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Today's Daf Yomi

September 10, 2020 | כ״א באלול תש״פ

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

Eruvin 32

Today’s daf is dedicated by Art Gould to the health, healing and well-being of his beloved bride of 47 years, Carol Robinson – Karina Gola bat Huddah. “Carol has been my best friend and partner, mother to our daughters, bubbe to our grand-daughter and the emotional center of our extended family. She has an almost magical ability to always know the right thing to do and the right thing to say. I love her more than words can possibly express.”

Can one assume that if one appoints a messenger, the messenger will get the job done? Do we rely on this only with rabbinic issues or also with Torah obligations? Rav Sheshet and Rav Nachman disagree about this and Rav Sheshet brings three proofs for his position from tannaitic sources (although according to one version, one is brought as a proof for Rav Nachman). The gemara then brings an explanation for each source according to Rav Nachman. Within these sources, a debate between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is brought regarding tithed produce as to whether or not it is assumed that one will transgress a minor transgression in order to ensure that someone else does not transgress a more serious prohibition – relating to the issue of not putting a stumbling block in front of others. In order to make an eruv techumim, one needs to be able to be able to be in the same location as one’s eruv, at least at twilight when Shabbat comes in. The mishna brings various cases regarding this issue and the rabbis try to figure out the exact case of the mishna.

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בשל סופרים חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו ורב ששת אמר אחד זה ואחד זה חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we do rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency. And Rav Sheshet disagreed and said: With regard to both this, Torah law, and that, rabbinic law, we rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתנן משקרב העומר הותר החדש מיד

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna: Once the omer has been offered, the grain from the new crop is immediately permitted. The Torah prohibits eating from the new crop of grain until the omer sacrifice is offered on the second day of Passover (Leviticus 23:14); once the omer is offered, it is immediately permitted to partake of the new grain.

והרחוקים מותרים מחצות היום ואילך והא חדש דאורייתא הוא וקתני הרחוקים מותרין מחצות היום ואילך לאו משום חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

And those far from Jerusalem, who do not know whether or not the omer has already been offered, are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on, as the omer must surely have been offered by this time. Isn’t the prohibition to eat from the new crop a Torah law? And nevertheless, it was taught: And those far from Jerusalem are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on. Is this not because we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency? The priests in the Temple serve as the agents of the entire Jewish people, and it may be assumed that they have performed the mission entrusted to them.

ורב נחמן התם כדקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו

The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman, who holds that with respect to Torah laws we may not rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, refute this proof? He can respond as follows: There, the agents may be trusted for the reason that was explicitly taught: Because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer sacrifice; however, the same cannot be said of ordinary agents.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב נחמן מנא אמינא לה דקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו בית דין הוא דלא מתעצלין בו הא שליח מתעצל בו

And some say a different version of this response: Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this principle? As it was taught that the reason is because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer past midday. From this we may infer: It is the court that will not be indolent with regard to missions entrusted to it, but an ordinary agent may indeed be indolent with regard to his mission. Therefore, we cannot rely upon an ordinary agent.

ורב ששת אמר לך בית דין עד פלגיה דיומא שליח כולי יומא

And Rav Sheshet could have said to you that this is not the correct inference; rather, we should infer as follows: It is only the court that is presumed to have executed its mission by midday, even though the mitzva to bring the omer offering lasts all day. However, an ordinary agent, who is not as diligent, is only presumed to have completed his mission by the end of the entire day.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האשה שיש עליה לידה או זיבה מביאה מעות ונותנת בשופר וטובלת ואוכלת בקדשים לערב מאי טעמא לאו משום דאמרינן חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say my opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: A woman who is responsible to offer sacrifices following childbirth or after experiencing ziva (Leviticus 12, 15) brings money and puts it in the appropriate collection box in the Temple, immerses in a ritual bath, and she may then eat sacrificial food at nightfall. What is the reason that she is permitted to eat immediately at nightfall? Is it not because we say that there is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, and the priests certainly purchased the appropriate sacrifices with her money and offered them during the day?

