Gittin 36
דְּמַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ בְּרַבִּים. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּדַּר בְּרַבִּים – אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara answers that we administer the vow to the priest in public. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a vow that was taken in public has no possibility of nullification by a halakhic authority, but according to the one who says it has the possibility of nullification, what can be said?
דְּמַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים – דְּאָמַר אַמֵּימָר, הִלְכְתָא: אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּדַּר בְּרַבִּים יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה, עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים – אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה.
The Gemara answers that we administer the vow to the priest based on the consent of the public, making it a type of vow that cannot be dissolved without their consent. As Ameimar said, the halakha is as follows: Even according to the one who says that a vow that was taken in public has the possibility of nullification, if it was taken based on the consent of the public, it has no possibility of nullification.
וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, אֲבָל לִדְבַר מִצְוָה – יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה. כִּי הָהוּא מַקְרֵי דַּרְדְּקֵי דְּאַדְּרֵיהּ רַב אַחָא עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים, דַּהֲוָה פָּשַׁע בְּיָנוֹקֵי; וְאַהְדְּרֵיהּ רָבִינָא, דְּלָא אִישְׁתְּכַח דְּדָיֵיק כְּווֹתֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to when the nullification of a vow is in order to enable one to perform an optional matter, but to enable one to perform a matter of a mitzva, it has the possibility of nullification. This is like the incident involving a certain teacher of children, upon whom Rav Aḥa administered a vow based on the consent of the public to cease teaching, as he was negligent with regard to the children by hitting them too much. And Ravina had his vow nullified and reinstated him, as they did not find another teacher who was as meticulous as he was.
וְהָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַגֵּט מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם: מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם?! דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכָתוֹב בַּסֵּפֶר וְחָתוֹם״!
§ The mishna taught: And the witnesses sign the bill of divorce for the betterment of the world. The Gemara asks: Is the reason that the witnesses sign the bill of divorce for the betterment of the world? It is by Torah law that they must sign, as it is written: “And subscribe the deeds, and sign them, and call witnesses” (Jeremiah 32:44).
אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא צְרִיכָא – לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי; תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם – דְּזִמְנִין דְּמָיְיתִי סָהֲדִי, אִי נָמֵי זִימְנִין דְּאָזְלִי לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם.
Rabba said: No, it is necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and not the witnesses who sign the bill of divorce, and by Torah law it does not need to be signed. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted signatory witnesses for the betterment of the world, as sometimes it occurs that the witnesses who witnessed the transmission of the bill of divorce die, or sometimes it occurs that they go overseas, and the validity of the bill of divorce may be contested. Since they are not present, there are no witnesses who can ratify the bill of divorce. Once the Sages instituted that the witnesses’ signatures appear on the bill of divorce, then the bill of divorce can be ratified by authenticating their signatures.
רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הִתְקִינוּ שֶׁיְּהֵא עֵדִים מְפָרְשִׁין שְׁמוֹתֵיהֶן בְּגִיטִּין – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.
Rav Yosef said: You can even say that it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and the mishna should be understood as follows: They instituted that the witnesses must specify their full names on bills of divorce and not merely sign the document, for the betterment of the world.
כִּדְתַנְיָא: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיָה כּוֹתֵב ״אֲנִי פְּלוֹנִי חָתַמְתִּי עֵד״; אִם כְּתַב יָדוֹ יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר, וְאִם לָאו – פָּסוּל.
As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:13): At first, the witness would write only: I, so-and-so, signed as a witness, but they did not state their full names. Therefore, the only way to identify the witness was to see if an identical signature could be found on a different document that had been ratified in court. Therefore, if another copy of a witness’s signature is produced from elsewhere, i.e., another court document, it is valid, but if not, then the bill of divorce is invalid even though it is possible that he was a valid witness, and as a result of this women were left unable to remarry.
אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: תַּקָּנָה גְּדוֹלָה הִתְקִינוּ, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מְפָרְשִׁין שְׁמוֹתֵיהֶן בְּגִיטִּין – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.
Rabban Gamliel said: They instituted a great ordinance that the witnesses must specify their full names on bills of divorce, stating that they are so-and-so, son of so-and-so, and other identifying features, for the betterment of the world. This made it possible to easily clarify who the witnesses were and to ratify the bill of divorce by finding acquaintances of the witnesses who recognized their signatures.
וּבְסִימָנָא לָא?! וְהָא רַב צָיֵיר כְּוָרָא; וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא צָיֵיר חֲרוּתָא; רַב חִסְדָּא סָמֶךְ; וְרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא עַיִן; רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא צָיֵיר מָכוּתָא! שָׁאנֵי רַבָּנַן, דִּבְקִיאִין סִימָנַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: But is it not sufficient to sign with a pictorial mark? But Rav drew a fish instead of a signature, and Rabbi Ḥanina drew a palm branch [ḥaruta]; Rav Ḥisda drew the letter samekh, and Rav Hoshaya drew the letter ayin; and Rabba bar Rav Huna drew a sail [makota]. None of these Sages would sign their actual names. The Gemara answers: The Sages are different, as everyone is well versed in their pictorial marks.
