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Today's Daf Yomi

January 3, 2016 | 讻状讘 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 21

If a husband writes the get on his servant and then gives his slave as a gift to his wife, is the get effective immediately (before the slave聽reaches the wife)? 聽what is the root of the disagreement between Rabbi Yossi HaGelili who doesn’t permit a get to be written on a live being or on food聽and the first tanna who does allow it?

讝拽谉 砖讗谞讬 讚讬讚注 诇讗拽谞讜讬讬

a knowledgeable old man is different, as he understands the need to transfer the documents, and this may not be true in the case of a woman and the bill of divorce.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讛讻讗 注专讘 讛讬讜爪讗 诇讗讞专 讞讬转讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rather, Rava said: A proof may be brought from here: If there was a guarantor whose commitment emerged after the promissory note was signed, then the creditor may collect only from the guarantor鈥檚 unsold property. However, he does not have a lien on the guarantor鈥檚 property with which he could collect from property sold after he signed on as a guarantor. Rava鈥檚 proof is that it must be that ownership of the promissory note was transferred to the guarantor before he signed it, in order for his commitment to take effect. It may therefore be seen from this baraita that the participants understand the need to transfer ownership of the document.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讚诇诪讗 讙讘专讗 砖讗谞讬 讚讬讚注 诇讗拽谞讜讬讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讛讻讗 讗砖讛 讻讜转讘转 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讜讛讗讬砖 讻讜转讘 讗转 砖讜讘专讜 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗诇讗 讘讞讜转诪讬讜

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty raised by this baraita? Perhaps a man is different, in that he understands the need to transfer the document, and the question of the Gemara pertains to a woman, who may not be as well versed in the minutiae of monetary law. Rather, Rav Ashi said: There is a proof from what was taught here (22b): A woman may write her bill of divorce on her own or allow a scribe to write it on her behalf, and then give it to her husband, so that he will give it to her. Similarly, a man may write his receipt that he will receive from the woman after paying her marriage contract, as the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, i.e., the witnesses who sign it, and the mere writing of the document or its receipt has no legal ramifications and may be done by anyone. In any case, it is clear from here that a woman understands the need to transfer the bill of divorce that will be given to her by her husband in the future.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讬讚 注讘讚讜 讜讻转讘 诇讛 砖讟专 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讜 拽谞讗转讛讜 讜诪转讙专砖转 讘讜

Rava says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his slave, and he wrote her a deed of gift with regard to the slave, then she acquired the slave due to the document, and she is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce that is in his hand. The slave is considered to be like her property, and it is as though the husband had placed the bill of divorce in her domain at the time that he transferred the slave to her, and she acquires the bill of divorce as though it were in her courtyard.

讜讗诪讗讬 讞爪专 诪讛诇讻转 讛讬讗 讜讞爪专 诪讛诇讻转 诇讗 拽谞讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讘注讜诪讚 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 砖讗讬诇讜 诪讛诇讱 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讜诪讚 讜讬讜砖讘 诇讗 拽谞讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘讻驻讜转

The Gemara asks: And why does she acquire the bill of divorce? The slave is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire property. One鈥檚 courtyard can acquire items for him only when the courtyard is fixed in its location. Since a slave is considered to be like land with regard to other areas of halakha, he should also be defined as a mobile courtyard, as he can move from place to place. And if you would say that Rava was referring to a slave who happens to be standing, who is not mobile, but didn鈥檛 Rava say: Anything that does not acquire when moving also does not acquire when it is standing or sitting. The fact that the slave could move gives him the status of a moving courtyard, regardless if he is currently moving or not. The Gemara answers: And the halakha taught by Rava could apply in a case where the slave was bound and unable to move, as in that case he is not even able to move, and is not considered to be a mobile courtyard.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讞爪专讜 讜讻转讘 诇讛 砖讟专 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讜 拽谞讗转讛讜 讜诪转讙专砖转 讘讜

