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Daf Yomi

October 18, 2020 | 诇壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讗

Masechet Eruvin is sponsored by Adina and Eric Hagege in honor of our parents, Rabbi Dov and Elayne Greenstone and Roger and Ketty Hagege who raised children, grandchildren and great grandchildren committed to Torah learning.

Eruvin 70

This week’s shiurim are sponsored by Rabbi Fredda Cohen in honor of her grandchildren, Violet Noa and Remy Meyer, and their great grandmother bubbie Paula Cohen, on the occasion of her 88th birthday. Yom Huledet Sameach. Today’s shiur is dedicated聽by Gary Zeitlin in honor of the 5th yahrzeit of Susan Zeitlin z”l, a “kanai” for her family and for yiddishkeit. And by Oren and Rachel Seliger in memory of Rifka Esther bat Sara Gittel and Yeshaya Halevi z”l on her 10th yahrzeit. She was always engaged in learning and went to weekly shiurim. She would be proud of her children learning daf yomi.聽

The gemara continues to analyze the cases in the mishna of when relinquishing of rights is effective and when it is not. Abaye asks Rabba whether one needs to relinquish rights to everyone or is it enough to relinquish to one of the people who were part of the eruv? Rabba says one needs to do it to everyone. Abaye disagrees and questions Rabba from a braita and the gemara goes in depth into all the cases in the braita to explain them in general and in accordance with Rabba and Abaye. Rava asks Rav Nachman if one who inherits property on Shabbat can relinquish rights. Rav Nachman says yes, but adds that Shmuel disagrees. Rava brings several sources that seem to go against Rav Nachman. Two are brought in this daf and they are both resolved.

诇讬讙讝专 讚讬诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讘讟讜诇讬 诇讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉:


Let us issue a decree that two residents may not give away their rights in a domain, lest people come to renounce their rights in favor of two residents as well. People might assume that just as two may give away their rights to one, so too may one give away his rights to two. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue such a decree.


讜讗讬谉 谞讜讟诇讬谉 专砖讜转: 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转


We learned in the mishna: But two may not receive rights in a domain. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need to say this? Isn鈥檛 it superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that rights may not be acquired even if the other residents of the courtyard say to one of the two who did not establish an eiruv: Acquire our rights in the courtyard on condition that you transfer them in turn to your friend, the other one who did not establish an eiruv. The mishna teaches that he does not become their agent and cannot transfer the rights to the other person, as he himself cannot receive such rights under these circumstances.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪专讘讛 讞诪砖讛 砖砖专讜讬讬谉 讘讞爪专 讗讞转 讜砖讻讞 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜诇讗 注讬专讘 讻砖讛讜讗 诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讗讜 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


Abaye raised a dilemma before Rabba: If five people live in the same courtyard, and one of them forgot to join in an eiruv, when he renounces his rights in the courtyard, must he renounce them in favor of each and every one of the others or not? Rabba said to him: He must renounce his rights in favor of each and every one.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘


Abaye raised an objection from the following baraita: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. Two courtyard residents who established an eiruv may also renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. And similarly, two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did establish an eiruv or in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv.


讗讘诇 诇讗 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜


But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv, nor may two residents who established an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two other residents who did not establish an eiruv, nor may two residents who did not establish an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did not establish an eiruv.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讬砖讗 讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讛 讘讛讚讬 诪讗谉 注讬专讘


In any event the first clause is teaching: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. What are the circumstances surrounding this case? If there is no other resident with him, i.e., if there were only two people living in the courtyard, with whom did he, the other resident, establish an eiruv? He could not have established an eiruv on his own.


讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讛 讜拽转谞讬 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘


Rather, it is obvious that there is another resident with him, apart from the one who failed to establish an eiruv, and yet it states: He may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv, which implies that it is enough for him to renounce his rights in favor of one of the residents. He does not have to renounce his rights in favor of all of them.


讜专讘讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转


The Gemara now asks: And how does Rabba understand this teaching? The Gemara answers: Rabba can say as follows: With what are we dealing here? This is a special case, where there was another person in the courtyard with whom he established the eiruv, but that person died in the meantime, leaving only one who established an eiruv, to whom the one who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights.


