The Gemara brings support for Abaye’s explanation that our Mishna is referring to a case where the get was brought from outside of Israel from a braita and from the language in our Mishna. How can Rav Yosef explain our Mishna according to his approach? In which case would a woman bringing her own get from outside of Israel need to say “in front of me it was written…”? Why would she need to do that if the moment she receives the get from her husband, she is divorced? The new perek starts delving into the issue of li’shma and gives 4 different cases where a get is not considered li’shma and would be invalid. What is the difference between all four cases? What are possible ramifications from here to other promissory notes? Can these really be inferred from here? Even though a get that is not li’shma is not a valid get, does it disqualify a woman from marrying a kohen (in the event that her husband dies and she wishes to remarry)?
This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
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Gittin 24
וּמִמָּקוֹם שֶׁבָּאתָ, מָה לְהַלָּן צְרִיכוֹת שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ: ״בְּפָנֵינוּ נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנֵינוּ נֶחְתַּם״, אַף הִיא צְרִיכָה שֶׁתֹּאמַר: ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״.
And from the place that you came, i.e., from this inference itself, one establishes: Just as there, those who bring the bill of divorce must say: It was written in our presence and it was signed in our presence, so too, she herself must say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. This baraita must be referring to a case in which the wife brought the bill of divorce from outside of Eretz Yisrael, as it is only then that she must state that it was written and signed in her presence. Therefore, the baraita supports the opinion of Abaye.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: הָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ מְבִיאָה גִּיטָּהּ, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא צְרִיכָה לוֹמַר כּוּ׳; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Ashi said: The mishna is also precisely formulated in a way that supports Abaye’s opinion, as it teaches: The woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce, provided that she is required by the court to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. Learn from the mishna that it is referring to a case outside of Eretz Yisrael, as Abaye explained.
וְרַב יוֹסֵף, רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, מְצִיעֲתָא בָּאָרֶץ?! אִין; רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, מְצִיעֲתָא בָּאָרֶץ.
The Gemara asks: But according to Rav Yosef, is it possible to say that the first clause of the mishna (23a): Anyone is fit to serve as an agent to bring a bill of divorce, and the last clause of the mishna (23b): The woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce, discuss a case that takes place in a location outside of Eretz Yisrael, and the middle clause: Even the women who are not deemed credible, discusses a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: Yes, the first clause and the last clause discuss a case that takes place in a location outside of Eretz Yisrael, but the middle clause discusses a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael.
מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי: מָה בֵּין גֵּט לְמִיתָה – שֶׁהַכְּתָב מוֹכִיחַ; וְלָא קָתָנֵי: שֶׁהַכְּתָב וּפֶה מוֹכִיחַ.
The Gemara explains: From where does Rav Yosef infer this? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna: What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death, that certain women are deemed credible to testify about one but not the other? With regard to a bill of divorce, it is so that the writing proves that the husband is divorcing his wife. The mishna does not teach that the writing and statement prove this. Consequently, the statement of: It was written in my presence, is not needed. This indicates that the mishna is discussing a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael.
הָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ מְבִיאָה וְכוּ׳: אִשָּׁה, מִכִּי מָטֵי גִּיטָּהּ לְיָדָהּ אִיגָּרַשָׁה לַהּ! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בְּאוֹמֵר ״לֹא תִּתְגָּרְשִׁי בּוֹ אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין פְּלוֹנִי״. סוֹף סוֹף, כִּי מָטְיָא הָתָם – אִיגָּרַשָׁה!
§ The mishna teaches that the woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce and state that it was written and signed in her presence. The Gemara asks: Why does she need to bring it and testify that it was written and signed in her presence? With regard to this woman, once her bill of divorce reaches her hand, she is divorced. Rav Huna says: This mishna is referring to one who says to his wife: You will be divorced through it only in the presence of such and such court, and the divorce does not take effect when she receives the bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, once she arrives there, to that court, she is immediately divorced through it, as she has fulfilled the condition set forth by her husband. Why, then, is it necessary for her to bring the bill of divorce and to testify?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: דְּאָמַר לַהּ: כִּי מָטֵית הָתָם, אַתְנְחֵיהּ אַאַרְעָא וְשִׁקְלֵיהּ.
