Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Michelle Winer for a refuah shelaima for Bella Rachel bat Malka Enya and Binyamin Yisrael ben Malka Enya.
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Summary
Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another’s property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item.
The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew’s wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate.
The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar’it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one’s house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye’s explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava’s explanation.
The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated – such as an olah, asham talui, or todah – renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.
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Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Michelle Winer for a refuah shelaima for Bella Rachel bat Malka Enya and Binyamin Yisrael ben Malka Enya.
Chullin 41
אֲבָל זֶבַח לָא. וְאִי אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, מַאי אִרְיָא חַטַּאת הָעוֹף? אֲפִילּוּ חַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקַנְיָא לֵיהּ לְכַפָּרָה כְּדִידֵיהּ דָּמְיָא.
But in the case of an animal offering there is no way in which one can violate all three prohibitions simultaneously. But if a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his, why must the tanna teach the halakha specifically with regard to a bird sin offering? The same halakha would apply even in the case of an animal sin offering. This is because cutting one siman for idolatry does not render the animal forbidden, as the priest has the exclusive right to derive benefit from it, so it does not belong to the owner anymore. Therefore, one would violate the three prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara answers: Since one who brings a sin offering acquires the animal for his atonement, its status is like that of an animal that is his, and he renders it forbidden with the first cut at the beginning of the slaughter.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ, וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another objection from the mishna: If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. Based on the formulation of the mishna, the one slaughtering with improper intent is not necessarily the owner of the animal. How, then, can he render the animal forbidden? Apparently, one can render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the one with improper intent has a partnership share in the animal, so he is rendering his own animal forbidden.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְטַמֵּא, וְהַמְדַמֵּעַ, וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ – בְּשׁוֹגֵג פָּטוּר, בְּמֵזִיד חַיָּיב. הָכָא נָמֵי דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another objection from a mishna (Gittin 52b): With regard to one who renders another’s food impure, and one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, and one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, if he did so unwittingly, he is exempt from payment of damages, even though he caused the other monetary loss. If he did so intentionally, he is liable to pay damages. Apparently, one can render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara answers: Here too it is a case where the one who caused the damage has a partnership share in the produce.
כְּתַנָּאֵי: גּוֹי שֶׁנִּיסֵּךְ יֵינוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – אֲסָרוֹ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בָּבָא מַתִּירִין אוֹתוֹ מִפְּנֵי שְׁנֵי דְבָרִים: אֶחָד – שֶׁאֵין מְנַסְּכִין יַיִן אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְאֶחָד – שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ ״לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנָּךְ שֶׁתֶּאֱסֹר יֵינִי לְאוֹנְסִי״.
The Gemara notes that the dispute whether one who slaughters another’s animal for idol worship renders the animal forbidden, in accordance with Rav Huna, or does not render it forbidden, in accordance with Rav Naḥman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im in a baraita: In the case of a gentile who poured a Jew’s wine as an idolatrous libation, but not in the presence of an object of idol worship, he has rendered the wine forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava permit drinking the wine due to two factors: One is that the presumption is that idol worshippers pour wine as an idolatrous libation only in the presence of an object of idol worship. And the other one is that even if the gentile poured the wine as an idolatrous libation, the Jew can say to the gentile: It is not within your power to render my wine forbidden against my will.
וְרַב נַחְמָן וְרַב עַמְרָם וְרַב יִצְחָק אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי גּוֹי, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל לְצַעוֹרֵיהּ קָא מִיכַּוֵּין.
