Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

June 2, 2019 | 讻状讞 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Bekhorot 46

What is the story of the students of Rabbi Yishmael who cooked up a prostitute doing in the middle of the chapter regarding priests who are blemished? There is a list of cases that if found in an animal would not be able to be sacrificed but in a priest, he can still work in the temple. If a priest kills someone, is he allowed to work in the temple? The mishna brings a list of cases where one could be a firstborn for either requiring redemption (pidyon haben) or for receiving a double potion of the inheritance but not for the other.


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

诇讬讛 讗讚注转 专讘讬诐

to the priest based on the consent of the public, making it a type of vow that cannot be dissolved without their consent.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讚专 砖讛讜讚专 讘专讘讬诐 讬砖 诇讜 讛驻专讛 注诇 讚注转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讜 讛驻专讛 讜讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讚讘专 讛专砖讜转 讗讘诇 诇讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 讬砖 诇讜 讛驻专讛 讻讬 讛讛讜讗 讚诪拽专讬 讚专讚拽讬 讗讚专讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讚拽讗 驻砖注 讘讬谞讜拽讬 讜讗讛讚专讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 讚诇讗 讗砖讻讞 讚讛讜讛 讚讬讬拽 讻讜讜转讬讛

Ameimar says: The halakha is as follows: Even according to the one who says a vow that was taken in public has the option of nullification, if it was taken based on the consent of the public it has no option of nullification. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to when the nullification of a vow is in order to enable one to perform an optional matter, but to enable one to perform a matter of a mitzva it has the option of nullification. As in the incident involving a certain teacher of children,upon whom Rav A岣 administered a vow to cease teaching based on the consent of the public, as he was negligent with regard to the children by hitting them too much; and Ravina had his vow nullified and reinstated him, as they did not find another teacher who was as meticulous as he was.

讜讛诪讟诪讗 诇诪转讬诐 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚住讙讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘诇讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚诪讚专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讛转诐 讬爪专讜 转拽驻讜

搂 The mishna teaches that a priest who becomes impure through exposure to corpses is disqualified from performing the Temple service until he accepts upon himself that he will no longer become impure in that manner. The Gemara asks: What is different here that it is sufficient for him merely to accept upon himself a commitment in order to continue serving in the Temple, and what is different there, where the priest marries by a transgression, that we administer a vow to him? The Gemara responds: There his desire seizes him, and it is therefore necessary for the priest to take a vow.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讜诪讬谉 讗诇讜

 

诪转谞讬壮 讬砖 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讻讛谉 讜讬砖 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讗 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讛谉

MISHNA: There is a son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to the requirement of redemption from a priest. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest. And there is another who is not a firstborn at all, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to redemption from a priest.

讗讬讝讛讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讜讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 讛诪驻诇转 讻诪讬谉 讘讛诪讛 讞讬讛 讜注讜祝 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Which is the son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; or after a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. The same applies to a son born to a woman who had previously miscarried a fetus that had the appearance of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, as that is considered the opening of the womb. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讘讜 诪爪讜专转 讗讚诐 讛诪驻诇转 住谞讚诇 讗讜 砖诇讬讗 讗讜 砖驻讬专 诪专讜拽诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗 诪讞讜转讱 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讛诐 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉

And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless his birth follows the birth of an animal that takes the form of a person. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus in the form of a sandal fish or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son who follows these is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讜 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 讜谞砖讗 讗砖讛 砖讻讘专 讬诇讚讛 注讜讚讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 注讜讚讛 谞讻专讬转 讜谞转讙讬讬专讛 诪砖讘讗转 诇讬砖专讗诇 讬诇讚讛 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉

In the case of a son born to one who did not have sons and he married a woman who had already given birth; or if he married a woman who gave birth when she was still a Canaanite maidservant and she was then emancipated; or one who gave birth when she was still a gentile and she then converted, and when the maidservant or the gentile came to join the Jewish people she gave birth to a male, that son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讻讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 驻讟专 专讞诐 讘讬砖专讗诇 注讚 砖讬驻讟专讜 专讞诐 诪讬砖专讗诇

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: That son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest, as it is stated: 鈥淲hatever opens the womb among the children of Israel鈥 (Exodus 13:2). This indicates that the halakhic status of a child born to the mother is not that of one who opens the womb unless it opens the womb of a woman from the Jewish people.

