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Today's Daf Yomi

February 28, 2016 | 讬状讟 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 77

If one gives a get conditioned upon not returning in 12 months and in the interim, he dies, the get is not valid. 聽However, Rabbi Yehuda Nesia validated this kind of get and caused a bit of a stir. 聽In order to give a get, one needs to give the get to his wife. 聽In today’s daf we learn that it just needs to get into her property. 聽This raises various questions as to how can this be if a woman’s property that is her own that she brings into the marriage, belongs to her husband while they are married and only returns after she is divorced so how can she receive her divorce document through property that will only become hers after the divorce is effective. 聽The law is stated that both her divorce and the property become her at the exact same moment.

诇讻讬 谞驻拽讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讜讻讬 诪讬讬转 讘诇讬诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讙讟 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

he is saying to her that it will be valid once the sun comes out in the morning. And if the husband dies during the night, before sunrise, then this will be a bill of divorce after his death and is therefore invalid.

注诇 诪谞转 砖转爪讗 讞诪讛 诪谞专转讬拽讛 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬

But if he said to her: On the condition that the sun will emerge from its sheath, then he is saying to his wife that the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively from now once the sun emerges. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讗诐 转爪讗 诪专 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讻诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 诪专 诇讗 住讘专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗诐 诪转讬 讙专讬讚讗

The tanna鈥檌m disagreed only in the case of one who said to his wife: This will be your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath, and the husband died during the night. One Sage, referred to as: Our Rabbis, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and it is as if the husband said: From today if I die, or as if he said: From now if I die. And one Sage, the unattributed tanna of the mishna, does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is as if the husband said only: If I die, in which case the bill of divorce is not valid because it cannot take effect after the husband鈥檚 death.

讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讙讟 诇讗砖转讬 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻转讘讜 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna states that if a husband says to others: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and they wrote it within the twelve months but gave it to her after twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: It is a valid bill of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇讬诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讻转讘 讙讟 注诇 转谞讗讬 讻砖专 诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 驻住讜诇 讜砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 诪讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讜讗诪专 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻转讘讜 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜转谞讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讜专讘谞谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讬 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讬

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei holds that in general, if he wrote a bill of divorce on condition then it is valid, even if the condition was not fulfilled? Rav Ashi replied: No, actually I could say to you that according to Rabbi Yosei it is invalid if the condition is not fulfilled, and here it is different. Since he could have said: If I do not come back within twelve months, write and give the bill of divorce to my wife, which would emphasize that they may write the document only if he does not come; but instead he said: Write and give a bill of divorce if I do not come back, this is what the husband is saying: Write the bill of divorce from now, and give it to my wife if I do not come back within twelve months. And what do the Rabbis hold? They hold that it is no different whether the husband formulates his instructions like this and it is no different if the husband formulates his instructions like that. The court cannot differentiate based on the minor differences in the formulation.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗讞专 砖讘讜注 砖谞讛 诇讗讞专 砖谞讛 讞讚砖 诇讗讞专 讞讚砖 砖讘转

搂 Since the mishna discussed conditions dependent on time, the Gemara cites a baraita on a similar topic. The Sages taught: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after a seven-year Sabbatical cycle, the word after means that the bill of divorce is not valid until a full year after the conclusion of the seven-year cycle. If he said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after one year, it is not valid until one month after the end of that year. If he said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after one month, it is not valid until one week after the end of the month.

诇讗讞专 砖讘转 诪讗讬 讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗住讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讗诪专 讞讚 讘砖讘讗 讜转专讬 讜转诇转讗 讘转专 砖讘转讗 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讗 讜诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 拽诪讬 砖讘转讗

The Gemara clarifies other similar cases not mentioned in the baraita. If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after a week, then what is the halakha? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Zeira sat before Rabbi Asi, and some say that it was Rabbi Asi who sat before Rabbi Yo岣nan, and he said the following: Sunday and Monday and Tuesday are called after Shabbat. Wednesday and Thursday and Friday are all called prior to Shabbat.

转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诇讗讞专 讛专讙诇 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 谞驻拽 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚专砖讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讜拽诇住讜讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 拽诇住讜讛 讗诇诪讗 诇讬转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If a man says: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after the pilgrimage Festival, then the document is valid only thirty days after the festival. Rabbi 岣yya went out and taught this halakha in public in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they praised it. He then taught it in the name of the majority, as an unattributed opinion, and they did not praise it. Apparently, the halakha is not in accordance with this ruling. Consequently, the Sages did not praise Rabbi 岣yya when he taught it as if it were a majority ruling, as that would cause it to be accepted as halakha.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讬 砖讗讞讝讜

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛讝讜专拽 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讗讜 讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讝专拽讜 诇讛 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讗讜 讘转讜讱 讞爪专讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讜讗 注诪讛 讘诪讟讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 诇转讜讱 讞讬拽讛 讗讜 诇转讜讱 拽诇转讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转

MISHNA: In a case of one who throws a bill of divorce to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard at the time, then she is divorced as though he placed the bill of divorce in her hand. If he threw it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even if the bill of divorce is with her in the bed, she is not divorced. If he threw the bill of divorce into her lap, or into her basket [kaltah], she is divorced, even if she was in her husband鈥檚 house at the time.