Rather, Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: This mishna is referring to a case where he said to her: When you arrive there, place the bill of divorce on the ground and take it. Consequently, the divorce does not take effect immediately upon her arrival.
אִי הָכִי, הֲוָה לֵיהּ: ״טְלִי גִּיטִּיךְ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע״, וְאָמַר רָבָא: ״טְלִי גִּיטִּיךְ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!
The Gemara challenges: If that is so, isn’t it like the case where he said to his wife: Take your bill of divorce from off the ground, and Rava says: If a husband says to his wife: Take your bill of divorce from off the ground, then it is as though he said nothing. He is not considered to have given her a bill of divorce; rather, she has taken it on her own.
אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר לַהּ: הֱוַי שָׁלִיחַ לְהוֹלָכָה עַד דְּמָטְיַת הָתָם, וְכִי מָטְיַת הָתָם הֱוַי שָׁלִיחַ לְִקַבָּלָה, וְקַבִּלִי אַתְּ גִּיטִּיךְ.
Rather, the mishna should be explained as follows: This is referring to a case where he said to his wife: Be my agent for delivery of the bill of divorce until you arrive there. And when you arrive there, be your own agent for receipt, and receive your bill of divorce as an agent.
וְהָא לֹא חָזְרָה שְׁלִיחוּת אֵצֶל הַבַּעַל! דְּאָמַר לַהּ: הֱוַי שָׁלִיחַ לְהוֹלָכָה עַד דְּמָטְיַת הָתָם, וְכִי מָטְיַת הָתָם שַׁוַּי שָׁלִיחַ לְִקַבָּלָה.
The Gemara challenges: But the agency has not returned to the husband. In other words, the first agency, where she acted as the agent for delivery, has not ended, because an agent must have the ability to complete his involvement in the act, return to the person who appointed him, and inform him that the agency has been carried out. In this case, once she arrives at the court, her agency ends when she assumes the role of the recipient of the bill of divorce, and her involvement does not end. Therefore, the appointment of the agent itself is deficient, and the divorce should not take effect. Rather, the mishna should be explained that he said to her: Be an agent for delivery until you arrive there, and when you arrive there, appoint an agent for receipt on your behalf and give him the bill of divorce.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אִשָּׁה עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ מִיָּד שְׁלִיחַ בַּעְלָהּ. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אֵין הָאִשָּׁה עוֹשָׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גִּיטָּהּ מִיָּד שְׁלִיחַ בַּעֲלָהּ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said: A woman can appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from the hand of the agent of her husband, and it is not required that she receive the bill of divorce herself. However, according to the one who says: A woman cannot appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from the hand of the agent of her husband, what can be said?
טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא בִּזָּיוֹן דְּבַעַל, וְהָכָא בַּעַל לָא קָפֵיד.
The Gemara answers: What is the reason of the one who said that the woman cannot appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from the agent of her husband? Because there is degradation of the husband in doing this, as he wishes to give the bill of divorce directly to the woman and not to an agent. And here the husband is not particular about the matter, as he instructed her to do so.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: מִשּׁוּם בִּזָּיוֹן דְּבַעַל; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: מִשּׁוּם חֲצֵרָהּ הַבָּאָה לְאַחַר מִיכָּן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who said: The reason for this halakha is due to the concern about the degradation of the husband. But according to the one who says that this halakha is a decree due to the case of her courtyard that comes afterward, what can be said? Some say that the reason for the halakha that the woman cannot appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce from the agent of her husband is that there was a concern that if she were able to do so, then the courts may eventually allow her to be divorced by purchasing a courtyard into which her husband had placed the bill of divorce. In the latter case, the divorce does not take effect. The courtyard needs to be an extension of the hand of the woman, into which the husband places the bill of divorce, but it does not act as her agent. In any event, according to this opinion, the fact that the husband is not particular does not prevent this halakha from applying, as it does not depend on him.
