Eruvin 46

כל שכן דהוו להו נולד דאסירי

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the water was previously not in its current state, all the more so should it be considered as something that came into being [nolad] on the Festival, and consequently it is prohibited to carry it. Something that came into being or assumed its present form on Shabbat or Festivals is considered set-aside [muktze] and may not be handled on Shabbat or Festivals.

אלא מיא בעבים מינד ניידי השתא דאתית להכי אוקיינוס נמי לא ליקשו לך מיא באוקיינוס נמי מינד ניידי ותניא נהרות המושכין ומעיינות הנובעין הרי הן כרגלי כל אדם

Rather, we should say: The water in clouds is in constant motion and therefore does not acquire residence there. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this answer, the ocean should also not be difficult for you, as the water in the ocean is also in constant motion. And it was taught in a baraita: Flowing rivers and streaming springs are like the feet of all people, as their waters do not acquire residence in any particular place. The same law also applies to clouds and seas.

אמר רבי יעקב בר אידי אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי אמר ליה רבי זירא לרבי יעקב בר אידי בפירוש שמיע לך או מכללא שמיע לך אמר ליה בפירוש שמיע לי

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, that one who was asleep at the beginning of Shabbat may travel two thousand cubits in every direction. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi: Did you hear this halakha explicitly from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, or did you understand it by inference from some other ruling that he issued? Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to him: I heard it explicitly from him.

מאי כללא דאמר רבי יהושע בן לוי הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב

The Gemara asks: From what other teaching could this ruling be inferred? The Gemara explains: From that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv.

ותרתי למה לי

The Gemara asks: Why do I need both? Why was it necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to state both the general ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, and also the specific ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri on this issue?

אמר רבי זירא צריכי דאי אשמעינן הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי הוה אמינא בין לקולא ובין לחומרא קא משמע לן הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב

Rabbi Zeira said: Both rulings were necessary, as had he informed us only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance with him whether this is a leniency, i.e., that a sleeping person acquires residence and may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, or whether it is a stringency, i.e., that ownerless utensils acquire residence and can be carried only two thousand cubits from that place. Consequently, he teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, so that we rule in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri only when it entails a leniency.

ולימא הלכה כדברי המיקל בעירוב הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי למה לי

The Gemara asks: Let him state only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv. Why do I need the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri?

איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי יחיד במקום יחיד ורבים במקום רבים אבל יחיד במקום רבים אימא לא

The Gemara answers: This ruling was necessary as well, for had he informed us only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it might have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only to disputes in which a single authority disagrees with another single authority, or several authorities disagree with several other authorities. But when a single authority maintains a lenient opinion against several authorities who maintain a more stringent position, you might have said that we do not rule in his favor. Hence, it was necessary to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri although he disputes the Rabbis.

אמר ליה רבא לאביי מכדי עירובין דרבנן מה לי יחיד במקום יחיד ומה לי יחיד במקום רבים

Rava said to Abaye: Now, since the laws of eiruvin are rabbinic in origin, what reason is there for me to differentiate between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities?

אמר ליה רב פפא לרבא ובדרבנן לא שני לן בין יחיד במקום יחיד ליחיד במקום רבים

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Is there no difference with regard to rabbinic laws between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities?

והתנן רבי אלעזר אומר כל אשה שעברו עליה שלש עונות דייה שעתה

Didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: Any woman who passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating. If afterward she sees blood, it is enough that she be regarded as ritually impure due to menstruation from the time that she examined herself and saw that she had a discharge, rather than retroactively for up to twenty-four hours. The Rabbis, however, maintain that this halakha applies only to an older woman or to a woman after childbirth, for whom it is natural to stop menstruating, but not to a normal young woman for whom three periods have passed without bleeding.

ותניא מעשה ועשה רבי כרבי אלעזר לאחר שנזכר אמר כדי הוא רבי אלעזר לסמוך עליו בשעת הדחק

And it was taught in a baraita: It once happened that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. After he remembered that Rabbi Elazar’s colleagues disagree with him on this matter and that he had apparently ruled incorrectly, he nonetheless said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances.

מאי לאחר שנזכר אילימא לאחר שנזכר דאין הלכה כרבי אלעזר אלא כרבנן בשעת הדחק היכי עביד כוותיה

The Gemara comments: What is the meaning of: After he remembered? If you say that it means after he remembered that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar but rather in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then how could he rule in accordance with him even in exigent circumstances, given that the halakha had been decided against him?

