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Eruvin 66

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Summary

Today’s daf is dedicated in memory of Avraham Nachum ben Yitzchak Refael z”l on his yahrzeit. His dedication to Daf Yomi is an inspiration to his family, who continue in his footsteps. And by Debbie and Michael Schreiber in honor of our first grandchild Naomi Frumit to our children Yarden and Adam Schreiber of Jerusalem. May she flourish and grow and may her parents raise her to torah, chuppah and maasim tovim in a home that I know will be filled with love and simcha and Torah learning.

Does Rabbi Yochanan really hold that one can make a rental arrangement on Shabbat with a gentile to allow carrying as happened in the situation at the inn? Didn’t Rabbi Yochanan make a comparison between making an eruv (which can only be done on Shabbat) and renting from a gentile? The gemara explains the comparison as regarding other issues and not whether or not it can be done on Shabbat. Shmuel describes differences between cases where there are courtyards and one forbids or doesn’t forbid the other and one can or cannot make an eruv with the other and concludes in which circumstances relinquishing rights would be permitted. One of his cases seems to be referring to the case in the inn with the gentile and Shmuel’s conclusion contradicts Rabbi Yochanan who allowed relinquishing of rights in that case (after the gentile rented the space to them, they needed to relinquish their rights to one of the Jews as their eruv was nullified). The gemara delves more in depth into Shmuel’s approach in some of the cases he mentioned which is based on the concept that relinquishing of rights from one courtyard to another is forbidden. Rava and Abaye disagree regarding the extent to which Shmuel said this? In which cases would be make exceptions?

Eruvin 66

יָפֶה עֲשִׂיתֶם שֶׁשְּׂכַרְתֶּם. תָּהוּ בָּהּ נְהַרְדָּעֵי: וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שׂוֹכֵר כִּמְעָרֵב דָּמֵי. מַאי לָאו: מָה מְעָרֵב מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, אַף שׂוֹכֵר מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם!

You acted well when you rented. The Sages of Neharde’a wondered at this teaching: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say just the opposite: Renting from a gentile is like establishing an eiruv? What, is he not to be understood as imposing a stringency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so only while it is still day, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property must do so while it is still day?

לָא, מָה מְעָרֵב וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אַף שׂוֹכֵר בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. וּמָה מְעָרֵב אֲפִילּוּ שְׂכִירוֹ וּלְקִיטוֹ, אַף שׂוֹכֵר אֲפִילּוּ שְׂכִירוֹ וּלְקִיטוֹ.

The Gemara rejects this argument: No, his statement was intended as a leniency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so even with less than the value of a peruta, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property may rent it for less than the value of a peruta. And just as the one who establishes an eiruv need not be the owner himself, but even his hired laborer or harvester may do so, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property need not rent from the landlord himself, but may rent even from his hired laborer or harvester who are acting on his behalf.

וּמָה מְעָרֵב חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אַחַת — אֶחָד מְעָרֵב עַל יְדֵי כּוּלָּן, שׂוֹכֵר נָמֵי, חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אַחַת — אֶחָד שׂוֹכֵר עַל יְדֵי כּוּלָּן.

And similarly, just as with regard to one who establishes an eiruv, the halakha is that if five people live in the same courtyard, one of them may establish an eiruv with the residents of a different courtyard on behalf of them all, so too, with regard to one who rents a gentile’s property; if five people live in the same courtyard together with a gentile, one of them may rent the gentile’s property on behalf of them all.

תָּהֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַאי תִּהְיָיא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה כְּרַבִּי זֵירָא לָא יָדַע מַאי תִּהְיָיא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל רַבֵּיהּ.

Rabbi Elazar wondered at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that the Sages had acted well when they rented the gentile’s property on Shabbat and then they renounced their rights to that one, so that at least it would be permitted to use the courtyard. Rabbi Zeira said: What was the reason for Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? Rav Sheshet said: Can it be that such a great person as Rabbi Zeira did not know what was the source of Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? He had difficulty with a statement of his teacher, Shmuel.

דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאוֹסְרִין וּמְעָרְבִין — מְבַטְּלִין. מְעָרְבִין וְאֵין אוֹסְרִין, אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין.

As Shmuel said: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish a joint eiruv if they so desire, in order to permit carrying, each may renounce his property rights for the other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat. However, in a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render it prohibited for each other for carrying, or where they render it prohibited for each other for carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such situations they may not renounce their property rights for each other.

כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאוֹסְרִין וּמְעָרְבִין — מְבַטְּלִין, כְּגוֹן שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ.

The Gemara clarifies the above teaching: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish an eiruv, they may renounce their rights for each other, such as in the case of two courtyards, one within the other. The residents of the two courtyards render each other prohibited to carry between the courtyards, but they may establish a joint eiruv in order to permit carrying. In such a case, the residents may renounce their property rights for each other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat.

מְעָרְבִין וְאֵין אוֹסְרִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין, כְּגוֹן שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן.

In a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render each other prohibited to carry, they may not renounce their property rights for each other, in a case where two courtyards both opening to an alleyway that have a single opening between them. Even though the two courtyards may establish a joint eiruv and be considered a single courtyard, they do not render it prohibited for each other to carry if they did not do so, because neither needs to make use of the other. Consequently, there is no option of renouncing rights in favor of the other courtyard.

אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי, לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי גּוֹי?

In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, what does this come to include? In reference to which case did Shmuel make this statement? Wasn’t it meant to include a gentile who shares a courtyard with two Jews? The Jewish residents of the courtyard render each other prohibited from carrying in such a case, but they may not establish an eiruv due to the presence of the gentile.

וְאִי דַּאֲתָא מֵאֶתְמוֹל — לוֹגַר מֵאֶתְמוֹל!

The Gemara further analyzes the case: Now, if it is referring to a situation where the gentile arrived on the previous day, i.e., before Shabbat, let him rent the property from the gentile on the previous day. Before Shabbat, both options were available: They could have either established an eiruv or one Jew could have renounced his rights in favor of the other. Therefore, it would not have been considered a situation in which they render each other prohibited to carry but cannot establish an eiruv.

אֶלָּא לָאו, דַּאֲתָא בְּשַׁבְּתָא, וְקָתָנֵי: אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין, אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, is it not referring to a case where the gentile arrived on Shabbat, and Shmuel is teaching: In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such a situation they may not renounce their rights for each other. Therefore, you can learn from this that if the gentile arrived on Shabbat, they cannot rent his property and then renounce their rights to one of them. This explains Rabbi Elazar’s surprise at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling, as it appears to contradict this teaching of Shmuel, his first teacher.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי הָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַתְּ אֲמַרְתְּ נִיהֲלַן, וְאַהָא אֲמַרְתְּ נִיהֲלַן, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Rav Yosef said: I have not heard this halakha of Shmuel’s with regard to two courtyards situated one within the other, that the residents of the inner courtyard may renounce their rights to the outer courtyard in favor of the residents of that courtyard. Abaye said to him: You yourself told it to us. Rav Yosef forgot his studies due to illness, so his student Abaye would remind him of his own teachings. Abaye continued: And it was with regard to this that you told it to us. As Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In other words, while one may renounce his rights to his own courtyard for the other residents of that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights to another courtyard for the residents of that courtyard.

וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה.

Likewise, there is no renunciation of property rights in a ruin. If a ruin was shared by two houses, neither can renounce its rights to the ruin in favor of the other. The Sages instituted renunciation of rights only with regard to a courtyard, as that is the typical case.

וַאֲמַרְתְּ לַן עֲלַהּ: כִּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן. אֲבָל זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה — מְבַטְּלִין.

And you said to us with regard to this matter: When Shmuel said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to a case of two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if the two courtyards were situated one within the other, since the residents of the courtyards render each other prohibited from carrying, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא אָמֵינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין לָנוּ בְּעֵירוּבִין אֶלָּא כִּלְשׁוֹן מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ — ״אַנְשֵׁי חָצֵר״, וְלֹא אַנְשֵׁי חֲצֵירוֹת!

Rav Yosef said to Abaye in surprise: I said that in the name of Shmuel? Didn’t Shmuel say: We may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, which states that the residents of a courtyard, in the singular, may renounce their rights, but not the residents of courtyards in the plural. Therefore, the option of renouncing rights does not apply to two courtyards.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי אֲמַרְתְּ לַן אֵין לָנוּ בְּעֵירוּבִין אֶלָּא כִּלְשׁוֹן מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ — אַהָא אֲמַרְתְּ לַן: שֶׁהַמָּבוֹי לַחֲצֵירוֹת כֶּחָצֵר לַבָּתִּים.