诪讬 砖讛讬讜 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 讜谞砖讗 讗砖讛 砖诇讗 讬诇讚讛 谞转讙讬讬专讛 诪注讜讘专转 谞砖转讞专专讛 诪注讜讘专转

In the case of one who had sons and married a woman who had not given birth; or if he married a woman who converted while she was pregnant, or a Canaanite maidservant who was emancipated while she was pregnant and she gave birth to a son, he is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest, as he opened his mother鈥檚 womb, but he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, because he is not the firstborn of his father or because halakhically he has no father.

讜讬诇讚讛 讛讬讗 讜讻讛谞转 讛讬讗 讜诇讜讬讛 讛讬讗 讜讗砖讛 砖讻讘专 讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 诪讬 砖诇讗 砖讛转讛 诇讗讞专 讘注诇讛 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讜谞砖讗转 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讚讜注 讗诐 讘谉 转砖注讛 诇专讗砖讜谉 讗诐 讘谉 砖讘注讛 诇讗讞专讜谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛

And likewise, if an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a priest, neither of whom had given birth yet, or an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a Levite, or an Israelite woman and a woman who had already given birth, all women whose sons do not require redemption from the priest, gave birth in the same place and it is uncertain which son was born to which mother; and likewise a woman who did not wait three months after the death of her husband and she married and gave birth, and it is unknown whether the child was born after a pregnancy of nine months and is the son of the first husband, or whether he was born after a pregnancy of seven months and is the son of the latter husband, in all these cases the child is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Due to the uncertainty, he is unable to prove he is the firstborn of either father, and therefore he is not entitled to the double portion of the firstborn.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讬谉 讛专讗砖 驻讜讟专 讘谞驻诇讬诐

GEMARA: Shmuel says: In a case where the head of a fetus emerged and then went back into the womb, the offspring is not considered to have been born and does not exempt the next fetus from the obligation of redemption of the firstborn, e.g., if its twin brother was born first. Shmuel says this halakha specifically in a case of miscarriage, i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a stillborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But in a case where both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 讗砖专 谞砖诪转 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讘讗驻讬讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚谞砖诪转 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讘讗驻讬讜 讛讜讗 讚讞砖讬讘 专讬砖讬讛 讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讞砖讬讘 专讬砖讬讛

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Shmuel鈥檚 ruling? The verse states: 鈥淎ll in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life鈥 (Genesis 7:22), from which it is derived: Anywhere that one has the breath of the spirit of life, i.e., if it is viable, one goes by its nostrils, i.e., its head is considered significant. But with regard to another offspring, one that is not viable, its head is not considered significant.

转谞谉 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讜讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 专讗砖讜 诪讗讬 专讗砖讜 专讜讘讜

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: What is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; and a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. Although the mishna addresses a nine-month-old fetus as well, in any event it teaches with regard to a miscarriage that its head exempts the offspring born after it. The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of the term: Its head? It means its head and most of the body.

讜诇讬转谞讬 专讜讘讜 讘讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬转谞讬 专讜讘讜 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 讟注诪讗 讚专讗砖讜 诪转 讛讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 转谞讗 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 专讗砖讜

The Gemara asks: But if so, let the mishna teach: Most of it. The Gemara answers: By right, the mishna should have taught: Most of it, but it did not do so, since in the latter clause of the mishna it needs to teach: A fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. It is inferred from there that the reason the subsequent son is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of this fetus emerged dead, but if it was a ninemonthold fetus whose head emerged alive, then the fetus that comes after it is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance either. Therefore, the tanna of the mishna taught in the first clause also that the head of a miscarriage exempts the subsequent son, to maintain stylistic uniformity.