And Rav Naḥman, and Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak say: Although Rav Huna’s opinion is compatible only with the opinion of the first tanna in the baraita and not with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, we can state our opinion even according to the one who says that a person renders forbidden an item that is not his, e.g., by pouring his wine as a libation or slaughtering his animal for idol worship. This statement applies only in a case where a gentile pours the libation or slaughters the animal. But if a Jew pours the wine or slaughters the animal, presumably he intends to torment that other person, and not to engage in idol worship. Therefore, a Jew does not render the animal forbidden.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a contradiction to that distinction from the mishna: If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. As the mishna is discussing a case involving Jews, this indicates that even a Jew who slaughters an animal for idol worship renders it forbidden. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with the case of a Jewish transgressor whose intent when declaring that his slaughter is for the sake of mountains, hills, or other natural entities is for idol worship.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְטַמֵּא וְהַמְדַמֵּעַ וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר, בְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב. הָכָא נָמֵי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a contradiction to the distinction between a Jew and gentile from a mishna (Gittin 52b): With regard to one who renders another’s food impure, and one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, and one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, if he did so unwittingly, he is exempt from payment of damages, even though he caused the other monetary loss. If he did so intentionally, he is liable to pay damages. Apparently, a Jew who pours wine as a libation for idolatry renders wine that is not his forbidden. The Gemara answers: Here too the reference is to an apostate Jew whose intent is for idol worship.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הִתְרוּ בּוֹ וְקִבֵּל עָלָיו הַתְרָאָה, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הִתִּיר עַצְמוֹ לְמִיתָה קָאָמְרַתְּ? אֵין לָךְ מְשׁוּמָּד גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: With regard to a Jew who is not a transgressor but declared that he is slaughtering another’s animal for idolatry, if those who heard his declaration forewarned him that doing so is prohibited by Torah law and is punishable by death, and he acknowledged the forewarning and said: It is in full knowledge of the prohibition and the punishment that I do so, what is the halakha? Does he render the animal forbidden in that case? Rav Ashi said to him: Are you saying a case where he subjected himself to death by acknowledging the forewarning? You have no transgressor greater than that, and he certainly renders the animal forbidden.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לֹא לְתוֹךְ יַמִּים, וְלֹא לְתוֹךְ נְהָרוֹת, וְלֹא לְתוֹךְ כֵּלִים, אֲבָל שׁוֹחֵט הוּא לְתוֹךְ עוּגָה שֶׁל מַיִם. וּבִסְפִינָה, עַל גַּבֵּי כֵלִים. אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר, אֲבָל עוֹשֶׂה גּוּמָּא בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּכָּנֵס הַדָּם לְתוֹכָהּ. וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, שֶׁלֹּא
MISHNA: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, as in all those cases it appears that he is slaughtering the animal in the manner of idolaters. But one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. And on a ship, one may slaughter an animal onto vessels as it is clear that his objective is to avoid sullying the ship. One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not
יְחַקֶּה אֶת הַמִּינִין.
appear to emulate [yeḥakkeh] the heretics.
גְּמָ׳ אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לֹא לְתוֹךְ וְכוּ׳. מַאי שְׁנָא לְתוֹךְ יַמִּים דְּלָא? דְּאָמְרִי: לְשָׂרָא דְּיַמָּא קָא שָׁחֵיט. לְתוֹךְ עוּגָה שֶׁל מַיִם נָמֵי אָמְרִי: לְבָבוּאָה קָא שָׁחֵיט. אָמַר רָבָא: בַּעֲכוּרִים שָׁנוּ.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, but one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. The Gemara asks: What is different about slaughter into seas? Is it that one may not perform it, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to the angel of the sea? If so, slaughter into a round excavation containing water should also be prohibited, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to his reflection [bavua], which is also similar to idolatry. Rava said: The tanna’im taught that halakha in the case of murky water, in which no reflection can be seen.
אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא וְכוּ׳. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כְּלָל? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא בְּגוּמָּא שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק.
§ The mishna states: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. The Gemara asks: How is it permitted to slaughter and have the blood flow into a hole inside his house? But didn’t you initially say that one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all? Abaye said: The first clause of the mishna, where there is a blanket prohibition against having the blood flow into a small hole, is referring to a small hole that is in the marketplace.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא ״וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן״, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא לָאו בְּשׁוּק עָסְקִינַן!
Rava said to him: But isn’t it so that from the fact that the latter clause teaches: And in the marketplace one may not do so, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are not dealing with the marketplace?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר, וְהָרוֹצֶה לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵרוֹ, כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם חוּץ לַגּוּמָּא וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד לַגּוּמָּא, וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, שֶׁלֹּא יְחַקֶּה אֶת הַמִּינִין.