Abaye said to him: When you told us this ruling of Shmuel’s that we may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, you said it to us with regard to the following mishna, which states: That an alleyway in relation to its courtyards is like a courtyard in relation to its houses. Shmuel inferred from this that there must be at least two courtyards with two houses each that open into an alleyway in order to permit carrying there by means of a side post or a cross beam.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, וְיֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה.

The Gemara examines the ruling of Shmuel that was cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is no renunciation of rights in a ruin. But Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed and said: There is renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is renunciation of rights in a ruin.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, בְּהָא קָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתָּא לְחוּד וְהָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתָּא לְחוּד. אֲבָל חוּרְבָּה, דְּתַשְׁמִישְׁתָּא חֲדָא לְתַרְוַויְיהוּ. אֵימָא: מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

The Gemara comments: It is necessary to explain that Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with regard to both cases, as neither case could have been learned from the other. As, if it had taught only that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Shmuel said that there is no renunciation of rights, because the use of the one courtyard stands alone and the use of the other courtyard stands alone. Each courtyard is not used by the residents of the other courtyard, and therefore there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to the other. However, with regard to a ruin, where there is one common use for both neighbors, as the residents of both houses use it, I would say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

וְכִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל, צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, if it was stated only with regard to the case of a ruin, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated his position, but with regard to the other case, renouncing rights from one courtyard to another, perhaps he concedes to Shmuel. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both cases.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן, אֲבָל שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאוֹסְרִין — מְבַטְּלִין.

Abaye said: With regard to that which Shmuel said, that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if there were two courtyards, one within the other, since the residents render each other prohibited to carry, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, פְּעָמִים מְבַטְּלִין וּפְעָמִים אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. כֵּיצַד? נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּחִיצוֹנָה וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד, בֵּין מִן הַפְּנִימִית וּבֵין מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת.

Rava said: Even in the case of two courtyards, one within the other, sometimes the residents may renounce their rights in favor of each other, and sometimes they may not renounce them. How so? If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The person who neglected to establish an eiruv renders it prohibited for the residents of both courtyards to carry, because the eiruv for both courtyards is located in the outer one, and it is prohibited to carry there without an eiruv due to the right of passage of the residents of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard. Therefore, there is no effective eiruv at all, not even for the residents of the inner courtyard.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּפְּנִימִית, וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַפְּנִימִית וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת.

However, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, the following distinction applies: If a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, both courtyards are prohibited. In that case, it is prohibited to carry in the inner courtyard itself, due to the one who did not join in the eiruv. Since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it also renders the outer one prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard must pass through it.

שָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה וְלֹא עֵירַב — פְּנִימִית מוּתֶּרֶת וְחִיצוֹנָה אֲסוּרָה.

On the other hand, if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is permitted to carry in the inner courtyard and it is prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. The residents of the inner courtyard have an eiruv, as they established an eiruv together, and therefore they may carry in their courtyard. The residents of the outer courtyard do not render it prohibited for them to carry, as they do not have the right to pass through the inner courtyard, and the inhabitants of the latter could bar their entrance to the inner courtyard by locking their doors.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּחִיצוֹנָה וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד, בֵּין מִן הַפְּנִימִית וּבֵין מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת. הַאי בַּר פְּנִימִית, לְמַאן נִיבַטֵּיל? לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי פְנִימִית — לֵיתָא לְעֵרוּבַיְיהוּ גַּבַּיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אֵין בִּטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר!

The Gemara explains why the residents of these courtyards cannot avail themselves of the option of renunciation: If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards, and the person who forgot to join in the eiruv cannot renounce his rights to the courtyard. The reason for this is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet that is ineffective, as their eiruv is not with them but in the outer courtyard. Consequently, they would remain without an eiruv, which means they would render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that too is ineffective, as Shmuel ruled that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

הַאי בַּר חִיצוֹנָה לְמַאן נְבַטֵּיל, לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אִיכָּא פְּנִימִית דְּאָסְרָה עֲלַיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי פְּנִימִית — אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Similarly, that resident of the outer courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but there is still the inner courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, but there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the mechanism of permitting carrying by means of renunciation cannot be applied in these cases.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּפְּנִימִית, וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַפְּנִימִית וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת. הַאי בַּר פְּנִימִית לְמַאן נְבַטֵּיל? לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי הַפְּנִימִית — אִיכָּא חִיצוֹנָה דְּאָסְרָה עֲלַיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Likewise, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, and a resident of the inner courtyard forgot to do so and did not establish an eiruv, it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The reason is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet there is still the outer courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying, as the eiruv shared by the courtyards is in essence a valid eiruv, which gives the residents of the outer courtyard the right to enter the inner one. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that is ineffective, as Shmuel maintains that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In that case, since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it renders it prohibited to carry in the outer one as well.