ורב נחמן התם כדרב שמעיה דאמר רב שמעיה חזקה אין בית דין של כהנים עומדים משם עד שיכלו כל מעות שבשופר

The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman counter this proof? There, in the case of a woman who put money in the box, the reason she may rely on agency is in accordance with the statement of Rav Shemaya, as Rav Shemaya said: There is a legal presumption that the court of priests would not leave the Temple until all the money in the collection box has been spent on the purchase of sacrifices. We may rely only on the special court appointed to carry out this task, as it can be trusted. However, no proof may be brought from here with regard to an ordinary agent.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האומר לחבירו צא ולקט לך תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן ודאי מלא לך כלכלה זה תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן דמאי

Rav Sheshet said another proof: From where do I say this? As it was taught in a baraita: One who says to another person: Go and gather for yourself figs from my fig tree, if he does not specify the amount that he should take, the gatherer may eat casually from them even without separating tithes. However, if one wishes to eat the figs as a regular, set meal, he must first tithe them as fruit that is known with certainty not to previously be tithed. In this case, it may be assumed that the owner of the fig tree did not separate tithes to exempt these figs, as he did not know how many the gatherer would take. However, if the owner of the fig tree said to him: Fill this basket for yourself with figs from my fig tree, he may eat from them casually without tithing, and before eating them as a regular meal, he must tithe them as demai, produce with regard to which we are unsure if the appropriate tithes have been separated. Since the owner of the tree knows how many figs the gatherer will take, it is possible that he has already separated tithes for these figs.

במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אינו אוכל עד שיעשר לפי שלא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף

In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them even as demai, as the owner certainly separated tithes for them from other produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. His father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says the opposite: In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may not eat the fruit until he tithes them because ḥaverim, who are meticulous in their observance of halakha, are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt. Since the figs that have been picked are not adjacent to the owner’s other figs, he has certainly not separated teruma and tithes on their account.

אמר רבי נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ולא יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלים

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.

עד כאן לא פליגי אלא דמר סבר נחשדו ומר סבר לא נחשדו אבל כולי עלמא חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

The Gemara infers: The tanna’im disagreed only with regard to the following point: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ḥaverim are suspected of tithing with produce that is not adjacent to the produce it comes to exempt, and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are not suspected of that. But all agree that we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, i.e., that the owner, who is regarded as an agent to tithe his produce so that no one will eat tevel on his account, can be relied upon to separate the tithes.

ורב נחמן התם כדרב חנינא חוזאה דאמר רב חנינא חוזאה חזקה הוא על חבר שאינו מוציא דבר שאינו מתוקן מתחת ידו

And Rav Naḥman can respond as follows: There, the owner can be trusted, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a, as Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a legal presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not release anything that is not tithed from his possession. Therefore, we are not relying on a general presumption with regard to agents but on a presumption with regard to ḥaverim.

אמר מר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי

The previous baraita contained several puzzling elements. Now that the Gemara has completed its primary discussion, namely the presumption that an agent carries out his mission, it turns to a discussion of the baraita itself. The Master said: If one said to his fellow: Go and gather for yourself figs, in what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. However, if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

האי עם הארץ דקאמר ליה למאן אילימא דקאמר לעם הארץ חבריה מעשרן דמאי מי ציית אלא בעם הארץ דקאמר ליה לחבר אימא סיפא נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואל יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלין עמי הארץ מאי בעי התם

The Gemara asks: This am ha’aretz, who addressed his fellow man, to whom did he speak? If you say that he spoke to his fellow am ha’aretz, if so how are we to understand the statement that follows: He must tithe them as demai? Would an am ha’aretz comply with the admonition of the Sages to suspect that the produce of his fellow am ha’aretz may not have been tithed? Rather, this must be referring to an am ha’aretz who told a ḥaver to gather figs from his fig tree, and the ḥaver will certainly tithe them. However, say that the latter clause of this baraita: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement, means the following: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel. What is the relevance of amei ha’aretz there? According to that explanation, the situation is the opposite. The person eating the figs is a ḥaver, and the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.