讗讬 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜讗讬 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讗诪讗讬 诇讗


The Gemara raises a difficulty: If it indeed refers to a case where there was another person, but he died, say an explanation for the latter clause of the baraita: But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. Now if it refers to a case where there was at first another person but he died, why may the one courtyard resident not renounce his rights in the courtyard? Now there is only one other person present in the courtyard.


讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讜诪讚住讬驻讗 讗讬转讬讛 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转讬讛


Rather, it is obvious that there is another person present, with whom the eiruv was established. And since the latter clause of the baraita deals with a case where there is another person present, the first clause of the baraita must also be dealing with a case where there is another person present.


诪讬讚讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗 讜讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗


The Gemara rejects this proof: Is this necessarily the designation in both cases? Must the two clauses necessarily be dealing with the same case? This case as it is, and this case as it is, i.e., each clause deals with a unique set of circumstances, which need not accord with each other.


转讚注 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讚专讬砖讗 讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诇讗


The Gemara adds: Know that this baraita does not only deal with one state of affairs, for the last part of the first clause teaches: And two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did establish an eiruv. It can be inferred from this that in favor of two residents, yes, they may renounce their rights, but in favor of one, no, they may not. This clearly indicates that they must renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of both of them.


讜讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪讗讬 诇砖谞讬诐 诇讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬诐 讗讬 讛讻讬 诇讬转谞讬 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 拽砖讬讗


And Abaye can say: What is the meaning of in favor of two? In favor of one of the two, for this is as effective as renouncing their rights in favor of both of them. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, let it teach that the two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one resident who established an eiruv or in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv, from which one would understand that there are two present, for otherwise there could be no eiruv. The Gemara concludes: This is indeed difficult according to Abaye鈥檚 opinion, although it does not completely refute his opinion.


讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 诇讗讘讬讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 专砖讜转 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 诇专讘讛 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讜诇讗 讙讝讜专 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讬转讬讛


The Gemara now explains the need for each clause of the baraita. The baraita opens: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. According to Abaye, this refers to a case where there is another person present, and it teaches us that he need not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of each and every one of the others. According to Rabba, this refers to a case where there was another person in the courtyard, with whom he established the eiruv, but that person died in the meantime, and the novel teaching is that the Sages did not issue a decree due to the concern that sometimes that other person is still present.


讜砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 注讬专讘 诇讬拽谞住讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The baraita continues: Two courtyard residents who established an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? What new halakha is being taught here? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since he did not establish an eiruv, we should penalize him by insisting that he renounce his rights in their favor and not the reverse, therefore the baraita teaches us that it is permitted even for the ones who established an eiruv to renounce their rights in his favor.


讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 诇专讘讛 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 诇讗讘讬讬 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讙讝专 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讘讟讜诇讬 诇讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


It was further taught in the baraita: And similarly, two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who established an eiruv. According to Rabba, the baraita taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause. As the latter clause teaches that one must renounce rights to every resident in the courtyard, the first clause must refer to the case where the additional resident passed away, for otherwise, he would not be able to renounce his rights to only one of the residents of the courtyard. According to Abaye, it was necessary for the mishna to teach the halakha in the case of two who did not establish an eiruv. For it could enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree determining that the two residents who did not establish an eiruv may not renounce their rights in favor of the two residents who established an eiruv, lest the two who established an eiruv come to renounce their rights in favor of the two who did not. The baraita, therefore, teaches us that we do not issue such a decree.


讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诪拽爪转谉 注讬专讘讜 讜诪拽爪转谉 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讜诇谉 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 诇讬拽谞住讬谞讛讜 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转砖转讻讞 转讜专转 注讬专讜讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The baraita continues: Or they may renounce their rights in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need this addition? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that these permissive rulings with regard to renunciation apply only in a case where some of the residents established an eiruv and some of them did not establish an eiruv. But in a case where none of the residents established an eiruv, we should penalize them by not allowing renunciation, so that the halakhic category of eiruv should not be forgotten by those who come after them. The baraita, therefore, teaches us that we are not concerned about this.


讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 诇讗讘讬讬 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 诇专讘讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗


We further learned in the baraita: But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. According to Abaye, the baraita taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, for Abaye proves from here that a person may renounce his rights to one of the two courtyard residents, and need not renounce his rights to both of them. According to Rabba, since the baraita taught the first clause in a certain style, it also taught the latter clause in that same style, but no halakhic conclusion can be garnered from here.


讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘讟讬诇 诇讬讛 讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇砖转专讬 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讘讟讬诇 诇讗 讛讜讜 诇讬讛 砖专讬讜转讗 讘讛讗 讞爪专 诇讗


The baraita further states: Nor may two residents who established an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two other residents who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why do I need this further matter? Isn鈥檛 this statement superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the case where one of the two who did not establish an eiruv subsequently renounced his rights in favor of his fellow resident. Lest you say that it should now be permitted to carry, as there is only one person left who has any rights in the courtyard and failed to establish an eiruv, therefore it teaches us that since at the time of his renunciation he was not permitted in that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights in it, and therefore carrying is prohibited for both.


讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转


The baraita concludes: Nor may two residents who did not establish an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses the question: Why do I need this additional matter? Isn鈥檛 it superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the case where the other courtyard residents said to one of the first two who did not establish an eiruv: Acquire our rights in the courtyard on condition that you transfer them in turn to your friend, the other one who did not establish an eiruv. They attempted to appoint one of them as an agent to transfer the collective rights to the other. The baraita teaches us that this method is ineffective.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讬讜专砖 诪讛讜 砖讬讘讟诇 专砖讜转


Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: With regard to an heir, what is the halakha regarding whether he may renounce rights in a courtyard? If a person who had forgotten to establish an eiruv died on Shabbat, may his heir renounce his rights in his stead?


讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诇注专讜讘讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 诪爪讬 诪注专讘 讘讟讜诇讬 谞诪讬 诪爪讬 诪讘讟诇 讗讘诇 讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诇注专讜讘讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪注专讘 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讘讟诇


The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: On the one hand, perhaps only in a case where, if the person wanted to establish an eiruv on the previous day he could have established an eiruv, he can also renounce his rights on Shabbat. But this heir, since, if he wanted to establish an eiruv the previous day he could not have established an eiruv, as he was not then a resident of the courtyard, therefore, today he cannot renounce his rights either.


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讬讜专砖 讻专注讬讛 讚讗讘讜讛 讛讜讗


Or perhaps an heir is like his father鈥檚 foot, i.e., he is considered an extension of his father and substitutes for him in all regards, which means that just as his father could have renounced his rights, so can he.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 诪讘讟诇 讜讛谞讬 讚讘讬 砖诪讜讗诇 转谞讜 讗讬谉 诪讘讟诇 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 砖诪讜转专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 讛讜转专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讜讻诇 砖谞讗住专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 谞讗住专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讞讜抓 诪诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转


Rav Na岣an said to him: I myself say that an heir can indeed renounce rights in a courtyard, while those scholars of the school of Shmuel taught: He cannot renounce rights in a courtyard. Rava raised an objection to Rav Na岣an from the following baraita: This is the principle: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat, and anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat, apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, for renunciation can provide an allowance halfway through Shabbat.


讻诇 砖讛讜转专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讻讙讜谉 注讬专讘 讚专讱 讛驻转讞 讜谞住转诐 讛驻转讞 注讬专讘 讚专讱 讞诇讜谉 讜谞住转诐 讞诇讜谉


The Gemara now explains each element of the baraita: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat. For example, if an eiruv was established between two adjacent courtyards that are connected via an opening between them, and that opening was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. Alternately, if an eiruv was established between the two courtyards that are connected via a window opening from one to the other, and that window was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. As carrying from one courtyard to another was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it is permitted throughout Shabbat.


讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讘讜讬 砖谞讬讟诇讜 拽讜专讜转讬讜 讗讜 诇讞讬讬讜


The Gemara comments: The words this is the principle come to include the case of an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, teaching that one may nonetheless use the alleyway, as it had been permitted at the outset of Shabbat.