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Eruvin 66

יָפֶה עֲשִׂיתֶם שֶׁשְּׂכַרְתֶּם. תָּהוּ בָּהּ נְהַרְדָּעֵי: וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שׂוֹכֵר כִּמְעָרֵב דָּמֵי. מַאי לָאו: מָה מְעָרֵב מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, אַף שׂוֹכֵר מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם!

You acted well when you rented. The Sages of Neharde’a wondered at this teaching: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say just the opposite: Renting from a gentile is like establishing an eiruv? What, is he not to be understood as imposing a stringency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so only while it is still day, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property must do so while it is still day?

לָא, מָה מְעָרֵב וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, אַף שׂוֹכֵר בְּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. וּמָה מְעָרֵב אֲפִילּוּ שְׂכִירוֹ וּלְקִיטוֹ, אַף שׂוֹכֵר אֲפִילּוּ שְׂכִירוֹ וּלְקִיטוֹ.

The Gemara rejects this argument: No, his statement was intended as a leniency: Just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so even with less than the value of a peruta, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property may rent it for less than the value of a peruta. And just as the one who establishes an eiruv need not be the owner himself, but even his hired laborer or harvester may do so, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property need not rent from the landlord himself, but may rent even from his hired laborer or harvester who are acting on his behalf.

וּמָה מְעָרֵב חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אַחַת — אֶחָד מְעָרֵב עַל יְדֵי כּוּלָּן, שׂוֹכֵר נָמֵי, חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אַחַת — אֶחָד שׂוֹכֵר עַל יְדֵי כּוּלָּן.

And similarly, just as with regard to one who establishes an eiruv, the halakha is that if five people live in the same courtyard, one of them may establish an eiruv with the residents of a different courtyard on behalf of them all, so too, with regard to one who rents a gentile’s property; if five people live in the same courtyard together with a gentile, one of them may rent the gentile’s property on behalf of them all.

תָּהֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַאי תִּהְיָיא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה כְּרַבִּי זֵירָא לָא יָדַע מַאי תִּהְיָיא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל רַבֵּיהּ.

Rabbi Elazar wondered at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that the Sages had acted well when they rented the gentile’s property on Shabbat and then they renounced their rights to that one, so that at least it would be permitted to use the courtyard. Rabbi Zeira said: What was the reason for Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? Rav Sheshet said: Can it be that such a great person as Rabbi Zeira did not know what was the source of Rabbi Elazar’s wonder? He had difficulty with a statement of his teacher, Shmuel.

דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאוֹסְרִין וּמְעָרְבִין — מְבַטְּלִין. מְעָרְבִין וְאֵין אוֹסְרִין, אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין.

As Shmuel said: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish a joint eiruv if they so desire, in order to permit carrying, each may renounce his property rights for the other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat. However, in a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render it prohibited for each other for carrying, or where they render it prohibited for each other for carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such situations they may not renounce their property rights for each other.

כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאוֹסְרִין וּמְעָרְבִין — מְבַטְּלִין, כְּגוֹן שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ.

The Gemara clarifies the above teaching: With regard to any place where the residents render it prohibited for each other to carry but where they may establish an eiruv, they may renounce their rights for each other, such as in the case of two courtyards, one within the other. The residents of the two courtyards render each other prohibited to carry between the courtyards, but they may establish a joint eiruv in order to permit carrying. In such a case, the residents may renounce their property rights for each other if they failed to establish an eiruv before Shabbat.

מְעָרְבִין וְאֵין אוֹסְרִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין, כְּגוֹן שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן.

In a place where the residents may establish an eiruv together but they do not render each other prohibited to carry, they may not renounce their property rights for each other, in a case where two courtyards both opening to an alleyway that have a single opening between them. Even though the two courtyards may establish a joint eiruv and be considered a single courtyard, they do not render it prohibited for each other to carry if they did not do so, because neither needs to make use of the other. Consequently, there is no option of renouncing rights in favor of the other courtyard.

אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין — אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי, לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי גּוֹי?

