Gittin 33
פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי הַדַּיָּינִין שֶׁבְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״.
so-and-so and so-and-so the judges, in such and such a place, in order that I will collect any debt that I am owed by so-and-so whenever I wish. Despite the fact that the prosbol mentions only two people, it nevertheless refers to them as judges, in accordance with the statement of Rav Naḥman.
וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת – אַטּוּ תַּנָּא כִּי רוֹכְלָא לִיחְשֹׁיב וְלֵיזִיל?!
And Rav Sheshet would respond to this: Is that to say that the tanna should have continued counting judges like a peddler? The tanna twice used the expression so-and-so because he wished to note that one should mention the judges’ names; he did not intend to teach anything about the number of judges.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: הַדַּיָּינִים חוֹתְמִין לְמַטָּה, אוֹ הָעֵדִים. מַאי, לָאו דַּיָּינִים דֻּומְיָא דְּעֵדִים – מָה עֵדִים שְׁנַיִם, אַף דַּיָּינִים נָמֵי שְׁנַיִם? וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת – מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא, וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא.
Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that two judges are also considered a court? As we learned in a mishna with regard to a prosbol (Shevi’it 10:4): The judges sign below the text of the prosbol, or the witnesses do so. What, is it not possible to deduce: The mishna means that judges are similar to witnesses? Just as there are two witnesses, so too, there are also two judges. And Rav Sheshet would respond to this: Are the cases comparable? This case of the judges is as it is, and that case of the witnesses is as it is, each one with its respective requirement of three or two members.
לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא דַּיָּינִים, לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא עֵדִים? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּלָא שְׁנָא כָּתוּב בִּלְשׁוֹן דַּיָּינִים וְחָתְמִי עֵדִים, וְלָא שְׁנָא כָּתוּב בִּלְשׁוֹן עֵדִים וְחָתְמִי דַּיָּינִים.
The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna in Shevi’it: Why do I need the tanna to teach that it can be signed by judges, and why do I need him to teach that it can be signed by witnesses as well? Why is it necessary to mention both? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that there is no difference if the prosbol is written in the terminology of judges and witnesses sign it, and there is no difference if it is written in the terminology of witnesses and judges sign it. What is important is that the prosbol was written and then signed by the court, and the precise wording is not important.
מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם: מַאי ״מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם״? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת מַמְזֵרִים. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת.
§ The mishna taught that Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one may not render a bill of divorce void in a court elsewhere for the betterment of the world. The Gemara asks: What problem did Rabban Gamliel ameliorate that this is considered to be for the betterment of the world? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is for the benefit of potential children born from an adulterous relationship [mamzerim], as the husband might render a bill of divorce void unbeknownst to his wife. She might remarry after having received the void bill of divorce, when in fact she is still married to her first husband, and children born from the second marriage will be mamzerim. To prevent this, Rabban Gamliel instituted that one may not render the bill of divorce void when not in the location of his wife. Reish Lakish says: For the betterment of deserted wives, lest women who received their bill of divorce by means of the husband’s agent refrain from remarrying out of the concern that perhaps their husband rendered the bill of divorce void.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת מַמְזֵרִים – סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב נַחְמָן, דְּאָמַר בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם; וּבֵי תְרֵי לֵית לְהוּ קָלָא; וְהִיא לָא שָׁמְעָה וְלָא יָדְעָה וְאָזְלָה וּמִינַּסְבָא, וְאִיכָּא מַמְזֵרִים.
The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says the reason for this ordinance is for the betterment of potential mamzerim, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who says that the husband can render void the bill of divorce even in the presence of two people. And since matters that occur in the presence of two people do not generate publicity, it is possible that she does not hear that the bill of divorce was rendered void. And since she does not know that her husband rendered the bill of divorce void, she will go and marry, and there are mamzerim as a result of second marriages like these.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת – סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, דְּאָמַר בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה; וּבֵי תְלָתָא אִית לְהוּ קָלָא; וְשָׁמְעָה וְיָדְעָה וְלָא מִינַּסְבָא; וְתַקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת הוּא דְּאִיכָּא.
And Reish Lakish, who says that the reason is for the betterment of deserted wives, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says: One can render void a bill of divorce only in the presence of three people. And since matters that occur in the presence of three people do generate publicity, she does hear and know that her husband rendered void the bill of divorce, and she would not marry again. Therefore, there is no concern that this will result in mamzerim, but there is a need to institute this ordinance for the betterment of deserted wives, as explained above.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בִּטְּלוֹ – מְבוּטָּל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לֹא לְבַטְּלוֹ וְלֹא לְהוֹסִיף עַל תְּנָאוֹ, שֶׁאִם כֵּן, מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה?
