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Today's Daf Yomi

January 7, 2016 | 讻状讜 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 25

Is the concept of bereira dependent on whether the determining factor is in the person’s control or not?

Study Guide Gittin 25

拽讟谉 讜讗谞驻讬诇讬讗 驻住讜诇讜转 讜讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讜转

However, if the yavam was a minor, or if the yevama performed 岣litza while he was wearing a soft shoe made of cloth [anpileya] and not the shoe used for 岣litza, then these acts of 岣litza are invalid, and in these cases they do not disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage.

讝注讬专讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉

The Gemara quotes another opinion with regard to the question of which of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna would disqualify the woman from marrying a priest. Ze鈥檈iri says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case, where the husband instructed the scribe to write a bill of divorce for one of his wives and explained that he would later decide which wife would be given the bill of divorce.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗祝 讗讞专讜谉 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇

And similarly, Rav Asi says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case. But Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even in the final case, that bill of divorce does not disqualify her from marrying a priest as well, as even that bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce at all. According to Rabbi Yo岣nan, there is no concern that retroactive clarification will determine that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the woman who received it, while the amora鈥檌m who hold that the woman is disqualified from marrying a priest in the final case of the mishna regard the efficacy of retroactive clarification to be uncertain.

讜讗讝讚讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讞诇拽讜 诇拽讜讞讜转 讛谉 讜诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讬讜讘诇

The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yo岣nan follows his own line of reasoning. As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Brothers who divided property they received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year. In the Jubilee Year, all land that had been purchased since the previous Jubilee Year reverts to the possession of the original owner. In this case, the land the brothers inherited from their father reverts to their joint ownership. Evidently, when they divided the land, this is not viewed as if it is retroactively clarified who inherited which portion from their father.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘注讬谞谉 诇讛 诇砖诪讛 讗讘诇 讛转诐 诪讻专 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬讛讚专 讘讬讜讘诇 讗讘诇 讬专讜砖讛 讜诪转谞讛 诇讗

And it is necessary for Rabbi Yo岣nan to state that there is no retroactive clarification both with regard to inheritance and with regard to a bill of divorce, as, if it were stated only with regard to this case, that of a bill of divorce, then one could say that with regard to this Rabbi Yo岣nan said that there is no retroactive clarification because we require that the bill of divorce be written in accordance with the verse: 鈥淗e writes for her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3), i.e., for her sake; but there, in the case of inheritance, one could say: It is only in the case of a sale that the Merciful One states that it will be returned in the Jubilee Year, but an inheritance and a gift will not be returned.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 砖讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讞讜诪专讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 讻转讞讬诇讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if he had taught us that there is no retroactive clarification only with regard to the inheritance of a field, then one could say that this is due to the fact that he holds that they must redistribute the property only as a stringency, but he would hold that in this case one must also be stringent and be concerned that it is a divorce. Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling was not because there is no retroactive clarification but because the halakha of the Jubilee Year requires that all land be returned to its state as it was initially, when the land had been divided among the tribes; but here, with regard to a bill of divorce, say that this consideration is not relevant, and there is retroactive clarification. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yo岣nan to rule that there is no retroactive clarification in each case separately.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 诪专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 诇讗讬讝讜 砖转爪讗 讘驻转讞 转讞讬诇讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讬转专 诪讬讻谉 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 诇讗讬讝讜 砖讗专爪讛 讗讙专砖 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜 讗诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

搂 The Gemara continues its discussion of the final case of the mishna. Rav Hoshaya asked of Rav Yehuda: If a husband said to a scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever of my wives emerges from the entrance first, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda said to him: You learned it already in the mishna: Moreover, even if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, it is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it. Apparently, there is no retroactive clarification.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讘谞讬讜 讛专讬谞讬 砖讜讞讟 讗转 讛驻住讞 注诇 诪讬 砖讬注诇讛 诪讻诐 专讗砖讜谉 诇讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讻谞住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜

Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Rav Yehuda鈥檚 answer based on a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal offering on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. This mishna indicates that there is retroactive clarification, as it becomes clear retroactively that the father slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of this son.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘专讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 驻住讞讬诐 讗爪诇 讙讬讟讬谉 讛讗 讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻讚讬 诇讝专讝谉 讘诪爪讜转

Rav Yehuda said to him: Hoshaya, my son, what do Paschal offerings have to do with bills of divorce? Wasn鈥檛 it stated concerning this mishna that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification; rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal offering from the outset. He created this competition only in order to galvanize them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot.

讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讻谞住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚讗诪谞讬谞讛讜 诪注讬拽专讗 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚诇讗 讗诪谞讬谞讛讜 诇讗讞专 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讬 拽诪讬转诪谞讜 讜讛转谞谉 谞诪谞讬谉 讜诪讜砖讻讬谉 讬讚讬讛谉 诪诪谞讜 注讚 砖讬砖讞讟

The Gemara comments that according to the explanation of Rabbi Yo岣nan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. Granted, if you say that the father registered them initially, before slaughtering the Paschal offering, the ruling is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them initially, can they then be registered after the slaughter of the Paschal offering? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): People may be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal offering until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered before the father said his statement.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪注砖讛 讜拽讚诪讜 讘谞讜转 诇讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘谞讜转 讝专讬讝讜转 讜讘谞讬诐 砖驻诇讬诐

That the competition was meant only to galvanize his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot is also taught in a baraita that records this type of competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And the daughters were found to have demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons were found to have demonstrated that they were lazy. The baraita is critical of the sons but does not say that they did not partake of the Paschal offering. Evidently the father slaughtered the offering for them as well.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 拽讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讜拽讗 驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜讛讚专 诪讜转讬讘 诇讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐

Questioning Rav Yehuda鈥檚 original answer to Rav Hoshaya, Abaye said: He asks him about a case where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others, but he resolves it based on a case where the husband makes the clarification dependent on his own decision. Rav Hoshaya asked about a bill of divorce written for whichever wife exits first, which depends on someone other than the husband, and Rav Yehuda resolved the question based on the mishna where the husband reserved the right to decide which wife he will divorce with the bill of divorce, which depends on his own decision. And then Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to him based on the mishna concerning the Paschal offering, where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讚诇诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is so that for the one who accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification. And according to the one who does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: The issue of retroactive clarification is contingent upon the question of on whom the outcome is dependent. But isn鈥檛 there the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in a case where one makes it dependent on his own decision, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛诇讜拽讞 讬讬谉 诪讘讬谉 讛讻讜转讬诐 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬 诇讜讙讬谉 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇讛驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛谉 转专讜诪讛 注砖专讛 诪注砖专 专讗砖讜谉 转砖注讛 诪注砖专 砖谞讬

The Gemara elaborates: When one makes it dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to now separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe.

讜诪讬讞诇 讜砖讜转讛 诪讬讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜住专讬谉

And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively which log he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice, as they hold that in this case there is no retroactive clarification. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on his own decision.

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞谉 诪讛 讛讬讗 讘讗讜转谉 讛讬诪讬诐

By contrast, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Yehuda accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as we learned in a mishna (73a): In a case where an ill husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die due to this illness, if he dies, the bill of divorce takes effect from the time of his statement. The mishna asks: What is the halakhic status of the wife in those days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the husband died?

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转 讗讬砖 诇讻诇 讚讘专讬讛 讜诇讻讬 诪讬讬转 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men; and when he will die, it is a bill of divorce. Death is equivalent to a matter that is dependent on the decision of others. Since Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, as it cannot take effect after the death of the husband, he evidently holds that there is retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 讛讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Furthermore, Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: But isn鈥檛 there Rabbi Shimon, who, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬谞讬 讘讜注诇讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讗讘讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转

The Gemara elaborates: When one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. This is understood from that which we said in the case of wine purchased from Samaritans. When one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on the condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, then even if the father did not desire it she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Gittin 25

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 25

拽讟谉 讜讗谞驻讬诇讬讗 驻住讜诇讜转 讜讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讜转

However, if the yavam was a minor, or if the yevama performed 岣litza while he was wearing a soft shoe made of cloth [anpileya] and not the shoe used for 岣litza, then these acts of 岣litza are invalid, and in these cases they do not disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage.