And Rava also says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in his courtyard, and he wrote a deed of gift with regard to the courtyard, then she has acquired the courtyard and is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce in the courtyard.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 注讘讚 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讜拽讗 注讘讚 讗讘诇 讞爪专 诇讬讙讝专 诪砖讜诐 讞爪专讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rava to teach his halakha both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard. One could not have been learned from the other, as had he taught us only about a slave, I would say that the husband may transfer the bill of divorce to his wife specifically through a slave, but in the case of a courtyard the Sages may decide to enact a decree that this should not be a valid bill of divorce, due to the case of her courtyard that comes afterward. People may not differentiate between this case and a similar case, where the husband places the bill of divorce in the courtyard of a third party, and that courtyard is subsequently acquired by her. In that case, the couple is not divorced, as the bill of divorce was not given by the husband to the wife. Therefore, Rava has to teach that the Sages did not make this decree, and in this case, where the husband gave the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is valid.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讞爪专 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讜拽讗 讞爪专 讗讘诇 注讘讚 诇讬讙讝专 讻驻讜转 讗讟讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讻驻讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

And had Rava taught us only about a courtyard, then I would say that a woman is divorced specifically if her husband placed the bill of divorce in a courtyard, but in the case of a slave the Sages may decide to decree with regard to a bound slave that the divorce will not take effect, due to the similarity to an unbound slave, where the divorce would not take effect, as explained above. Therefore, Rava teaches us that it is a valid bill of divorce in both cases.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讻讚讬 讞爪专 诪讛讬讻讗 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讬讚讛

Abaye said as a challenge to Rava: Now, from where was a courtyard included? What is the source for the halakha that a man can divorce a woman by placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard? This can be derived from the phrase: 鈥淎nd gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), and the Sages derived that this is not limited to her actual hand but also includes anything that is an extension of her hand, such as her courtyard.

诪讛 讬讚讛 讚讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讛 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讚讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讛 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 讜讛讗 诪转谞讛 诪讚注转讛 讗讬转讗 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 诇讬转讗

Consequently, the following reasoning should apply: Just as with regard to her hand, that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will, so too, with regard to her courtyard, it should be that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will. And with regard to a gift, it is so that she acquires it with her consent, but it is not so that she acquires it against her will. Therefore, a courtyard that a husband transfers to his wife as a gift along with a bill of divorce is not the same as a bill of divorce that he gives into her hand. As a courtyard is different from her hand in this sense, it should not be able to be used as a means of transferring a bill of divorce.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讛讗 砖诇讬讞讜转 诇拽讘诇讛 讚诪讚注转讛 讗讬转讗 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 诇讬转讗 讜拽讗 讛讜讬 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇讛

Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the reasoning of Abaye: But what of agency for receipt of the bill of divorce, where the woman appoints an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf, concerning which the agent can act with her consent, but not against her will. No one other than the wife can appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce, and despite this he is an agent for receipt. Yet a woman is able to appoint an agent for receipt. Evidently, the comparison of other methods of acquisition to acquisition by placing the bill of divorce in her hand is not absolute.

讜讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 砖诇讬讞讜转 诪讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讜砖诇讞 讜砖诇讞讛 讗讬转专讘讬

And Abaye would respond: Is that to say that the halakha of agency is included from the words 鈥渉er hand鈥? It is not learned from there; rather, it is included based on the additional wording of the verse, as the verse does not state: And he sent [veshilla岣]. Rather, it states: 鈥淎nd sends her out [veshille岣]鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). The expanded term teaches that a woman can also appoint an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf. Since agency has a different source in the Torah, it is not impacted by the limitations of her hand. The halakha that a bill of divorce can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard is an extension of the halakha that it can be placed in her hand and does carry the limitations of her hand. Therefore, it must be able to work whether with her consent or against her will.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讬讞讜转 诇拽讘诇讛 谞诪讬 讗砖讻讞谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 砖讻谉 讗讘 诪拽讘诇 讙讟 诇讘转讜 拽讟谞讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛

And if you wish, say a different answer: We also have found that agency for receipt can be effective against her will. How so? As the halakha is that a father can receive a bill of divorce for his minor daughter against her will. The halakhot of agency are therefore consistent with the halakhot with regard to her hand, and Abaye鈥檚 objection stands.