In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, what does this come to include? In reference to which case did Shmuel make this statement? Wasn’t it meant to include a gentile who shares a courtyard with two Jews? The Jewish residents of the courtyard render each other prohibited from carrying in such a case, but they may not establish an eiruv due to the presence of the gentile.

וְאִי דַּאֲתָא מֵאֶתְמוֹל — לוֹגַר מֵאֶתְמוֹל!

The Gemara further analyzes the case: Now, if it is referring to a situation where the gentile arrived on the previous day, i.e., before Shabbat, let him rent the property from the gentile on the previous day. Before Shabbat, both options were available: They could have either established an eiruv or one Jew could have renounced his rights in favor of the other. Therefore, it would not have been considered a situation in which they render each other prohibited to carry but cannot establish an eiruv.

אֶלָּא לָאו, דַּאֲתָא בְּשַׁבְּתָא, וְקָתָנֵי: אוֹסְרִין וְאֵין מְעָרְבִין, אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, is it not referring to a case where the gentile arrived on Shabbat, and Shmuel is teaching: In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such a situation they may not renounce their rights for each other. Therefore, you can learn from this that if the gentile arrived on Shabbat, they cannot rent his property and then renounce their rights to one of them. This explains Rabbi Elazar’s surprise at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling, as it appears to contradict this teaching of Shmuel, his first teacher.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי הָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַתְּ אֲמַרְתְּ נִיהֲלַן, וְאַהָא אֲמַרְתְּ נִיהֲלַן, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Rav Yosef said: I have not heard this halakha of Shmuel’s with regard to two courtyards situated one within the other, that the residents of the inner courtyard may renounce their rights to the outer courtyard in favor of the residents of that courtyard. Abaye said to him: You yourself told it to us. Rav Yosef forgot his studies due to illness, so his student Abaye would remind him of his own teachings. Abaye continued: And it was with regard to this that you told it to us. As Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In other words, while one may renounce his rights to his own courtyard for the other residents of that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights to another courtyard for the residents of that courtyard.

וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה.

Likewise, there is no renunciation of property rights in a ruin. If a ruin was shared by two houses, neither can renounce its rights to the ruin in favor of the other. The Sages instituted renunciation of rights only with regard to a courtyard, as that is the typical case.

וַאֲמַרְתְּ לַן עֲלַהּ: כִּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן. אֲבָל זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאוֹסְרִין זֶה עַל זֶה — מְבַטְּלִין.

And you said to us with regard to this matter: When Shmuel said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to a case of two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if the two courtyards were situated one within the other, since the residents of the courtyards render each other prohibited from carrying, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא אָמֵינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין לָנוּ בְּעֵירוּבִין אֶלָּא כִּלְשׁוֹן מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ — ״אַנְשֵׁי חָצֵר״, וְלֹא אַנְשֵׁי חֲצֵירוֹת!

Rav Yosef said to Abaye in surprise: I said that in the name of Shmuel? Didn’t Shmuel say: We may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, which states that the residents of a courtyard, in the singular, may renounce their rights, but not the residents of courtyards in the plural. Therefore, the option of renouncing rights does not apply to two courtyards.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי אֲמַרְתְּ לַן אֵין לָנוּ בְּעֵירוּבִין אֶלָּא כִּלְשׁוֹן מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ — אַהָא אֲמַרְתְּ לַן: שֶׁהַמָּבוֹי לַחֲצֵירוֹת כֶּחָצֵר לַבָּתִּים.

Abaye said to him: When you told us this ruling of Shmuel’s that we may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, you said it to us with regard to the following mishna, which states: That an alleyway in relation to its courtyards is like a courtyard in relation to its houses. Shmuel inferred from this that there must be at least two courtyards with two houses each that open into an alleyway in order to permit carrying there by means of a side post or a cross beam.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, וְיֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת בְּחוּרְבָּה.

