Gittin 39
הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין אָדָם מוֹצִיא דְּבָרָיו לְבַטָּלָה.
The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person does not make a statement of consecration for naught. If one declared an item consecrated, even if he did not use the correct formulation, his statement is interpreted in a manner to render it meaningful. Therefore, although the master did not say that the slave is consecrated with regard to his monetary value, his statement is interpreted in this way. However, Rav holds in accordance with the dissenting opinion of the Rabbis. In their opinion the slave is not consecrated.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְכֵן הוּא, שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁ עַצְמוֹ – עוֹשֶׂה וְאוֹכֵל, שֶׁלֹּא הִקְדִּישׁ אֶלָּא דָּמָיו. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא – שַׁפִּיר;
The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, as it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita: And so too, a freeman who consecrated himself works and is sustained from his labor, as he consecrated only his monetary value and he did not consecrate his body. Granted, if you say that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, then the entire baraita works out well. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, even when he consecrated himself, his statement is interpreted so that it is referring to a type of consecration that is meaningful.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבָּנַן הִיא, בִּשְׁלָמָא עַבְדּוֹ – לִדְמֵי קָאֵי, אֶלָּא אִיהוּ – לִדְמֵי קָאֵי?!
Rather, if you say that it is the opinion of the Rabbis, granted, the first clause of the baraita that deals with one who consecrates his slave is understood, as his slave exists primarily for monetary value. It is logical that when the owner consecrates him he intends to consecrate his monetary value. However, in the case of the latter clause of the baraita, which is referring to one who consecrates himself, does he exist for monetary value? Therefore, the baraita must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי – הַמַּקְדִּישׁ עַבְדּוֹ, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מוֹעֲלִין בִּשְׂעָרוֹ. מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: קָדוֹשׁ; וּמָר סָבַר: לָא קָדוֹשׁ?
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute with regard to one who consecrates his slave is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. A baraita taught: With regard to one who consecrates his slave, if one then makes use of the slave, there is no misuse of property consecrated to the Temple. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One misuses property consecrated to the Temple if one makes use of his hair. What, is it not that they disagree about this issue, as one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the slave is consecrated, and therefore the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property apply, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the slave is not consecrated?
וְתִסְבְּרָא?! הַאי ״מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ״ וְ״אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ״?! הַאי ״קָדוֹשׁ״ וְ״אֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara asks: And how can you understand that to be their dispute? If that were the case, then these expressions of: One misuses property consecrated to the Temple, and: There is no misuse of property consecrated to the Temple, are not the correct expressions. They should have used these expressions, of: Consecrated, and: Not consecrated, if that were actually the subject of their dispute.
אֶלָּא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא קָדוֹשׁ, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: עַבְדָּא כִּמְקַרְקְעֵי דָּמֵי; וּמָר סָבַר: כְּמִטַּלְטְלִי דָּמֵי.
Rather, everyone agrees that the slave is consecrated, in opposition to the opinion of Rav. And here they disagree about this, as one Sage, the first tanna, holds that a slave is considered equivalent to land, as slaves are compared to land in several areas of halakha. Just as the misuse of consecrated property does not apply in the case of land, so too, it does not apply to slaves. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are considered equivalent to movable property, and therefore the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property do apply to slaves.
אִי הָכִי, אַדְּמִיפַּלְגִי בִּשְׂעָרוֹ, לִיפַּלְגוּ בְּגוּפוֹ!
The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so, and they disagree with regard to whether a slave is equivalent to land or movable property, instead of disagreeing with regard to whether making use of the slave’s hair constitutes a misuse of consecrated property, let them disagree with regard to whether making use of the slave himself constitutes a misuse of consecrated property.
אֶלָּא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עַבְדָּא כִּמְקַרְקְעֵי דָּמֵי, וְהָכָא בִּשְׂעָרוֹ הָעוֹמֵד לִיגָּזֵז קָמִיפַּלְגִי – מָר סָבַר: כְּגָזוּז דָּמֵי; וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כְּגָזוּז דָּמֵי.
Rather, it must be that everyone agrees that a slave is considered equivalent to land, and making use of the slave himself does not constitute a misuse of consecrated property. And here they disagree with regard to his hair that is ready to be cut, whether it is still considered a part of the slave. One Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it is considered as if it were already cut and is no longer part of the slave. Since it is viewed as detached, it is subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property, like all movable property. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that it is not considered as if it were already cut. Until it is cut, the hair is part of the slave, and, like all land, is not subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property.