讜诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬讜谉 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 专讬砖讬讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讚讛 转谞讬谞讗 讛讜爪讬讗 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚

The Gemara asks: And according to this interpretation, what is the mishna teaching us? Is it that once the offspring reached out its head from the womb it is considered a birth? We learn this in a mishna with regard to the fetus of an animal (岣llin 68a): If a fetus reached out its head, although it returned the head, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, whose consumption is permitted only by its own slaughter.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讘讛诪讛 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘讗讚诐 讚讗讚诐 诪讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讬诇讬祝 讚诇讬转 诇讛 驻专讜讝讚讜专

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us this halakha with regard to animals, and the mishna here teaches us that the same halakha applies to a human, this does not resolve the difficulty. The Gemara first explains why two rulings might be necessary with regard to people and animals: The reason is that the halakha of a human cannot be derived from that of an animal, as the animal has no concealed opening, i.e., the opening of an animal鈥檚 womb is not hidden. Consequently, one might have thought that only in the case of an animal is the emergence of the head considered a birth. By contrast, in humans, where the woman鈥檚 thighs conceal the opening of the womb and the emergence of the head alone is not noticeable, perhaps the emergence of the head is not considered a full-fledged birth.

讘讛诪讛 诪讗讚诐 诇讗 讬诇驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讞砖讬讘 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛

Conversely, had this ruling been taught only with regard to humans, one would have said that the halakha of animals cannot be derived from that of a human because the countenance of a person鈥檚 face is significant, as people are created in the image of God. This is not so with regard to animals.

讛讗 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 讬爪讗 讻讚专讻讜 诪砖讬爪讗 专讜讘 专讗砖讜 讜讗讬讝讛讜 专讜讘 专讗砖讜 诪砖转爪讗 驻讚讞转讜 转讬讜讘转讗 讚砖诪讜讗诇 转讬讜讘转讗

After clarifying why both rulings are necessary, the Gemara explains why this does not resolve the difficulty: We learn that ruling with regard to people also, in a mishna (Nidda 28a): If the fetus emerged in the usual manner, head first, it is considered born only when most of its head emerges. And what is considered most of its head? It is from when its forehead emerges. Accordingly, there was no need for the mishna here to state the halakha with regard to the head of a nine-month-old fetus, and the mention of a head with regard to a miscarriage contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara comments: The refutation of the opinion of Shmuel is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 驻讚讞转 驻讜讟专转 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛谞讞诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讬讻讬专 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇谞讞诇讛

搂 Concerning this matter, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts, i.e., is considered a birth, in all cases, except with regard to inheritance. If a son reached out his head alone and then brought it back, after which his twin brother was born, the second brother is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. What is the reason? The Merciful One states: 鈥淔or he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:17), and recognition is not attained by emergence of the forehead alone. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even with regard to inheritance the emergence of a forehead is sufficient.

讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讙讬讜专转 砖讬爪讗讛 驻讚讞转 讜诇讚讛 讘讙讬讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞转讙讬讬专讛 讗讬谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讬诪讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讜讬诪讬 讟讛专讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讘讬讗讛 拽专讘谉 诇讬讚讛

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says the emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts in all cases, what does this comprehensive phrase serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include that which the Sages taught: With regard to a female convert whose offspring reached out its forehead alone in her gentile state, and then she converted and gave birth to the entire child, one does not assign to her the days of ritual impurity and the days of ritual purity of a Jewish woman who gave birth. And likewise she does not bring the offering that a woman is obligated to sacrifice after giving birth, as the child is considered to have been born while the mother was still a gentile.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讬讻讬专 讝讜 讛讻专转 驻谞讬诐 讜讗讬讝讜 讛讬讗 讛讻专转 驻谞讬诐 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 转谞讬 注讚 讛讞讜讟诐 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗诇讗 注诇 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 转谞讬 注讚 讛讞讜讟诐

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan from a baraita: When the verse states: 鈥淗e shall recognize鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:17), this is referring to the recognition of the face. And what exactly is the recognition of the face? It is recognizing the countenance of the face with the nose. This indicates that the forehead alone is insufficient. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as saying: Up to, but not including, the nose. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One can testify that a man died, in order to permit his wife to remarry, only if he can attest to seeing the countenance of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual definitively. Once again, the Gemara answers that one should teach: Up to, but not including, the nose.