注诇 讛注诇讛 砖诇 讝讬转 讜讻讜壮 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讚 讚注讘讚

搂 The mishna taught that a bill of divorce may be written on an olive leaf, on the horn of a cow, or on the hand of a slave, provided that the husband then gives her the slave or the cow. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the hand of a slave,

诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇诪拽爪讬讬讛 讗诇讗 拽专谉 砖诇 驻专讛 诇讬拽爪讬讬讛 讜诇讬转讘讬讛 诇讛

it is not possible to cut it off, as it is certainly prohibited to cut off the hand of a slave, and he therefore must give her the slave. But if he wrote the bill of divorce on the horn of a cow, let him cut it off and give it to her. Why does the mishna state that he must give her the cow?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻转讘 讜谞转谉 诇讛 诪讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜住专 讗诇讗 讻转讬讘讛 讜谞转讬谞讛 讬爪讗 讝讛 砖诪讞讜住专 讻转讬讘讛 拽爪讬爪讛 讜谞转讬谞讛

The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), meaning that something is valid as a bill of divorce when it is lacking only writing and giving, excluding this, a cow鈥檚 horn, which is lacking writing, cutting, and giving. Since the additional step of cutting would be required in order for him to give her the horn alone, the horn would not be a valid bill of divorce, so he must give her the cow.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讚转谞讬讗 住驻专 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 住驻专 诪谞讬谉 诇专讘讜转 讻诇 讚讘专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讻转讘 诇讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 住驻专 诪讛 住驻专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that a bill of divorce may not be written on something living, nor on food. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: It is said in the Torah with regard to a bill of divorce: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). From the word 鈥渟croll,鈥 I have derived only that a scroll is valid; from where do I derive that it is correct to include all objects as valid materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her,鈥 in any case, i.e., a bill of divorce can be written on any type of surface. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states 鈥渟croll鈥? This teaches: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. This is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems invalid a bill of divorce written on a living being.

讜专讘谞谉 讗讬 讻转讬讘 讘住驻专 讻讚拽讗诪专转 讛砖转讗 讚讻转讬讘 住驻专 诇住驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: If the verse were written: And he shall write for her in the scroll [besefer], then it would be as you said, and it would indicate the type of surface on which the bill of divorce may be written. Now that it is written: 鈥淪croll [sefer],鈥 it comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirat devarim] is required. In other words, sefer is referring not to the surface on which a bill of divorce must be written, but rather, to the essence of the bill of divorce. The verse teaches that the bill of divorce must contain particular content.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 讜讻转讘 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 讘讻转讬讘讛 诪转讙专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 讘讻住祝 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗拽讬砖 讬爪讬讗讛 诇讛讜讬讬讛 诪讛 讛讜讬讬讛 讘讻住祝 讗祝 讬爪讬讗讛 谞诪讬 讘讻住祝 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara continues: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase in the verse: 鈥淎nd he writes her鈥? The Gemara answers: For them, that phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only via writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced via giving money. It might enter your mind to say: I should juxtapose leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, and I will say that just as becoming married is effected with giving money, so too, leaving marriage can also be effected with giving money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: 鈥淎nd he writes her鈥; divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讚讱 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪住驻专 讻专讬转讜转 住驻专 讻讜专转讛 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专 讗讞专 讻讜专转讛

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning? He derives it from the phrase 鈥渟croll of severance,鈥 which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him.

讜讗讬讚讱 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讻讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara asks: And those who hold the other opinion, the Rabbis, how do they explain this phrase? For them, the phrase 鈥渟croll of severance鈥 is required to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her, as it is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or on condition that you will never go to your father鈥檚 house, that is not severance, and the bill of divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition until thirty days have passed, or for any other limited period of time, that is severance. The bill of divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.

讜讗讬讚讱 诪讻专转 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive that a stipulation without a termination point invalidates the divorce? From the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches us two things: Divorce can be effected only via writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance.