לֵימָא הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי – כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי? דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהֵם כַּקַּרְקַע וְאֵינָן כַּקַּרְקַע, וְאֵין חֲכָמִים מוֹדִים לוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״עֶשֶׂר גְּפָנִים טְעוּנוֹת מָסַרְתִּי לָךְ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵינָן אֶלָּא חָמֵשׁ״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב; וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל הַמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע הֲרֵי הוּא כַּקַּרְקַע.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these tanna’im are parallel to the opinions of those tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b) that Rabbi Meir says: There are certain things that are like land with regard to their form but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective, but the Rabbis do not admit to him that this is so. How so? If one makes the claim: I gave you ten grapevines laden with fruit to guard, and the other one says: They are only five vines, then Rabbi Meir obligates the defendant to take an oath, for one who makes a partial admission to a claim concerning movable property is obligated to take an oath that he is stating the truth. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of anything that is attached to the ground is like the ground itself, and therefore one does not take an oath in this case, as one does not take an oath if one makes a partial admission to a claim concerning land.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: עֲנָבִים הָעוֹמְדוֹת לִיבָּצֵר אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ; דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: כִּבְצוּרוֹת דָּמְיָין; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָאו כִּבְצוּרוֹת דָּמְיָין.
The Gemara continues the comparison: And with regard to this, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says that the practical difference between them is not concerning all vines. It exists only in a case of grapes that are ready to be harvested, as Rabbi Meir holds that since they are ready to be harvested, they are considered like they are already harvested, and the defendant must take an oath, as he is denying a claim concerning movable property. And the Rabbis hold that they are not considered like they are already harvested, and they still have the status of land. This dispute seems to be identical to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָתָם, אֶלָּא בַּעֲנָבִים – דְּכַמָּה דְּקָיְימָן מִיכְחָשׁ כְּחִישִׁי; אֲבָל הָכָא – כַּמָּה דְּקָאֵי אַשְׁבּוֹחֵי מַשְׁבַּח.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The dispute in the baraita with regard to a slave’s hair is not necessarily parallel to the dispute with regard to grapes. Even if you say the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that grapes that are about to be harvested are considered like they are already harvested, this does not dictate one’s opinion with regard to a slave’s hair that is ready to be cut. Rabbi Meir states his opinion only there, with regard to grapes, since the longer they remain on the vine after ripening the more they become withered and are ruined. Since they no longer benefit from their attachment to the ground, they are considered to be like movable property. However, here, with regard to hair, the longer it remains on the slave the more it improves, i.e., grows, and therefore it should not be considered as if it were already cut.
כִּי סְלֵיק רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף, אֲמַר לְהַאי שְׁמַעְתָּא דְרַב קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אָמַר רַב הָכִי? וְהוּא – לָא אָמַר הָכִי?! וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר!
In connection with Rav’s statement that one who renounces ownership of his slave emancipates the slave, the Gemara recounts: When Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this halakha of Rav, that one who renounces ownership of his slave emancipates the slave, before Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in astonishment: Did Rav actually say so? This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with the statement of Rav, which leads the Gemara to ask: But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say so? But didn’t Ulla say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission. Why then was Rabbi Yoḥanan so surprised by Rav’s statement?
הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: אָמַר רַב כְּווֹתִי? וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לָא סַיְּימוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָא אָמַר רַב צָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר?! וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ – דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר.
The Gemara answers: The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan was not objecting to Rav’s opinion, but this is what he said to him: Did Rav actually say in accordance with my opinion? And alternatively, there are those who say that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef did not conclude Rav’s statement before Rabbi Yoḥanan by saying that nevertheless the slave requires a bill of manumission. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: And didn’t Rav say that the slave requires a bill of manumission? And Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission.
גּוּפָא – אָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר.
§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission to be fully considered a freeman and to be able to marry a Jewish woman.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְעוּלָּא: גֵּר שֶׁמֵּת וּבִזְבְּזוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נְכָסָיו, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים – בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים וּבֵין קְטַנִּים, קָנוּ עַצְמָן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: גְּדוֹלִים – קָנוּ עַצְמָן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין; קְטַנִּים – כׇּל הַמַּחְזִיק בָּהֶן, זָכָה בָּהֶן.
Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from a baraita: If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, as his possessions became ownerless property with his death because he had no heirs, and among his possessions were slaves, then, whether the slaves were adults or minors, they acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen, as they can acquire themselves from the ownerless property. Abba Shaul says: Adult slaves acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen. However, with regard to minor slaves, anyone who takes possession of them acquires them.
