, thereby designating her as his wife, if the maidservant is subsequently divorced or widowed, her father may no longer sell her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and he interprets bevigdo as related to bigdo, his garment.

רבי אליעזר אומר כיון שבגד בה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה

Rabbi Eliezer says: The word bevigdo is written without a yod and therefore is written in a manner that it can be read: Bevagdo. Accordingly, bevigdo bah means that since the father dealt deceitfully [bagad] with her by selling her once, he may not sell her again. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. This contradicts his derivation with regard to teruma, which is based on the pronunciation of the words.

אלא הכא בהא קמיפלגי רבי יהושע סבר הראויה לך שמור ושאינה ראויה לך לא תשמור ורבי אליעזר הא נמי ראויה היא שמא יבוא אליהו ויטהרנה

Rather, here, the tanna’im disagree with regard to this: The verse states: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot” (Numbers 18:8). Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the term “you” teaches that only teruma that is fit for you to eat, i.e., teruma that is definitely ritually pure, you must safeguard. But teruma that is not fit for you, i.e., teruma whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain, you do not need to safeguard. And Rabbi Eliezer holds that this teruma, whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain, is also considered fit for you, because perhaps Elijah will come and deem it ritually pure.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי שמעון מתקיף לה רב נחמן בר יצחק הי רבי שמעון אילימא רבי שמעון דמתניתין עד השתא לא אשמעינן שמואל דבר שאין מתכוין מותר

§ The Gemara again discusses letting the blood of a firstborn offering. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak objects to this: To which opinion of Rabbi Shimon is Shmuel referring? If we say he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, that the blood may be let despite the resulting blemish, because the purpose of the treatment is solely medical, that cannot be correct. After all, hasn’t Shmuel taught us until now that an unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited result inadvertently ensues, is permitted?

והא רבי חייא בר אשי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהודה ורב חנין בר אשי אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי שמעון ורב חייא בר אבין מתני בלא גברי רב אמר הלכה כרבי יהודה ושמואל אמר הלכה כרבי שמעון

But doesn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that an unintentional act is prohibited, and Rav Ḥanin bar Ashi says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that an unintentional act is permitted. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin teaches these rulings directly, without citing additional men in their transmission. He simply states that Rav says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Evidently, Shmuel could not be referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, as if so, he would be repeating himself.

אלא רבי שמעון דברייתא ורב שישא בריה דרב אידי מתני לה בהדיא אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי שמעון דברייתא

The Gemara answers: Rather, Shmuel is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the baraita (33b), that not only may one let the blood of the dying firstborn animal despite the resulting blemish, but it is even permitted to eat the animal’s meat on account of the blemish. And the Gemara notes that Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, teaches this explicitly: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon as stated in the baraita.

מתני׳ הצורם אוזן בבכור הרי זה לא ישחוט עולמית דברי רבי אליעזר וחכמים אומרים נולד בו מום אחר ישחוט עליו

MISHNA: In the case of one who slits [hatzorem] the ear of a firstborn offering, that person may never slaughter that animal. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: If another blemish later develops in the firstborn, he may slaughter the animal on account of that second blemish.

גמ׳ ומי קניס רבי אליעזר לעולם ורמינהי מי שהיתה לו בהרת

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer penalize for a transgression forever? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Nega’im 7:5): In the case of one who had a snow-white leprous mark [baheret] on his body,

ונקצצה טהור קצצה מתכוין רבי אליעזר אומר לכשיולד לו נגע אחר יטהר הימנו

and it inadvertently got excised, that individual is ritually pure. If he excised it intentionally, in an attempt to render himself ritually pure, the Sages impose a punitive impurity upon him. The tanna’im disagree with regard to the extent of the penalty: Rabbi Eliezer says: When he will develop another leprous mark, his status of ritual purity is assessed based on this new mark. When that mark is ruled ritually pure, he will become ritually pure from the ritual impurity generated by the mark he excised.

וחכמים אומרים עד שתפרח בכולו או עד שתמעט בהרתו מכגריס

And the Rabbis say: The development of a new leprous mark is insufficient. Rather, he must wait either until the leprosy of the new mark spreads over his entire body, a sign of ritual purity (see Leviticus 13:12), or unless his old baheret had shrunk to a size smaller than that of a split beanbefore he excised it. Otherwise, he remains ritually impure. In any event, it is clear from this mishna that Rabbi Eliezer does not impose an indefinite penalty on one who transgresses. If so, why does he impose an indefinite penalty in the mishna discussing one who causes a blemish on the ear of a firstborn offering?

רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרווייהו כי קניס רבי אליעזר בממונו בגופו לא קניס

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say, in answer to this question, that when Rabbi Eliezer penalizes one who transgresses, that is only in a case which involves his property, e.g., a firstborn offering. But in a case which affects his body, e.g., leprosy, he does not penalize him to such an extent.

ממונו איכא למימר דאתי למיעבד גופו מי איכא למימר דאתי למיעבד

The Gemara elaborates: With regard to his property, i.e., the firstborn offering, if he would not be penalized indefinitely, there is reason to say that he might come to perform an action which would cause a blemish. Since the firstborn offering is anyway prohibited for personal use until it is blemished, he suffers no risk in blemishing it. A greater deterrent than usual is therefore needed to prevent such action. By contrast, in the case of leprosy on his body, is there a basis to say that he will come to perform an action and remove the white spot? In this case, the limited penalty of having to wait for purification from another leprous mark serves as a sufficient deterrent, as there is no guarantee that another mark will ever appear.

אמר רבא דרבי אליעזר אדרבי אליעזר קשיא דרבנן אדרבנן לא קשיא

Rava said: Is this to say that the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is difficult in light of the other statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna in Nega’im, whereas the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the other statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im? In the mishna here, the Rabbis impose a limited penalty on the transgressor, whereas in the mishna in Nega’im they impose an indefinite one. This contradiction also requires resolution.

אלא דרבי אליעזר אדרבי אליעזר לא קשיא כדשנינן רבנן אדרבנן נמי לא קשיא הכא במאי דעבד קנסוה הכא במאי דעבד קנסוה

Rather, say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is not difficult in light of the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in Nega’im, as we answered. Likewise, the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im, as both rulings follow the same logic. Here, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did, and there, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did.

במאי איכוין למישרייה בהאי מומא בהאי מומא קנסוה רבנן דבהאי מומא לא לישתרי ליה והכא במאי דעבד קנסוה איכוין לטהורי נפשיה בהאי קציצה בהאי קציצה קנסוה רבנן

The Gemara elaborates: In the case of causing a blemish in a firstborn offering, by what means did he intend to permit it? By means of this blemish. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him only with regard to this blemish, i.e., that the animal will not become permitted to him by means of this blemish that he himself caused. The firstborn offering retains its status as unblemished and will become permitted only if it develops another blemish. And similarly, here, with regard to the removal of the leprous mark, the Rabbis penalize him for what he did. He intended to render himself ritually pure by means of this act of excising the mark. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him with regard to this act of excision. It is considered as though he did not excise the mark, and as a result, he remains impure permanently.

בעי רב פפא יטהר תנן או ויטהר תנן

§ The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: When he will develop another leprous mark, he will become ritually pure [yit’har] from the first. Rav Pappa asks: What is the correct version of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? Did we learn: Yit’har, or did we learn: Veyit’har, and he will become ritually pure? Yit’har indicates that he will immediately be rendered ritually pure from the first leprous mark upon the appearance of the second mark. Veyit’har, by contrast, indicates that the punitive ritual impurity by rabbinic law imparted by the first mark remains until the second mark is deemed ritually pure.

למאי נפקא מינה לחתן שנראה בו נגע

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two versions? After all, he is in any case ritually impure due to the second mark until that mark is deemed pure. The Gemara explains that there is a difference in the case of a bridegroom who had removed a leprous mark upon whom a new leprous mark appeared during the seven days of his wedding celebrations.

דתנן חתן שנראה בו נגע נותנין לו שבעה ימים לו ולאצטליתו ולכסותו וכן ברגל נותנין לו כל ימי הרגל

As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 3:2): In the case of a bridegroom upon whom a leprous mark appeared, the court grants him seven days of his wedding celebrations before the mark is examined by a priest. This grace period is granted to him whether the mark appeared on him, i.e., his body, or on his cloak, or on any other garment of his. And similarly, with regard to any individual upon whom a leprous mark appeared during a pilgrimage Festival, the court grants him all the days of the pilgrimage Festival as a grace period, during which the mark is not examined by a priest.