讝注讬专讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉

The Gemara quotes another opinion with regard to the question of which of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna would disqualify the woman from marrying a priest. Ze鈥檈iri says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case, where the husband instructed the scribe to write a bill of divorce for one of his wives and explained that he would later decide which wife would be given the bill of divorce.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讻讜诇谉 讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗祝 讗讞专讜谉 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇

And similarly, Rav Asi says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case. But Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even in the final case, that bill of divorce does not disqualify her from marrying a priest as well, as even that bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce at all. According to Rabbi Yo岣nan, there is no concern that retroactive clarification will determine that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the woman who received it, while the amora鈥檌m who hold that the woman is disqualified from marrying a priest in the final case of the mishna regard the efficacy of retroactive clarification to be uncertain.

讜讗讝讚讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讞诇拽讜 诇拽讜讞讜转 讛谉 讜诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讬讜讘诇

The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yo岣nan follows his own line of reasoning. As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Brothers who divided property they received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year. In the Jubilee Year, all land that had been purchased since the previous Jubilee Year reverts to the possession of the original owner. In this case, the land the brothers inherited from their father reverts to their joint ownership. Evidently, when they divided the land, this is not viewed as if it is retroactively clarified who inherited which portion from their father.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗讬转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘注讬谞谉 诇讛 诇砖诪讛 讗讘诇 讛转诐 诪讻专 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬讛讚专 讘讬讜讘诇 讗讘诇 讬专讜砖讛 讜诪转谞讛 诇讗

And it is necessary for Rabbi Yo岣nan to state that there is no retroactive clarification both with regard to inheritance and with regard to a bill of divorce, as, if it were stated only with regard to this case, that of a bill of divorce, then one could say that with regard to this Rabbi Yo岣nan said that there is no retroactive clarification because we require that the bill of divorce be written in accordance with the verse: 鈥淗e writes for her鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:3), i.e., for her sake; but there, in the case of inheritance, one could say: It is only in the case of a sale that the Merciful One states that it will be returned in the Jubilee Year, but an inheritance and a gift will not be returned.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 砖讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讞讜诪专讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 讻转讞讬诇讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if he had taught us that there is no retroactive clarification only with regard to the inheritance of a field, then one could say that this is due to the fact that he holds that they must redistribute the property only as a stringency, but he would hold that in this case one must also be stringent and be concerned that it is a divorce. Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 ruling was not because there is no retroactive clarification but because the halakha of the Jubilee Year requires that all land be returned to its state as it was initially, when the land had been divided among the tribes; but here, with regard to a bill of divorce, say that this consideration is not relevant, and there is retroactive clarification. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yo岣nan to rule that there is no retroactive clarification in each case separately.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 诪专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 诇讗讬讝讜 砖转爪讗 讘驻转讞 转讞讬诇讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 讬转专 诪讬讻谉 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 诇讗讬讝讜 砖讗专爪讛 讗讙专砖 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜 讗诇诪讗 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

搂 The Gemara continues its discussion of the final case of the mishna. Rav Hoshaya asked of Rav Yehuda: If a husband said to a scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever of my wives emerges from the entrance first, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda said to him: You learned it already in the mishna: Moreover, even if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, it is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it. Apparently, there is no retroactive clarification.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讘谞讬讜 讛专讬谞讬 砖讜讞讟 讗转 讛驻住讞 注诇 诪讬 砖讬注诇讛 诪讻诐 专讗砖讜谉 诇讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讻谞住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜

Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Rav Yehuda鈥檚 answer based on a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal offering on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. This mishna indicates that there is retroactive clarification, as it becomes clear retroactively that the father slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of this son.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜砖注讬讗 讘专讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 驻住讞讬诐 讗爪诇 讙讬讟讬谉 讛讗 讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻讚讬 诇讝专讝谉 讘诪爪讜转

Rav Yehuda said to him: Hoshaya, my son, what do Paschal offerings have to do with bills of divorce? Wasn鈥檛 it stated concerning this mishna that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification; rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal offering from the outset. He created this competition only in order to galvanize them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot.

讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讻谞住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讚讗诪谞讬谞讛讜 诪注讬拽专讗 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚诇讗 讗诪谞讬谞讛讜 诇讗讞专 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讬 拽诪讬转诪谞讜 讜讛转谞谉 谞诪谞讬谉 讜诪讜砖讻讬谉 讬讚讬讛谉 诪诪谞讜 注讚 砖讬砖讞讟

The Gemara comments that according to the explanation of Rabbi Yo岣nan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. Granted, if you say that the father registered them initially, before slaughtering the Paschal offering, the ruling is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them initially, can they then be registered after the slaughter of the Paschal offering? Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): People may be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal offering until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered before the father said his statement.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪注砖讛 讜拽讚诪讜 讘谞讜转 诇讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘谞讜转 讝专讬讝讜转 讜讘谞讬诐 砖驻诇讬诐

That the competition was meant only to galvanize his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot is also taught in a baraita that records this type of competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And the daughters were found to have demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons were found to have demonstrated that they were lazy. The baraita is critical of the sons but does not say that they did not partake of the Paschal offering. Evidently the father slaughtered the offering for them as well.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 拽讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讜拽讗 驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜讛讚专 诪讜转讬讘 诇讬讛 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐

Questioning Rav Yehuda鈥檚 original answer to Rav Hoshaya, Abaye said: He asks him about a case where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others, but he resolves it based on a case where the husband makes the clarification dependent on his own decision. Rav Hoshaya asked about a bill of divorce written for whichever wife exits first, which depends on someone other than the husband, and Rav Yehuda resolved the question based on the mishna where the husband reserved the right to decide which wife he will divorce with the bill of divorce, which depends on his own decision. And then Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to him based on the mishna concerning the Paschal offering, where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗讬 拽讜砖讬讗 讚诇诪讗 讚诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is so that for the one who accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification. And according to the one who does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: The issue of retroactive clarification is contingent upon the question of on whom the outcome is dependent. But isn鈥檛 there the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in a case where one makes it dependent on his own decision, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛诇讜拽讞 讬讬谉 诪讘讬谉 讛讻讜转讬诐 讗讜诪专 砖谞讬 诇讜讙讬谉 砖讗谞讬 注转讬讚 诇讛驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛谉 转专讜诪讛 注砖专讛 诪注砖专 专讗砖讜谉 转砖注讛 诪注砖专 砖谞讬

The Gemara elaborates: When one makes it dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to now separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe.

讜诪讬讞诇 讜砖讜转讛 诪讬讚 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜住专讬谉

And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively which log he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice, as they hold that in this case there is no retroactive clarification. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on his own decision.

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞谉 诪讛 讛讬讗 讘讗讜转谉 讛讬诪讬诐

By contrast, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Yehuda accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as we learned in a mishna (73a): In a case where an ill husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die due to this illness, if he dies, the bill of divorce takes effect from the time of his statement. The mishna asks: What is the halakhic status of the wife in those days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the husband died?

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻讗砖转 讗讬砖 诇讻诇 讚讘专讬讛 讜诇讻讬 诪讬讬转 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗

Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men; and when he will die, it is a bill of divorce. Death is equivalent to a matter that is dependent on the decision of others. Since Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, as it cannot take effect after the death of the husband, he evidently holds that there is retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 诇专讘讗 讛讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讜转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛

Furthermore, Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: But isn鈥檛 there Rabbi Shimon, who, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?

转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讛讗 讚讗诪专谉 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讘专讬专讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬谞讬 讘讜注诇讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讗讘讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转

The Gemara elaborates: When one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. This is understood from that which we said in the case of wine purchased from Samaritans. When one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on the condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, then even if the father did not desire it she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed,

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