讜讗讬讚讱 讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 诇讗 讚专砖讬

And the other, the Rabbis, what do they derive from this? The Gemara answers: They do not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讘诪讞讜讘专 诇拽专拽注 讻转讘讜 讘诪讞讜讘专 转诇砖讜 讜讞转诪讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜住诇 注讚 砖转讛讗 讻转讬讘转讜 讜讞转讬诪转讜 讘转诇讜砖

MISHNA: One may not write a bill of divorce on anything that is attached to the ground. If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and afterward he detached it, signed it, and gave it to her, then it is valid. Rabbi Yehuda deems a bill of divorce invalid unless its writing and its signing were performed when it was already detached.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 诇讗 注诇 讛谞讬讬专 讛诪讞讜拽 讜诇讗 注诇 讛讚讬驻转专讗 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讝讚讬讬祝 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪讻砖讬专讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: One may not write a bill of divorce on erased paper or on unfinished leather [diftera], because writing on these surfaces can be forged. And the Rabbis deem valid a bill of divorce that was written on either of these items.

讙诪壮 讻转讘讜 注诇 讛诪讞讜讘专 讜讛讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝

GEMARA: The mishna taught: If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and detached it before he gave it to her, then it is valid. The Gemara challenges: But didn鈥檛 you say in the first clause of the mishna that one may not write a bill of divorce on something that is attached to the ground? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna鈥檚 statement that if something was detached and signed then it is a valid bill of divorce is applicable only when one left a place for the essential part of the document. He did not write the entire bill of divorce while it was attached to the ground. Rather, he wrote only the standard part of the bill of divorce. However, he left a place for the essential part of the bill of divorce, which includes the names of the man and woman, and wrote that part only after it was detached.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚讬 诪住讬专讛 讻专转讬

And so Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: And this is a case where he left a place for the essential part of the document. And so Rabba bar bar 岣na says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And this is when he left a place for the essential part of the document. And all these Sages hold that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce. It is not the signatures of the witnesses on a bill of divorce that validate it. Rather, the divorce is effected by the transmission of the document in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the phrase: 鈥淎nd he writes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), must be referring to the writing of the bill of divorce and not to the signing of the witnesses, and the restrictions derived from this verse will apply to the writing of the bill of divorce, so the essential part may not be written on something that is attached to the ground.

讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讟讜驻住 砖诪讗 讬讻转讜讘 转讜专祝 讻转讘讜 诇讟讜驻住 讜转诇砖讜 讻转讘讜 诇转讜专祝 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write even the standard part on something that is attached to the ground ab initio, lest he write the essential part of the document in this manner as well. However, if he wrote the standard part while it was attached to the ground, and then detached it, wrote the essential part, and gave it to her, it is valid.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讞转诪讜 砖谞讬谞讜 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚讬 讞转讬诪讛 讻专转讬

And Reish Lakish says: The mishna should not be understood in that way, where the phrase: And signed it, is referring to the writing of the essential part, since we learned that they signed it, which is referring to the signatures of the witnesses. And it is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce.

讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 转讜专祝 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讞转讜诐 讻转讘讜 诇转讜专祝 转诇砖讜 讞转诪讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write the essential part on something that is attached to the ground due to a rabbinic decree, lest he also have the witnesses sign while it is attached. However, even if he wrote the essential part while it was attached, then detached it, had it signed, and gave it to her, it is valid. According to Rabbi Meir, when the verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her,鈥 it is referring to when he has the bill of divorce signed. Therefore, by Torah law, the limitation that it not be attached while he writes applies only to the signing but not to the writing. The Sages decreed that the essential part of the bill of divorce also not be written while it is attached to the ground, but if he violated this decree, it is still valid after the fact.

讻转讘讜 注诇 讞专住 砖诇 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讻砖专 讚砖拽讬诇 诇讬讛 讜讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 谞讬讛诇讛 注诇 注诇讛 砖诇 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻砖专 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻砖专

搂 In connection with this discussion, the Gemara mentions several halakhot that are affected by items being attached to the ground or detached. If he wrote the bill of divorce on the clay of a perforated pot [atzitz], which is considered to be attached to the ground, then it is valid, as he can take this pot and give it to her. However, if he wrote it on a leaf of a plant growing in a perforated pot, then what is the halakha? Abaye says: It is valid. And Rava says: It is invalid. The Gemara clarifies their dispute in detail: Abaye says that it is valid

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Gittin 21

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 21

讝拽谉 砖讗谞讬 讚讬讚注 诇讗拽谞讜讬讬

a knowledgeable old man is different, as he understands the need to transfer the documents, and this may not be true in the case of a woman and the bill of divorce.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讛讻讗 注专讘 讛讬讜爪讗 诇讗讞专 讞讬转讜诐 砖讟专讜转 讙讜讘讛 诪谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉

Rather, Rava said: A proof may be brought from here: If there was a guarantor whose commitment emerged after the promissory note was signed, then the creditor may collect only from the guarantor鈥檚 unsold property. However, he does not have a lien on the guarantor鈥檚 property with which he could collect from property sold after he signed on as a guarantor. Rava鈥檚 proof is that it must be that ownership of the promissory note was transferred to the guarantor before he signed it, in order for his commitment to take effect. It may therefore be seen from this baraita that the participants understand the need to transfer ownership of the document.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讚诇诪讗 讙讘专讗 砖讗谞讬 讚讬讚注 诇讗拽谞讜讬讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讛讻讗 讗砖讛 讻讜转讘转 讗转 讙讬讟讛 讜讛讗讬砖 讻讜转讘 讗转 砖讜讘专讜 砖讗讬谉 拽讬讜诐 讛讙讟 讗诇讗 讘讞讜转诪讬讜

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty raised by this baraita? Perhaps a man is different, in that he understands the need to transfer the document, and the question of the Gemara pertains to a woman, who may not be as well versed in the minutiae of monetary law. Rather, Rav Ashi said: There is a proof from what was taught here (22b): A woman may write her bill of divorce on her own or allow a scribe to write it on her behalf, and then give it to her husband, so that he will give it to her. Similarly, a man may write his receipt that he will receive from the woman after paying her marriage contract, as the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, i.e., the witnesses who sign it, and the mere writing of the document or its receipt has no legal ramifications and may be done by anyone. In any case, it is clear from here that a woman understands the need to transfer the bill of divorce that will be given to her by her husband in the future.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讬讚 注讘讚讜 讜讻转讘 诇讛 砖讟专 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讜 拽谞讗转讛讜 讜诪转讙专砖转 讘讜

Rava says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his slave, and he wrote her a deed of gift with regard to the slave, then she acquired the slave due to the document, and she is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce that is in his hand. The slave is considered to be like her property, and it is as though the husband had placed the bill of divorce in her domain at the time that he transferred the slave to her, and she acquires the bill of divorce as though it were in her courtyard.

讜讗诪讗讬 讞爪专 诪讛诇讻转 讛讬讗 讜讞爪专 诪讛诇讻转 诇讗 拽谞讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讘注讜诪讚 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 砖讗讬诇讜 诪讛诇讱 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讜诪讚 讜讬讜砖讘 诇讗 拽谞讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘讻驻讜转

The Gemara asks: And why does she acquire the bill of divorce? The slave is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire property. One鈥檚 courtyard can acquire items for him only when the courtyard is fixed in its location. Since a slave is considered to be like land with regard to other areas of halakha, he should also be defined as a mobile courtyard, as he can move from place to place. And if you would say that Rava was referring to a slave who happens to be standing, who is not mobile, but didn鈥檛 Rava say: Anything that does not acquire when moving also does not acquire when it is standing or sitting. The fact that the slave could move gives him the status of a moving courtyard, regardless if he is currently moving or not. The Gemara answers: And the halakha taught by Rava could apply in a case where the slave was bound and unable to move, as in that case he is not even able to move, and is not considered to be a mobile courtyard.

讜讗诪专 专讘讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讙讟 讜谞转谞讜 讘讞爪专讜 讜讻转讘 诇讛 砖讟专 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讜 拽谞讗转讛讜 讜诪转讙专砖转 讘讜

And Rava also says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in his courtyard, and he wrote a deed of gift with regard to the courtyard, then she has acquired the courtyard and is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce in the courtyard.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 注讘讚 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讜拽讗 注讘讚 讗讘诇 讞爪专 诇讬讙讝专 诪砖讜诐 讞爪专讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讞专 诪讻讗谉