אלא דלא איתמר הלכתא לא כרבי אלעזר ולא כרבנן לאחר שנזכר דלאו יחיד פליג עליה אלא רבים פליגי עליה אמר כדי הוא רבי אלעזר לסמוך עליו בשעת הדחק

Rather, it must be that the halakha had not been stated on this matter, neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, nor in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And after he remembered that it was not a single authority who disagreed with Rabbi Elazar, but rather several authorities who disagreed with him, he nonetheless said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances. This demonstrates that even with a dispute that involves a rabbinic decree, such as whether a woman is declared ritually impure retroactively, there is room to distinguish between a disagreement of a single authority and a single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority and several authorities.

אמר רב משרשיא לרבא ואמרי לה רב נחמן בר יצחק לרבא ובדרבנן לא שני בין יחיד במקום יחיד בין יחיד במקום רבים

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said to Rava: Is there no difference with regard to rabbinic laws between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities?

והתניא שמועה קרובה נוהגת שבעה ושלשים רחוקה אינה נוהגת אלא יום אחד

Wasn’t it was taught in a baraita: If a person receives a proximate report that one of his close relatives has died, he practices all the customs of the intense seven day mourning period as well as the customs of the thirty day mourning period. But if he receives a distant report, he practices only one day of mourning.

ואי זו היא קרובה ואיזו היא רחוקה בתוך שלשים קרובה לאחר שלשים רחוקה דברי רבי עקיבא וחכמים אומרים אחת שמועה קרובה ואחת שמועה רחוקה נוהגת שבעה ושלשים

What is considered a proximate report, and what is considered a distant report? If the report arrives within thirty days of the close relative’s passing, it is regarded as proximate, and if it arrives after thirty days it is considered distant; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: Both in the case of a proximate report and in the case of a distant report, the grieving relative practices the seven-day mourning period and the thirty-day mourning period.

ואמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן כל מקום שאתה מוצא יחיד מיקל ורבים מחמירין הלכה כדברי המחמירין המרובים חוץ מזו שאף על פי שרבי עקיבא מיקל וחכמים מחמירין הלכה כדברי רבי עקיבא

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Wherever you find that a single authority is lenient with regard to a certain halakha and several other authorities are stringent, the halakha is in accordance with the words of the stringent authorities, who constitute the majority, except for here, where despite the fact that the opinion of Rabbi Akiva is lenient and the opinion of the Rabbis is more stringent, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

וסבר לה כשמואל דאמר שמואל הלכה כדברי המיקל באבל

And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds like Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to mourning practices, i.e., wherever there is a dispute with regard to mourning customs, the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion.

באבילות הוא דאקילו בה רבנן אבל בעלמא אפילו בדרבנן שני בין יחיד במקום יחיד בין יחיד במקום רבים

From here the Gemara infers: It is only with regard to mourning practices that the Sages were lenient, but in general, with regard to other areas of halakha, even in the case of rabbinic laws there is a difference between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities. This being the case, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did well to rule explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, even though he is a single authority who ruled leniently in dispute with the Rabbis.

ורב פפא אמר איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי בעירובי חצירות אבל בעירובי תחומין אימא לא צריכא

Rav Pappa said a different explanation for the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi made both statements: It was necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, because had he said only that the halakha follows the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only with regard to the laws governing the eiruv of courtyards, which are entirely rabbinic in origin. But with regard to the more stringent laws governing the eiruv of Shabbat limits, you would have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to make both statements.

ומנא תימרא דשני לן בין עירובי חצירות לעירובי תחומין דתנן אמר רבי יהודה במה דברים אמורים בעירובי תחומין אבל בעירובי חצירות מערבין בין לדעת ובין שלא לדעת שזכין לאדם שלא בפניו ואין חבין לאדם אלא בפניו

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we distinguish between an eiruv of courtyards and an eiruv of Shabbat limits? As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said, that an eiruv may be established for another person only with his knowledge? It was said with regard to an eiruv of Shabbat limits, but with regard to an eiruv of courtyards, an eiruv may be established for another person whether with his knowledge or without his knowledge, as one may act in a person’s interest in his absence; however, one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence. One may act unilaterally on someone else’s behalf when the action is to that other person’s benefit; however, when it is to the other person’s detriment, or when there are both advantages and disadvantages to him, one may act on the other person’s behalf only if one has been explicitly appointed as an agent. Since an eiruv of courtyards is always to a person’s benefit, it can be established even without his knowledge. However, with regard to an eiruv of Shabbat limits, while it enables one to walk in one direction, it disallows him from walking in the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be established only with his knowledge.

רב אשי אמר איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי בשיורי עירוב אבל בתחילת עירוב אימא לא

Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s need to issue two rulings can be explained in another manner: It is necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, as if he had said only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that had been properly established, where the concern is that it might subsequently have become invalid. But with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that is just being established and has not yet taken effect, you might have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to issue both rulings.

