Eruvin 62

גמ׳ יתיב אביי בר אבין ורב חיננא בר אבין ויתיב אביי גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי בשלמא רבי מאיר קסבר דירת גוי שמה דירה ולא שנא חד ולא שנא תרי

GEMARA: Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥinana bar Avin were sitting, and Abaye was sitting beside them, and they sat and said: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the author of the unattributed mishna, is clear, as he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence. In other words, the gentile living in the courtyard is considered a resident who has a share in the courtyard. Since he cannot join in an eiruv with the Jew, he renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or from the courtyard to his house. Consequently, the case of one Jew living in the courtyard is no different from the case of two Jews living there. In both cases, the gentile renders it prohibited for carrying.

אלא רבי אליעזר בן יעקב מאי קסבר אי קסבר דירת גוי שמה דירה אפילו חד נמי ניתסר ואי לא שמה דירה אפילו תרי נמי לא ניתסר

But Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, what does he hold? If you say he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence, he should prohibit carrying even when there is only one Jew living in the courtyard. And if it is not considered a significant residence, he should not prohibit carrying even when there are two Jews living there.

אמר להו אביי וסבר רבי מאיר דירת גוי שמה דירה והתניא חצירו של נכרי הרי הוא כדיר של בהמה

Abaye said to them: Your basic premise is based on a faulty assumption. Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant residence? Wasn’t it taught in the Tosefta: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, i.e., just as an animal pen does not render it prohibited to carry in a courtyard, so too, the gentile’s residence in itself does not impose restrictions on a Jew.

אלא דכולי עלמא דירת גוי לא שמה דירה והכא בגזירה שמא ילמד ממעשיו קא מיפלגי

Rather, this explanation must be rejected, and the dispute in the mishna should be understood differently: Everyone agrees that the residence of gentile is not considered a significant residence, and here they disagree about a decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways. The disagreement is with regard to whether this decree is applicable only when there are two Jews living in the courtyard, or even when there is only one Jew living there.

רבי אליעזר בן יעקב סבר כיון דגוי חשוד אשפיכות דמים תרי דשכיחי דדיירי גזרו בהו חד לא שכיח לא גזרו ביה רבנן

The disagreement should be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that since a gentile is suspected of bloodshed, it is unusual for a single Jew to share a courtyard with a gentile. However, it is not unusual for two or more Jews to do so, as they will protect each other. Therefore, in the case of two Jews, who commonly live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages issued a decree to the effect that the gentile renders it prohibited for them to carry. This would cause great inconvenience to Jews living with gentiles and would thereby motivate the Jews to distance themselves from gentiles. In this manner, the Sages sought to prevent the Jews from learning from the gentiles’ ways. However, in the case of one Jew, for whom it is not common to live together with a gentile in the same courtyard, the Sages did not issue a decree that the gentile renders it prohibited for him to carry, as the Sages do not issue decrees for uncommon situations.

ורבי מאיר סבר זמנין דמקרי ודייר ואמרו רבנן אין עירוב מועיל במקום גוי ואין ביטול רשות מועיל במקום גוי עד שישכיר וגוי לא מוגר

On the other hand, Rabbi Meir holds that sometimes it happens that a single Jew lives together with a gentile in the same courtyard, and hence it is appropriate to issue the decree in such a case as well. Therefore, the Sages said: An eiruv is not effective in a place where a gentile is living, nor is the renunciation of rights to a courtyard in favor of the other residents effective in a place where a gentile is living. Therefore, carrying is prohibited in a courtyard in which a gentile resides, unless the gentile rents out his property to one of the Jews for the purpose of an eiruv regardless of the number of Jews living there. And as a gentile would not be willing to rent out his property for this purpose, the living conditions will become too strained, prompting the Jew to move.

מאי טעמא אילימא משום דסבר דלמא אתי לאחזוקי ברשותו הניחא למאן דאמר שכירות בריאה בעינן

The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason that a gentile will not rent out his property for the purpose of an eiruv? If you say it is because the gentile thinks that perhaps they will later come to take possession of his property based on this rental, this works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, i.e., that rental for the purpose of an eiruv must be proper and valid according to all the halakhot of renting.