§ The Sages taught: Even after Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that a husband cannot render void a bill of divorce when not in the presence of the wife or the agent, if he nevertheless rendered it void, the bill of divorce is rendered void; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He is unable to render it void, and he also cannot add on to his condition if the bill of divorce contained some condition, as if so, i.e., if he can render it void, what advantage does the court have, if an ordinance of the court of Rabban Gamliel can be ignored?
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בָּטֵל גִּיטָּא, וּמִשּׁוּם ״מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה״, שָׁרֵינַן אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא? אִין, כׇּל דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ – אַדַּעְתָּא דְּרַבָּנַן מְקַדֵּשׁ, וְאַפְקְעִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן לְקִידּוּשִׁין מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law renders the bill of divorce void and the wife remains married, and due to the reasoning of: What advantage does the court have, we do not recognize that the bill of divorce is void and permit a married woman to marry anyone? The Gemara answers: Yes, anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תִּינַח דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּכַסְפָּא, קַדֵּישׁ בְּבִיאָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן לִבְעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? The Gemara answers: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל אֶלָּא זֶה בִּפְנֵי זֶה.
§ The Sages taught: If a husband said to ten people: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, in which case any one of them may write the bill of divorce and two others will serve as witnesses, he can render his instructions void before this one, i.e., any one of them, by stating: Do not write the bill of divorce, even though it is not before that one, i.e., any other one of them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can render his instructions void only when this one is before that one of them, meaning that all ten people must be present.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בְּעֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ קָמִיפַּלְגִי; רַבִּי סָבַר: עֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to whether testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: Testimony that was partially invalidated
לֹא בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ; וְאִי אָזְלִי הָנָךְ כָּתְבִי וְיָהֲבִי – לִיכְתְּבוּ וְלִיתְּבוּ;
is not entirely invalidated; and therefore, even though the husband nullified the agency of part of the group, if these other people whose agency was never nullified go and write the bill of divorce and give it to the wife, let them write and give the bill of divorce. There is nothing to be concerned about, as their agency was never nullified. Since the bill of divorce that they deliver is valid, there is no reason to institute an ordinance that a husband can nullify the agency only in the presence of the entire group.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: עֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ; וְהָנָךְ לָא יָדְעִי, וְאָזְלִי וְכָתְבִי וְיָהֲבִי; וְשָׁרוּ אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and holds: Testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. And if the agency of part of the group was nullified when those agents were not in the presence of the rest of the group, then those others do not know that their agency has been nullified as well. And they might then go and write a bill of divorce and give it, and they will cause the court to mistakenly permit a married woman to marry anyone.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ לֹא בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ; וְהָכָא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – קָסָבַר: מִלְּתָא דְּמִתְעַבְדָא בְּאַפֵּי עַשְׂרָה – צְרִיכָא בֵּי עַשְׂרָה לְמִישְׁלְפַהּ.
And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that testimony that was partially invalidated is not entirely invalidated; and here, this is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the husband can nullify his instructions only in the presence of all of the agents: He holds that a matter that is performed in the presence of ten people requires the presence of ten people to revoke it. Since the husband instructed ten people to write the bill of divorce, he cannot revoke his instructions in the presence of only a portion of them.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״כּוּלְּכֶם״, מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: עֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ – וְהָנֵי, כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ ״כּוּלְּכֶם״, לָא מָצוּ כָּתְבִי וְיָהֲבִי;
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said to them: All of you should write a bill of divorce for my wife, in which case all of them must sign the bill of divorce, what is the halakha according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? The Gemara elaborates: Is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel for prohibiting the husband from nullifying the instructions that he had given to ten people because he holds that testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated, and one should be concerned that the rest of the group will not know that their agency was nullified? And these people, since he said to them explicitly: All of you should write the bill of divorce, the rest of the group are not able to write and give the bill of divorce on their own. Therefore, the husband should be able to nullify his instructions when not in the presence of the entire group, as no mistake can occur because of his action.
אוֹ דִלְמָא, טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: כֹּל מִלְּתָא דְּמִתְעַבְדָא בְּאַפֵּי בֵּי עַשְׂרָה, צְרִיכָא בֵּי עַשְׂרָה לְמִישְׁלְפַהּ – וְהִילְכָּךְ, אֲפִילּוּ ״כּוּלְּכֶם״ נָמֵי?
Or perhaps the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is because he holds that a matter that is performed in the presence of ten people requires the presence of ten people to revoke it. And therefore, even if he said: All of you should write the bill of divorce, he must nullify his instructions in all ten people’s presence as well.
תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״תְּנוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל אֶלָּא זֶה בִּפְנֵי זֶה. וְהָא שְׁנַיִם, דְּכִי ״כוּלְּכֶם״ דָּמוּ, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita (Tosefta 4:1): If one said to two agents: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, he can render his instructions void before this one, i.e., either of them, even though it is not before that one, i.e., the other one; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can render his instructions void only when this one is before that one, i.e., when the two of them are together. The Gemara now states the attempted proof. But two are equivalent to: All of you, as the bill of divorce cannot be written and given by fewer than two people, and there is no concern that perhaps one will sign without the other. And yet Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel still disagree, proving that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reason is that the husband can nullify his instructions only in the same manner that he gave them.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִי בְּעֵדֵי כְתִיבָה – הָכִי נָמֵי; הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּעֵדֵי הוֹלָכָה.