מֵעִיקָּרָא בְּמַאי אַפְקְעִינְהוּ? בְּדִיסְקֵי.
The Gemara asks: Initially, with what did they publicize these marks, as they could not use them in place of signatures before people were well versed in them? The Gemara answers: They initially used their marks in letters, where there is no legal requirement to sign their names. Once it became known that they would use these marks as their signatures, they were able to use them as signatures even on legal documents.
הִלֵּל הִתְקִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל וְכוּ׳: תְּנַן הָתָם, פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. זֶה אֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהִתְקִין הִלֵּל הַזָּקֵן; שֶׁרָאָה אֶת הָעָם שֶׁנִּמְנְעוּ מִלְּהַלְווֹת זֶה אֶת זֶה, וְעָבְרוּ עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן יִהְיֶה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְלִיַּעַל וְגוֹ׳״, עָמַד וְהִתְקִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל.
§ The mishna taught that Hillel the Elder instituted a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from abrogating an outstanding debt [prosbol]. We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:3): If one writes a prosbol, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debt. This is one of the matters that Hillel the Elder instituted because he saw that the people of the nation were refraining from lending to one another around the time of the Sabbatical Year, as they were concerned that the debtor would not repay the loan, and they violated that which is written in the Torah: “Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and your eye be evil against your needy brother, and you give him nothing” (Deuteronomy 15:9). He arose and instituted the prosbol so that it would also be possible to collect those debts in order to ensure that people would continue to give loans.
וְזֶה הוּא גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל פְּרוֹסְבּוּל: ״מוֹסְרַנִי לָכֶם פְּלוֹנִי [וּפְלוֹנִי] דַּיָּינִין שֶׁבְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁכׇּל חוֹב שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי אֵצֶל פְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁאֶגְבֶּנּוּ כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאֶרְצֶה״. וְהַדַּיָּינִים חוֹתְמִים לְמַטָּה, אוֹ הָעֵדִים.
And this is the essence of the text of the prosbol: I transfer to you, so-and-so the judges, who are in such and such a place, so that I will collect any debt that I am owed by so-and-so whenever I wish, as the court now has the right to collect the debts. And the judges or the witnesses sign below, and this is sufficient. The creditor will then be able to collect the debt on behalf of the court, and the court can give it to him.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מְשַׁמְּטָא שְׁבִיעִית, וְהִתְקִין הִלֵּל דְּלָא מְשַׁמְּטָא?! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בַּשְּׁבִיעִית בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה, וְרַבִּי הִיא –
The Gemara asks about the prosbol itself: But is there anything like this, where by Torah law the Sabbatical Year cancels the debt but Hillel instituted that it does not cancel the debt? Abaye said: The baraita is referring to the Sabbatical Year in the present, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״וְזֶה דְּבַר הַשְּׁמִיטָּה שָׁמוֹט״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי שְׁמִיטוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר: אַחַת שְׁמִיטַּת קַרְקַע וְאַחַת שְׁמִיטַּת כְּסָפִים. בִּזְמַן שֶׁאַתָּה מְשַׁמֵּט קַרְקַע – אַתָּה מְשַׁמֵּט כְּסָפִים, בִּזְמַן שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְשַׁמֵּט קַרְקַע, אִי אַתָּה מְשַׁמֵּט כְּסָפִים.
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states in the context of the cancellation of debts: “And this is the manner of the abrogation: He shall abrogate” (Deuteronomy 15:2). The verse speaks of two types of abrogation: One is the release of land and one is the abrogation of monetary debts. Since the two are equated, one can learn the following: At a time when you release land, when the Jubilee Year is practiced, you abrogate monetary debts; at a time when you do not release land, such as the present time, when the Jubilee Year is no longer practiced, you also do not abrogate monetary debts.
וְתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן דִּתְשַׁמֵּט, זֵכֶר לַשְּׁבִיעִית; רָאָה הִלֵּל שֶׁנִּמְנְעוּ הָעָם מִלְּהַלְווֹת זֶה אֶת זֶה, עָמַד וְהִתְקִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל.
And the Sages instituted that despite this, the Sabbatical Year still will abrogate debt in the present, in remembrance of the Torah-mandated Sabbatical Year. Hillel saw that the people of the nation refrained from lending to each other so he arose and instituted the prosbol. According to this explanation, the ordinance of Hillel did not conflict with a Torah law; rather, he added an ordinance to counter the effect of a rabbinic law.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לָא מְשַׁמְּטָא שְׁבִיעִית, וְתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן דִּתְשַׁמֵּט?!