דְּאָמַר לַהּ: הֱוַי שָׁלִיחַ לְהוֹלָכָה עַד דְּמָטְיַת הָתָם, וְכִי מָטְיַת הָתָם שַׁוַּי שָׁלִיחַ לְהוֹלָכָה, וְקַבִּלִי אַתְּ גִּיטִּיךְ מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: According to this opinion, the mishna should be explained as discussing a case when he said to her: Be an agent for delivery of this bill of divorce until you arrive there, and when you arrive there, appoint another agent for delivery, and receive your bill of divorce from him.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּאָמַר לַהּ: הֱוַי שָׁלִיחַ לְהוֹלָכָה עַד דְּמָטְיַת הָתָם, וְכִי מָטְיַת הָתָם אֵימַר קַמֵּי בֵּי דִינָא ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״, וּמְשַׁוֵּי בֵּי דִּינָא שָׁלִיחַ, וְלִיתְּבוּהּ נִיהֲלִיךְ.
And if you wish, say that he said to her: Be an agent for delivery until you arrive there, and when you arrive there, say before the court: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and you should then appoint the court as an agent, and they will give the bill of divorce to you.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט
כׇּל גֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם אִשָּׁה, פָּסוּל. כֵּיצַד, הָיָה עוֹבֵר בַּשּׁוּק וְשָׁמַע קוֹל סוֹפְרִים מַקְרִין: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מְגָרֵשׁ אֶת פְּלוֹנִית מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְאָמַר: זֶה שְׁמִי וְזֶה שֵׁם אִשְׁתִּי; פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
MISHNA: Any bill of divorce that was not written for the sake of a specific woman is invalid. How so? In a case of a man who was passing through the marketplace and heard the sound of scribes who write bills of divorce dictating the text to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such; and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he wishes to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit for him to divorce his wife with it, as it was not written for the sake of any woman.
יָתֵר מִיכֵּן – כָּתַב לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִמְלַךְ, מְצָאוֹ בֶּן עִירוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ: שְׁמִי כְּשִׁמְךָ וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתִּי כְּשֵׁם אִשְׁתְּךָ; פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
Moreover, if one wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it; the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it.
יָתֵר מִיכֵּן – הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים וּשְׁמוֹתֵיהֶן שָׁווֹת, כָּתַב לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת הַגְּדוֹלָה – לֹא יְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה.
Moreover, if one had two wives and their names were identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it.
יָתֵר מִיכֵּן – אָמַר לְלַבְלָר: ״כְּתוֹב, לְאֵיזוֹ שֶׁאֶרְצֶה אֲגָרֵשׁ״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
Moreover, if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, this bill of divorce is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it.
גְּמָ׳ כָּתַב לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִמְלַךְ וְכוּ׳: וְאֶלָּא רֵישָׁא בְּמַאי?
GEMARA: The second clause of the mishna considers a case where one wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town with identical personal details found him and desired to use the bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: But then with what case is the first clause of the mishna, where a man discovers that a scribe had written a bill of divorce with identical personal details to his own, dealing; isn’t that also a case of a bill of divorce that was written for someone else? Why did the tanna cite two seemingly identical cases?
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּסוֹפְרִין הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהִתְלַמֵּד עָסְקִינַן. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״סוֹפְרִין מַקְרִין״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״סוֹפְרִין קוֹרְאִין״; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with scribes who are practicing writing; the bill of divorce in the first case was written as an exercise and not because someone requested that it be written. Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Scribes dictating, i.e., to their students, and it does not teach: Scribes reading the names on their own. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this phrasing that this is the correct understanding of the mishna.
מַאי ״יָתֵר מִיכֵּן״? תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: לֹא זֶה – שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין; אֶלָּא אַף זֶה – שֶׁנִּכְתַּב לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין, פָּסוּל.
By employing the introductory term: Moreover, the mishna indicates that each case teaches an additional novelty beyond that of the previous case. The Gemara asks: What novel element warrants the use of the term: Moreover? The Gemara answers by quoting a baraita: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that not only this bill of divorce, which was written for practice and which was not written for the sake of divorce, is unfit, but even that bill of divorce, which was written for the sake of divorce but the husband then reconsidered and did not use it, is unfit to be used by someone else.