讻诇 砖谞讗住专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 谞讗住专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讻讜诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讬 讘转讬诐 讘砖谞讬 爪讬讚讬 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讛拽讬驻讜诐 讙讜讬诐 诪讞讬爪讛 讘砖讘转


The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat. For example, if there were two houses on two sides of a public domain, which gentiles enclosed with a wall on Shabbat, the enclosed area remains prohibited. Even though a partition of this kind is considered a proper one with regard to Shabbat domains, it is prohibited to carry objects from either house into the enclosed area, even if the owner of the first house renounces his rights in the area in favor of the owner of the second house, as they could not have established an eiruv between them before Shabbat.


讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪转 讙讜讬 讘砖讘转


The Gemara asks: What do the words this is the principle come to include in this part of the baraita? The Gemara answers: It comes to include the case of a gentile resident of the courtyard who died on Shabbat without having rented out his domain to a Jew for the purpose of an eiruv. In this case, the Jewish neighbors are prohibited from carrying in the courtyard. Because it was prohibited to establish an eiruv the previous day, carrying in the courtyard continues to be prohibited on Shabbat, even though the gentile is now deceased.


讜拽转谞讬 讞讜抓 诪诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转 讗讬讛讜 讗讬谉 讬讜专砖 诇讗


And the baraita teaches: Apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, which teaches that a person may renounce his rights in a courtyard even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the courtyard was prohibited prior to his renunciation. The Gemara infers: He himself, i.e., the original owner, yes, he may renounce his rights even on Shabbat, but with regard to his heir, no, he may not renounce his rights on Shabbat, which contradicts Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion.


讗讬诪讗 讞讜抓 诪转讜专转 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转


Rav Na岣an replied: Say that the baraita must be understood as follows: Apart from anyone who falls into the halakhic category of one who renounces his rights in a domain. In other words, the baraita is not referring to a particular person who renounces his rights, but rather to the category of renunciation in general, which includes an heir.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讞讚 诪讘谞讬 讞爪专 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


Rava raised a further objection to the opinion of Rav Na岣an from a different baraita: If a resident of a courtyard died and left his domain, the use of his house, to one from the marketplace, i.e., a non-resident of the courtyard, the following distinction applies: If he died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the one from the marketplace renders carrying prohibited, for it is assumed that he received his portion before the onset of Shabbat and should have joined in an eiruv with the others. Since he failed to establish an eiruv with the other residents of the courtyard, he renders carrying prohibited in the entire courtyard. If, however, he died after nightfall, he does not render carrying prohibited, for so long as it was permitted to carry for part of Shabbat it remains permitted for the entirety of Shabbat.


讜讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 诪讘谞讬 讞爪专 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗讜住专


And alternatively, if one from the marketplace who owned a residence in the courtyard but did not dwell there died and left his domain to a resident of the courtyard who does live there and usually joins in an eiruv with his neighbors, the following distinction applies: If the person from the marketplace died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the courtyard resident does not render carrying prohibited, as when he establishes his eiruv it includes his new residence as well. If, however, the person from the marketplace died after nightfall without having established an eiruv, the deceased renders carrying prohibited. As this residence was prohibited at the beginning of Shabbat, it can no longer be permitted on that Shabbat.


讗诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞讬讘讟讬诇 诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讘讟诇


Rava鈥檚 question is based on the first case discussed in the baraita: According to Rav Na岣an, why does the heir render carrying prohibited in this case? Let him renounce his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, as Rav Na岣an maintains that an heir may renounce rights. Rav Na岣an replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that the baraita teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, i.e., although there is no way of rectifying the situation by means of an eiruv, it can be corrected by way of renunciation.


转讗 砖诪注 讬砖专讗诇 讜讙专 砖专讜讬讬谉 讘诪讙讜专讛 讗讞转 讜诪转 讙专 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐


Come and hear a different proof challenging Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion, from the following baraita: If a Jew and a convert were living in a single residency comprised of several rooms, and the convert died childless while it was still day, such a convert has no heirs, and therefore the first to take possession of his property acquires it.