וְכִי מִי כָּתַב גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר לְאֵלּוּ?
This appears difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as one could ask: But who wrote a bill of manumission for those slaves who became free men? Their owner died without freeing them, and nevertheless they are emancipated. Therefore, the baraita demonstrates that when a slave becomes ownerless, he is emancipated entirely and does not require a bill of manumission to be considered a freeman.
אָמַר: דָּמֵי הַאי מִדְּרַבָּנַן כִּדְלָא גָּמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי שְׁמַעְתָּא. וְטַעְמָא מַאי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, קָסָבַר עוּלָּא: עַבְדּוֹ דְּגֵר כִּי אִשְׁתּוֹ – מָה אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשְׁתַּלַּחַת בְּלֹא גֵּט, אַף עֲבָדָיו מִשְׁתַּלְּחִים בְּלֹא גֵּט.
Ulla said in reply: This one of the Rabbis, Rabbi Abba, is like a person who has not studied halakha. He refused to address Rabbi Abba’s objection, as he did not think it was worthy of a response. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that these slaves do not require a bill of manumission? Rav Naḥman said that Ulla holds as follows: A slave of a convert is comparable to his wife in this case. Just as his wife is freed by his death without a bill of divorce, and she is no longer considered married with regard to any halakhot, so too, his slaves are freed without a bill of manumission.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי! אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהִתְנַחַלְתֶּם אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם אַחֲרֵיכֶם לָרֶשֶׁת אֲחוּזָּה״.
The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, if a slave is comparable to a wife, then even the slave of a Jew that dies should be freed entirely as well, just as his wife is. Why should this halakha apply only to the slave of a convert? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to slaves: “And you may make them an inheritance for your children after you, to hold for a possession” (Leviticus 25:46). Therefore, slaves are not emancipated with the death of their owner, as the heirs have a right to the slaves. However, in the case of a convert who does not have heirs, the slaves are emancipated.
אִי הָכִי, הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ וָמֵת – נָמֵי; אַלְּמָה אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ וָמֵת – אוֹתוֹ הָעֶבֶד אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה? דְּאַמֵּימָר קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara challenges: If so, then in a case of one who renounces ownership of his slave and dies, the slaves should not require a bill of manumission as well, as they are not part of the inheritance of the children. Why then did Ameimar say that with regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave and dies, there is no remedy for that slave and he cannot marry a Jewish woman, as there is no one to emancipate him? The Gemara states: This statement of Ameimar poses a difficulty to Rav Naḥman’s explanation of Ulla’s statement.
אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הֲלָכָה כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי:
Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul with regard to a convert who died and left behind slaves. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi:
בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ, אוֹ מִכְּלָלָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ? מַאי כְּלָלָא? דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, אָמְרוּ לִפְנֵי רַבִּי: אָמַר ״נִתְיָיאַשְׁתִּי מִפְּלוֹנִי עַבְדִּי״, מַהוּ? אָמַר לָהֶם: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטָר.
Did you hear it explicitly said by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, or did you hear it by inference, i.e., did you infer it from some other statement of his? Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi asked him: What inference could I have drawn? Rabbi Zeira answered: As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that they said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one says: I have despaired of recovering so-and-so, my slave, what is the halakha? He said to them: I say that his slave has no remedy other than via a bill of manumission.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? גָּמַר ״לָהּ״–״לָהּ״ מֵאִשָּׁה – מָה אִשָּׁה בִּשְׁטָר, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי בִּשְׁטָר.
The Gemara continues explaining the possible inference. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derived this by means of a verbal analogy, understanding the meaning of “to her [lah],” written with regard to a maidservant in the verse: “Nor was freedom given to her” (Leviticus 19:20), from the meaning of “for her [lah],” written with regard to a wife: “And he writes for her a bill of divorce” (Deuteronomy 24:3). Just as a wife is released from her husband via a bill of divorce, so too, a slave is also emancipated only via a bill of manumission.
וְקָא דָיְיקַתְּ מִינַּהּ, כְּאִשָּׁה – מָה אִשָּׁה אִיסּוּרָא וְלָא מָמוֹנָא, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי אִיסּוּרָא וְלָא מָמוֹנָא.
You heard this statement and deduced from this comparison that with regard to his master’s death, a slave is comparable to a wife. Just as a wife is released by the death of her husband from a prohibition but not from a monetary bond, so too, a slave is also emancipated by his master’s death from a prohibition but not from a monetary bond. Therefore, an adult slave, who can acquire ownership of himself, is freed entirely by means of the death of his master. However, in the case of a minor slave, who cannot acquire possession of his own person, the monetary bond remains, in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul.