אמר רבינא רישא בעם הארץ שאמר לחבר סיפא בחבר שאמר לעם הארץ וחבר אחר שומעו רבי

Ravina said: The first clause is referring to an am ha’aretz who spoke to a ḥaver, while the latter clause is referring to a ḥaver who spoke to an am ha’aretz, and a different ḥaver heard him speak, and the discussion relates not to the one gathering the figs but to whether the second ḥaver may partake of the figs if they are offered to him. The Gemara explains the disagreement according to this understanding: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi

סבר אותו חבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דודאי עישורי מעשר ההוא חבר קמא עילויה ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לא יאכל עד שיעשר לפי שלא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואמר ליה רבי מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואל יאכילו עמי הארץ טבלים

holds: That ḥaver, who heard the first ḥaver speaking to the am ha’aretz, may immediately eat from the basket, and he is not required to tithe the produce, as the first ḥaver certainly separated tithes for the person who picked the figs, as he would not have caused an am ha’aretz to eat tevel. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: That ḥaver may not eat of the fruit until he has tithed them, for ḥaverim are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.

במאי קמיפלגי רבי סבר ניחא ליה לחבר דלעביד הוא איסורא קלילא ולא ליעבד עם הארץ איסורא רבה ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל סבר ניחא ליה לחבר דליעבד עם הארץ איסורא רבה ואיהו אפילו איסורא קלילא לא ליעבד:

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: It is preferable to a ḥaver that he commit a minor transgression, namely separating tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, so that an am ha’aretz will not commit the major transgression of eating tevel on his account. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: It is preferable to a ḥaver that an am ha’aretz commit a major transgression, and that he himself not commit even a minor transgression.

מתני׳ נתנו באילן למעלה מעשרה טפחים אין עירובו עירוב למטה מעשרה טפחים עירובו עירוב נתנו בבור אפילו עמוק מאה אמה עירובו עירוב:

MISHNA: If one placed his eiruv in a tree above ten handbreadths from the ground, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv; if it is below ten handbreadths, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If he placed the eiruv in a pit, even if it was a hundred cubits deep, his eiruv is a valid eiruv.

גמ׳ יתיב רבי חייא בר אבא ורבי אסי ורבא בר נתן ויתיב רב נחמן גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי האי אילן דקאי היכא אילימא דקאי ברשות היחיד מה לי למעלה מה לי למטה רשות היחיד עולה עד לרקיע

GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba sat, and with him sat Rabbi Asi and Rava bar Natan, and Rav Naḥman sat beside them, and they sat and said: This tree mentioned in the mishna, where does it stand? If you say it stands in the private domain, what is the difference to me whether the eiruv is placed above ten handbreadths or below ten handbreadths? The private domain ascends to the sky, and there is no difference whether an object is above or below ten handbreadths.

ואלא דקאי ברשות הרבים דמתכוין לשבות היכא אילימא דנתכוון לשבות למעלה הוא ועירובו במקום אחד הוא אלא נתכוון לשבות למטה והא קא משתמש באילן

Rather, say that the tree stands in the public domain; but in that case the question arises: Where did the person intend to establish his Shabbat residence? If you say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence in the tree above, he and his eiruv are in one place. Consequently, the eiruv should be valid, even if is at a height of more than ten handbreadths. Rather, say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below; but isn’t he making use of the tree if he accesses his eiruv? It is prohibited to make use of a tree on Shabbat, and therefore his eiruv should invalid even if it is less than ten handbreadths above the ground because it is inaccessible to him.

לעולם דקאי ברשות הרבים ונתכוון לשבות למטה ורבי היא דאמר כל דבר שהוא משום שבות לא גזרו עליו בין השמשות

The Gemara answers: Actually, we can accept the latter assumption that the tree stands in the public domain, and that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below, in the public domain. And with regard to the prohibition against making use of a tree, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat not by Torah law, but rather due to a rabbinic decree [shevut], the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight, which is neither definitively day nor definitively night. Since using a tree is only prohibited due to a shevut, it is permitted to make use of the tree and remove one’s eiruv from it during the twilight period, which is when the eiruv establishes the person’s Shabbat residence. Therefore, the eiruv is valid, provided that it is below ten handbreadths. If, however, the eiruv is above ten handbreadths, it is invalid. At that height, removing the eiruv from the tree entails violation of the Torah prohibition of carrying from a private domain to a public domain, which is prohibited even during twilight.