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Eruvin 70

诇讬讙讝专 讚讬诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讘讟讜诇讬 诇讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉:


Let us issue a decree that two residents may not give away their rights in a domain, lest people come to renounce their rights in favor of two residents as well. People might assume that just as two may give away their rights to one, so too may one give away his rights to two. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue such a decree.


讜讗讬谉 谞讜讟诇讬谉 专砖讜转: 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转


We learned in the mishna: But two may not receive rights in a domain. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need to say this? Isn鈥檛 it superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that rights may not be acquired even if the other residents of the courtyard say to one of the two who did not establish an eiruv: Acquire our rights in the courtyard on condition that you transfer them in turn to your friend, the other one who did not establish an eiruv. The mishna teaches that he does not become their agent and cannot transfer the rights to the other person, as he himself cannot receive such rights under these circumstances.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪专讘讛 讞诪砖讛 砖砖专讜讬讬谉 讘讞爪专 讗讞转 讜砖讻讞 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜诇讗 注讬专讘 讻砖讛讜讗 诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讗讜 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚


Abaye raised a dilemma before Rabba: If five people live in the same courtyard, and one of them forgot to join in an eiruv, when he renounces his rights in the courtyard, must he renounce them in favor of each and every one of the others or not? Rabba said to him: He must renounce his rights in favor of each and every one.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘


Abaye raised an objection from the following baraita: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. Two courtyard residents who established an eiruv may also renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. And similarly, two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did establish an eiruv or in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv.


讗讘诇 诇讗 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜


But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv, nor may two residents who established an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two other residents who did not establish an eiruv, nor may two residents who did not establish an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did not establish an eiruv.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讬砖讗 讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讛 讘讛讚讬 诪讗谉 注讬专讘


In any event the first clause is teaching: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. What are the circumstances surrounding this case? If there is no other resident with him, i.e., if there were only two people living in the courtyard, with whom did he, the other resident, establish an eiruv? He could not have established an eiruv on his own.


讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讘讛讚讬讛 讜拽转谞讬 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘


Rather, it is obvious that there is another resident with him, apart from the one who failed to establish an eiruv, and yet it states: He may renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did establish an eiruv, which implies that it is enough for him to renounce his rights in favor of one of the residents. He does not have to renounce his rights in favor of all of them.


讜专讘讛 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转


The Gemara now asks: And how does Rabba understand this teaching? The Gemara answers: Rabba can say as follows: With what are we dealing here? This is a special case, where there was another person in the courtyard with whom he established the eiruv, but that person died in the meantime, leaving only one who established an eiruv, to whom the one who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights.


讗讬 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 讜讗讬 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讗诪讗讬 诇讗


The Gemara raises a difficulty: If it indeed refers to a case where there was another person, but he died, say an explanation for the latter clause of the baraita: But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. Now if it refers to a case where there was at first another person but he died, why may the one courtyard resident not renounce his rights in the courtyard? Now there is only one other person present in the courtyard.


讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讜诪讚住讬驻讗 讗讬转讬讛 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 讗讬转讬讛


Rather, it is obvious that there is another person present, with whom the eiruv was established. And since the latter clause of the baraita deals with a case where there is another person present, the first clause of the baraita must also be dealing with a case where there is another person present.


诪讬讚讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗 讜讛讗 讻讚讗讬转讗


The Gemara rejects this proof: Is this necessarily the designation in both cases? Must the two clauses necessarily be dealing with the same case? This case as it is, and this case as it is, i.e., each clause deals with a unique set of circumstances, which need not accord with each other.


转讚注 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讚专讬砖讗 讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诇讗


The Gemara adds: Know that this baraita does not only deal with one state of affairs, for the last part of the first clause teaches: And two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did establish an eiruv. It can be inferred from this that in favor of two residents, yes, they may renounce their rights, but in favor of one, no, they may not. This clearly indicates that they must renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of both of them.