אלא למאן דאמר שכירות רעועה בעינן מאי איכא למימר דאתמר רב חסדא אמר שכירות בריאה ורב ששת אמר שכירות רעועה

However, according to the one who said that we require only a flawed, symbolic rental, i.e., all that is needed is a token gesture that has the appearance of renting, what is there to say? The gentile would understand that it is not a real rental, and therefore he would not be wary of renting out his residence. As it was stated that the amora’im disputed this issue as follows: Rav Ḥisda said that we require a full-fledged rental, and Rav Sheshet said: A flawed, symbolic rental is sufficient.

מאי רעועה מאי בריאה אילימא בריאה בפרוטה רעועה פחות משוה פרוטה מי איכא למאן דאמר מגוי בפחות משוה פרוטה לא והא שלח רבי יצחק ברבי יעקב בר גיורי משמיה דרבי יוחנן הוו יודעין ששוכרין מן הגוי אפילו בפחות משוה פרוטה

Having mentioned this dispute, the Gemara now clarifies its particulars: What is a flawed rental, and what is a full-fledged one? If you say that a full-fledged rental refers to a case where one gives another person a peruta as rent, whereas in a flawed rental he provides him with less than the value of a peruta, this poses a difficulty. Is there anyone who said that renting from a gentile for less than the value of a peruta is not valid? Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Ya’akov bar Giyorei, send in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: You should know that one may rent from a gentile even for less than the value of a peruta?

ואמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן בן נח נהרג על פחות משוה פרוטה ולא ניתן להשבון

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A Noahide, i.e., a gentile who stole is executed for his crime, according to the laws applying to Noahides, even if he stole less than the value of a peruta. A Noahide is particular about his property and unwilling to waive his rights to it, even if it is of minimal value; therefore, the prohibition against stealing applies to items of any value whatsoever. And in the case of Noahides, the stolen item is not returnable, as the possibility of rectification by returning a stolen object was granted only to Jews. The principle that less than the value of a peruta is not considered money applies to Jews alone. With regard to gentiles, it has monetary value, and therefore one may rent from a gentile with this amount.

אלא בריאה במוהרקי ואבורגני רעועה בלא מוהרקי ואבורגני הניחא למאן דאמר שכירות בריאה בעינן

Rather, the distinction between a full-fledged rental and a flawed rental should be explained as follows: A full-fledged rental refers to one that is confirmed by legal documents [moharkei] and guaranteed by officials [aburganei]; and a flawed rental means one that is not confirmed by legal documents and guaranteed by officials, an agreement that is unenforceable in court. Based on this explanation, the Gemara reiterates what was stated earlier with regard to the gentile’s concern about renting: This works out well according to the one who said that we require a full-fledged rental, as it is clear why the gentile would refuse to rent out his property.

אלא למאן דאמר שכירות רעועה בעינן מאי איכא למימר אפילו הכי חשיש גוי לכשפים ולא מוגר

But according to the one who said that we require only a flawed rental, what is there to say in this regard? Why shouldn’t the gentile want to rent out his residence? The Gemara answers: Even so, the gentile is concerned about witchcraft, i.e., that the procedure is used to cast a spell on him, and therefore he does not rent out his residence.

גופא חצירו של גוי הרי הוא כדיר של בהמה ומותר להכניס ולהוציא מן חצר לבתים ומן בתים לחצר

The Gemara examines the ruling in the Tosefta cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, and it is permitted to carry in and carry out from the courtyard to the houses and from the houses to the courtyard, as the halakhot of eiruvin do not apply to the residences of gentiles.

ואם יש שם ישראל אחד אוסר דברי רבי מאיר

But if there is one Jew living there in the same courtyard as the gentile, the gentile renders it prohibited for the Jew to carry from his house to the courtyard or vice versa. The Jew may carry there only if he rents the gentile’s property for the duration of Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר לעולם אינו אוסר עד שיהו שני ישראלים אוסרים זה על זה

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for the Jew to carry unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv, and the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective.

אמר מר חצירו של גוי הרי הוא כדיר של בהמה והא אנן תנן הדר עם הנכרי בחצר הרי זה אוסר עליו

The Gemara proceeds to analyze the Tosefta: The Master said above: The courtyard of a gentile is like the pen of an animal, which implies that the residence of a gentile is not considered a significant residence. But didn’t we learn otherwise in the mishna: One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard this person prohibits him from carrying? This implies that a gentile’s residence is in fact of significance.