Rather, Rava said that this is what the mishna is saying: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all. And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied in blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not appear to emulate the heretics.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בִּסְפִינָה וְאֵין לוֹ מָקוֹם בַּסְּפִינָה לִשְׁחוֹט – מוֹצִיא יָדוֹ חוּץ לַסְּפִינָה וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד עַל דּוֹפְנֵי הַסְּפִינָה, וְאֵין שׁוֹחֵט לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If one was traveling on a ship and he has no place on the ship to slaughter an animal, he extends his hand with a knife, holds the head of the animal outside the walls of the ship, and slaughters the animal there; and the blood flows and descends down the sides of the ship. He may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow directly into the sea. And one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all.
וְהָרוֹצֶה לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵרוֹ, כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם חוּץ לַגּוּמָּא וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד לַגּוּמָּא. וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ״, וְאִם עָשָׂה כֵּן – צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה אַחֲרָיו.
And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied with blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace, one may not do so, as it is stated: “Neither shall you follow their statutes” (Leviticus 18:3). And if he did so, he requires examination after his actions to ascertain whether he is a heretic.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה, לְשֵׁם זְבָחִים, לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח, לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁיר.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, his slaughter is not valid, as it appears that he is consecrating animals and slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the Temple. And Rabbi Shimon deems his slaughter valid.
שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ, וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת, לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר, לְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר, לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, for the sake of a guilt offering for a definite transgression, for the sake of the offering of a firstborn, for the sake of the offering of animal tithe, or for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. All of these offerings may be brought only as obligations and not as gifts. Therefore, there is no concern that he consecrated the animals.
זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּידָּר וְנִידָּב – הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמוֹ אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ נִידָּר וְנִידָּב – הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר.
This is the principle: For any item, i.e., offering, which is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is forbidden. And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift but is an obligation that is incumbent upon him, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted.
גְּמָ׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה. אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בַּר נִידָּר וְנִידָּב הוּא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, the slaughter is not valid. This is because one who slaughters for the sake of any type of offering that is consecrated as a vow or as a gift renders the animal forbidden. The Gemara asks: Is a provisional guilt offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? A provisional guilt offering is brought only when one is obligated to do so due to uncertainty whether or not he is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says in a mishna (Karetot 25a): A person donates a provisional guilt offering every day if he chooses, due to concern that perhaps he violated a prohibition.
פֶּסַח בַּר נִידָּב וְנִידָּר הוּא? זִמְנָא קְבִיעָא לֵיהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: שָׁאנֵי פֶּסַח, הוֹאִיל וְהַפְרָשָׁתוֹ כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: Is a Paschal offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? The time is fixed for its offering on Passover eve, when bringing it is an obligation, and it may not be brought on any other day. Rabbi Oshaya said: The Paschal offering is different, since although the date for bringing and slaughtering it is the fourteenth of Nisan, its designation can be performed throughout the entire year.
אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא תְּמִימִים, אֲבָל בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין – מִידָּע יְדִיעַ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין נָמֵי, זִימְנִין דִּרְמֵי לֵיהּ מִידֵּי אַמּוּמָא וְלָא יְדִיעַ.
Rabbi Yannai says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid only if the animals were unblemished. But with regard to animals with blemishes, the slaughterer knows that they are blemished and disqualified from sacrifice. Therefore, despite his declaration, there is no concern that his actual intent was to slaughter the animal for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid even if the animals were blemished as well, as there are times that an item is cast over the blemish and covers it, and he does not know that the animal is blemished.
הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת, אֲבָל מְחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – אֵימָא לְשׁוּם חַטָּאתוֹ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם חַטָּאתִי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם חַטָּאתִי״.
The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, his slaughter is valid, as, since one cannot voluntarily contribute a sin offering, there is no concern that the onlookers will draw the wrong conclusion. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of a sin offering is valid only with regard to a slaughterer who is not liable to bring a sin offering. But a slaughterer who knows that he is liable to bring a sin offering, his slaughter is not valid. Say that he is performing consecration and slaughter for the sake of his sin offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a sin offering, and he did not say: For the sake of my sin offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of my sin offering.
לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין לוֹ זֶבַח בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ זֶבַח בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ – אֵימָא אֲמוֹרֵי אֲמַיר בֵּיהּ. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרַת זִבְחִי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרַת זִבְחִי״.
The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have an animal consecrated as an offering inside his house for which it can be the substitute, but if he has an animal consecrated as an offering in his house, say that he is substituting this animal for it, and the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, and he did not say: For the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering.
״זֶה הַכְּלָל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹלַת נָזִיר, דְּמַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָא לָא נְדַר, אֵימַר נֶדֶר בְּצִינְעָא.
The mishna states that this is the principle: For any offering that is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake, the animal is forbidden. The Gemara asks: What case does this clause add? The list in the mishna appears to be comprehensive. The Gemara answers: The clause serves to add the burnt offering of a nazirite. As, lest you say there is no concern in that case, as that person did not vow to become a nazirite and could not possibly be obligated to bring that offering, therefore, the tanna teaches that there is a concern if he said he was slaughtering for the sake of the burnt offering of a nazirite. Say that perhaps he vowed to become a nazirite in private, and no one else was aware of it.
וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ נִידָּר וְנִידָּב, לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹלַת יוֹלֶדֶת.
The Gemara asks: What is added by the second half of the principle: And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or as a gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth. If one slaughters an animal for the sake of a burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, the slaughter is valid, as it is an obligation.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אִשָּׁה, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ אִשָּׁה – אֵימַר לִשְׁמָהּ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת אִשְׁתִּי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת אִשְׁתִּי״.
Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have a wife. But if he has a wife, say that he performs consecration and slaughter of the animal for her sake and therefore the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, and he did not say: For the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth.
פְּשִׁיטָא?
The Gemara objects: This is obvious. Clearly, if he explicitly declared that the slaughter is for the sake of the burnt offering of his wife after childbirth the slaughter is not valid.
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Chullin 41
אֲבָל זֶבַח לָא. וְאִי אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, מַאי אִרְיָא חַטַּאת הָעוֹף? אֲפִילּוּ חַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקַנְיָא לֵיהּ לְכַפָּרָה כְּדִידֵיהּ דָּמְיָא.
But in the case of an animal offering there is no way in which one can violate all three prohibitions simultaneously. But if a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his, why must the tanna teach the halakha specifically with regard to a bird sin offering? The same halakha would apply even in the case of an animal sin offering. This is because cutting one siman for idolatry does not render the animal forbidden, as the priest has the exclusive right to derive benefit from it, so it does not belong to the owner anymore. Therefore, one would violate the three prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara answers: Since one who brings a sin offering acquires the animal for his atonement, its status is like that of an animal that is his, and he renders it forbidden with the first cut at the beginning of the slaughter.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ, וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another objection from the mishna: If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. Based on the formulation of the mishna, the one slaughtering with improper intent is not necessarily the owner of the animal. How, then, can he render the animal forbidden? Apparently, one can render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the one with improper intent has a partnership share in the animal, so he is rendering his own animal forbidden.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְטַמֵּא, וְהַמְדַמֵּעַ, וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ – בְּשׁוֹגֵג פָּטוּר, בְּמֵזִיד חַיָּיב. הָכָא נָמֵי דְּאִית לֵיהּ שׁוּתָּפוּת בְּגַוַּהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another objection from a mishna (Gittin 52b): With regard to one who renders another’s food impure, and one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, and one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, if he did so unwittingly, he is exempt from payment of damages, even though he caused the other monetary loss. If he did so intentionally, he is liable to pay damages. Apparently, one can render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara answers: Here too it is a case where the one who caused the damage has a partnership share in the produce.
כְּתַנָּאֵי: גּוֹי שֶׁנִּיסֵּךְ יֵינוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – אֲסָרוֹ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בָּבָא מַתִּירִין אוֹתוֹ מִפְּנֵי שְׁנֵי דְבָרִים: אֶחָד – שֶׁאֵין מְנַסְּכִין יַיִן אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְאֶחָד – שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ ״לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנָּךְ שֶׁתֶּאֱסֹר יֵינִי לְאוֹנְסִי״.