אמר להו רב נחמן ישר וכן אמר שמואל אמרו ליה פתריתו בה כולי האי אינהו נמי הכי קא פתרי בה [אלא הכי] אמרו ליה קבעיתו ליה בגמרא אמר להו אין אתמר נמי אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל הכא באילן העומד ברשות הרבים עסקינן גבוה עשרה ורחב ארבעה ונתכוון לשבות למטה ורבי היא דאמר כל דבר שהוא משום שבות לא גזרו עליו בין השמשות

Rav Naḥman said to them: Well said, and Shmuel said similarly with regard to this issue. They said to him: Have you, the Sages of Babylonia, gone so far in your explanation of the mishna? The Gemara asks: Why were the Sages of Eretz Yisrael so surprised? They, too, explained the mishna in this manner. Rather, this is what they said to Rav Naḥman: Have you established this explanation as part of your regular study of the mishna?He said to them: Yes. Indeed, it was also explicitly stated that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: Here, we are dealing with a tree standing in the public domain, and the tree is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. It thereby constitutes a private domain, and one intended to establish his Shabbat residence below in the public domain. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat not by Torah law, but rather due to a rabbinic decree, the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight.

אמר רבא לא שנו אלא באילן העומד חוץ לעיבורה של עיר אבל אילן העומד בתוך עיבורה של עיר אפילו למעלה מעשרה הרי זה עירוב דמתא כמאן דמליא דמיא

Rava said in continuation of this discussion: They only taught this law with regard to a tree that stands beyond the outskirts of the city, i.e., outside a radius of seventy and two-thirds cubits around the city. However, with regard to a tree that stands within the outskirts of the city, even if the eiruv was placed above ten handbreadths, it is a valid eiruv, as the city is considered as though it were filled in with earth,so that anything located at any height within the town itself or its outskirts is regarded as being in the same domain. Even though the person intended to establish his Shabbat residence below the tree in the public domain, we view the ground as raised to the height of the eiruv, and his eiruv is therefore valid even though he cannot actually remove it from the tree during the twilight period.

אי הכי חוץ לעיבורה של עיר נמי כיון דאמר רבא הנותן עירובו יש לו ארבע אמות הויא לה רשות היחיד ורשות היחיד עולה עד לרקיע

The Gemara asks: If so, if the tree stood beyond the outskirts of the town, there should also be no difference whether the eiruv is above or below the height of ten handbreadths. Since Rava himself said: One who places his eiruv in a particular location has four cubits surrounding him that are considered as a private domain, here too, the area should be considered a private domain; and a private domain rises to the sky. Since the tree stands within this area, all parts of the tree should be regarded as a private domain regardless of their height.

אמר רב יצחק בריה דרב משרשיא הכא באילן הנוטה חוץ לארבע אמות עסקינן

Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiya, said: Here, we are dealing with a tree that leans out horizontally beyond four cubits from its trunk, and one placed the eiruv on a section that is beyond four cubits,

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Eruvin 32

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Eruvin 32

בשל סופרים חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו ורב ששת אמר אחד זה ואחד זה חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we do rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency. And Rav Sheshet disagreed and said: With regard to both this, Torah law, and that, rabbinic law, we rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתנן משקרב העומר הותר החדש מיד

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna: Once the omer has been offered, the grain from the new crop is immediately permitted. The Torah prohibits eating from the new crop of grain until the omer sacrifice is offered on the second day of Passover (Leviticus 23:14); once the omer is offered, it is immediately permitted to partake of the new grain.

והרחוקים מותרים מחצות היום ואילך והא חדש דאורייתא הוא וקתני הרחוקים מותרין מחצות היום ואילך לאו משום חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

And those far from Jerusalem, who do not know whether or not the omer has already been offered, are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on, as the omer must surely have been offered by this time. Isn’t the prohibition to eat from the new crop a Torah law? And nevertheless, it was taught: And those far from Jerusalem are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on. Is this not because we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency? The priests in the Temple serve as the agents of the entire Jewish people, and it may be assumed that they have performed the mission entrusted to them.

ורב נחמן התם כדקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו

The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman, who holds that with respect to Torah laws we may not rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, refute this proof? He can respond as follows: There, the agents may be trusted for the reason that was explicitly taught: Because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer sacrifice; however, the same cannot be said of ordinary agents.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב נחמן מנא אמינא לה דקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו בית דין הוא דלא מתעצלין בו הא שליח מתעצל בו

And some say a different version of this response: Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this principle? As it was taught that the reason is because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer past midday. From this we may infer: It is the court that will not be indolent with regard to missions entrusted to it, but an ordinary agent may indeed be indolent with regard to his mission. Therefore, we cannot rely upon an ordinary agent.