讜讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诪讗讬 诇砖谞讬诐 诇讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬诐 讗讬 讛讻讬 诇讬转谞讬 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 拽砖讬讗


And Abaye can say: What is the meaning of in favor of two? In favor of one of the two, for this is as effective as renouncing their rights in favor of both of them. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, let it teach that the two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one resident who established an eiruv or in favor of one resident who did not establish an eiruv, from which one would understand that there are two present, for otherwise there could be no eiruv. The Gemara concludes: This is indeed difficult according to Abaye鈥檚 opinion, although it does not completely refute his opinion.


讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 诇讗讘讬讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讘讟诇 专砖讜转 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 诇专讘讛 讚讛讜讛 讜诪讬转 讜诇讗 讙讝讜专 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讬转讬讛


The Gemara now explains the need for each clause of the baraita. The baraita opens: One resident of a courtyard who did not establish an eiruv may renounce his rights in favor of one who did establish an eiruv. According to Abaye, this refers to a case where there is another person present, and it teaches us that he need not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of each and every one of the others. According to Rabba, this refers to a case where there was another person in the courtyard, with whom he established the eiruv, but that person died in the meantime, and the novel teaching is that the Sages did not issue a decree due to the concern that sometimes that other person is still present.


讜砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 注讬专讘 诇讬拽谞住讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The baraita continues: Two courtyard residents who established an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? What new halakha is being taught here? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since he did not establish an eiruv, we should penalize him by insisting that he renounce his rights in their favor and not the reverse, therefore the baraita teaches us that it is permitted even for the ones who established an eiruv to renounce their rights in his favor.


讜砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 诇专讘讛 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 诇讗讘讬讬 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讙讝专 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讘讟讜诇讬 诇讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


It was further taught in the baraita: And similarly, two courtyard residents who did not establish an eiruv may renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who established an eiruv. According to Rabba, the baraita taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause. As the latter clause teaches that one must renounce rights to every resident in the courtyard, the first clause must refer to the case where the additional resident passed away, for otherwise, he would not be able to renounce his rights to only one of the residents of the courtyard. According to Abaye, it was necessary for the mishna to teach the halakha in the case of two who did not establish an eiruv. For it could enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree determining that the two residents who did not establish an eiruv may not renounce their rights in favor of the two residents who established an eiruv, lest the two who established an eiruv come to renounce their rights in favor of the two who did not. The baraita, therefore, teaches us that we do not issue such a decree.


讗讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诪拽爪转谉 注讬专讘讜 讜诪拽爪转谉 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讜诇谉 诇讗 注讬专讘讜 诇讬拽谞住讬谞讛讜 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转砖转讻讞 转讜专转 注讬专讜讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉


The baraita continues: Or they may renounce their rights in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses a question: Why do I need this addition? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that these permissive rulings with regard to renunciation apply only in a case where some of the residents established an eiruv and some of them did not establish an eiruv. But in a case where none of the residents established an eiruv, we should penalize them by not allowing renunciation, so that the halakhic category of eiruv should not be forgotten by those who come after them. The baraita, therefore, teaches us that we are not concerned about this.


讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讗讞讚 砖注讬专讘 谞讜转谉 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 砖诇讗 注讬专讘 诇讗讘讬讬 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 诇专讘讛 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 专讬砖讗 转谞讗 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗


We further learned in the baraita: But one courtyard resident who did establish an eiruv may not renounce his rights in the courtyard in favor of one who did not establish an eiruv. According to Abaye, the baraita taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, for Abaye proves from here that a person may renounce his rights to one of the two courtyard residents, and need not renounce his rights to both of them. According to Rabba, since the baraita taught the first clause in a certain style, it also taught the latter clause in that same style, but no halakhic conclusion can be garnered from here.


讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘讟讬诇 诇讬讛 讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇砖转专讬 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚讘讟讬诇 诇讗 讛讜讜 诇讬讛 砖专讬讜转讗 讘讛讗 讞爪专 诇讗


The baraita further states: Nor may two residents who established an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two other residents who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why do I need this further matter? Isn鈥檛 this statement superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the case where one of the two who did not establish an eiruv subsequently renounced his rights in favor of his fellow resident. Lest you say that it should now be permitted to carry, as there is only one person left who has any rights in the courtyard and failed to establish an eiruv, therefore it teaches us that since at the time of his renunciation he was not permitted in that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights in it, and therefore carrying is prohibited for both.