The Gemara notes that the dispute whether one who slaughters another’s animal for idol worship renders the animal forbidden, in accordance with Rav Huna, or does not render it forbidden, in accordance with Rav Naḥman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im in a baraita: In the case of a gentile who poured a Jew’s wine as an idolatrous libation, but not in the presence of an object of idol worship, he has rendered the wine forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava permit drinking the wine due to two factors: One is that the presumption is that idol worshippers pour wine as an idolatrous libation only in the presence of an object of idol worship. And the other one is that even if the gentile poured the wine as an idolatrous libation, the Jew can say to the gentile: It is not within your power to render my wine forbidden against my will.
וְרַב נַחְמָן וְרַב עַמְרָם וְרַב יִצְחָק אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי גּוֹי, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל לְצַעוֹרֵיהּ קָא מִיכַּוֵּין.
And Rav Naḥman, and Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak say: Although Rav Huna’s opinion is compatible only with the opinion of the first tanna in the baraita and not with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, we can state our opinion even according to the one who says that a person renders forbidden an item that is not his, e.g., by pouring his wine as a libation or slaughtering his animal for idol worship. This statement applies only in a case where a gentile pours the libation or slaughters the animal. But if a Jew pours the wine or slaughters the animal, presumably he intends to torment that other person, and not to engage in idol worship. Therefore, a Jew does not render the animal forbidden.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a contradiction to that distinction from the mishna: If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. As the mishna is discussing a case involving Jews, this indicates that even a Jew who slaughters an animal for idol worship renders it forbidden. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with the case of a Jewish transgressor whose intent when declaring that his slaughter is for the sake of mountains, hills, or other natural entities is for idol worship.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְטַמֵּא וְהַמְדַמֵּעַ וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר, בְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב. הָכָא נָמֵי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a contradiction to the distinction between a Jew and gentile from a mishna (Gittin 52b): With regard to one who renders another’s food impure, and one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, and one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, if he did so unwittingly, he is exempt from payment of damages, even though he caused the other monetary loss. If he did so intentionally, he is liable to pay damages. Apparently, a Jew who pours wine as a libation for idolatry renders wine that is not his forbidden. The Gemara answers: Here too the reference is to an apostate Jew whose intent is for idol worship.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הִתְרוּ בּוֹ וְקִבֵּל עָלָיו הַתְרָאָה, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הִתִּיר עַצְמוֹ לְמִיתָה קָאָמְרַתְּ? אֵין לָךְ מְשׁוּמָּד גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: With regard to a Jew who is not a transgressor but declared that he is slaughtering another’s animal for idolatry, if those who heard his declaration forewarned him that doing so is prohibited by Torah law and is punishable by death, and he acknowledged the forewarning and said: It is in full knowledge of the prohibition and the punishment that I do so, what is the halakha? Does he render the animal forbidden in that case? Rav Ashi said to him: Are you saying a case where he subjected himself to death by acknowledging the forewarning? You have no transgressor greater than that, and he certainly renders the animal forbidden.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לֹא לְתוֹךְ יַמִּים, וְלֹא לְתוֹךְ נְהָרוֹת, וְלֹא לְתוֹךְ כֵּלִים, אֲבָל שׁוֹחֵט הוּא לְתוֹךְ עוּגָה שֶׁל מַיִם. וּבִסְפִינָה, עַל גַּבֵּי כֵלִים. אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר, אֲבָל עוֹשֶׂה גּוּמָּא בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּכָּנֵס הַדָּם לְתוֹכָהּ. וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, שֶׁלֹּא
MISHNA: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, as in all those cases it appears that he is slaughtering the animal in the manner of idolaters. But one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. And on a ship, one may slaughter an animal onto vessels as it is clear that his objective is to avoid sullying the ship. One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not
יְחַקֶּה אֶת הַמִּינִין.
appear to emulate [yeḥakkeh] the heretics.
