Gittin 23
וְהוּא שֶׁהָיָה גָּדוֹל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו.
And that is the case only when there was an adult standing over him. When the adult supervises the writing, and instructs him to write it for her sake, it will be valid.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, גּוֹי – וְיִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכָשֵׁר?! וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתַנְיָא: גּוֹי פָּסוּל! גּוֹי, לְדַעְתֵּיהּ דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ עָבֵד.
Rav Naḥman said to him: If that is so, that anyone who is disqualified from writing a bill of divorce may do so with an adult supervising him, then if the one writing is a gentile, and a Jew stands over him and instructs him to write it for her sake, would you also say that it is valid? And if you would say that it is also valid, but isn’t it taught in a baraita: A gentile is disqualified from writing a bill of divorce in any event? Rav Huna answered: A gentile acts based on his own will. Since he is halakhically competent, he will have his own intentions while writing and may not be relied upon to carry out the intentions of the supervisor. In the case of the mishna, since those doing the writing are not halakhically competent, they will write according to the instructions of the supervisor.
הֲדַר אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרִי; דְּמִדְּקָא פָּסֵיל לֵיהּ לְגוֹי לְעִנְיַן הֲבָאָה, מִכְּלָל דִּלְעִנְיַן כְּתִיבָה – כָּשֵׁר.
Rav Naḥman then said: What I said when I raised a challenge from a case involving a gentile is not correct, as from the fact that the mishna later disqualifies a gentile with regard to acting as an agent in the bringing of the bill of divorce, one can learn by inference that he is qualified with regard to writing, where he is not listed among those who are disqualified.
וְהָתַנְיָא: גּוֹי פָּסוּל! הַהִיא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי, וּבָעֵינַן כְּתִיבָה לִשְׁמָהּ; וְהָא וַדַּאי גּוֹי אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָעָבֵיד.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that a gentile is disqualified from writing a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: That baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and when the verse states: “And he writes her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which is the source for the halakha that the writing needs to be done for her sake, it is referring to the writing of the bill of divorce and not to its signing. Therefore, we need the writing to be for her sake, and certainly a gentile acts based on his own will and may not be relied upon to write the bill of divorce according to the instructions of a supervisor.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אֲפִילּוּ מְצָאוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה, חֲתָמוֹ, וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ – כָּשֵׁר.
With regard to the requirement that a bill of divorce be written for her sake, Rav Naḥman says that Rabbi Meir would have said: Even if the husband found the bill of divorce in the garbage dump, and the names written on it happened to be the same as his and his wife’s names, if he had it signed by witnesses and he gave it to her, then it is valid, because the essential requirement is that it be signed for her sake.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ – לִשְׁמָהּ; מַאי, לָאו כְּתִיבַת הַגֵּט?! לֹא, חֲתִימַת עֵדִים.
Rava raised an objection to the statement of Rav Naḥman: The verse states: “And he writes her,” which is interpreted to mean that it must be written for her sake. What, is it not referring to the actual writing of the bill of divorce, that it must be written with the intent that it be used to sever this particular marriage? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to the signing of the witnesses.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא: כׇּל גֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם אִשָּׁה – פָּסוּל! אֵימָא: שֶׁנֶּחְתַּם שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם אִשָּׁה – פָּסוּל.
Rava raised another objection to him based on what was taught in a mishna (24a): Any bill of divorce that was not written for the sake of a specific woman is invalid. He responded: Say that according Rabbi Meir the mishna teaches: Any bill of divorce that was not signed for the sake of a specific woman is invalid.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: כְּשֶׁהוּא כּוֹתְבוֹ – כְּאִילּוּ כּוֹתְבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ. מַאי, לָאו כְּשֶׁהוּא כּוֹתְבוֹ לַתּוֹרֶף לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּאִילּוּ כּוֹתְבוֹ לַטּוֹפֶס לִשְׁמָהּ?!
Rava raised another objection to him based on another baraita: When he writes it, it is as though he writes it for her sake, meaning that writing one part for her sake makes it as if the entire document were written for her sake. What, it is not stating that when he writes the essential part of the document, which includes the names of the spouses; the date on which it was written; and the expression: Behold you are permitted to any man, for her sake, then is it as though he writes the standard part of the bill of divorce, containing the rest of the information, for her sake? This baraita indicates that there is a requirement that the bill of divorce, not just the signatures, be written for her sake.