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rava to teach his halakha both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard. One could not have been learned from the other, as had he taught us only about a slave, I would say that the husband may transfer the bill of divorce to his wife specifically through a slave, but in the case of a courtyard the Sages may decide to enact a decree that this should not be a valid bill of divorce, due to the case of her courtyard that comes afterward. People may not differentiate between this case and a similar case, where the husband places the bill of divorce in the courtyard of a third party, and that courtyard is subsequently acquired by her. In that case, the couple is not divorced, as the bill of divorce was not given by the husband to the wife. Therefore, Rava has to teach that the Sages did not make this decree, and in this case, where the husband gave the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is valid.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讞爪专 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讚讜拽讗 讞爪专 讗讘诇 注讘讚 诇讬讙讝专 讻驻讜转 讗讟讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讻驻讜转 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

And had Rava taught us only about a courtyard, then I would say that a woman is divorced specifically if her husband placed the bill of divorce in a courtyard, but in the case of a slave the Sages may decide to decree with regard to a bound slave that the divorce will not take effect, due to the similarity to an unbound slave, where the divorce would not take effect, as explained above. Therefore, Rava teaches us that it is a valid bill of divorce in both cases.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讻讚讬 讞爪专 诪讛讬讻讗 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讬讚讛

Abaye said as a challenge to Rava: Now, from where was a courtyard included? What is the source for the halakha that a man can divorce a woman by placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard? This can be derived from the phrase: 鈥淎nd gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), and the Sages derived that this is not limited to her actual hand but also includes anything that is an extension of her hand, such as her courtyard.

诪讛 讬讚讛 讚讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讛 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讚讗讬转讗 讘讬谉 诪讚注转讛 讜讘讬谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 讜讛讗 诪转谞讛 诪讚注转讛 讗讬转讗 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 诇讬转讗

Consequently, the following reasoning should apply: Just as with regard to her hand, that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will, so too, with regard to her courtyard, it should be that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will. And with regard to a gift, it is so that she acquires it with her consent, but it is not so that she acquires it against her will. Therefore, a courtyard that a husband transfers to his wife as a gift along with a bill of divorce is not the same as a bill of divorce that he gives into her hand. As a courtyard is different from her hand in this sense, it should not be able to be used as a means of transferring a bill of divorce.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讛讗 砖诇讬讞讜转 诇拽讘诇讛 讚诪讚注转讛 讗讬转讗 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 诇讬转讗 讜拽讗 讛讜讬 砖诇讬讞 诇拽讘诇讛

Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the reasoning of Abaye: But what of agency for receipt of the bill of divorce, where the woman appoints an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf, concerning which the agent can act with her consent, but not against her will. No one other than the wife can appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce, and despite this he is an agent for receipt. Yet a woman is able to appoint an agent for receipt. Evidently, the comparison of other methods of acquisition to acquisition by placing the bill of divorce in her hand is not absolute.

讜讗讘讬讬 讗讟讜 砖诇讬讞讜转 诪讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讜砖诇讞 讜砖诇讞讛 讗讬转专讘讬

And Abaye would respond: Is that to say that the halakha of agency is included from the words 鈥渉er hand鈥? It is not learned from there; rather, it is included based on the additional wording of the verse, as the verse does not state: And he sent [veshilla岣]. Rather, it states: 鈥淎nd sends her out [veshille岣]鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). The expanded term teaches that a woman can also appoint an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf. Since agency has a different source in the Torah, it is not impacted by the limitations of her hand. The halakha that a bill of divorce can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard is an extension of the halakha that it can be placed in her hand and does carry the limitations of her hand. Therefore, it must be able to work whether with her consent or against her will.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讬讞讜转 诇拽讘诇讛 谞诪讬 讗砖讻讞谉 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛 砖讻谉 讗讘 诪拽讘诇 讙讟 诇讘转讜 拽讟谞讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讛

And if you wish, say a different answer: We also have found that agency for receipt can be effective against her will. How so? As the halakha is that a father can receive a bill of divorce for his minor daughter against her will. The halakhot of agency are therefore consistent with the halakhot with regard to her hand, and Abaye鈥檚 objection stands.