According to this explanation, the Sages instituted that even in the present the Sabbatical Year would bring a cancellation of debt, despite the fact that by Torah law the debt still stands. The Gemara asks: But is there anything like this, where by Torah law the Sabbatical Year does not cancel the debt, and the Sages instituted that it will cancel? It is as though the Sages are instructing the debtors to steal from their creditors, as by Torah law they still owe the money.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שֵׁב וְאַל תַּעֲשֶׂה הוּא. רָבָא אָמַר: הֶפְקֵר בֵּית דִּין – הֶפְקֵר. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן שֶׁהֶפְקֵר בֵּית דִּין – הֶפְקֵר? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָבוֹא לִשְׁלֹשֶׁת הַיָּמִים כַּעֲצַת הַשָּׂרִים וְהַזְּקֵנִים, יׇחֳרַם כׇּל רְכוּשׁוֹ וְהוּא יִבָּדֵל מִקְּהַל הַגּוֹלָה״.
Abaye says: This is not actual theft; it is an instruction to sit passively and not do anything. The Sages have the authority to instruct one to passively violate a Torah law, so long as no action is taken. Rava says: The Sages are able to institute this ordinance because property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever did not come within three days according to the counsel of the princes and the Elders, all of his property shall be forfeited, and he shall be separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8).
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״אֵלֶּה הַנְּחָלוֹת אֲשֶׁר נִחֲלוּ אֶלְעָזָר הַכֹּהֵן וִיהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן נוּן וְרָאשֵׁי הָאָבוֹת וְגוֹ׳״. וְכִי מָה עִנְיַן רָאשִׁים אֵצֶל אָבוֹת? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה אָבוֹת מַנְחִילִין אֶת בְּנֵיהֶם כֹּל מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצוּ, אַף רָאשִׁים מַנְחִילִין הָעָם כֹּל מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצוּ.
Rabbi Eliezer said: The halakha that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless is derived from here: The verse states: “These are the inheritances, which Eleazar the priest, and Joshua the son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance” (Joshua 19:51). The Gemara asks: What do the heads have to do with the fathers? It comes to tell you: Just as fathers transmit anything that they wish to their children, so too, heads of the nation transmit to the people anything that they wish. This demonstrates that the court has the authority to take property from one person and to give it to another; therefore, the Sages have the authority to decide that all debts are canceled.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: כִּי הִתְקִין הִלֵּל פְּרוֹסְבּוּל – לְדָרֵיהּ הוּא דְּתַקֵּין, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְדָרֵי עָלְמָא נָמֵי תַּקֵּין?
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Hillel instituted the prosbol, was it for his generation alone that he instituted it, and the custom developed to continue using it, or did he perhaps institute it also for all generations?
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְבַטּוֹלֵיהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְדָרֵיהּ הוּא דְּתַקֵּין – מְבַטְּלִינַן לֵיהּ; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְדָרֵי עָלְמָא נָמֵי תַּקֵּין, הָא אֵין בֵּית דִּין יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל דִּבְרֵי בֵּית דִּין חֲבֵרוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן גָּדוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ בְּחׇכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן. מַאי?
The Gemara asks: What difference is there whether it was instituted for his generation only or for all generations when either way, it is still in use? The Gemara explains: The difference arises with regard to nullifying the institution of prosbol. If you say that it was for his generation alone that he instituted it, then we can nullify it if we desire. But if you say that he instituted it also for all generations, then there is a principle that a court can nullify the action of another court only if it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. Therefore, we would not be able to nullify the ordinance instituted by Hillel and his court. What, then, is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא כָּתְבִינַן פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֶלָּא אִי בְּבֵי דִינָא דְּסוּרָא אִי בְּבֵי דִינָא דִּנְהַרְדְּעָא. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לְדָרֵי עָלְמָא נָמֵי תַּקֵּין, בִּשְׁאָר בֵּי דִינָא נָמֵי לִכְתְּבוּ!
The Gemara suggests a resolution to the dilemma: Come and hear that which Shmuel said: We write a prosbol only in the court of Sura or in the court of Neharde’a, as they were the primary centers of Torah study, but not in any other court. And if it enters your mind to say that he instituted it also for all generations, then let them write a prosbol in the other courts as well.