אי אמרת יטהר תנן מקמייתא טהר ליה לבתרייתא נטרין ליה שבעה ימי משתה

The Gemara continues: If you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is yit’har, i.e., the individual is rendered ritually pure upon the development of the new mark, this means that he is ritually pure during the seven-day period, as he has already become ritually pure of the punitive impurity from the first mark. As for the latter mark, we wait the seven days of feasting for him, before the mark is examined by a priest. He is therefore ritually pure in all regards.

אלא אי אמרת ויטהר תנן סוף סוף כי לא מטמיא לבתרייתא הא מיטמא וקאי מקמייתא מאי תיקו

But if you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is veyit’har, and the punitive impurity of the first mark remains intact until the ritual purity of the second mark has been confirmed, the grace period has no effect. The reason is that ultimately, even if the individual does not yet contract ritual impurity from the latter mark, he remains ritually impure on account of the first mark until the purification of the latter mark. The Gemara asks: What is the resolution to Rav Pappa’s query? Since there is no clear resolution, the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי מיניה רבי ירמיה מרבי זירא צורם אוזן בבכור ומת מהו לקנוס בנו אחריו

§ The mishna teaches that one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering is prohibited indefinitely from slaughtering the animal on account of that blemish. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In the case of one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering and subsequently dies, what is the halakha with regard to penalizing his son after the father’s death? Does the penalty prohibiting consumption of the firstborn offering extend to the son?

אם תימצי לומר מוכר עבדו לגוים ומת קנסו בנו אחריו דכל יומא ויומא מפקע ליה ממצות

The Gemara compares this dilemma to two similar cases. If you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to gentiles and the seller subsequently dies, where the Sages penalized his son after the father’s death and required him to redeem the slave, this is not a direct parallel. The Gemara explains: It is possible that the penalty is extended to the son only there, as each day that the slave is in the servitude of the gentile master, that master prevents the slave from performing mitzvot. A Canaanite slave is obligated to perform the same mitzvot as a Jewish woman, and he is unable to fulfill the mitzvot when in the possession of a gentile. Since this reason does not apply in a case of a firstborn offering, the case of the Canaanite slave cannot be cited as a source to resolve this dilemma.

אם תימצי לומר כוון מלאכתו במועד ומת לא קנסו בנו אחריו משום דלא עבדא לאיסורא

And if you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who planned from the outset to perform his labor on the intermediate days of a Festival, by placing himself in a situation in which the labor should in theory be permitted, i.e., that a significant monetary loss would otherwise be incurred, that comparison is also inaccurate. The Gemara elaborates: In such a case the Sages penalized him by deeming it prohibited for him to perform the labor and by removing his rights to any of the finished products, but if he died before the start of the Festival, they did not penalize his son after the father’s death. This case is not a direct parallel either, as it is possible that it is only there that the penalty is not extended to the son, since the father did not yet perform a prohibited act, as he did not carry out any action on the Festival before he died.

הכא מאי לדידיה קנסו רבנן והא ליתיה או דלמא לממוניה קנסו רבנן והא איתיה

If so, here, in the case of mutilating the ear of a firstborn offering, what is the halakha? Should one say that the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, and he is no longer alive? Or perhaps the Sages imposed the penalty upon his property, i.e., that no benefit may be derived from the animal, and that animal still exists in the possession of his heirs.

אמר ליה תניתוה שדה שנתקווצה בשביעית תזרע למוצאי שביעית ניטייבה נידיירה לא תזרע למוצאי שביעית ואמר רב אסי ברבי חנינא נקטינן הטיבה ומת בנו זורעה אלמא לדידיה קנסו רבנן לבריה לא קנסו רבנן

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: You learned the resolution to your dilemma in a mishna (Shevi’it 4:2). A field whose thorns were removed during the Sabbatical Year may be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as removing thorns is not full-fledged labor that renders the field prohibited. But if it had been improved with fertilizer, or if it had been enclosed so that the animals inside would fertilize it with their manure, it may not be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as both these acts cause significant improvements to the field. The Sages imposed a penalty that one may not derive benefit from prohibited labor. And Rav Asi, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: We have a tradition that if one improved his field in a prohibited manner and then died, his son may sow it. Apparently, the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, but the Sages did not penalize his son.

אמר אביי נקטינן

Abaye says: We have a tradition