לֹא; כְּשֶׁהוּא חוֹתְמוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּאִילּוּ כּוֹתְבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָנֵי מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי.
Rav Naḥman rejects this: No, Rabbi Meir would explain that this baraita is referring to a case where he has witnesses sign it for her sake; it is as though he wrote it for her sake. And if you wish, say: Who is the tanna of these baraitot from which you raised challenges? They are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce. According to him, the verse is referring to the writing and not the signing of the bill of divorce, and the writing must be for her sake.
וְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְהוּא שֶׁשִּׁיֵּיר מְקוֹם הַתּוֹרֶף. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי חַגָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: וְהוּא שֶׁשִּׁיֵּיר מְקוֹם הַתּוֹרֶף, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא.
And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And the statement of the mishna that one who is not halakhically competent is qualified to write a bill of divorce is the halakha only when he left unwritten the essential part of the document, which will be written later by a halakhically competent person, as only the essential part must be written for her sake. And so Rabbi Ḥagga says in the name of Ulla: And this is the halakha only when he left the essential part of the document unwritten, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that the writing of the essential part must be done for her sake.
וְרַבִּי זְרִיקָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵינָהּ תּוֹרָה. מַאי ״אֵינָהּ תּוֹרָה״? אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: כָּאן הוֹדִיעֲךָ שֶׁאֵין כֹּחַ לִשְׁמָהּ; וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי.
And Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is not Torah. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the expression: It is not Torah? Rabbi Abba says: Here Rabbi Yoḥanan informs you that there is no force to a requirement that a bill of divorce be written for her sake, as only the signing needs to be done for her sake. And it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce.
וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא! אָמוֹרָאֵי נִינְהוּ וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say earlier that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? How, then, can Rabbi Abba say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara answers: They are amora’im and disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, whether he explains the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or that of Rabbi Elazar.
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לְהָבִיא אֶת הַגֵּט, חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, וְסוֹמֵא, וְגוֹי.
MISHNA: Anyone is fit to serve as an agent to bring a bill of divorce to a woman except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, or a blind person, or a gentile.
קִיבֵּל הַקָּטָן וְהִגְדִּיל; חֵרֵשׁ וְנִתְפַּקֵּחַ; סוֹמֵא וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ; שׁוֹטֶה וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה; גּוֹי וְנִתְגַּיֵּיר – פָּסוּל.
If a minor received the bill of divorce and then reached the age of majority, or one received it when he was a deaf-mute and then became able to hear, or one received it when he was blind and then became able to see, or one received it when he was an imbecile and then became halakhically competent, or one received it when he was a gentile and then converted, in all of these cases he is unfit to bring the bill of divorce.
אֲבָל פִּקֵּחַ וְנִתְחָרֵשׁ וְחָזַר וְנִתְפַּקֵּחַ; פָּתוּחַ וְנִסְתַּמֵּא וְחָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ; שָׁפוּי וְנִשְׁתַּטָּה וְחָזַר וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה – כָּשֵׁר. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל שֶׁתְּחִילָּתוֹ וְסוֹפוֹ בְּדַעַת – כָּשֵׁר.
However, if one received it when he was able to hear, and then became a deaf-mute, and then again became able to hear; or if one received it when he was able to see, and then became blind, and then again became able to see; or one received it when he was halakhically competent, and then became an imbecile, and then again became halakhically competent, in all of these cases he is fit to bring the bill of divorce. This is the principle: Anyone who is halakhically competent in the beginning and in the end is fit, even if there was time in the interim when he was unfit.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – דְּלָאו בְּנֵי דֵּיעָה נִינְהוּ; גּוֹי נָמֵי – דְּלָאו בַּר הֶיתֵּירָא הוּא; אֶלָּא סוֹמֵא, אַמַּאי לָא? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מִמִּי נוֹטְלוֹ וּלְמִי נוֹתְנוֹ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to those the mishna lists as not being qualified to bring a bill of divorce: Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are not qualified because they are not halakhically competent, and only one who is competent can be appointed as an agent. Additionally, a gentile also is not qualified, as he is not subject to the halakhot that permit a woman to remarry via a bill of divorce. A person cannot serve as an agent for a matter that does not apply to him. But why isn’t a blind person qualified to bring a bill of divorce? Rav Sheshet says: Because he does not know from whom he takes it and to whom he gives it, and since he is unaware of this he will not be able to testify about it.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: הֵיאַךְ סוֹמֵא מוּתָּר בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ? הֵיאַךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם מוּתָּרִים בִּנְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם בַּלַּיְלָה? אֶלָּא בִּטְבִיעוּת עֵינָא דְּקָלָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּטְבִיעוּת עֵינָא דְּקָלָא!