ורב ששת אמר לך בית דין עד פלגיה דיומא שליח כולי יומא

And Rav Sheshet could have said to you that this is not the correct inference; rather, we should infer as follows: It is only the court that is presumed to have executed its mission by midday, even though the mitzva to bring the omer offering lasts all day. However, an ordinary agent, who is not as diligent, is only presumed to have completed his mission by the end of the entire day.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האשה שיש עליה לידה או זיבה מביאה מעות ונותנת בשופר וטובלת ואוכלת בקדשים לערב מאי טעמא לאו משום דאמרינן חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say my opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: A woman who is responsible to offer sacrifices following childbirth or after experiencing ziva (Leviticus 12, 15) brings money and puts it in the appropriate collection box in the Temple, immerses in a ritual bath, and she may then eat sacrificial food at nightfall. What is the reason that she is permitted to eat immediately at nightfall? Is it not because we say that there is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, and the priests certainly purchased the appropriate sacrifices with her money and offered them during the day?

ורב נחמן התם כדרב שמעיה דאמר רב שמעיה חזקה אין בית דין של כהנים עומדים משם עד שיכלו כל מעות שבשופר

The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman counter this proof? There, in the case of a woman who put money in the box, the reason she may rely on agency is in accordance with the statement of Rav Shemaya, as Rav Shemaya said: There is a legal presumption that the court of priests would not leave the Temple until all the money in the collection box has been spent on the purchase of sacrifices. We may rely only on the special court appointed to carry out this task, as it can be trusted. However, no proof may be brought from here with regard to an ordinary agent.

אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האומר לחבירו צא ולקט לך תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן ודאי מלא לך כלכלה זה תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן דמאי

Rav Sheshet said another proof: From where do I say this? As it was taught in a baraita: One who says to another person: Go and gather for yourself figs from my fig tree, if he does not specify the amount that he should take, the gatherer may eat casually from them even without separating tithes. However, if one wishes to eat the figs as a regular, set meal, he must first tithe them as fruit that is known with certainty not to previously be tithed. In this case, it may be assumed that the owner of the fig tree did not separate tithes to exempt these figs, as he did not know how many the gatherer would take. However, if the owner of the fig tree said to him: Fill this basket for yourself with figs from my fig tree, he may eat from them casually without tithing, and before eating them as a regular meal, he must tithe them as demai, produce with regard to which we are unsure if the appropriate tithes have been separated. Since the owner of the tree knows how many figs the gatherer will take, it is possible that he has already separated tithes for these figs.

במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אינו אוכל עד שיעשר לפי שלא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף

In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them even as demai, as the owner certainly separated tithes for them from other produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. His father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says the opposite: In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may not eat the fruit until he tithes them because ḥaverim, who are meticulous in their observance of halakha, are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt. Since the figs that have been picked are not adjacent to the owner’s other figs, he has certainly not separated teruma and tithes on their account.

אמר רבי נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ולא יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלים

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.

עד כאן לא פליגי אלא דמר סבר נחשדו ומר סבר לא נחשדו אבל כולי עלמא חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו

The Gemara infers: The tanna’im disagreed only with regard to the following point: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ḥaverim are suspected of tithing with produce that is not adjacent to the produce it comes to exempt, and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are not suspected of that. But all agree that we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, i.e., that the owner, who is regarded as an agent to tithe his produce so that no one will eat tevel on his account, can be relied upon to separate the tithes.

ורב נחמן התם כדרב חנינא חוזאה דאמר רב חנינא חוזאה חזקה הוא על חבר שאינו מוציא דבר שאינו מתוקן מתחת ידו

And Rav Naḥman can respond as follows: There, the owner can be trusted, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a, as Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a legal presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not release anything that is not tithed from his possession. Therefore, we are not relying on a general presumption with regard to agents but on a presumption with regard to ḥaverim.