转讗 砖诪注 驻讚讞转 讘诇讗 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讘诇讗 驻讚讞转 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 注讚 砖讬讛讜 砖谞讬讛诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗讬 拽专讗讛 讛讻专转 驻谞讬讛诐 注谞转讛 讘诐 砖讗谞讬 注讚讜转 讗砖讛 讚讗讞诪讬专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof: If people saw the forehead of a dead person without the countenance of the face, or the countenance of the face without the forehead, they cannot testify that he died and render his wife permitted to remarry until they see both the countenance of the face and the forehead, with the nose. And Abaye says, and some say it was Rav Kahana who says: What is the verse from which it is derived? 鈥淭he recognition of their countenance does witness against them鈥 (Isaiah 3:9), and there is no recognition of a face without the nose. The Gemara answers: Testimony enabling a woman to remarry is different, as the Sages were stringent with regard to it. Therefore, they required greater proof than with regard to the halakhot of a firstborn.

讜诪讬 讗讞诪讬专讜 讜讛讗 转谞谉 讛讜讞讝拽讜 诇讛讬讜转 诪砖讬讗讬诐 注讚 诪驻讬 注讚 诪驻讬 讗砖讛 诪驻讬 注讘讚 诪驻讬 砖驻讞讛 讻讬 讗拽讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 讘住讜驻讛 讘转讞诇转讛 诇讗 讗拽讬诇讜 专讘谞谉

The Gemara asks: And were the Sages stringent with regard to this testimony? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yevamot 122a): The Sages established that they would allow a woman to marry again based on testimony that is generally not accepted, such as testimony based on hearsay, i.e., the testimony of one man which was heard from another man who saw her husband die, from a woman鈥檚 testimony, from a Canaanite slave鈥檚 testimony, or from a Canaanite maidservant鈥檚 testimony? The Gemara answers that when the Sages were lenient it was with regard to the end of the testimony, i.e., to accept testimony that a husband had died even from individuals just mentioned. But the Sages were not lenient with regard to its beginning, i.e., the basic clarification of whether the witnesses properly identified the dead person when they saw him.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗

And if you wish, say instead that Rabbi Yo岣nan can resolve the difficulty as follows:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bekhorot 46

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bekhorot 46

诇讬讛 讗讚注转 专讘讬诐

to the priest based on the consent of the public, making it a type of vow that cannot be dissolved without their consent.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讚专 砖讛讜讚专 讘专讘讬诐 讬砖 诇讜 讛驻专讛 注诇 讚注转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讜 讛驻专讛 讜讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讚讘专 讛专砖讜转 讗讘诇 诇讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 讬砖 诇讜 讛驻专讛 讻讬 讛讛讜讗 讚诪拽专讬 讚专讚拽讬 讗讚专讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讚拽讗 驻砖注 讘讬谞讜拽讬 讜讗讛讚专讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 讚诇讗 讗砖讻讞 讚讛讜讛 讚讬讬拽 讻讜讜转讬讛

Ameimar says: The halakha is as follows: Even according to the one who says a vow that was taken in public has the option of nullification, if it was taken based on the consent of the public it has no option of nullification. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to when the nullification of a vow is in order to enable one to perform an optional matter, but to enable one to perform a matter of a mitzva it has the option of nullification. As in the incident involving a certain teacher of children,upon whom Rav A岣 administered a vow to cease teaching based on the consent of the public, as he was negligent with regard to the children by hitting them too much; and Ravina had his vow nullified and reinstated him, as they did not find another teacher who was as meticulous as he was.

讜讛诪讟诪讗 诇诪转讬诐 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讚住讙讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘诇讛 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛转诐 讚诪讚专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讛转诐 讬爪专讜 转拽驻讜

搂 The mishna teaches that a priest who becomes impure through exposure to corpses is disqualified from performing the Temple service until he accepts upon himself that he will no longer become impure in that manner. The Gemara asks: What is different here that it is sufficient for him merely to accept upon himself a commitment in order to continue serving in the Temple, and what is different there, where the priest marries by a transgression, that we administer a vow to him? The Gemara responds: There his desire seizes him, and it is therefore necessary for the priest to take a vow.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讜诪讬谉 讗诇讜

 

诪转谞讬壮 讬砖 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讻讛谉 讜讬砖 砖讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讗 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讛谉

MISHNA: There is a son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to the requirement of redemption from a priest. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest. And there is another who is not a firstborn at all, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to redemption from a priest.