Rav Yosef objects to this: If there is a concern that a blind person cannot distinguish between different people, then how is a blind man permitted to have sexual relations with his wife? How does he know that she is in fact his wife? Similarly, how are all people permitted to have sexual relations with their wives at night? If it is dark, they cannot see them. Rather, you must say that they are permitted through voice recognition [teviut eina dekala]. They can recognize each other based on their voices. Here too, with regard to a blind person, he can recognize the giver and receiver of the bill of divorce through voice recognition.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הָכָא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ עָסְקִינַן; דְּבָעֵי לְמֵימַר: ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״, וְלָא מָצֵי לְמֵימַר.
Rather, Rav Yosef says: Here we are dealing with a husband who sends a bill of divorce to his wife outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the agent needs to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and a blind man cannot say this because he is unable to see it being written or signed.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, פָּתוּחַ וְנִסְתַּמֵּא, דְּמָצֵי אָמַר, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכָשֵׁר?! וְהָא קָתָנֵי: פָּתוּחַ וְנִסְתַּמֵּא וְחָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ, כָּשֵׁר – חָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ, אִין; לֹא חָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ, לֹא!
Abaye said to him: However, if that is so, then a person who is able to see when he receives the bill of divorce and then becomes blind, who can say: It was written and signed in my presence, as he was able to see when it was written and signed, would you say that he is also fit to bring the bill of divorce? But it is taught in the mishna: If one received it when he was able to see, and then became blind, and then again became able to see, then he is fit to bring the bill of divorce. It can be inferred from here that only when he again became able to see, yes, he may bring it. But if he did not again become able to see, then no, he may not bring it.
הוּא הַדִּין דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא חָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ; וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָתָנֵי שָׁפוּי וְנִשְׁתַּטָּה וְחָזַר וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה – טַעְמָא דְּחָזַר וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה, הָא לֹא חָזַר וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה – לָא; תְּנָא נָמֵי פָּתוּחַ וְנִסְתַּמֵּא וְחָזַר וְנִתְפַּתֵּחַ.
The Gemara answers this question: In fact, with regard to a blind person, the same is true, that although he did not again become able to see he can serve as an agent to bring the bill of divorce and testify that it was written and signed in his presence. And why does it teach that the blind man became able to see again? Since the mishna teaches that one who received the bill of divorce when he was halakhically competent, and then became an imbecile, and then again became halakhically competent is qualified to bring the bill of divorce. And in that case, the reason why he is qualified is specifically that he again became halakhically competent, but if he did not again become halakhically competent, then he is not qualified. Therefore, the mishna also teaches with regard to one who was able to see that he then became blind and then again became able to see.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי – דְּקָתָנֵי, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל שֶׁתְּחִילָּתוֹ וְסוֹפוֹ בְּדַעַת – כָּשֵׁר; וְלָא קָתָנֵי: כׇּל שֶׁתְּחִילָּתוֹ וְסוֹפוֹ בְּכַשְׁרוּת – כָּשֵׁר; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that this is the principle: Anyone who is halakhically competent in the beginning and in the end is fit, and it does not teach: Anyone who is fit in the beginning and the end is fit. Learn from the mishna that it is not necessary for him to be fit in the beginning and the end, as there are times that being fit in the beginning is sufficient, as in the case of one who became blind after witnessing the writing and signing of the bill of divorce. However, it is clear that he must be halakhically competent both in the beginning and the end, which a blind person is.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבִּי אַמֵּי: עֶבֶד, מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט אִשָּׁה מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: מִדְּקָא פָּסֵיל לֵיהּ לְגוֹי,
§ They raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: With regard to a slave, what is the halakha? Can he be made an agent to receive a woman’s bill of divorce from the hand of her husband? Is he qualified to act as an agent or not? He said to them: From the fact that the mishna disqualified a gentile,
מִכְּלָל דְּעֶבֶד כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר רַב אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט לְאִשָּׁה מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִדּוּשִׁין.
one can learn by inference that a slave is fit. Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from the hand of her husband, because he is not included in the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, and one can act as an agent only in a matter that applies to him.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: טַעְמָא בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ, הָא בְּמִילְּתָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ – כָּשֵׁר?!