讙诪壮 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讛 讙讙讛 讞爪专讛 讜拽专驻讬驻讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

GEMARA: From where are these matters derived? What is the basis for the halakha that when the husband throws the bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 house or courtyard, the divorce takes effect? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught: The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: 鈥淎nd gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), from which I have derived that she is divorced only if he actually places it in her hand. But from where do I derive that she is divorced even if he places it on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure? The verse states: 鈥淎nd gives it,鈥 indicating that she is divorced in any case, regardless of the manner in which he gives her the bill of divorce.

讜转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讙讘讬 讙谞讘 讬讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讜 讙讙讜 讞爪专讜 讜拽专驻讬驻讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛诪爪讗 转诪爪讗 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

And that is also taught in a baraita with regard to a thief. It is written: 鈥淚f the theft be found in his hand鈥 (Exodus 22:3), from which I have derived that one is liable for theft only when the stolen item was found in his hand. But from where do I derive that one is liable for theft even if it was found on his roof, in his courtyard, or in his enclosure, i.e., if the item reached his domain and he secured it with the intent to steal it? The verse states: 鈥淚f the theft be found,鈥 indicating that he is liable in any case, whether it was found in his hand or in his domain.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙讟 诪砖讜诐 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 诪讙专砖讛 讗讘诇 讙谞讘 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases. As if the Torah had taught us only with regard to a bill of divorce, one could have said: Because a husband divorces his wife against her will, the divorce is effective regardless of how the husband places the document in her possession. But a thief, who is not accountable for theft that he performs against his will, say no, he is liable only when he actually steals the item with his hand, and not when it enters his domain by other means.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙谞讘 诪砖讜诐 讚拽谞住讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 讗讘诇 讙讟 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if the Torah had taught us only with regard to a thief, one could have said: Because the Merciful One penalized the thief, obligating him to pay double the value of the item, it is clear that the Torah is strict with a thief. Similarly, the Torah also deemed him responsible for an item that was not actually in his hand. But with regard to a bill of divorce, say no, the divorce is not effective unless the husband places the document in her hand. Therefore, it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases.

讞爪专讛 诪讛 砖拽谞转讛 讗砖讛 拽谞讛 讘注诇讛

搂 It was taught in the mishna that if the husband threw the bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 courtyard, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: How can she own a courtyard of her own? There is a principle: That which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband, which indicates that the husband has the rights to all profits generated by his wife鈥檚 property. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the courtyard belongs to him for the duration of their marriage.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱

Rabbi Elazar says: The mishna is referring to a case where the husband writes to his wife: I have no legal dealings or involvement in your property, thereby relinquishing any ownership rights to her property.

讜讻讬 讻转讘 诇讛 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: And when he writes this to her, what of it? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says to another with whom he owns a field in a partnership: I have no rights and claims to this field, or: I have no involvement with it, or: My hand is removed from it; it is as though he said nothing, since these expressions are not considered to be a withdrawal of his rights to the field.

讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讜注讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讜讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 谞讞诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讛 砖诇讗 讬专砖谞讛

The Gemara answers: They say in the school of Rabbi Yannai: The case is one where he writes to her and she is still only betrothed; he has yet to obtain ownership of her property, being that his rights to his wife鈥檚 property are only actuated at the time of the marriage. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says: With regard to an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., it is not an inheritance from his father, a person can stipulate about it from the outset that he should not inherit it, and this condition is effective in annulling his rights to the inheritance. This teaches that as long as the property has not yet entered his possession, he can withdraw his rights to it.

讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: One who says:

讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜

I do not want to avail myself of the ordinance of the Sages that was instituted on my behalf, such as in this scenario, we listen to him.