讗讬讝讛讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讜讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 讛诪驻诇转 讻诪讬谉 讘讛诪讛 讞讬讛 讜注讜祝 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Which is the son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; or after a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. The same applies to a son born to a woman who had previously miscarried a fetus that had the appearance of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, as that is considered the opening of the womb. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 注讚 砖讬讛讗 讘讜 诪爪讜专转 讗讚诐 讛诪驻诇转 住谞讚诇 讗讜 砖诇讬讗 讗讜 砖驻讬专 诪专讜拽诐 讜讛讬讜爪讗 诪讞讜转讱 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讛诐 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉

And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless his birth follows the birth of an animal that takes the form of a person. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus in the form of a sandal fish or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son who follows these is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讜 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 讜谞砖讗 讗砖讛 砖讻讘专 讬诇讚讛 注讜讚讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 注讜讚讛 谞讻专讬转 讜谞转讙讬讬专讛 诪砖讘讗转 诇讬砖专讗诇 讬诇讚讛 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉

In the case of a son born to one who did not have sons and he married a woman who had already given birth; or if he married a woman who gave birth when she was still a Canaanite maidservant and she was then emancipated; or one who gave birth when she was still a gentile and she then converted, and when the maidservant or the gentile came to join the Jewish people she gave birth to a male, that son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜诇讻讛谉 砖谞讗诪专 驻讟专 专讞诐 讘讬砖专讗诇 注讚 砖讬驻讟专讜 专讞诐 诪讬砖专讗诇

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: That son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest, as it is stated: 鈥淲hatever opens the womb among the children of Israel鈥 (Exodus 13:2). This indicates that the halakhic status of a child born to the mother is not that of one who opens the womb unless it opens the womb of a woman from the Jewish people.

诪讬 砖讛讬讜 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 讜谞砖讗 讗砖讛 砖诇讗 讬诇讚讛 谞转讙讬讬专讛 诪注讜讘专转 谞砖转讞专专讛 诪注讜讘专转

In the case of one who had sons and married a woman who had not given birth; or if he married a woman who converted while she was pregnant, or a Canaanite maidservant who was emancipated while she was pregnant and she gave birth to a son, he is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest, as he opened his mother鈥檚 womb, but he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, because he is not the firstborn of his father or because halakhically he has no father.

讜讬诇讚讛 讛讬讗 讜讻讛谞转 讛讬讗 讜诇讜讬讛 讛讬讗 讜讗砖讛 砖讻讘专 讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 诪讬 砖诇讗 砖讛转讛 诇讗讞专 讘注诇讛 砖诇砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讜谞砖讗转 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讬讚讜注 讗诐 讘谉 转砖注讛 诇专讗砖讜谉 讗诐 讘谉 砖讘注讛 诇讗讞专讜谉 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谉 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛

And likewise, if an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a priest, neither of whom had given birth yet, or an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a Levite, or an Israelite woman and a woman who had already given birth, all women whose sons do not require redemption from the priest, gave birth in the same place and it is uncertain which son was born to which mother; and likewise a woman who did not wait three months after the death of her husband and she married and gave birth, and it is unknown whether the child was born after a pregnancy of nine months and is the son of the first husband, or whether he was born after a pregnancy of seven months and is the son of the latter husband, in all these cases the child is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Due to the uncertainty, he is unable to prove he is the firstborn of either father, and therefore he is not entitled to the double portion of the firstborn.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讬谉 讛专讗砖 驻讜讟专 讘谞驻诇讬诐

GEMARA: Shmuel says: In a case where the head of a fetus emerged and then went back into the womb, the offspring is not considered to have been born and does not exempt the next fetus from the obligation of redemption of the firstborn, e.g., if its twin brother was born first. Shmuel says this halakha specifically in a case of miscarriage, i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a stillborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But in a case where both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 讗砖专 谞砖诪转 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讘讗驻讬讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚谞砖诪转 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讘讗驻讬讜 讛讜讗 讚讞砖讬讘 专讬砖讬讛 讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讞砖讬讘 专讬砖讬讛

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Shmuel鈥檚 ruling? The verse states: 鈥淎ll in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life鈥 (Genesis 7:22), from which it is derived: Anywhere that one has the breath of the spirit of life, i.e., if it is viable, one goes by its nostrils, i.e., its head is considered significant. But with regard to another offspring, one that is not viable, its head is not considered significant.