גְּמָ׳ אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לֹא לְתוֹךְ וְכוּ׳. מַאי שְׁנָא לְתוֹךְ יַמִּים דְּלָא? דְּאָמְרִי: לְשָׂרָא דְּיַמָּא קָא שָׁחֵיט. לְתוֹךְ עוּגָה שֶׁל מַיִם נָמֵי אָמְרִי: לְבָבוּאָה קָא שָׁחֵיט. אָמַר רָבָא: בַּעֲכוּרִים שָׁנוּ.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, but one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. The Gemara asks: What is different about slaughter into seas? Is it that one may not perform it, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to the angel of the sea? If so, slaughter into a round excavation containing water should also be prohibited, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to his reflection [bavua], which is also similar to idolatry. Rava said: The tanna’im taught that halakha in the case of murky water, in which no reflection can be seen.
אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא וְכוּ׳. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כְּלָל? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא בְּגוּמָּא שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק.
§ The mishna states: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. The Gemara asks: How is it permitted to slaughter and have the blood flow into a hole inside his house? But didn’t you initially say that one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all? Abaye said: The first clause of the mishna, where there is a blanket prohibition against having the blood flow into a small hole, is referring to a small hole that is in the marketplace.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא ״וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן״, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא לָאו בְּשׁוּק עָסְקִינַן!
Rava said to him: But isn’t it so that from the fact that the latter clause teaches: And in the marketplace one may not do so, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are not dealing with the marketplace?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר, וְהָרוֹצֶה לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵרוֹ, כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם חוּץ לַגּוּמָּא וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד לַגּוּמָּא, וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, שֶׁלֹּא יְחַקֶּה אֶת הַמִּינִין.
Rather, Rava said that this is what the mishna is saying: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all. And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied in blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not appear to emulate the heretics.
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בִּסְפִינָה וְאֵין לוֹ מָקוֹם בַּסְּפִינָה לִשְׁחוֹט – מוֹצִיא יָדוֹ חוּץ לַסְּפִינָה וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד עַל דּוֹפְנֵי הַסְּפִינָה, וְאֵין שׁוֹחֵט לַגּוּמָּא כׇּל עִיקָּר.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If one was traveling on a ship and he has no place on the ship to slaughter an animal, he extends his hand with a knife, holds the head of the animal outside the walls of the ship, and slaughters the animal there; and the blood flows and descends down the sides of the ship. He may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow directly into the sea. And one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all.
וְהָרוֹצֶה לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵרוֹ, כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם חוּץ לַגּוּמָּא וְשׁוֹחֵט, וְדָם שׁוֹתֵת וְיוֹרֵד לַגּוּמָּא. וּבַשּׁוּק לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כֵּן, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ״, וְאִם עָשָׂה כֵּן – צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה אַחֲרָיו.
And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied with blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace, one may not do so, as it is stated: “Neither shall you follow their statutes” (Leviticus 18:3). And if he did so, he requires examination after his actions to ascertain whether he is a heretic.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה, לְשֵׁם זְבָחִים, לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח, לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁיר.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, his slaughter is not valid, as it appears that he is consecrating animals and slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the Temple. And Rabbi Shimon deems his slaughter valid.
שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּסַכִּין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין, אֶחָד לְשׁוּם אֶחָד מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ, וְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם דָּבָר כָּשֵׁר – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה. הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת, לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר, לְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר, לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, for the sake of a guilt offering for a definite transgression, for the sake of the offering of a firstborn, for the sake of the offering of animal tithe, or for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. All of these offerings may be brought only as obligations and not as gifts. Therefore, there is no concern that he consecrated the animals.
זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּידָּר וְנִידָּב – הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמוֹ אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ נִידָּר וְנִידָּב – הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר.
This is the principle: For any item, i.e., offering, which is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is forbidden. And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift but is an obligation that is incumbent upon him, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted.