ומנא תימרא דשני לן בין שיורי עירוב לתחילת עירוב דתנן אמר רבי יוסי במה דברים אמורים בתחילת עירוב אבל בשיורי עירוב אפילו כל שהוא

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we distinguish between the remnants of an eiruv and an initial eiruv? As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said, that the Sages stipulated that a fixed quantity of food is necessary for establishing an eiruv? It is said with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., when setting up an eiruv for the first time; however, with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, i.e., on a subsequent Shabbat when the measure may have become diminished, even a minimal amount suffices.

ולא אמרו לערב חצירות אלא כדי שלא לשכח תורת עירוב מן התינוקות

And they said to establish an eiruv for courtyards only after all the inhabitants of the city merge their alleyways and become like the inhabitants of a single courtyard, so that the law of eiruv should not be forgotten by the children, who may not be aware of the arrangement that has been made with regard to the alleyways.

רבי יעקב ורבי זריקא אמרו הלכה כרבי עקיבא מחבירו וכרבי יוסי מחבריו וכרבי מחבירו

Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic decision-making, it cites additional principles. Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Zerika said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in disputes with any individual Sage, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with other Sages, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with any individual Sage.

למאי הלכתא רבי אסי אמר הלכה ורבי חייא בר אבא אמר מטין ורבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר נראין

The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha do these principles apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? Rabbi Asi said: This is considered binding halakha. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: One is inclined toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It appears that one should rule this way, but it is not an established halakha that is considered binding with regard to issuing rulings.

כלשון הזה אמר רבי יעקב בר אידי אמר רבי יוחנן רבי מאיר ורבי יהודה הלכה כרבי יהודה רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי ואין צריך לומר רבי מאיר ורבי יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי השתא במקום רבי יהודה ליתא במקום רבי יוסי מיבעיא

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; in the case of a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; and, needless to say, in the case of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As now, if in disputes with Rabbi Yehuda, the opinion of Rabbi Meir is not accepted as law, need it be stated that in disputes with Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Meir’s opinion is rejected? Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is not accepted in disputes with Rabbi Yosei.

אמר רב אסי אף אני לומד רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יוסי דאמר רבי אבא אמר רבי יוחנן רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יהודה השתא במקום רבי יהודה ליתא במקום רבי יוסי מיבעיא

Rav Asi said: I also learn based on the same principle that in a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In cases of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Now, if where it is opposed by Rabbi Yehuda the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is not accepted as law, where it is opposed by the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, with whom the halakha is in accordance against Rabbi Yehuda, is it necessary to say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei?

איבעיא להו רבי מאיר ורבי שמעון מאי תיקו

The Gemara raises a dilemma: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, what is the halakha? No sources were found to resolve this dilemma, and it stands unresolved.

אמר רב משרשיא ליתנהו להני כללי מנא ליה לרב משרשיא הא

Rav Mesharshiya said: These principles of halakhic decision-making are not to be relied upon. The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Mesharshiya derive this statement?

אילימא מהא דתנן רבי שמעון אומר למה הדבר דומה לשלש חצירות הפתוחות זו לזו ופתוחות לרשות הרבים עירבו שתים החיצונות עם האמצעית היא מותרת עמהן והן מותרות עמה ושתים החיצונות אסורות זו עם זו

If you say that he derived it from that which we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is like three courtyards that open into one another, and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the middle one, the residents of the middle one are permitted to carry to the two outer ones, and they are permitted to carry to it, but the residents of the two outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one to the other, as they did not establish an eiruv with one another.

ואמר רב חמא בר גוריא אמר רב הלכה כרבי שמעון ומאן פליג עליה רבי יהודה והא אמרת רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יהודה אלא לאו שמע מינה ליתנהו

And Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It is Rabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say: In disputes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, can we not conclude from this mishna that these principles should not be relied upon?

ומאי קושיא דילמא היכא דאיתמר איתמר היכא דלא איתמר לא איתמר

The Gemara rejects this argument: What is the difficulty posed by this ruling? Perhaps where it is stated explicitly to the contrary, it is stated, but where it is not stated explicitly to the contrary, it is not stated, and these principles apply.

אלא מהא דתנן עיר של יחיד ונעשית של רבים מערבין את כולה של רבים ונעשית של יחיד אין מערבין את כולה אלא אם כן עושה חוצה לה כעיר חדשה שביהודה שיש בה חמשים דיורין דברי רבי יהודה

Rather, the proof is from that which we learned elsewhere in a mishna: If a city that belongs to a single individual subsequently becomes one that belongs to many people, one may establish an eiruv of courtyards for all of it. But if the city belongs to many people, and it falls into the possession of a single individual, one may not establish an eiruv for all of it, unless he excludes from the eiruv an area the size of the town of Ḥadasha in Judea, which contains fifty residents; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבי שמעון אומר

Rabbi Shimon says: