What are the laws regarding carrying in a courtyard where a Jew and a non-Jew are living? Does it matter if it is one Jew or two Jews living there? On what principles are these laws based? The gemara discusses the importance of the law to not teach a halacha if there is a more senior rabbi there – he should be the one to answer the question.
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Eruvin 62
גְּמָ׳ יָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי בַּר אָבִין וְרַב חִינָּנָא בַּר אָבִין, וְיָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר קָסָבַר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה, וְלָא שְׁנָא חַד וְלָא שְׁנָא תְּרֵי.
GEMARA: Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥinana bar Avin were sitting, and Abaye was sitting beside them, and they sat and said: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the author of the unattributed mishna, is clear, as he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence. In other words, the gentile living in the courtyard is considered a resident who has a share in the courtyard. Since he cannot join in an eiruv with the Jew, he renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or from the courtyard to his house. Consequently, the case of one Jew living in the courtyard is no different from the case of two Jews living there. In both cases, the gentile renders it prohibited for carrying.
אֶלָּא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ חַד נָמֵי נִיתְּסַר! וְאִי לָא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי נָמֵי לָא נִיתְּסַר!
But Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, what does he hold? If you say he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence, he should prohibit carrying even when there is only one Jew living in the courtyard. And if it is not considered a significant residence, he should not prohibit carrying even when there are two Jews living there.
אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי: וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל נׇכְרִי — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה.
Abaye said to them: Your basic premise is based on a faulty assumption. Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence? Wasn’t it taught in the Tosefta: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, i.e., just as an animal pen does not render it prohibited to carry in a courtyard, so too, the gentile’s residence in itself does not impose restrictions on a Jew.
אֶלָּא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דִּירַת גּוֹי לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה, וְהָכָא בִּגְזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִלְמַד מִמַּעֲשָׂיו קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
Rather, this explanation must be rejected, and the dispute in the mishna should be understood differently: Everyone agrees that the residence of gentile is not considered a significant residence, and here they disagree about a decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways. The disagreement is with regard to whether this decree is applicable only when there are two Jews living in the courtyard, or even when there is only one Jew living there.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דְּגוֹי חָשׁוּד אַשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, תְּרֵי דִּשְׁכִיחִי דְּדָיְירִי — גְּזַרוּ בְּהוּ, חַד לָא שְׁכִיחַ — לָא גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The disagreement should be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that since a gentile is suspected of bloodshed, it is unusual for a single Jew to share a courtyard with a gentile. However, it is not unusual for two or more Jews to do so, as they will protect each other. Therefore, in the case of two Jews, who commonly live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages issued a decree to the effect that the gentile renders it prohibited for them to carry. This would cause great inconvenience to Jews living with gentiles and would thereby motivate the Jews to distance themselves from gentiles. In this manner, the Sages sought to prevent the Jews from learning from the gentiles’ ways. However, in the case of one Jew, for whom it is not common to live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages did not issue a decree that the gentile renders it prohibited for him to carry, as the Sages do not issue decrees for uncommon situations.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: זִמְנִין דְּמִקְּרֵי וְדָיֵיר. וַאֲמַרוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין עֵירוּב מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם גּוֹי, וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם גּוֹי, עַד שֶׁיַּשְׂכִּיר. וְגוֹי לָא מוֹגַר.
On the other hand, Rabbi Meir holds that sometimes it happens that a single Jew lives together with a gentile in the same courtyard, and hence it is appropriate to issue the decree in such a case as well. Therefore, the Sages said: An eiruv is not effective in a place where a gentile is living, nor is the renunciation of rights to a courtyard in favor of the other residents effective in a place where a gentile is living. Therefore, carrying is prohibited in a courtyard in which a gentile resides, unless the gentile rents out his property to one of the Jews for the purpose of an eiruv regardless of the number of Jews living there. And as a gentile would not be willing to rent out his property for this purpose, the living conditions will become too strained, prompting the Jew to move.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר: דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאַחְזוֹקֵי בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה בָּעִינַן.
The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that a gentile will not rent out his property for the purpose of an eiruv? If you say it is because the gentile thinks that perhaps they will later come to take possession of his property based on this rental, this works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, i.e., that rental for the purpose of an eiruv must be proper and valid according to all the halakhot of renting.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה בָּעִינַן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? דְּאִתְּמַר, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה. וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה.
However, according to the one who said that we require only a flawed, symbolic rental, i.e., all that is needed is a token gesture that has the appearance of renting, what is there to say? The gentile would understand that it is not a real rental, and therefore he would not be wary of renting out his residence. As it was stated that the amora’im disputed this issue as follows: Rav Ḥisda said that we require a full-fledged rental, and Rav Sheshet said: A flawed, symbolic rental is sufficient.
מַאי רְעוּעָה, מַאי בְּרִיאָה? אִילֵּימָא: בְּרִיאָה — בִּפְרוּטָה, רְעוּעָה — פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִגּוֹי בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה לָא? וְהָא שָׁלַח רַבִּי יִצְחָק בְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר גִּיּוֹרֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲווֹ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁשּׂוֹכְרִין מִן הַגּוֹי אֲפִילּוּ בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
Having mentioned this dispute, the Gemara now clarifies its particulars: What is a flawed rental, and what is a full-fledged one? If you say that a full-fledged rental refers to a case where one gives another person a peruta as rent, whereas in a flawed rental he provides him with less than the value of a peruta, this poses a difficulty. Is there anyone who said that renting from a gentile for less than the value of a peruta is not valid? Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Ya’akov bar Giyorei, send in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: You should know that one may rent from a gentile even for less than the value of a peruta?
וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג עַל פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְלֹא נִיתָּן לְהִשָּׁבוֹן.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A Noahide, i.e., a gentile who stole is executed for his crime, according to the laws applying to Noahides, even if he stole less than the value of a peruta. A Noahide is particular about his property and unwilling to waive his rights to it, even if it is of minimal value; therefore, the prohibition against stealing applies to items of any value whatsoever. And in the case of Noahides, the stolen item is not returnable, as the possibility of rectification by returning a stolen object was granted only to Jews. The principle that less than the value of a peruta is not considered money applies to Jews alone. With regard to gentiles, it has monetary value, and therefore one may rent from a gentile with this amount.
אֶלָּא: בְּרִיאָה — בְּמוּהְרְקֵי וָאבוּרְגָנֵי, רְעוּעָה — בְּלָא מוּהְרְקֵי וָאבוּרְגָנֵי. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה בָּעִינַן.
Rather, the distinction between a full-fledged rental and a flawed rental should be explained as follows: A full-fledged rental refers to one that is confirmed by legal documents [moharkei] and guaranteed by officials [aburganei]; and a flawed rental means one that is not confirmed by legal documents and guaranteed by officials, an agreement that is unenforceable in court. Based on this explanation, the Gemara reiterates what was stated earlier with regard to the gentile’s concern about renting: This works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, as it is clear why the gentile would refuse to rent out his property.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה בָּעִינַן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי חָשֵׁישׁ גּוֹי לִכְשָׁפִים, וְלָא מוֹגַר.
But according to the one who said that we require only a flawed rental, what is there to say in this regard? Why shouldn’t the gentile want to rent out his residence? The Gemara answers: Even so, the gentile is concerned about witchcraft, i.e., that the procedure is used to cast a spell on him, and therefore he does not rent out his residence.
גּוּפָא: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה, וּמוּתָּר לְהַכְנִיס וּלְהוֹצִיא מִן חָצֵר לַבָּתִּים וּמִן בָּתִּים לֶחָצֵר.
The Gemara examines the ruling in the Tosefta cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, and it is permitted to carry in and carry out from the courtyard to the houses and from the houses to the courtyard, as the halakhot of eiruvin do not apply to the residences of gentiles.
וְאִם יֵשׁ שָׁם יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶחָד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
But if there is one Jew living there in the same courtyard as the gentile, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or vice versa. The Jew may carry there only if he rents the gentile’s property for the duration of Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵי יִשְׂרְאֵלִים אוֹסְרִים זֶה עַל זֶה.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for the Jew to carry unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv, and the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective.
אָמַר מָר: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה. וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: הַדָּר עִם הַנׇּכְרִי בֶּחָצֵר הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹסֵר עָלָיו!
The Gemara proceeds to analyze the Tosefta: The Master said above: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, which implies that the residence of a gentile is not considered a significant residence. But didn’t we learn otherwise in the mishna: One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard this person prohibits him from carrying? This implies that a gentile’s residence is in fact of significance.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — דְּאִיתֵיהּ. הָא — דְּלֵיתֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. This halakha in the mishna is referring to a situation where the gentile is present, and therefore carrying is prohibited, whereas that halakha in the Tosefta refers to a situation where he is not present, and therefore carrying is permitted.
וּמַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ גּוֹי נָמֵי נִיתְּסַר. וְאִי קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי לָא נִיתְּסַר!
The Gemara poses a question: What does Rabbi Meir hold? If he holds that a residence without its owners is still considered a residence, and it is prohibited to carry in the courtyard even when the owner is away, then even a gentile in absentia should likewise render it prohibited for carrying. And if he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, then even a Jew who is away should also not render it prohibited for carrying.
לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים — לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה. וְיִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ אָסַר, כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ — גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara answers: Actually, he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, but nevertheless, he draws a distinction between a Jew and a gentile. In the case of a Jew, who renders it prohibited to carry for those who dwell in the same courtyard when he is present in his residence, the Sages decreed with regard to him that even when he is not present, his residence renders it prohibited for them to carry as though he were present.
גּוֹי, דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ — גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִלְמַד מִמַּעֲשָׂיו. כִּי אִיתֵיהּ — אָסַר, כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ — לָא אָסַר.
However, with regard to a gentile, who even when he is present does not fundamentally render it prohibited to carry, but only due to a rabbinic decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways, no further decree was necessary. Thus, when he is present, the gentile renders it prohibited to carry; but when he is not present, he does not render it prohibited to carry.
וְכִי לֵיתֵיהּ, לָא אָסַר? וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ וְהָלַךְ לוֹ לִשְׁבּוֹת בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, אֶחָד נׇכְרִי וְאֶחָד יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara asks: And when the gentile is not present, does he really not render it prohibited for carrying? Didn’t we learn elsewhere in a mishna: With regard to one who left his house without establishing an eiruv and went to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents of his courtyard to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard and vice versa. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, a gentile renders it prohibited to carry in the courtyard even if he is not present.
הָתָם דְּאָתֵי בְּיוֹמֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a situation where the person who left his house without establishing an eiruv intends to return on that same day, on Shabbat. Since upon his return he will render it prohibited for others to carry in the courtyard, the decree is applied even before he returns home. However, if he left his house intending to return after the conclusion of Shabbat, he does not render it prohibited to carry, in absentia.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב. וְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר: מִנְהָג כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: נָהֲגוּ הָעָם כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And Rav Huna said: This is not an established halakha to be issued publicly; rather, the custom is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, i.e., a Sage would rule according to his opinion for those who come to ask. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The people are accustomed to conduct themselves in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Accordingly, a Sage would not issue such a ruling even to those who inquire, but if someone acts leniently in accordance with his opinion, he would not object.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: קַיְימָא לַן מִשְׁנַת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב קַב וְנָקִי, וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.
Abaye said to Rav Yosef, his teacher: We maintain that the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov measures a kav, but is clean, meaning that it is small in quantity but clear and complete, and that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in all instances. Moreover, with regard to our issue, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and therefore there is no doubt about the matter.
מַהוּ לְאוֹרוֹיֵי בִּמְקוֹם רַבּוֹ?
However, what is the halakha with regard to whether a disciple may issue a ruling according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction, i.e., in a place where he is the recognized authority? Although it is usually prohibited to do so, perhaps such an evident and well-known principle such as this does not fall into the category of rulings that a disciple may not issue in his teacher’s territory.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲפִילּוּ בֵּיעֲתָא בְּכוּתָּחָא בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב חִסְדָּא כׇּל שְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְלָא אוֹרִי.
Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ, a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אַבָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: כְּגוֹן מְגִלַּת תַּעֲנִית דִּכְתִיבָא וּמַנְּחָא. מַהוּ לְאוֹרוֹיֵי בְּאַתְרֵיהּ דְּרַבֵּיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֲפִילּוּ בֵּיעֲתָא בְּכוּתָּחָא בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב חִסְדָּא כׇּל שְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְלָא אוֹרִי.
Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba said to Abaye: With regard to matters such as those detailed in Megillat Ta’anit, which is written and laid on the shelf for all to access and offers a list of the days on which fasting is prohibited, what is the halakha concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction? Abaye said to him: Rav Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.
רַב חִסְדָּא אוֹרִי בְּכַפְרִי בִּשְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא.
The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.
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Ra’anana, Israel
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Givat Zev, Israel
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Zichron Yaakov, Israel
Eruvin 62
גְּמָ׳ יָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי בַּר אָבִין וְרַב חִינָּנָא בַּר אָבִין, וְיָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר קָסָבַר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה, וְלָא שְׁנָא חַד וְלָא שְׁנָא תְּרֵי.
GEMARA: Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥinana bar Avin were sitting, and Abaye was sitting beside them, and they sat and said: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the author of the unattributed mishna, is clear, as he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence. In other words, the gentile living in the courtyard is considered a resident who has a share in the courtyard. Since he cannot join in an eiruv with the Jew, he renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or from the courtyard to his house. Consequently, the case of one Jew living in the courtyard is no different from the case of two Jews living there. In both cases, the gentile renders it prohibited for carrying.
אֶלָּא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ חַד נָמֵי נִיתְּסַר! וְאִי לָא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי נָמֵי לָא נִיתְּסַר!
But Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, what does he hold? If you say he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence, he should prohibit carrying even when there is only one Jew living in the courtyard. And if it is not considered a significant residence, he should not prohibit carrying even when there are two Jews living there.
אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי: וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר דִּירַת גּוֹי שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל נׇכְרִי — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה.
Abaye said to them: Your basic premise is based on a faulty assumption. Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence? Wasn’t it taught in the Tosefta: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, i.e., just as an animal pen does not render it prohibited to carry in a courtyard, so too, the gentile’s residence in itself does not impose restrictions on a Jew.
אֶלָּא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דִּירַת גּוֹי לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה, וְהָכָא בִּגְזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִלְמַד מִמַּעֲשָׂיו קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
Rather, this explanation must be rejected, and the dispute in the mishna should be understood differently: Everyone agrees that the residence of gentile is not considered a significant residence, and here they disagree about a decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways. The disagreement is with regard to whether this decree is applicable only when there are two Jews living in the courtyard, or even when there is only one Jew living there.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דְּגוֹי חָשׁוּד אַשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, תְּרֵי דִּשְׁכִיחִי דְּדָיְירִי — גְּזַרוּ בְּהוּ, חַד לָא שְׁכִיחַ — לָא גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The disagreement should be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that since a gentile is suspected of bloodshed, it is unusual for a single Jew to share a courtyard with a gentile. However, it is not unusual for two or more Jews to do so, as they will protect each other. Therefore, in the case of two Jews, who commonly live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages issued a decree to the effect that the gentile renders it prohibited for them to carry. This would cause great inconvenience to Jews living with gentiles and would thereby motivate the Jews to distance themselves from gentiles. In this manner, the Sages sought to prevent the Jews from learning from the gentiles’ ways. However, in the case of one Jew, for whom it is not common to live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages did not issue a decree that the gentile renders it prohibited for him to carry, as the Sages do not issue decrees for uncommon situations.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: זִמְנִין דְּמִקְּרֵי וְדָיֵיר. וַאֲמַרוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין עֵירוּב מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם גּוֹי, וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם גּוֹי, עַד שֶׁיַּשְׂכִּיר. וְגוֹי לָא מוֹגַר.
On the other hand, Rabbi Meir holds that sometimes it happens that a single Jew lives together with a gentile in the same courtyard, and hence it is appropriate to issue the decree in such a case as well. Therefore, the Sages said: An eiruv is not effective in a place where a gentile is living, nor is the renunciation of rights to a courtyard in favor of the other residents effective in a place where a gentile is living. Therefore, carrying is prohibited in a courtyard in which a gentile resides, unless the gentile rents out his property to one of the Jews for the purpose of an eiruv regardless of the number of Jews living there. And as a gentile would not be willing to rent out his property for this purpose, the living conditions will become too strained, prompting the Jew to move.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר: דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאַחְזוֹקֵי בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה בָּעִינַן.
The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that a gentile will not rent out his property for the purpose of an eiruv? If you say it is because the gentile thinks that perhaps they will later come to take possession of his property based on this rental, this works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, i.e., that rental for the purpose of an eiruv must be proper and valid according to all the halakhot of renting.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה בָּעִינַן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? דְּאִתְּמַר, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה. וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה.
However, according to the one who said that we require only a flawed, symbolic rental, i.e., all that is needed is a token gesture that has the appearance of renting, what is there to say? The gentile would understand that it is not a real rental, and therefore he would not be wary of renting out his residence. As it was stated that the amora’im disputed this issue as follows: Rav Ḥisda said that we require a full-fledged rental, and Rav Sheshet said: A flawed, symbolic rental is sufficient.
מַאי רְעוּעָה, מַאי בְּרִיאָה? אִילֵּימָא: בְּרִיאָה — בִּפְרוּטָה, רְעוּעָה — פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִגּוֹי בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה לָא? וְהָא שָׁלַח רַבִּי יִצְחָק בְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר גִּיּוֹרֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲווֹ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁשּׂוֹכְרִין מִן הַגּוֹי אֲפִילּוּ בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
Having mentioned this dispute, the Gemara now clarifies its particulars: What is a flawed rental, and what is a full-fledged one? If you say that a full-fledged rental refers to a case where one gives another person a peruta as rent, whereas in a flawed rental he provides him with less than the value of a peruta, this poses a difficulty. Is there anyone who said that renting from a gentile for less than the value of a peruta is not valid? Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Ya’akov bar Giyorei, send in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: You should know that one may rent from a gentile even for less than the value of a peruta?
וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג עַל פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְלֹא נִיתָּן לְהִשָּׁבוֹן.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A Noahide, i.e., a gentile who stole is executed for his crime, according to the laws applying to Noahides, even if he stole less than the value of a peruta. A Noahide is particular about his property and unwilling to waive his rights to it, even if it is of minimal value; therefore, the prohibition against stealing applies to items of any value whatsoever. And in the case of Noahides, the stolen item is not returnable, as the possibility of rectification by returning a stolen object was granted only to Jews. The principle that less than the value of a peruta is not considered money applies to Jews alone. With regard to gentiles, it has monetary value, and therefore one may rent from a gentile with this amount.
אֶלָּא: בְּרִיאָה — בְּמוּהְרְקֵי וָאבוּרְגָנֵי, רְעוּעָה — בְּלָא מוּהְרְקֵי וָאבוּרְגָנֵי. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת בְּרִיאָה בָּעִינַן.
Rather, the distinction between a full-fledged rental and a flawed rental should be explained as follows: A full-fledged rental refers to one that is confirmed by legal documents [moharkei] and guaranteed by officials [aburganei]; and a flawed rental means one that is not confirmed by legal documents and guaranteed by officials, an agreement that is unenforceable in court. Based on this explanation, the Gemara reiterates what was stated earlier with regard to the gentile’s concern about renting: This works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, as it is clear why the gentile would refuse to rent out his property.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: שְׂכִירוּת רְעוּעָה בָּעִינַן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי חָשֵׁישׁ גּוֹי לִכְשָׁפִים, וְלָא מוֹגַר.
But according to the one who said that we require only a flawed rental, what is there to say in this regard? Why shouldn’t the gentile want to rent out his residence? The Gemara answers: Even so, the gentile is concerned about witchcraft, i.e., that the procedure is used to cast a spell on him, and therefore he does not rent out his residence.
גּוּפָא: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה, וּמוּתָּר לְהַכְנִיס וּלְהוֹצִיא מִן חָצֵר לַבָּתִּים וּמִן בָּתִּים לֶחָצֵר.
The Gemara examines the ruling in the Tosefta cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, and it is permitted to carry in and carry out from the courtyard to the houses and from the houses to the courtyard, as the halakhot of eiruvin do not apply to the residences of gentiles.
וְאִם יֵשׁ שָׁם יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶחָד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
But if there is one Jew living there in the same courtyard as the gentile, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or vice versa. The Jew may carry there only if he rents the gentile’s property for the duration of Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵי יִשְׂרְאֵלִים אוֹסְרִים זֶה עַל זֶה.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for the Jew to carry unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv, and the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective.
אָמַר מָר: חֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי הֲרֵי הוּא כְּדִיר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה. וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: הַדָּר עִם הַנׇּכְרִי בֶּחָצֵר הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹסֵר עָלָיו!
The Gemara proceeds to analyze the Tosefta: The Master said above: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, which implies that the residence of a gentile is not considered a significant residence. But didn’t we learn otherwise in the mishna: One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard this person prohibits him from carrying? This implies that a gentile’s residence is in fact of significance.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — דְּאִיתֵיהּ. הָא — דְּלֵיתֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. This halakha in the mishna is referring to a situation where the gentile is present, and therefore carrying is prohibited, whereas that halakha in the Tosefta refers to a situation where he is not present, and therefore carrying is permitted.
וּמַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ גּוֹי נָמֵי נִיתְּסַר. וְאִי קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה — אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי לָא נִיתְּסַר!
The Gemara poses a question: What does Rabbi Meir hold? If he holds that a residence without its owners is still considered a residence, and it is prohibited to carry in the courtyard even when the owner is away, then even a gentile in absentia should likewise render it prohibited for carrying. And if he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, then even a Jew who is away should also not render it prohibited for carrying.
לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר דִּירָה בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים — לֹא שְׁמָהּ דִּירָה. וְיִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ אָסַר, כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ — גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara answers: Actually, he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, but nevertheless, he draws a distinction between a Jew and a gentile. In the case of a Jew, who renders it prohibited to carry for those who dwell in the same courtyard when he is present in his residence, the Sages decreed with regard to him that even when he is not present, his residence renders it prohibited for them to carry as though he were present.
גּוֹי, דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ — גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִלְמַד מִמַּעֲשָׂיו. כִּי אִיתֵיהּ — אָסַר, כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ — לָא אָסַר.
However, with regard to a gentile, who even when he is present does not fundamentally render it prohibited to carry, but only due to a rabbinic decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways, no further decree was necessary. Thus, when he is present, the gentile renders it prohibited to carry; but when he is not present, he does not render it prohibited to carry.
וְכִי לֵיתֵיהּ, לָא אָסַר? וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ וְהָלַךְ לוֹ לִשְׁבּוֹת בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, אֶחָד נׇכְרִי וְאֶחָד יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara asks: And when the gentile is not present, does he really not render it prohibited for carrying? Didn’t we learn elsewhere in a mishna: With regard to one who left his house without establishing an eiruv and went to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents of his courtyard to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard and vice versa. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, a gentile renders it prohibited to carry in the courtyard even if he is not present.
הָתָם דְּאָתֵי בְּיוֹמֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a situation where the person who left his house without establishing an eiruv intends to return on that same day, on Shabbat. Since upon his return he will render it prohibited for others to carry in the courtyard, the decree is applied even before he returns home. However, if he left his house intending to return after the conclusion of Shabbat, he does not render it prohibited to carry, in absentia.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב. וְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר: מִנְהָג כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: נָהֲגוּ הָעָם כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And Rav Huna said: This is not an established halakha to be issued publicly; rather, the custom is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, i.e., a Sage would rule according to his opinion for those who come to ask. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The people are accustomed to conduct themselves in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Accordingly, a Sage would not issue such a ruling even to those who inquire, but if someone acts leniently in accordance with his opinion, he would not object.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: קַיְימָא לַן מִשְׁנַת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב קַב וְנָקִי, וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.
Abaye said to Rav Yosef, his teacher: We maintain that the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov measures a kav, but is clean, meaning that it is small in quantity but clear and complete, and that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in all instances. Moreover, with regard to our issue, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and therefore there is no doubt about the matter.
מַהוּ לְאוֹרוֹיֵי בִּמְקוֹם רַבּוֹ?
However, what is the halakha with regard to whether a disciple may issue a ruling according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction, i.e., in a place where he is the recognized authority? Although it is usually prohibited to do so, perhaps such an evident and well-known principle such as this does not fall into the category of rulings that a disciple may not issue in his teacher’s territory.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲפִילּוּ בֵּיעֲתָא בְּכוּתָּחָא בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב חִסְדָּא כׇּל שְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְלָא אוֹרִי.
Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ, a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אַבָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: כְּגוֹן מְגִלַּת תַּעֲנִית דִּכְתִיבָא וּמַנְּחָא. מַהוּ לְאוֹרוֹיֵי בְּאַתְרֵיהּ דְּרַבֵּיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֲפִילּוּ בֵּיעֲתָא בְּכוּתָּחָא בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב חִסְדָּא כׇּל שְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְלָא אוֹרִי.
Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba said to Abaye: With regard to matters such as those detailed in Megillat Ta’anit, which is written and laid on the shelf for all to access and offers a list of the days on which fasting is prohibited, what is the halakha concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction? Abaye said to him: Rav Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.
רַב חִסְדָּא אוֹרִי בְּכַפְרִי בִּשְׁנֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא.
The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.
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