גְּמָ׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה. אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בַּר נִידָּר וְנִידָּב הוּא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, the slaughter is not valid. This is because one who slaughters for the sake of any type of offering that is consecrated as a vow or as a gift renders the animal forbidden. The Gemara asks: Is a provisional guilt offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? A provisional guilt offering is brought only when one is obligated to do so due to uncertainty whether or not he is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says in a mishna (Karetot 25a): A person donates a provisional guilt offering every day if he chooses, due to concern that perhaps he violated a prohibition.
פֶּסַח בַּר נִידָּב וְנִידָּר הוּא? זִמְנָא קְבִיעָא לֵיהּ! אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: שָׁאנֵי פֶּסַח, הוֹאִיל וְהַפְרָשָׁתוֹ כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: Is a Paschal offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? The time is fixed for its offering on Passover eve, when bringing it is an obligation, and it may not be brought on any other day. Rabbi Oshaya said: The Paschal offering is different, since although the date for bringing and slaughtering it is the fourteenth of Nisan, its designation can be performed throughout the entire year.
אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא תְּמִימִים, אֲבָל בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין – מִידָּע יְדִיעַ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין נָמֵי, זִימְנִין דִּרְמֵי לֵיהּ מִידֵּי אַמּוּמָא וְלָא יְדִיעַ.
Rabbi Yannai says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid only if the animals were unblemished. But with regard to animals with blemishes, the slaughterer knows that they are blemished and disqualified from sacrifice. Therefore, despite his declaration, there is no concern that his actual intent was to slaughter the animal for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid even if the animals were blemished as well, as there are times that an item is cast over the blemish and covers it, and he does not know that the animal is blemished.
הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת, אֲבָל מְחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – אֵימָא לְשׁוּם חַטָּאתוֹ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם חַטָּאתִי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם חַטָּאתִי״.
The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, his slaughter is valid, as, since one cannot voluntarily contribute a sin offering, there is no concern that the onlookers will draw the wrong conclusion. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of a sin offering is valid only with regard to a slaughterer who is not liable to bring a sin offering. But a slaughterer who knows that he is liable to bring a sin offering, his slaughter is not valid. Say that he is performing consecration and slaughter for the sake of his sin offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a sin offering, and he did not say: For the sake of my sin offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of my sin offering.
לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרָה, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין לוֹ זֶבַח בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ זֶבַח בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ – אֵימָא אֲמוֹרֵי אֲמַיר בֵּיהּ. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרַת זִבְחִי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם תְּמוּרַת זִבְחִי״.
The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have an animal consecrated as an offering inside his house for which it can be the substitute, but if he has an animal consecrated as an offering in his house, say that he is substituting this animal for it, and the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, and he did not say: For the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering.
״זֶה הַכְּלָל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹלַת נָזִיר, דְּמַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָא לָא נְדַר, אֵימַר נֶדֶר בְּצִינְעָא.
The mishna states that this is the principle: For any offering that is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake, the animal is forbidden. The Gemara asks: What case does this clause add? The list in the mishna appears to be comprehensive. The Gemara answers: The clause serves to add the burnt offering of a nazirite. As, lest you say there is no concern in that case, as that person did not vow to become a nazirite and could not possibly be obligated to bring that offering, therefore, the tanna teaches that there is a concern if he said he was slaughtering for the sake of the burnt offering of a nazirite. Say that perhaps he vowed to become a nazirite in private, and no one else was aware of it.
וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ נִידָּר וְנִידָּב, לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹלַת יוֹלֶדֶת.
The Gemara asks: What is added by the second half of the principle: And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or as a gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth. If one slaughters an animal for the sake of a burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, the slaughter is valid, as it is an obligation.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אִשָּׁה, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ אִשָּׁה – אֵימַר לִשְׁמָהּ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה. וְהָא לָא קָאָמַר ״לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת אִשְׁתִּי״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת אִשְׁתִּי״.
Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have a wife. But if he has a wife, say that he performs consecration and slaughter of the animal for her sake and therefore the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, and he did not say: For the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth.
פְּשִׁיטָא?
The Gemara objects: This is obvious. Clearly, if he explicitly declared that the slaughter is for the sake of the burnt offering of his wife after childbirth the slaughter is not valid.