诪讗讬 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讻讜诇讛 讗砖讛 砖转讗诪专 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谞讬 谞讬讝讜谞讬转 讜讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: What is referred to by the words: Such as in this scenario? What case did Rava refer to that he indicated that in similar situations the halakha is the same? The Gemara explains that Rava was referring to that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I do not wish to be sustained by you, and I will not do work for you. Although the Sages instituted on her behalf that she would be sustained in exchange for her work, she has the choice of waiving that right if she prefers to retain her earnings. Rava adds that in any similar case where the Sages instituted an ordinance for one鈥檚 benefit, he can say that he does not wish to accept this rabbinic ordinance if it does not assist him.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讟讜 讬讚讛 诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讗诇讗 讙讬讟讛 讜讬讚讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Rava said that one can resolve the question about the wife鈥檚 ability to acquire a bill of divorce in a courtyard in a more direct way: Is that to say that her hand is not acquired by her husband? Yet despite the fact that he owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives a bill of divorce in her hand. Rather, one must say that her bill of divorce and her hand, i.e., her complete ownership over her hand, enter her possession simultaneously. Since the bill of divorce releases her from her obligations to her husband, at that moment she acquires full rights to her hand. Here too, in the case of her courtyard, one can say that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, as her husband鈥檚 rights to her property are terminated at the time of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 专讘讗 讬讚 讚讗砖讛 拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚拽谞讬 诇讬讛 诇诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讬讚讛 讙讜驻讛 诪讬 拽谞讬 诇讬讛

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Was it difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect divorce by placing a bill of divorce in the hand of a woman? Why is this difficult? Though the rights to her earnings belong to the husband, does her hand itself belong to him? Therefore, since a woman owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives the bill of divorce in her hand; and it is not necessary to apply the principle that the bill of divorce and her hand enter her possession simultaneously. Therefore, there is no proof that the bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讬讚 讛注讘讚 拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘砖讟专 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 讙讟讜 讜讬讚讜 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪讬专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Rav Ashi said to him: It was difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect emancipation by placing a bill of manumission in the hand of a slave, as follows: According to the one who says that a slave can be emancipated with a bill of manumission by receiving the bill himself, one can ask: How is this effective? Isn鈥檛 the hand of a slave like the hand of his master, as the master owns the slave鈥檚 body? Therefore, when the master gives the bill of manumission to his slave, it is as though he gave it to himself, and the bill is never considered as having reached the slave鈥檚 domain. How can the slave be emancipated in this manner? Rather, one must say that his bill of manumission and his hand enter his possession simultaneously. So too, with regard to a woman鈥檚 courtyard, one can explain that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讛讛讜讗 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讚讻转讘 诇讛 讙讬讟讗 诇讚讘讬转讛讜 讘讛讚讬 驻谞讬讗 讚诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇诪讬转讘讬讛 诇讛 诇诪讞专 转拽祝 诇讬讛 注诇诪讗 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讝讬诇讜 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讬拽谞讬讛 谞讬讛诇讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讚讜讻转讗 讚讬转讬讘 讘讬讛 讙讬讟讗 讜转讬讝诇 讗讬讛讬 讜转讬讞讜讚 讜转驻转讞 讜转讞讝讬拽 讘讬讛

搂 The Gemara relates that there was a certain person on his deathbed who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife toward the evening of the coming of the Shabbat, but he did not manage to give it to her. The next day his condition intensified and he was unable to give her the bill of divorce. People came before Rava to ask what they should do. He said to them: Go tell him to transfer to her ownership of that place where the bill of divorce is resting, and she should go and close the door and open it and assert ownership over it, thereby acquiring the place together with the bill of divorce that is in it.

讚转谞谉 谞注诇 讙讚专 驻专抓 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讜 讞讝拽讛

As we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 42a): If one locked, fenced in, or breached any amount, this is a valid act of taking possession through which land is acquired.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 注讬诇讬砖 诇专讘讗 诪讛 砖拽谞转讛 讗砖讛 拽谞讛 讘注诇讛 讗讬讻住讬祝

Rav Ilish said to Rava: How will it help for her to acquire the place, since that which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband? Rava was embarrassed that he issued an incorrect ruling.

诇住讜祝 讗讬讙诇讬 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗专讜住讛 讛讜讗讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讗诪专讜 讘谞砖讜讗讛 讬讗诪专讜 讘讗专讜住讛 讛讚专 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 讗专讜住讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 谞砖讜讗讛 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪讬专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Ultimately, it was revealed that she was a betrothed woman. Rava said: I ruled correctly, as even if they said with regard to a married woman that everything she acquires belongs to her husband, would they say the same with regard to a betrothed woman? A betrothed woman鈥檚 hand is not considered to be like the hand of her husband. Rava then said: There is no difference if she is a betrothed woman, and there is no difference if she is a married woman, as her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讜讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘讗 诪注讬拽专讗 讻讬 讗诪专讛 专讘讗 讗讛讗讬 诪注砖讛 讗诪专讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rava already say this halakha, that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, at the outset? The Gemara answers: When Rava said this halakha, he said it in connection with this very incident.