转谞谉 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讜讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 专讗砖讜 诪讗讬 专讗砖讜 专讜讘讜

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: What is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; and a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. Although the mishna addresses a nine-month-old fetus as well, in any event it teaches with regard to a miscarriage that its head exempts the offspring born after it. The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of the term: Its head? It means its head and most of the body.

讜诇讬转谞讬 专讜讘讜 讘讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬转谞讬 专讜讘讜 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转 讟注诪讗 讚专讗砖讜 诪转 讛讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 转谞讗 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 专讗砖讜

The Gemara asks: But if so, let the mishna teach: Most of it. The Gemara answers: By right, the mishna should have taught: Most of it, but it did not do so, since in the latter clause of the mishna it needs to teach: A fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. It is inferred from there that the reason the subsequent son is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of this fetus emerged dead, but if it was a ninemonthold fetus whose head emerged alive, then the fetus that comes after it is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance either. Therefore, the tanna of the mishna taught in the first clause also that the head of a miscarriage exempts the subsequent son, to maintain stylistic uniformity.

讜诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬讜谉 讚诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 专讬砖讬讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讚讛 转谞讬谞讗 讛讜爪讬讗 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚

The Gemara asks: And according to this interpretation, what is the mishna teaching us? Is it that once the offspring reached out its head from the womb it is considered a birth? We learn this in a mishna with regard to the fetus of an animal (岣llin 68a): If a fetus reached out its head, although it returned the head, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, whose consumption is permitted only by its own slaughter.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讘讛诪讛 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘讗讚诐 讚讗讚诐 诪讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讬诇讬祝 讚诇讬转 诇讛 驻专讜讝讚讜专

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us this halakha with regard to animals, and the mishna here teaches us that the same halakha applies to a human, this does not resolve the difficulty. The Gemara first explains why two rulings might be necessary with regard to people and animals: The reason is that the halakha of a human cannot be derived from that of an animal, as the animal has no concealed opening, i.e., the opening of an animal鈥檚 womb is not hidden. Consequently, one might have thought that only in the case of an animal is the emergence of the head considered a birth. By contrast, in humans, where the woman鈥檚 thighs conceal the opening of the womb and the emergence of the head alone is not noticeable, perhaps the emergence of the head is not considered a full-fledged birth.

讘讛诪讛 诪讗讚诐 诇讗 讬诇驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讞砖讬讘 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛

Conversely, had this ruling been taught only with regard to humans, one would have said that the halakha of animals cannot be derived from that of a human because the countenance of a person鈥檚 face is significant, as people are created in the image of God. This is not so with regard to animals.

讛讗 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 讬爪讗 讻讚专讻讜 诪砖讬爪讗 专讜讘 专讗砖讜 讜讗讬讝讛讜 专讜讘 专讗砖讜 诪砖转爪讗 驻讚讞转讜 转讬讜讘转讗 讚砖诪讜讗诇 转讬讜讘转讗

After clarifying why both rulings are necessary, the Gemara explains why this does not resolve the difficulty: We learn that ruling with regard to people also, in a mishna (Nidda 28a): If the fetus emerged in the usual manner, head first, it is considered born only when most of its head emerges. And what is considered most of its head? It is from when its forehead emerges. Accordingly, there was no need for the mishna here to state the halakha with regard to the head of a nine-month-old fetus, and the mention of a head with regard to a miscarriage contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara comments: The refutation of the opinion of Shmuel is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 驻讚讞转 驻讜讟专转 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛谞讞诇讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讬讻讬专 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇谞讞诇讛

搂 Concerning this matter, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts, i.e., is considered a birth, in all cases, except with regard to inheritance. If a son reached out his head alone and then brought it back, after which his twin brother was born, the second brother is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. What is the reason? The Merciful One states: 鈥淔or he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:17), and recognition is not attained by emergence of the forehead alone. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even with regard to inheritance the emergence of a forehead is sufficient.

讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讙讬讜专转 砖讬爪讗讛 驻讚讞转 讜诇讚讛 讘讙讬讜转讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞转讙讬讬专讛 讗讬谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讛 讬诪讬 讟讜诪讗讛 讜讬诪讬 讟讛专讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪讘讬讗讛 拽专讘谉 诇讬讚讛

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says the emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts in all cases, what does this comprehensive phrase serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include that which the Sages taught: With regard to a female convert whose offspring reached out its forehead alone in her gentile state, and then she converted and gave birth to the entire child, one does not assign to her the days of ritual impurity and the days of ritual purity of a Jewish woman who gave birth. And likewise she does not bring the offering that a woman is obligated to sacrifice after giving birth, as the child is considered to have been born while the mother was still a gentile.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讬讻讬专 讝讜 讛讻专转 驻谞讬诐 讜讗讬讝讜 讛讬讗 讛讻专转 驻谞讬诐 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 转谞讬 注讚 讛讞讜讟诐 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗诇讗 注诇 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 转谞讬 注讚 讛讞讜讟诐

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan from a baraita: When the verse states: 鈥淗e shall recognize鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:17), this is referring to the recognition of the face. And what exactly is the recognition of the face? It is recognizing the countenance of the face with the nose. This indicates that the forehead alone is insufficient. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as saying: Up to, but not including, the nose. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One can testify that a man died, in order to permit his wife to remarry, only if he can attest to seeing the countenance of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual definitively. Once again, the Gemara answers that one should teach: Up to, but not including, the nose.

转讗 砖诪注 驻讚讞转 讘诇讗 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讘诇讗 驻讚讞转 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 注讚 砖讬讛讜 砖谞讬讛诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪讗讬 拽专讗讛 讛讻专转 驻谞讬讛诐 注谞转讛 讘诐 砖讗谞讬 注讚讜转 讗砖讛 讚讗讞诪讬专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof: If people saw the forehead of a dead person without the countenance of the face, or the countenance of the face without the forehead, they cannot testify that he died and render his wife permitted to remarry until they see both the countenance of the face and the forehead, with the nose. And Abaye says, and some say it was Rav Kahana who says: What is the verse from which it is derived? 鈥淭he recognition of their countenance does witness against them鈥 (Isaiah 3:9), and there is no recognition of a face without the nose. The Gemara answers: Testimony enabling a woman to remarry is different, as the Sages were stringent with regard to it. Therefore, they required greater proof than with regard to the halakhot of a firstborn.

讜诪讬 讗讞诪讬专讜 讜讛讗 转谞谉 讛讜讞讝拽讜 诇讛讬讜转 诪砖讬讗讬诐 注讚 诪驻讬 注讚 诪驻讬 讗砖讛 诪驻讬 注讘讚 诪驻讬 砖驻讞讛 讻讬 讗拽讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 讘住讜驻讛 讘转讞诇转讛 诇讗 讗拽讬诇讜 专讘谞谉

The Gemara asks: And were the Sages stringent with regard to this testimony? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yevamot 122a): The Sages established that they would allow a woman to marry again based on testimony that is generally not accepted, such as testimony based on hearsay, i.e., the testimony of one man which was heard from another man who saw her husband die, from a woman鈥檚 testimony, from a Canaanite slave鈥檚 testimony, or from a Canaanite maidservant鈥檚 testimony? The Gemara answers that when the Sages were lenient it was with regard to the end of the testimony, i.e., to accept testimony that a husband had died even from individuals just mentioned. But the Sages were not lenient with regard to its beginning, i.e., the basic clarification of whether the witnesses properly identified the dead person when they saw him.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗

And if you wish, say instead that Rabbi Yo岣nan can resolve the difficulty as follows:

Scroll To Top