注诇 讛注诇讛 砖诇 讝讬转 讜讻讜壮 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讚 讚注讘讚

搂 The mishna taught that a bill of divorce may be written on an olive leaf, on the horn of a cow, or on the hand of a slave, provided that the husband then gives her the slave or the cow. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the hand of a slave,

诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇诪拽爪讬讬讛 讗诇讗 拽专谉 砖诇 驻专讛 诇讬拽爪讬讬讛 讜诇讬转讘讬讛 诇讛

it is not possible to cut it off, as it is certainly prohibited to cut off the hand of a slave, and he therefore must give her the slave. But if he wrote the bill of divorce on the horn of a cow, let him cut it off and give it to her. Why does the mishna state that he must give her the cow?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻转讘 讜谞转谉 诇讛 诪讬 砖讗讬谞讜 诪讞讜住专 讗诇讗 讻转讬讘讛 讜谞转讬谞讛 讬爪讗 讝讛 砖诪讞讜住专 讻转讬讘讛 拽爪讬爪讛 讜谞转讬谞讛

The Gemara answers: The verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), meaning that something is valid as a bill of divorce when it is lacking only writing and giving, excluding this, a cow鈥檚 horn, which is lacking writing, cutting, and giving. Since the additional step of cutting would be required in order for him to give her the horn alone, the horn would not be a valid bill of divorce, so he must give her the cow.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讜讻讜壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讚转谞讬讗 住驻专 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 住驻专 诪谞讬谉 诇专讘讜转 讻诇 讚讘专 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜讻转讘 诇讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 住驻专 诪讛 住驻专 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 专讜讞 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇

搂 The mishna taught that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that a bill of divorce may not be written on something living, nor on food. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: It is said in the Torah with regard to a bill of divorce: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1). From the word 鈥渟croll,鈥 I have derived only that a scroll is valid; from where do I derive that it is correct to include all objects as valid materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her,鈥 in any case, i.e., a bill of divorce can be written on any type of surface. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states 鈥渟croll鈥? This teaches: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. This is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems invalid a bill of divorce written on a living being.

讜专讘谞谉 讗讬 讻转讬讘 讘住驻专 讻讚拽讗诪专转 讛砖转讗 讚讻转讬讘 住驻专 诇住驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: If the verse were written: And he shall write for her in the scroll [besefer], then it would be as you said, and it would indicate the type of surface on which the bill of divorce may be written. Now that it is written: 鈥淪croll [sefer],鈥 it comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirat devarim] is required. In other words, sefer is referring not to the surface on which a bill of divorce must be written, but rather, to the essence of the bill of divorce. The verse teaches that the bill of divorce must contain particular content.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 讜讻转讘 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 讘讻转讬讘讛 诪转讙专砖转 讜讗讬谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 讘讻住祝 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗拽讬砖 讬爪讬讗讛 诇讛讜讬讬讛 诪讛 讛讜讬讬讛 讘讻住祝 讗祝 讬爪讬讗讛 谞诪讬 讘讻住祝 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara continues: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase in the verse: 鈥淎nd he writes her鈥? The Gemara answers: For them, that phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only via writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced via giving money. It might enter your mind to say: I should juxtapose leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, and I will say that just as becoming married is effected with giving money, so too, leaving marriage can also be effected with giving money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: 鈥淎nd he writes her鈥; divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.

讜讗讬讚讱 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪住驻专 讻专讬转讜转 住驻专 讻讜专转讛 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专 讗讞专 讻讜专转讛

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning? He derives it from the phrase 鈥渟croll of severance,鈥 which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him.

讜讗讬讚讱 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讻讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara asks: And those who hold the other opinion, the Rabbis, how do they explain this phrase? For them, the phrase 鈥渟croll of severance鈥 is required to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her, as it is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or on condition that you will never go to your father鈥檚 house, that is not severance, and the bill of divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition until thirty days have passed, or for any other limited period of time, that is severance. The bill of divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.

讜讗讬讚讱 诪讻专转 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive that a stipulation without a termination point invalidates the divorce? From the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches us two things: Divorce can be effected only via writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance.