אמר מר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי

The previous baraita contained several puzzling elements. Now that the Gemara has completed its primary discussion, namely the presumption that an agent carries out his mission, it turns to a discussion of the baraita itself. The Master said: If one said to his fellow: Go and gather for yourself figs, in what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. However, if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

האי עם הארץ דקאמר ליה למאן אילימא דקאמר לעם הארץ חבריה מעשרן דמאי מי ציית אלא בעם הארץ דקאמר ליה לחבר אימא סיפא נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואל יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלין עמי הארץ מאי בעי התם

The Gemara asks: This am ha’aretz, who addressed his fellow man, to whom did he speak? If you say that he spoke to his fellow am ha’aretz, if so how are we to understand the statement that follows: He must tithe them as demai? Would an am ha’aretz comply with the admonition of the Sages to suspect that the produce of his fellow am ha’aretz may not have been tithed? Rather, this must be referring to an am ha’aretz who told a ḥaver to gather figs from his fig tree, and the ḥaver will certainly tithe them. However, say that the latter clause of this baraita: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement, means the following: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel. What is the relevance of amei ha’aretz there? According to that explanation, the situation is the opposite. The person eating the figs is a ḥaver, and the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.

אמר רבינא רישא בעם הארץ שאמר לחבר סיפא בחבר שאמר לעם הארץ וחבר אחר שומעו רבי

Ravina said: The first clause is referring to an am ha’aretz who spoke to a ḥaver, while the latter clause is referring to a ḥaver who spoke to an am ha’aretz, and a different ḥaver heard him speak, and the discussion relates not to the one gathering the figs but to whether the second ḥaver may partake of the figs if they are offered to him. The Gemara explains the disagreement according to this understanding: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi

סבר אותו חבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דודאי עישורי מעשר ההוא חבר קמא עילויה ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לא יאכל עד שיעשר לפי שלא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואמר ליה רבי מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואל יאכילו עמי הארץ טבלים

holds: That ḥaver, who heard the first ḥaver speaking to the am ha’aretz, may immediately eat from the basket, and he is not required to tithe the produce, as the first ḥaver certainly separated tithes for the person who picked the figs, as he would not have caused an am ha’aretz to eat tevel. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: That ḥaver may not eat of the fruit until he has tithed them, for ḥaverim are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.

במאי קמיפלגי רבי סבר ניחא ליה לחבר דלעביד הוא איסורא קלילא ולא ליעבד עם הארץ איסורא רבה ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל סבר ניחא ליה לחבר דליעבד עם הארץ איסורא רבה ואיהו אפילו איסורא קלילא לא ליעבד:

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: It is preferable to a ḥaver that he commit a minor transgression, namely separating tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, so that an am ha’aretz will not commit the major transgression of eating tevel on his account. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: It is preferable to a ḥaver that an am ha’aretz commit a major transgression, and that he himself not commit even a minor transgression.

מתני׳ נתנו באילן למעלה מעשרה טפחים אין עירובו עירוב למטה מעשרה טפחים עירובו עירוב נתנו בבור אפילו עמוק מאה אמה עירובו עירוב:

MISHNA: If one placed his eiruv in a tree above ten handbreadths from the ground, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv; if it is below ten handbreadths, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If he placed the eiruv in a pit, even if it was a hundred cubits deep, his eiruv is a valid eiruv.

גמ׳ יתיב רבי חייא בר אבא ורבי אסי ורבא בר נתן ויתיב רב נחמן גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי האי אילן דקאי היכא אילימא דקאי ברשות היחיד מה לי למעלה מה לי למטה רשות היחיד עולה עד לרקיע

GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba sat, and with him sat Rabbi Asi and Rava bar Natan, and Rav Naḥman sat beside them, and they sat and said: This tree mentioned in the mishna, where does it stand? If you say it stands in the private domain, what is the difference to me whether the eiruv is placed above ten handbreadths or below ten handbreadths? The private domain ascends to the sky, and there is no difference whether an object is above or below ten handbreadths.