וְאִי מִכְּלָלָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּרַבָּה! דּוֹק מִינַּהּ לְאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא: מָה אִשָּׁה – בֵּין גְּדוֹלָה בֵּין קְטַנָּה, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי – בֵּין גָּדוֹל בֵּין קָטָן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לִי.
Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to him: And if this was derived by inference, what of it? Rabbi Zeira said to him: If you derived this by inference from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s statement, then, on the contrary, deduce from this to the other side and say as follows: Just as a wife is released by her husband’s death and requires no bill of divorce whether she is an adult or a minor, so too, a slave is also emancipated when his master dies whether he is an adult or a minor, in opposition to the opinion of Abba Shaul. He said to him: I heard explicitly that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul.
וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ, אוֹ מִכְּלָלָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ? מַאי כְּלָלָא? דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, אָמְרוּ לִפְנֵי רַבִּי: ״נִתְיָיאַשְׁתִּי מִפְּלוֹנִי עַבְדִּי״, מַהוּ? אָמַר לָהֶם: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטָר.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Did you hear it explicitly that Rabbi Yoḥanan said it, or did you hear it by inference? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked: What inference could have been drawn? Rabbi Zeira answered: For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that they said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one says: I have despaired of recovering so-and-so, my slave, what is the halakha? He said to them: I say that his slave has no remedy other than via a bill of manumission.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? גָּמַר ״לָהּ״–״לָהּ״ מֵאִשָּׁה – מָה אִשָּׁה בִּשְׁטָר, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי בִּשְׁטָר.
The Gemara continues explaining the possible inference. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derived this halakha by means of a verbal analogy, understanding the meaning of the words “to her,” written with regard to a maidservant, from the meaning of “for her,” written with regard to a wife. Just as a wife can leave her husband only via a bill of divorce, so too, a slave is also emancipated only via a bill of manumission.
וְקָא דָיְיקַתְּ מִינַּהּ, כְּאִשָּׁה – מָה אִשָּׁה בֵּין גְּדוֹלָה בֵּין קְטַנָּה, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי בֵּין גָּדוֹל בֵּין קָטָן.
You heard this statement and deduced from this comparison that with regard to his master’s death, a slave is comparable to a wife. Just as a wife is released by her husband’s death whether she is an adult or a minor, so too, a slave is also emancipated whether he is an adult or a minor, and there is no distinction between a minor slave who receives a bill of manumission and a minor slave whose master dies.
וְאִי מִכְּלָלָא מַאי? אַדְּרַבָּה! דּוֹק מִינַּהּ לְהָךְ גִּיסָא: מָה אִשָּׁה – אִיסּוּרָא וְלָא מָמוֹנָא, אַף עֶבֶד נָמֵי – אִיסּוּרָא וְלָא מָמוֹנָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לִי.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked him: And if this was derived by inference, what of it? Rabbi Zeira said to him: If you derived this by inference, then, on the contrary, deduce from this to the other side and say as follows: Just as a wife is released by the death of her husband from a prohibition and not from a monetary bond, so too, a slave is also emancipated by his master’s death from a prohibition and not a monetary bond. He said to him: I heard this explicitly from Rabbi Yoḥanan.
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר לָהֶם: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטָר. וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, אַף הוּא – נוֹתֵן דְּמֵי עַצְמוֹ וְיוֹצֵא, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמוֹכְרוֹ לוֹ!
§ In connection with the baraita cited above, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. The Master said above: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: I say that his slave has no remedy other than via a bill of manumission. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that even the slave himself can give his own monetary value and is emancipated, due to the fact that it is as if the Temple treasurer sold him to himself. This demonstrates that a slave can be emancipated by paying money in addition to receiving a bill of manumission.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: אוֹ בְּכֶסֶף אוֹ בִּשְׁטָר; וְהַאי – פְּקַע לֵיהּ כַּסְפֵּיהּ. וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מֵהַאי תַּנָּא –
The Gemara answers: This is what he is saying: A slave can be emancipated either via money or via a bill of manumission. And with regard to this master, who despaired of recovering his slave, his monetary hold over this slave is abrogated, and he can be emancipated only via a bill of manumission. And this statement, that generally a slave can be emancipated either via a bill of manumission or by paying money, serves to exclude the opinion of this tanna in the following baraita.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא כֶּסֶף גּוֹמֵר בָּהּ, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁשְּׁטָר גּוֹמֵר בָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהׇפְדֵּה לֹא נִפְדָּתָה״ –
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: One might have thought that paying money completes the emancipation of a Hebrew maidservant, just as a bill of manumission completes her emancipation. The verse states, concerning a Jewish man who engages in sexual intercourse with a maidservant who had been designated to cohabit with a Hebrew slave: “And whoever lies carnally with a woman that is a bondmaid designated for a man, and not at all redeemed, nor was freedom given to her; there shall be inquisition; they shall not be put to death, because she was not free” (Leviticus 19:20). In this case, neither the Jewish man nor the maidservant is liable to receive the death penalty, in contrast to a man who engages in sexual intercourse with a married woman.