讜讗讬讚讱 讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 诇讗 讚专砖讬

And the other, the Rabbis, what do they derive from this? The Gemara answers: They do not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讘诪讞讜讘专 诇拽专拽注 讻转讘讜 讘诪讞讜讘专 转诇砖讜 讜讞转诪讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜住诇 注讚 砖转讛讗 讻转讬讘转讜 讜讞转讬诪转讜 讘转诇讜砖

MISHNA: One may not write a bill of divorce on anything that is attached to the ground. If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and afterward he detached it, signed it, and gave it to her, then it is valid. Rabbi Yehuda deems a bill of divorce invalid unless its writing and its signing were performed when it was already detached.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 诇讗 注诇 讛谞讬讬专 讛诪讞讜拽 讜诇讗 注诇 讛讚讬驻转专讗 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讝讚讬讬祝 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪讻砖讬专讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: One may not write a bill of divorce on erased paper or on unfinished leather [diftera], because writing on these surfaces can be forged. And the Rabbis deem valid a bill of divorce that was written on either of these items.

讙诪壮 讻转讘讜 注诇 讛诪讞讜讘专 讜讛讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝

GEMARA: The mishna taught: If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and detached it before he gave it to her, then it is valid. The Gemara challenges: But didn鈥檛 you say in the first clause of the mishna that one may not write a bill of divorce on something that is attached to the ground? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna鈥檚 statement that if something was detached and signed then it is a valid bill of divorce is applicable only when one left a place for the essential part of the document. He did not write the entire bill of divorce while it was attached to the ground. Rather, he wrote only the standard part of the bill of divorce. However, he left a place for the essential part of the bill of divorce, which includes the names of the man and woman, and wrote that part only after it was detached.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖砖讬讬专 诪拽讜诐 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚讬 诪住讬专讛 讻专转讬

And so Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: And this is a case where he left a place for the essential part of the document. And so Rabba bar bar 岣na says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And this is when he left a place for the essential part of the document. And all these Sages hold that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce. It is not the signatures of the witnesses on a bill of divorce that validate it. Rather, the divorce is effected by the transmission of the document in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the phrase: 鈥淎nd he writes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), must be referring to the writing of the bill of divorce and not to the signing of the witnesses, and the restrictions derived from this verse will apply to the writing of the bill of divorce, so the essential part may not be written on something that is attached to the ground.

讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 讟讜驻住 砖诪讗 讬讻转讜讘 转讜专祝 讻转讘讜 诇讟讜驻住 讜转诇砖讜 讻转讘讜 诇转讜专祝 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write even the standard part on something that is attached to the ground ab initio, lest he write the essential part of the document in this manner as well. However, if he wrote the standard part while it was attached to the ground, and then detached it, wrote the essential part, and gave it to her, it is valid.

讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讞转诪讜 砖谞讬谞讜 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚讬 讞转讬诪讛 讻专转讬

And Reish Lakish says: The mishna should not be understood in that way, where the phrase: And signed it, is referring to the writing of the essential part, since we learned that they signed it, which is referring to the signatures of the witnesses. And it is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce.

讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜转讘讬谉 转讜专祝 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讞转讜诐 讻转讘讜 诇转讜专祝 转诇砖讜 讞转诪讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讻砖专

And this is what the mishna is saying: One may not write the essential part on something that is attached to the ground due to a rabbinic decree, lest he also have the witnesses sign while it is attached. However, even if he wrote the essential part while it was attached, then detached it, had it signed, and gave it to her, it is valid. According to Rabbi Meir, when the verse states: 鈥淎nd he writes her,鈥 it is referring to when he has the bill of divorce signed. Therefore, by Torah law, the limitation that it not be attached while he writes applies only to the signing but not to the writing. The Sages decreed that the essential part of the bill of divorce also not be written while it is attached to the ground, but if he violated this decree, it is still valid after the fact.

讻转讘讜 注诇 讞专住 砖诇 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讻砖专 讚砖拽讬诇 诇讬讛 讜讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 谞讬讛诇讛 注诇 注诇讛 砖诇 注爪讬抓 谞拽讜讘 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻砖专 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻砖专

搂 In connection with this discussion, the Gemara mentions several halakhot that are affected by items being attached to the ground or detached. If he wrote the bill of divorce on the clay of a perforated pot [atzitz], which is considered to be attached to the ground, then it is valid, as he can take this pot and give it to her. However, if he wrote it on a leaf of a plant growing in a perforated pot, then what is the halakha? Abaye says: It is valid. And Rava says: It is invalid. The Gemara clarifies their dispute in detail: Abaye says that it is valid

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