讜讗讬谉 砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 专砖讜转谉 诇砖谞讬诐 砖诇讗 注讬专讘讜 讛讗 转讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 拽谞讬 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛拽谞讜转


The baraita concludes: Nor may two residents who did not establish an eiruv renounce their rights in the courtyard in favor of two residents who did not establish an eiruv. The Gemara poses the question: Why do I need this additional matter? Isn鈥檛 it superfluous? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the case where the other courtyard residents said to one of the first two who did not establish an eiruv: Acquire our rights in the courtyard on condition that you transfer them in turn to your friend, the other one who did not establish an eiruv. They attempted to appoint one of them as an agent to transfer the collective rights to the other. The baraita teaches us that this method is ineffective.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讬讜专砖 诪讛讜 砖讬讘讟诇 专砖讜转


Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: With regard to an heir, what is the halakha regarding whether he may renounce rights in a courtyard? If a person who had forgotten to establish an eiruv died on Shabbat, may his heir renounce his rights in his stead?


讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诇注专讜讘讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 诪爪讬 诪注专讘 讘讟讜诇讬 谞诪讬 诪爪讬 诪讘讟诇 讗讘诇 讛讗讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诇注专讜讘讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪注专讘 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讘讟诇


The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: On the one hand, perhaps only in a case where, if the person wanted to establish an eiruv on the previous day he could have established an eiruv, he can also renounce his rights on Shabbat. But this heir, since, if he wanted to establish an eiruv the previous day he could not have established an eiruv, as he was not then a resident of the courtyard, therefore, today he cannot renounce his rights either.


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讬讜专砖 讻专注讬讛 讚讗讘讜讛 讛讜讗


Or perhaps an heir is like his father鈥檚 foot, i.e., he is considered an extension of his father and substitutes for him in all regards, which means that just as his father could have renounced his rights, so can he.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 诪讘讟诇 讜讛谞讬 讚讘讬 砖诪讜讗诇 转谞讜 讗讬谉 诪讘讟诇 讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 砖诪讜转专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 讛讜转专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讜讻诇 砖谞讗住专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 谞讗住专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讞讜抓 诪诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转


Rav Na岣an said to him: I myself say that an heir can indeed renounce rights in a courtyard, while those scholars of the school of Shmuel taught: He cannot renounce rights in a courtyard. Rava raised an objection to Rav Na岣an from the following baraita: This is the principle: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat, and anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat, apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, for renunciation can provide an allowance halfway through Shabbat.


讻诇 砖讛讜转专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讻讙讜谉 注讬专讘 讚专讱 讛驻转讞 讜谞住转诐 讛驻转讞 注讬专讘 讚专讱 讞诇讜谉 讜谞住转诐 讞诇讜谉


The Gemara now explains each element of the baraita: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat. For example, if an eiruv was established between two adjacent courtyards that are connected via an opening between them, and that opening was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. Alternately, if an eiruv was established between the two courtyards that are connected via a window opening from one to the other, and that window was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. As carrying from one courtyard to another was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it is permitted throughout Shabbat.


讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讘讜讬 砖谞讬讟诇讜 拽讜专讜转讬讜 讗讜 诇讞讬讬讜


The Gemara comments: The words this is the principle come to include the case of an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, teaching that one may nonetheless use the alleyway, as it had been permitted at the outset of Shabbat.


讻诇 砖谞讗住专 诇诪拽爪转 砖讘转 谞讗住专 诇讻诇 讛砖讘转 讻讜诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讬 讘转讬诐 讘砖谞讬 爪讬讚讬 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讛拽讬驻讜诐 讙讜讬诐 诪讞讬爪讛 讘砖讘转


The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat. For example, if there were two houses on two sides of a public domain, which gentiles enclosed with a wall on Shabbat, the enclosed area remains prohibited. Even though a partition of this kind is considered a proper one with regard to Shabbat domains, it is prohibited to carry objects from either house into the enclosed area, even if the owner of the first house renounces his rights in the area in favor of the owner of the second house, as they could not have established an eiruv between them before Shabbat.


讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪转 讙讜讬 讘砖讘转


The Gemara asks: What do the words this is the principle come to include in this part of the baraita? The Gemara answers: It comes to include the case of a gentile resident of the courtyard who died on Shabbat without having rented out his domain to a Jew for the purpose of an eiruv. In this case, the Jewish neighbors are prohibited from carrying in the courtyard. Because it was prohibited to establish an eiruv the previous day, carrying in the courtyard continues to be prohibited on Shabbat, even though the gentile is now deceased.


讜拽转谞讬 讞讜抓 诪诪讘讟诇 专砖讜转 讗讬讛讜 讗讬谉 讬讜专砖 诇讗


And the baraita teaches: Apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, which teaches that a person may renounce his rights in a courtyard even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the courtyard was prohibited prior to his renunciation. The Gemara infers: He himself, i.e., the original owner, yes, he may renounce his rights even on Shabbat, but with regard to his heir, no, he may not renounce his rights on Shabbat, which contradicts Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion.


讗讬诪讗 讞讜抓 诪转讜专转 讘讬讟讜诇 专砖讜转


Rav Na岣an replied: Say that the baraita must be understood as follows: Apart from anyone who falls into the halakhic category of one who renounces his rights in a domain. In other words, the baraita is not referring to a particular person who renounces his rights, but rather to the category of renunciation in general, which includes an heir.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讞讚 诪讘谞讬 讞爪专 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专


Rava raised a further objection to the opinion of Rav Na岣an from a different baraita: If a resident of a courtyard died and left his domain, the use of his house, to one from the marketplace, i.e., a non-resident of the courtyard, the following distinction applies: If he died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the one from the marketplace renders carrying prohibited, for it is assumed that he received his portion before the onset of Shabbat and should have joined in an eiruv with the others. Since he failed to establish an eiruv with the other residents of the courtyard, he renders carrying prohibited in the entire courtyard. If, however, he died after nightfall, he does not render carrying prohibited, for so long as it was permitted to carry for part of Shabbat it remains permitted for the entirety of Shabbat.


讜讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 砖诪转 讜讛谞讬讞 专砖讜转讜 诇讗讞讚 诪讘谞讬 讞爪专 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐 讗讬谞讜 讗讜住专 诪砖讞砖讬讻讛 讗讜住专


And alternatively, if one from the marketplace who owned a residence in the courtyard but did not dwell there died and left his domain to a resident of the courtyard who does live there and usually joins in an eiruv with his neighbors, the following distinction applies: If the person from the marketplace died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the courtyard resident does not render carrying prohibited, as when he establishes his eiruv it includes his new residence as well. If, however, the person from the marketplace died after nightfall without having established an eiruv, the deceased renders carrying prohibited. As this residence was prohibited at the beginning of Shabbat, it can no longer be permitted on that Shabbat.


讗诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞讬讘讟讬诇 诪讗讬 讗讜住专 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 注讚 砖讬讘讟诇


Rava鈥檚 question is based on the first case discussed in the baraita: According to Rav Na岣an, why does the heir render carrying prohibited in this case? Let him renounce his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, as Rav Na岣an maintains that an heir may renounce rights. Rav Na岣an replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that the baraita teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, i.e., although there is no way of rectifying the situation by means of an eiruv, it can be corrected by way of renunciation.


转讗 砖诪注 讬砖专讗诇 讜讙专 砖专讜讬讬谉 讘诪讙讜专讛 讗讞转 讜诪转 讙专 诪讘注讜讚 讬讜诐


Come and hear a different proof challenging Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion, from the following baraita: If a Jew and a convert were living in a single residency comprised of several rooms, and the convert died childless while it was still day, such a convert has no heirs, and therefore the first to take possession of his property acquires it.


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