Rabbi Elazar objects to this explanation as to why a slave cannot act as an agent: The reason that a slave is unfit is that this agency pertains to a matter whose halakhot he is not included in, but for a matter whose halakhot he is included in, i.e., a mitzva that applies to a slave, is he fit to serve as an agent?
וְהָא גּוֹי וְהָא כּוּתִי; דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בְּתוֹרַת תְּרוּמָה דְּנַפְשַׁיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹי וְהַכּוּתִי שֶׁתָּרְמוּ מִשֶּׁלָּהֶם – תְּרוּמָתָם תְּרוּמָה; וּתְנַן: גּוֹי שֶׁתָּרַם שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲפִילּוּ בִּרְשׁוּת – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה!
But what of a gentile and a Samaritan, who are included in the halakhot of teruma with regard to their own produce, i.e., they must designate a portion of it for the priest, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): With regard to a gentile and a Samaritan that separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma. And yet we learned in a different mishna (Terumot 1:1): In the case of a gentile who separated teruma from a Jew’s produce, i.e., acted as his agent, even if he did so with permission from the Jew, his teruma is not teruma.
מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב: (אַתֶּם) ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – מָה אַתֶּם יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם יִשְׂרָאֵל?!
What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is written “you” in the verse that is the source for the halakhot of agency: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28), and the Sages expound the expression “so you also” to mean the following: Just as you, the ones appointing the agents, are Jews, so too, your agents must be Jews. Since slaves are not full-fledged Jews, they should be disqualified from ever acting as agents, even in a matter in which they are included in its halakhot.
אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֹא; מָה אַתֶּם בְּנֵי בְּרִית, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם בְּנֵי בְּרִית.
The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: No, the verse should be expounded in the following manner: Just as you, the ones appointing the agents, are members of the covenant, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. Gentiles cannot serve as agents because they are not members of the covenant. Slaves, whose masters are commanded to circumcise them and who are obligated in some of the mitzvot, are members of the covenant, and they can serve as agents in a matter in which they are included in its halakhot.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט אִשָּׁה מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִידּוּשִׁין, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ שִׁפְחָה וּוְלָדֵךְ בֶּן חוֹרִין״, אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה – זָכְתָה לוֹ.
The Gemara quotes a related statement: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from the hand of her husband, because he is not included in the halakhot of divorce and betrothal. And although we learned: If a person said to his female slave: Behold you are still a maidservant and your unborn child is a freeman, if she was pregnant at that time, then she acquired freedom for the unborn child.
מַאי ״אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה זָכְתָה לוֹ״? כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן תַּרְתֵּי אָמַר: נִרְאִים דְּבָרִים שֶׁהָעֶבֶד מְקַבֵּל גֵּט לַחֲבֵירוֹ – מִיָּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ.
The Gemara first clarifies: What is the connection between the initial statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the clause: If she was pregnant at that time, she acquired freedom for the unborn child? When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said two distinct statements: The first statement was that a slave cannot be appointed as an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from her husband, and the other was: It appears that a slave can receive a bill of manumission for his fellow slave from the hand of his fellow’s master, but not from the hand of his own master if both of them are enslaved by the same person.
וְאִם לְחָשְׁךָ אָדָם לוֹמַר: זוֹ הֲלָכָה שְׁנוּיָה – אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה, זָכְתָה לוֹ! אֱמוֹר לוֹ: שְׁנֵי גְּדוֹלֵי הַדּוֹר פֵּירְשׁוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר – רַבִּי זֵירָא, וְרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק.
And if a person will whisper a question to you, saying: This ruling, that a slave cannot receive a bill of manumission for his fellow slave from their common master, is difficult, as a halakha was taught that states the opposite: If a maidservant was pregnant at that time, then she acquired freedom for the unborn child, and the child and mother both belong to the same master, then say to him that two greats of the generation already explained the matter, and they are Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak.
חַד אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הַמְשַׁחְרֵר חֲצִי עַבְדּוֹ – קָנָה; וְחַד אָמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי בְּהָא? קָסָבַר: עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא, וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁהִקְנָה לָהּ אֶחָד מֵאֵבָרֶיהָ.