The Gemara examines the ruling of Shmuel that was cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is no renunciation of rights in a ruin. But Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed and said: There is renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is renunciation of rights in a ruin.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, בְּהָא קָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתָּא לְחוּד וְהָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתָּא לְחוּד. אֲבָל חוּרְבָּה, דְּתַשְׁמִישְׁתָּא חֲדָא לְתַרְוַויְיהוּ. אֵימָא: מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

The Gemara comments: It is necessary to explain that Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with regard to both cases, as neither case could have been learned from the other. As, if it had taught only that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Shmuel said that there is no renunciation of rights, because the use of the one courtyard stands alone and the use of the other courtyard stands alone. Each courtyard is not used by the residents of the other courtyard, and therefore there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to the other. However, with regard to a ruin, where there is one common use for both neighbors, as the residents of both houses use it, I would say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

וְכִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל, צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, if it was stated only with regard to the case of a ruin, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated his position, but with regard to the other case, renouncing rights from one courtyard to another, perhaps he concedes to Shmuel. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both cases.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת וּפֶתַח אֶחָד בֵּינֵיהֶן, אֲבָל שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאוֹסְרִין — מְבַטְּלִין.

Abaye said: With regard to that which Shmuel said, that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if there were two courtyards, one within the other, since the residents render each other prohibited to carry, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּי חֲצֵירוֹת זוֹ לִפְנִים מִזּוֹ, פְּעָמִים מְבַטְּלִין וּפְעָמִים אֵין מְבַטְּלִין. כֵּיצַד? נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּחִיצוֹנָה וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד, בֵּין מִן הַפְּנִימִית וּבֵין מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת.

Rava said: Even in the case of two courtyards, one within the other, sometimes the residents may renounce their rights in favor of each other, and sometimes they may not renounce them. How so? If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The person who neglected to establish an eiruv renders it prohibited for the residents of both courtyards to carry, because the eiruv for both courtyards is located in the outer one, and it is prohibited to carry there without an eiruv due to the right of passage of the residents of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard. Therefore, there is no effective eiruv at all, not even for the residents of the inner courtyard.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּפְּנִימִית, וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַפְּנִימִית וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת.

However, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, the following distinction applies: If a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, both courtyards are prohibited. In that case, it is prohibited to carry in the inner courtyard itself, due to the one who did not join in the eiruv. Since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it also renders the outer one prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard must pass through it.

שָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה וְלֹא עֵירַב — פְּנִימִית מוּתֶּרֶת וְחִיצוֹנָה אֲסוּרָה.

On the other hand, if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is permitted to carry in the inner courtyard and it is prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. The residents of the inner courtyard have an eiruv, as they established an eiruv together, and therefore they may carry in their courtyard. The residents of the outer courtyard do not render it prohibited for them to carry, as they do not have the right to pass through the inner courtyard, and the inhabitants of the latter could bar their entrance to the inner courtyard by locking their doors.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּחִיצוֹנָה וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד, בֵּין מִן הַפְּנִימִית וּבֵין מִן הַחִיצוֹנָה, וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת. הַאי בַּר פְּנִימִית, לְמַאן נִיבַטֵּיל? לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי פְנִימִית — לֵיתָא לְעֵרוּבַיְיהוּ גַּבַּיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אֵין בִּטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר!

The Gemara explains why the residents of these courtyards cannot avail themselves of the option of renunciation: If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards, and the person who forgot to join in the eiruv cannot renounce his rights to the courtyard. The reason for this is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet that is ineffective, as their eiruv is not with them but in the outer courtyard. Consequently, they would remain without an eiruv, which means they would render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that too is ineffective, as Shmuel ruled that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

הַאי בַּר חִיצוֹנָה לְמַאן נְבַטֵּיל, לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אִיכָּא פְּנִימִית דְּאָסְרָה עֲלַיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי פְּנִימִית — אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Similarly, that resident of the outer courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but there is still the inner courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, but there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the mechanism of permitting carrying by means of renunciation cannot be applied in these cases.

נָתְנוּ עֵירוּבָן בַּפְּנִימִית, וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מִן הַפְּנִימִית וְלֹא עֵירַב — שְׁתֵּיהֶן אֲסוּרוֹת. הַאי בַּר פְּנִימִית לְמַאן נְבַטֵּיל? לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי הַפְּנִימִית — אִיכָּא חִיצוֹנָה דְּאָסְרָה עֲלַיְיהוּ. לִיבַטֵּיל לִבְנֵי חִיצוֹנָה — אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Likewise, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, and a resident of the inner courtyard forgot to do so and did not establish an eiruv, it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The reason is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet there is still the outer courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying, as the eiruv shared by the courtyards is in essence a valid eiruv, which gives the residents of the outer courtyard the right to enter the inner one. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that is ineffective, as Shmuel maintains that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In that case, since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it renders it prohibited to carry in the outer one as well.

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