לא קשיא הא דאיתיה הא דליתיה

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. This halakha in the mishna is referring to a situation where the gentile is present, and therefore carrying is prohibited, whereas that halakha in the Tosefta refers to a situation where he is not present, and therefore carrying is permitted.

ומאי קסבר אי קסבר דירה בלא בעלים שמה דירה אפילו גוי נמי ניתסר ואי קסבר דירה בלא בעלים לא שמה דירה אפילו ישראל נמי לא ניתסר

The Gemara poses a question: What does Rabbi Meir hold? If he holds that a residence without its owners is still considered a residence, and it is prohibited to carry in the courtyard even when the owner is away, then even a gentile in absentia should likewise render it prohibited for carrying. And if he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, then even a Jew who is away should also not render it prohibited for carrying.

לעולם קסבר דירה בלא בעלים לא שמה דירה וישראל דכי איתיה אסר כי ליתיה גזרו ביה רבנן

The Gemara answers: Actually, he holds that a residence without its owners is not considered a residence, but nevertheless, he draws a distinction between a Jew and a gentile. In the case of a Jew, who renders it prohibited to carry for those who dwell in the same courtyard when he is present in his residence, the Sages decreed with regard to him that even when he is not present, his residence renders it prohibited for them to carry as though he were present.

גוי דכי איתיה גזירה שמא ילמד ממעשיו כי איתיה אסר כי ליתיה לא אסר

However, with regard to a gentile, who even when he is present does not fundamentally render it prohibited to carry, but only due to a rabbinic decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways, no further decree was necessary. Thus, when he is present, the gentile renders it prohibited to carry; but when he is not present, he does not render it prohibited to carry.

וכי ליתיה לא אסר והתנן המניח את ביתו והלך לו לשבות בעיר אחרת אחד נכרי ואחד ישראל אוסר דברי רבי מאיר

The Gemara asks: And when the gentile is not present, does he really not render it prohibited for carrying? Didn’t we learn elsewhere in a mishna: With regard to one who left his house without establishing an eiruv and went to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents of his courtyard to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard and vice versa. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, a gentile renders it prohibited to carry in the courtyard even if he is not present.

התם דאתי ביומיה

The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a situation where the person who left his house without establishing an eiruv intends to return on that same day, on Shabbat. Since upon his return he will render it prohibited for others to carry in the courtyard, the decree is applied even before he returns home. However, if he left his house intending to return after the conclusion of Shabbat, he does not render it prohibited to carry, in absentia.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב ורב הונא אמר מנהג כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב ורבי יוחנן אמר נהגו העם כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And Rav Huna said: This is not an established halakha to be issued publicly; rather, the custom is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, i.e., a Sage would rule according to his opinion for those who come to ask. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The people are accustomed to conduct themselves in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Accordingly, a Sage would not issue such a ruling even to those who inquire, but if someone acts leniently in accordance with his opinion, he would not object.

אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף קיימא לן משנת רבי אליעזר בן יעקב קב ונקי ואמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב

Abaye said to Rav Yosef, his teacher: We maintain that the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov measures a kav, but is clean, meaning that it is small in quantity but clear and complete, and that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in all instances. Moreover, with regard to our issue, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and therefore there is no doubt about the matter.

מהו לאורויי במקום רבו

However, what is the halakha with regard to whether a disciple may issue a ruling according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction, i.e., in a place where he is the recognized authority? Although it is usually prohibited to do so, perhaps such an evident and well-known principle such as this does not fall into the category of rulings that a disciple may not issue in his teacher’s territory.

אמר ליה אפילו ביעתא בכותחא בעו מיניה מרב חסדא כל שני דרב הונא ולא אורי

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ, a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.

אמר ליה רבי יעקב בר אבא לאביי כגון מגלת תענית דכתיבא ומנחא מהו לאורויי באתריה דרביה אמר ליה הכי אמר רב יוסף אפילו ביעתא בכותחא בעו מיניה מרב חסדא כל שני דרב הונא ולא אורי

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba said to Abaye: With regard to matters such as those detailed in Megillat Ta’anit, which is written and laid on the shelf for all to access and offers a list of the days on which fasting is prohibited, what is the halakha concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction? Abaye said to him: Rav Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.

רב חסדא אורי בכפרי בשני דרב הונא

The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.