דִּלְמָא כִּי תַּקֵּין הִלֵּל לְדָרֵי עָלְמָא – כְּגוֹן בֵּי דִינָא דִּידֵיהּ, וּכְרַב אַמֵּי וְרַב אַסִּי, דְּאַלִּימֵי לְאַפְקוֹעֵי מָמוֹנָא; אֲבָל לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – לָא.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps when Hillel instituted the prosbol, he did so for all generations, but only for courts such as his court, which was the primary court of his time, and courts like those of Rav Ami and Rav Asi, as they have the power to remove money from someone’s possession. However, for all other courts, which are not as authoritative, he did not institute this ordinance. Therefore, the statement of Shmuel cannot serve as a proof with regard to the manner in which the prosbol was instituted.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָא פְּרוֹסְבֻּלָא – עוּלְבָּנָא דְּדַיָּינֵי הוּא; אִי אֲיַישַּׁר חַיִל אֲבַטְּלִינֵּיהּ. אֲבַטְּלִינֵּיהּ?! וְהָא אֵין בֵּית דִּין יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל דִּבְרֵי בֵּית דִּין חֲבֵרוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן גָּדוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ בְּחָכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם אֲיַישֵּׁר חַיִל יוֹתֵר מֵהִלֵּל, אֲבַטְּלִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear that which Shmuel said: This prosbol is an ulbena of the judges; if my strength increases I will nullify it. The Gemara challenges this statement: How could Shmuel say: I will nullify it? But isn’t it the case that a court can nullify the action of another court only if it is greater than it in wisdom and in number? It must be that Shmuel holds that Hillel did not establish the prosbol for all generations, and in his time it carried the force of a mere custom. The Gemara rejects this proof: It can be explained that this is what he said: If my strength increases so that I become greater than Hillel, then I will nullify the prosbol.
וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אֲקַיְּימִנֵּהּ. אֲקַיְּימִנֵּהּ?! הָא מִיקַּיַּים וְקָאֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵימָא בֵּיהּ מִילְּתָא, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא כָּתוּב כְּכָתוּב דָּמֵי.
By contrast, Rav Naḥman said: If my strength increases, I will uphold the institution of the prosbol. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: I will uphold it? Isn’t it upheld and standing? Why does the prosbol require further support? The Gemara explains: This is what he said: If my strength increases, I will say something about it, and I will institute that even though the prosbol was not written, it is considered as though it was written. Then people would no longer need to write a prosbol, as it would be considered as if everyone wrote one.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הַאי עוּלְבָּנָא – לִישָּׁנָא דְחוּצְפָּא הוּא, אוֹ לִישָּׁנָא דְנִיחוּתָא הוּא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: עֲלוּבָה כַּלָּה שֶׁזִּינְּתָה בְּקֶרֶב חוּפָּתָהּ.
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: This ulbena of the judges that Shmuel speaks of, is it a term of insolence, in that the judges are, according to Shmuel, enabling lenders to insolently collect debts that are not due to them, or a term of convenience, in that the judges are saving themselves the inconvenience of having to actually collect the debts detailed in the promissory notes? The Gemara suggests a proof: Come and hear that which Ulla said in describing the Jewish people after they sinned with the Golden Calf immediately following the revelation at Sinai: Insolent [aluva] is the bride who is promiscuous under her wedding canopy.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי בְּרַהּ דְּבַת שְׁמוּאֵל: מַאי קְרָא? ״עַד שֶׁהַמֶּלֶךְ בִּמְסִבּוֹ נִרְדִּי נָתַן רֵיחוֹ״. אָמַר רָבָא: עֲדַיִין חַבִּיבוּתָא הוּא גַּבַּן, דִּכְתִיב ״נָתַן״, וְלָא כְּתִיב ״הִסְרִיחַ״.
Rav Mari, son of Shmuel’s daughter, says: What is the verse from which it is derived? “While the king sat at his table, my spikenard sent forth its fragrance” (Song of Songs 1:12). He understands the verse in the following manner: While the king was still involved in his celebration, i.e., God had just given the Torah, the perfume of the Jewish people gave off an unpleasant odor, i.e., they sinned with the Golden Calf. Rava says: Nevertheless, it is apparent from the verse that the affection of God is still upon us, as it is written euphemistically as “sent forth its fragrance” and the verse is not written: It reeked.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַנֶּעֱלָבִין וְאֵינָן עוֹלְבִים, שׁוֹמְעִין חֶרְפָּתָן וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין, עוֹשִׂין מֵאַהֲבָה וּשְׂמֵחִין בְּיִסּוּרִין, עֲלֵיהֶן הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״וְאוֹהֲבָיו כְּצֵאת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ בִּגְבוּרָתוֹ״.
The Gemara continues discussing the meaning of the word ulbena. The Sages taught: Those who are insulted [ne’elavin] but do not insult others, who hear their shame but do not respond, who act out of love and are joyful in their suffering, about them the verse states: “And they that love Him are as the sun going forth in its might” (Judges 5:31).
מַאי ״פְּרוֹסְבּוּל״? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פְּרוֹס בּוּלֵי וּבוּטֵי.
§ The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word prosbol? Rav Ḥisda said: An ordinance [pros] of bulei and butei.