ואלא דקאי ברשות הרבים דמתכוין לשבות היכא אילימא דנתכוון לשבות למעלה הוא ועירובו במקום אחד הוא אלא נתכוון לשבות למטה והא קא משתמש באילן

Rather, say that the tree stands in the public domain; but in that case the question arises: Where did the person intend to establish his Shabbat residence? If you say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence in the tree above, he and his eiruv are in one place. Consequently, the eiruv should be valid, even if is at a height of more than ten handbreadths. Rather, say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below; but isn’t he making use of the tree if he accesses his eiruv? It is prohibited to make use of a tree on Shabbat, and therefore his eiruv should invalid even if it is less than ten handbreadths above the ground because it is inaccessible to him.

לעולם דקאי ברשות הרבים ונתכוון לשבות למטה ורבי היא דאמר כל דבר שהוא משום שבות לא גזרו עליו בין השמשות

The Gemara answers: Actually, we can accept the latter assumption that the tree stands in the public domain, and that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below, in the public domain. And with regard to the prohibition against making use of a tree, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat not by Torah law, but rather due to a rabbinic decree [shevut], the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight, which is neither definitively day nor definitively night. Since using a tree is only prohibited due to a shevut, it is permitted to make use of the tree and remove one’s eiruv from it during the twilight period, which is when the eiruv establishes the person’s Shabbat residence. Therefore, the eiruv is valid, provided that it is below ten handbreadths. If, however, the eiruv is above ten handbreadths, it is invalid. At that height, removing the eiruv from the tree entails violation of the Torah prohibition of carrying from a private domain to a public domain, which is prohibited even during twilight.

אמר להו רב נחמן ישר וכן אמר שמואל אמרו ליה פתריתו בה כולי האי אינהו נמי הכי קא פתרי בה [אלא הכי] אמרו ליה קבעיתו ליה בגמרא אמר להו אין אתמר נמי אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל הכא באילן העומד ברשות הרבים עסקינן גבוה עשרה ורחב ארבעה ונתכוון לשבות למטה ורבי היא דאמר כל דבר שהוא משום שבות לא גזרו עליו בין השמשות

Rav Naḥman said to them: Well said, and Shmuel said similarly with regard to this issue. They said to him: Have you, the Sages of Babylonia, gone so far in your explanation of the mishna? The Gemara asks: Why were the Sages of Eretz Yisrael so surprised? They, too, explained the mishna in this manner. Rather, this is what they said to Rav Naḥman: Have you established this explanation as part of your regular study of the mishna?He said to them: Yes. Indeed, it was also explicitly stated that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: Here, we are dealing with a tree standing in the public domain, and the tree is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. It thereby constitutes a private domain, and one intended to establish his Shabbat residence below in the public domain. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat not by Torah law, but rather due to a rabbinic decree, the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight.

אמר רבא לא שנו אלא באילן העומד חוץ לעיבורה של עיר אבל אילן העומד בתוך עיבורה של עיר אפילו למעלה מעשרה הרי זה עירוב דמתא כמאן דמליא דמיא

Rava said in continuation of this discussion: They only taught this law with regard to a tree that stands beyond the outskirts of the city, i.e., outside a radius of seventy and two-thirds cubits around the city. However, with regard to a tree that stands within the outskirts of the city, even if the eiruv was placed above ten handbreadths, it is a valid eiruv, as the city is considered as though it were filled in with earth,so that anything located at any height within the town itself or its outskirts is regarded as being in the same domain. Even though the person intended to establish his Shabbat residence below the tree in the public domain, we view the ground as raised to the height of the eiruv, and his eiruv is therefore valid even though he cannot actually remove it from the tree during the twilight period.

אי הכי חוץ לעיבורה של עיר נמי כיון דאמר רבא הנותן עירובו יש לו ארבע אמות הויא לה רשות היחיד ורשות היחיד עולה עד לרקיע

The Gemara asks: If so, if the tree stood beyond the outskirts of the town, there should also be no difference whether the eiruv is above or below the height of ten handbreadths. Since Rava himself said: One who places his eiruv in a particular location has four cubits surrounding him that are considered as a private domain, here too, the area should be considered a private domain; and a private domain rises to the sky. Since the tree stands within this area, all parts of the tree should be regarded as a private domain regardless of their height.

אמר רב יצחק בריה דרב משרשיא הכא באילן הנוטה חוץ לארבע אמות עסקינן

Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiya, said: Here, we are dealing with a tree that leans out horizontally beyond four cubits from its trunk, and one placed the eiruv on a section that is beyond four cubits,

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