One of them said: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: With regard to one who emancipates half of his slave, the slave acquires freedom for half of himself, and one of them added an explanation and said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi for this ruling? He holds: A fetus is considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its mother’s body, and it is as though the master transferred ownership of one of her limbs to her. Since the maidservant is pregnant, the child is considered to be a part of her, and it is as though he emancipated a portion of her body. Therefore, the mother is not acting as an agent for the child, and this halakha does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.
מַתְנִי׳ אַף הַנָּשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״, נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא אֶת גִּיטָּהּ – חֲמוֹתָהּ, וּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ, וְצָרָתָהּ, וִיבִמְתָּהּ, וּבַת בַּעְלָהּ.
MISHNA: There are instances in which a woman’s testimony that another woman’s husband has died is not deemed credible (Yevamot 117a). If there is a presumption that due to their familial relationship the two women hate each other, there is concern that the woman is testifying falsely in order to harm the other woman. By doing so, she can cause the other woman to remarry. If her original husband then proves to be living, she will be required to leave her second husband. This mishna teaches: Even the women who are not deemed credible to testify on behalf of a woman and say: Her husband died, and she is permitted to remarry, are deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce. The relatives of the woman who are not deemed credible to testify that her husband has died are: Her mother-in-law; and her mother-in-law’s daughter; and her rival wife, i.e., another wife of her husband’s; and her yevama, i.e., her husband’s brother’s wife; and her husband’s daughter.
מָה בֵּין גֵּט לְמִיתָה? שֶׁהַכְּתָב מוֹכִיחַ. הָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ מְבִיאָה אֶת גִּיטָּהּ, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לוֹמַר: ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״.
The mishna explains: What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death, that certain women are deemed credible to testify about one but not the other? With regard to a bill of divorce, it is so that the writing proves that the husband is divorcing his wife, and the testimony is needed only to supplement the bill of divorce. Similarly, the woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce, provided that she is required by the court to state in its presence: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as the Gemara will explain.
גְּמָ׳ וְהָתַנְיָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״, כָּךְ אֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ! אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן בָּאָרֶץ, כָּאן בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Just as these women are not deemed credible to say: Her husband died, so too, they are not deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce. Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult. Here, this mishna is referring to a case that took place in Eretz Yisrael. There, the baraita is referring to a case that took place outside of Eretz Yisrael.
בָּאָרֶץ – דְּלָאו אַדִּיבּוּרַהּ דִּידַהּ קָא סָמְכִינַן, מְהֵימְנָא; בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – דְּאַדִּיבּוּרַהּ דִּידַהּ קָא סָמְכִינַן, לָא מְהֵימְנָא.
The Gemara explains the difference: In a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael, where, to validate the bill of divorce we do not rely on her statement of: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, she serves only as an agent. Consequently, she is deemed credible to bring the bill of divorce. However, in a case that takes place outside of Eretz Yisrael, where we rely on her statement of: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and no one can contest the validity of the bill of divorce after her statement has been accepted, she is not deemed credible, as there is a concern that this woman may be intentionally lying in order to cause harm.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִיפְּכָא מִסְתַּבְּרָא! בָּאָרֶץ, דְּאִי אָתֵי בַּעַל מְעַרְעַר – מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בֵּיהּ, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר לְקִלְקוּלָא קָא מִיכַּוְּונָה, לָא מְהֵימְנָא; בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, דְּאִי אָתֵי בַּעַל מְעַרְעַר – לָא מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בֵּיהּ, מְהֵימְנָא.
Abaye said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable, and the distinction should be: In Eretz Yisrael, where if the husband were to come and contest the validity of the bill of divorce, we would pay attention to him and rule that they are not divorced, where it could be said that the woman who hates her intends to do her harm by having her remarry based on a bill of divorce that was later contested, she is not deemed credible. However, outside of Eretz Yisrael, where if the husband were to come and contest the validity of the bill of divorce, we would not pay attention to him, she is deemed credible, as she does not have the power to make trouble for the other woman and cause her to have to leave her second husband.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ – מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״ – נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ; הִיא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמֶנֶת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱמֶנֶת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ?!
The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Abaye (Tosefta 2:6): Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: A woman is deemed credible to bring her own bill of divorce through an a fortiori inference: Just as women about whom the Sages said: They are not deemed credible to say: Her husband died, are nevertheless deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce, with regard to the woman herself, who is deemed credible to say that her husband died, is it not right that she is deemed credible to bring her own bill of divorce?