וְלֹא זֶה – שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין דִּידֵיהּ; אֶלָּא אַף זֶה – שֶׁנִּכְתַּב לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין דִּידֵיהּ, פָּסוּל. וְלֹא זֶה – שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתַּב לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין הָא; אֶלָּא אַף זֶה – שֶׁנִּכְתַּב לְשׁוּם גֵּירוּשִׁין הָא, פָּסוּל.
And not only this bill of divorce, which was not written for the sake of his own divorce, is unfit, but even that bill of divorce, which was written for the sake of his own divorce, albeit for a particular wife, is unfit to be used for divorcing his other wife. And not only this bill of divorce, which was not written for the sake of this wife’s divorce, but even that bill of divorce, which was written for this wife’s divorce, as he instructed the scribe to write the bill of divorce for the sake of whichever wife he decides to divorce, is unfit to use in divorce.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אִי כְּתַב ״וְנָתַן סֵפֶר כְּרִיתוּת בְּיָדָהּ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לְמַעוֹטֵי הַאיְךְ קַמָּא, דְּלָא עֲבִיד לְשׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת; אֲבָל כָּתַב לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִמְלַךְ, דַּעֲבִיד לְשׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת – אֵימָא כָּשֵׁר; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְכָתַב״.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason that a bill of divorce must be written for the sake of the woman who is being divorced? It is stated in the verse that deals with divorce: “And he writes for her a scroll of severance and gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). This teaches the following: If the Merciful One had written only: And he gives a scroll of severance in her hand, I would say that the verse serves to exclude this case of the first clause of the mishna, where it was done not for the sake of severance, as the scribe wrote the bill of divorce as a mere exercise; however, if one wrote a bill of divorce to divorce his wife but then reconsidered, where it was done for the sake of severance, I would say that it is valid for another man to use for divorcing his wife. Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “And he writes,” meaning that the bill of divorce must be written exclusively for the sake of his own divorce.
אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְכָתַב״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לְמַעוֹטֵי הַאי, דְּלָא אִיהוּ קָא כָתֵיב לַהּ; אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, דְּאִיהוּ קָא כָתֵיב לַהּ – אֵימָא כָּשֵׁר; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לָהּ״ – לִשְׁמָהּ.
The Gemara continues the explanation: If the Merciful One had written only: And he writes, I would say that the verse serves to exclude this case mentioned previously, where the man using the bill of divorce was not the one who wrote it; but if a man has two wives with the same name, so that the man using the bill of divorce is writing it, say that it is a valid bill of divorce. Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “And he writes for her,” teaching that a bill of divorce must be written for the sake of a specific wife.
וְסֵיפָא לְמָה לִי? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּאֵין בְּרֵירָה.
The Gemara asks: And why do I need the last clause of the mishna, which deals with a man who writes a bill of divorce for whichever wife he later chooses? The earlier clauses made clear that one must write the bill of divorce for the sake of the woman who is being divorced. The Gemara answers: This teaches us that there is no retroactive clarification, i.e., that one does not say that since he gave the bill of divorce to this wife, it is clarified retroactively that he had written the bill of divorce for her sake; rather, he must write it for her sake from the outset.
כָּתַב לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת הַגְּדוֹלָה – לֹא יְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ אֶת הַקְּטַנָּה: קְטַנָּה הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ בֵּיהּ, הָא גְּדוֹלָה – מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ בֵּיהּ.
§ The mishna teaches: If he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older of his two wives and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger wife with it, even though the two wives share the same name. The Gemara deduces from this: It is the younger one whom he is not able to divorce with it, but he is able to divorce the older wife with it, as it was written for her from the outset. This is the case even though the younger wife would be able to collect payment of her marriage contract and remarry if she were to present this bill of divorce, as the court would think it was written for her.