אוֹרְעָה כָּל הַפָּרָשָׁה כֻּולָּהּ לְ״לֹא חוּפָּשָׁה״, לוֹמַר לָךְ: שְׁטָר גּוֹמֵר בָּהּ, וְאֵין הַכֶּסֶף גּוֹמֵר בָּהּ.
The halakha of this entire portion of a maidservant who had been designated to cohabit with a Hebrew slave is linked to, i.e., dependent on, only the phrase “nor was freedom given her” by means of a bill of manumission. The reason she does not have the status of a free woman is that she was not granted her freedom by means of a bill of manumission. If the halakha of this portion would be dependent upon the phrase “and not at all redeemed,” this would indicate that the reason she does not have the status of a free woman is that she was not redeemed with money. This is in order to say to you: A bill of manumission completes her emancipation entirely, and money does not complete her emancipation. According to Rabbi Shimon, a slave can be emancipated only via a bill of manumission but not by paying money.
אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וְרַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
Rami bar Ḥama says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא בַּר שְׁאֵילְתָא, דַּהֲוָה קָאֵי אַפִּיתְחָא דְּבֵי תְפִלָּה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲלָכָה אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנִי אוֹמֵר – אֵין הֲלָכָה; וְרַבָּנַן דַּאֲתוֹ מִמָּחוֹזָא אָמְרִי, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה;
The Gemara relates: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak found Rava bar She’eilta when he was standing at the entrance to a house of prayer. He said to him, with regard to this issue: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? He said to him: I say that the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion in this matter, and the Rabbis who came from Meḥoza say that Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
וְכִי אֲתַאי לְסוּרָא, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין, אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אֵימָא לִי אִיזִי, גּוּפָא דְעוֹבָדָא הֵיכִי הֲוָה? אֲמַר לִי: דְּהַהִיא אַמְתָּא דַּהֲוָה מָרַהּ שְׁכִיב מְרַע, אָתְיָא בָּכְיָא קַמֵּיהּ, אָמְרָה לֵיהּ: עַד אֵימַת תִּשְׁתַּעְבֵּיד וְתֵיזִיל הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא? שְׁקַל כּוּמְתֵּיהּ שְׁדָא בַּהּ, אֲמַר לַהּ: זִיל קְנִי הָא וּקְנִי נַפְשִׁיךְ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.
And when I came to Sura, I found Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin, and I said to him: Tell me, my friend [izi], the incident itself. What happened, and what exactly did Rav Naḥman say? He said to me that there was a certain maidservant whose master was on his deathbed. She came crying before him and said to him: Until when will that woman, i.e., I, continue to be subjugated? He took his hat [kumtei], threw it to her, and said to her: Go acquire this hat and thereby acquire yourself as a free woman. They came before Rav Naḥman for a ruling, and he said to them: He did nothing.
מַאן דַּחֲזָא, סָבַר מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; וְלָא הִיא, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ כֵּלָיו שֶׁל מַקְנֶה.
One who saw this incident thought that he ruled in this manner because he holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that a maidservant can be emancipated only via a bill of manumission. But that is not so. Rather, it was because this was a legal act of acquisition formalizing the transfer of ownership that was performed with the items of the one who transfers ownership, and this mode of acquisition takes effect only when the one who transfers ownership acquires an item belonging to the one to whom the ownership is being transferred. Since the item of the owner was used, the maidservant was not emancipated.
אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַחִיתַאי, אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא סָבָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַשְׁיָאן, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא, אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וְלָא הִיא, אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
Rav Shmuel bar Aḥittai says that Rav Hamnuna the Elder says that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ashyan says that Rav Huna says that Rav Hamnuna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara concludes: And that is not so, as the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, אָמַר רַבִּי: עֶבֶד שֶׁנָּשָׂא אֶת בַּת חוֹרִין בִּפְנֵי רַבּוֹ –
Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that Rav Ashi says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In the case of a slave who marries a free woman in the presence of his master,