Rav Ashi said: If the baraita was speaking of witnesses of the writing of the bill of divorce, both of whom must sign the bill of divorce, this would indeed resolve the question. However, here we are dealing with witnesses of the delivery of the bill of divorce. In that case there is no need for two agents, so there is a concern that if the husband nullifies their agency in the presence of only one of them, then the second agent could mistakenly deliver the bill of divorce to the wife.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִיסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אָמַר לָזֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְלָזֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי זֶה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּעֵדֵי הוֹלָכָה – שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּעֵדֵי כְתִיבָה, מִי מִצְטָרְפִי?! הָא אָמַר מָר: אֵין עֵדוּתָן מִצְטָרֶפֶת, עַד שֶׁיִּרְאוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד! דִּלְמָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קָרְחָה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: This too, stands to reason, as the latter clause of the baraita teaches: If one said to this one on his own and to that one on his own, then he can nullify each of their agencies before this one even though it is not before that one. Granted, if you say that this is referring to witnesses of the delivery of the bill of divorce, this works out well, as they need not be appointed together. However, if you say that this is referring to witnesses of the writing, can they combine together if they were appointed separately? But doesn’t the Master say: The testimony of two witnesses does not combine together until the two of them see the event as one, together? The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who holds that in order for the witnesses to combine together and present their testimony it is not necessary for them to witness the event together.
אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה: שְׁמַעִית מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא תַּרְתֵּי – חֲדָא כְּרַבִּי, וַחֲדָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל; וְלָא יָדַעְנָא הֵי כְּרַבִּי וְהֵי כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said: I heard from Rabbi Abba two rulings with regard to these questions; in one he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and in one he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and I do not know which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן – דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מַעֲשֶׂה וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן, מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? וְחָזַר רַבִּי וְעָשָׂה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
Rav Yosef said: Let us see ourselves which argument was decided in favor of whom based on other sources, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: There was an incident and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Perata, the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata and the son of the son of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If so, what advantage does the court have? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reversed his ruling and acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The claim of: If so, what advantage does the court have, is the reason behind Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion with regard to the question of whether, in a case where the husband violates the ordinance and renders the bill of divorce void in the presence of a court but not before the agent, it is void after the fact.
וּמִדְּהָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָךְ כְּרַבִּי.
And from the fact that this dispute is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi retracted his opinion and acted in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, by inference, in the case of that disagreement, with regard to one who gives instructions to ten people, the halakha must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
וְאַף רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה דְּמִן אוּשָׁא סָבַר, חֲדָא כְּרַבִּי וַחֲדָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה: חַמְשָׁה סָבֵי הֲוֵינַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה דְּמִן אוּשָׁא, אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא קַמֵּיהּ, וְאַשְׁקְלֵיהּ גִּיטָּא עַל כּוּרְחֵיהּ. אֲמַר לַן: זִילוּ אִטַּמּוּרוּ וּכְתֻבוּ לַהּ.
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoshiya from the city of Usha also holds that one halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: We were five elders sitting before Rabbi Yoshiya from Usha. A certain man came before him, and Rabbi Yoshiya extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from him against his will. Rabbi Yoshiya said to us: Go hide and write for her a bill of divorce, so that the husband will not find you and render the bill of divorce void after it has been written.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כְּרַבִּי, כִּי מִיטַּמְּרִי מַאי הָוֵי? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ;
The Gemara explains the inference as to the ruling of Rabbi Yoshiya: And if it enters your mind that he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that if a husband renders a bill of divorce void when not in the presence of the agent then the bill of divorce is void, then if they hide, what of it? The man could simply render the bill of divorce void in the presence of others. Rather, learn from it that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that one can render the bill of divorce void only in the presence of the agents.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אִידַּךְ נָמֵי כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, לְמָה לְהוּ אִטַּמּוֹרֵי? לִיבַּדְּרוּ אִיבַּדּוֹרֵי! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ – חֲדָא כְּרַבִּי, וַחֲדָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara explains the second element: And if it enters your mind to say that with regard to the other dispute, where one instructs ten people to write the bill of divorce, he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, then why would they need to hide? Let them scatter, and since the husband will not find all of them together, he will be unable to render the bill of divorce void. Rather, learn from it that he holds in one case in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and in one case in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. This is one opinion with regard to the halakha in the two disputes of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
וְרָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן. וְלֵית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן ״מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה״?! וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל:
And Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in both cases. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Naḥman accept the argument that the court should have an advantage? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel says,