אָמַר רָבָא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, שְׁנֵי יוֹסֵף בֶּן שִׁמְעוֹן הַדָּרִין בְּעִיר אַחַת – מוֹצִיאִין שְׁטַר חוֹב עַל אֲחֵרִים.
Rava said: That is to say that one of two people with identical names, e.g., Yosef ben Shimon, who live in one city, can present a promissory note to claim a debt from others, and the borrower cannot claim that the promissory note was written for the other Yosef ben Shimon.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, רֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁמִי כְּשִׁמְךָ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ; שֵׁנִי הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ בֵּיהּ, הָא רִאשׁוֹן מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ בֵּיהּ?! וְהָא אָמְרִינַן: ״וְלֹא אַחֵר יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיא עֲלֵיהֶן שְׁטַר חוֹב״!
Abaye said to him: If that is so, then according to your reasoning, from the earlier clause of the mishna that teaches that if one man requests a bill of divorce from another, saying: My name is the same as your name, the bill of divorce is unfit for the second person to divorce his wife with it, one could infer that the second man is the one who is not able to divorce with it, but the first man is able to divorce with it even though they have the same names. But didn’t we say in a mishna (Bava Batra 172a): With regard to two people with identical names, neither of them can present a promissory note to the other, and another person cannot present a promissory note to them, as each one can deny that he is the one who owes the money? Here too, there is a concern lest the wife of the other use the bill of divorce to collect payment of her marriage contract even though the bill of divorce was not written for her.
אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר? בְּעֵדֵי מְסִירָה, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא;
Rather, what have you to say to explain how the first man can divorce his wife with this bill of divorce, and how it can be used as a reliable proof of divorce? One can say that the ruling of the mishna applies in a case where there are witnesses who observe the transmission of the bill of divorce, and they confirm in court which woman was given the bill of divorce. And this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that presence of witnesses at the transmission of the bill of divorce is essential to its taking effect, so there is no concern that the wife of the other man will claim payment of her marriage contract.
הָכָא נָמֵי – בְּעֵדֵי מְסִירָה, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא.
Here too, in the case of two wives of the same man who have the same name, the ruling of the mishna applies in a case where there are witnesses who observe the transmission of the bill of divorce. And this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, and there is no concern that the other wife will claim payment of her marriage contract. Therefore, one should not deduce from this, as Rava did, that one of two people with the same name can present a promissory note to claim a debt from others.
אָמַר רַב: כּוּלָּן פּוֹסְלִין בִּכְהוּנָּה, חוּץ מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אַף רִאשׁוֹן נָמֵי פּוֹסֵל.
§ Rav says: All of the bills of divorce that the mishna categorizes as unfit to use for divorce still disqualify the women who receive them from marrying into the priesthood, as she is considered a divorced woman with regard to the halakha of marrying a priest, except for the first bill of divorce mentioned in the mishna. Unlike the other cases, that one was not written for the sake of divorce at all but was written only as part of a scribe’s training. And Shmuel says: Even the first bill of divorce disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood.
וְאַזְדָּא שְׁמוּאֵל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנוּ חֲכָמִים ״גֵּט פָּסוּל״ – פָּסוּל וּפוֹסֵל. ״חֲלִיצָה פְּסוּלָה״ – פְּסוּלָה, וּפוֹסַלְתָּהּ מִן הָאַחִין.
And Shmuel follows his own line of reasoning, as Shmuel says: Any place where the Sages taught in a mishna: An invalid bill of divorce, it indicates both that it is invalid to be used as a bill of divorce and that it nevertheless disqualifies the one who receives it from marrying a priest. Similarly, where the Sages taught: An invalid ḥalitza, it indicates both that the ḥalitza is invalid and that it nevertheless disqualifies the yevama from entering into levirate marriage with the other brothers.
בְּמַעְרְבָא אָמְרִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שְׂמֹאל וְלַיְלָה – פְּסוּלוֹת וּפוֹסְלוֹת,
In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: If ḥalitza was performed on the left foot of the yavam, or at night, these acts of ḥalitza are invalid, and they nevertheless disqualify the yevama from entering into levirate marriage with the other brothers.






