讜讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讜讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讗 讘讟讘专讬讗 讜讞爪专讛 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讛讬讗 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讜讞爪专讛 讘讟讘专讬讗 诪讙讜专砖转

搂 It was taught in the mishna that if a husband throws his wife a bill of divorce and she is in her house, then she is divorced. Ulla says: This is only if she is standing next to her house and next to her courtyard, as only then will her house and courtyard acquire it for her. Rabbi Oshaya says: Even if she is in Tiberius and her courtyard is in Tzippori, or if she is in Tzippori and her courtyard is in Tiberius, she is divorced.

讜讛讗 讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讜讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 讻诪讬 砖讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讜讛讬讗 讻诪讬 砖讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讞爪专 诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 讛讬讗 诪转讙专砖转

The Gemara challenges this: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the mishna that she is in her house and in her courtyard? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: And she is considered to be like one who is in her house; and she is considered to be like one who is in her courtyard. This means that since it is a courtyard that is secured with her knowledge, it is as though she is there, and she is divorced.

诇讬诪讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗转专讘讗讬 讜诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗转专讘讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Ulla, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. Consequently, it has the same halakhot as her hand, so that just as her hand is close to her, so too, her courtyard must be close to her in order for her to acquire the bill of divorce through it. And one Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of agency, and therefore, like an agent, her courtyard can acquire the bill of divorce for her when she is far away.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 诪专 住讘专 讻讬讚讛 诪讛 讬讚讛 讘住诪讜讻讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讘住诪讜讻讛

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. They disagree about how it is compared to her hand. One Sage, Ulla, holds that it is entirely like her hand. Just as her actual hand is next to her, so too, her courtyard, which is an extension of her hand, acquires the bill of divorce when it is next to her.

讜讗讬讚讱 讗讬 诪讛 讬讚讛 讘讚讘讜拽讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讘讚讘讜拽讛 讗诇讗 讻讬讚讛 诪讛 讬讚讛 诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讛诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讞爪专讛 讛诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转讛

And the other Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that if you derive matters in this way, you should say that just as her actual hand is attached to her, so too, her courtyard can acquire a bill of divorce only when it is attached to her, which cannot be. Rather, the comparison is as follows: Her courtyard is like her actual hand, and just as her hand is secured with her knowledge, so too, only her courtyard that is consciously secured by her can acquire a bill of divorce for her. This serves to exclude her courtyard that is not consciously secured by her, i.e., that she has no control over, which cannot acquire a bill of divorce for her, since it is not similar to her hand.

讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝专拽 诇讛 讙讬讟讗 诇讚讘讬转讛讜 讛讜讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讗讝诇 讙讬讟讗 谞驻诇 讘驻讬住诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 讛讜讬讗 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 注诇 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 驻诇讙 诇讬讛 专砖讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 讞讚讗 专砖讜转讗 讛讬讗

搂 The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who threw a bill of divorce to his wife while she was standing in a courtyard. The bill of divorce went and fell onto a board of wood. Rav Yosef said: We see the precise circumstance: If the board encompassed an area of four cubits by four cubits, it thereby is considered to be a separate domain of its own and is not included in the courtyard within which she was standing, and she is consequently not divorced. And if the board was not that large, it is part of the courtyard and it is all one domain, and she is therefore divorced.

讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚讬讚讛 讻讬 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚讬讚讬讛 讻讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara clarifies: With what are we dealing here? If we say that the incident occurred in her courtyard, if the board had an area of four cubits, what of it? Since the board belongs to her as well, it should still be an effective divorce. Rather, say that the incident occurred in his courtyard; but then, even if the board did not have an area of four cubits, what of it? Since none of it belongs to her, why would it be an effective divorce?

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讜砖诇讛 诪拽讜诐 讚讞讚 诪拽讜诐 诪讜砖诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 转专讬 诪拽讜诪讜转 诇讗 诪讜砖诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he lent her the place, i.e., the courtyard, as a means to acquire the bill of divorce. And since people lend one place, but people do not lend two places, if the board is considered to be a separate domain then it was not included in the courtyard that was lent to her, and it would therefore not be an effective divorce.

讜诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讙讘讜讛 注砖专讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讜讛 注砖专讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转

The Gemara notes: And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was not ten handbreadths higher than the courtyard. But if the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was ten handbreadths higher, even though the board did not have an area of four cubits, it is still considered to be a separate domain.

讜诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛

And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell does not have

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Gittin 77

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 77

诇讻讬 谞驻拽讗 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讜讻讬 诪讬讬转 讘诇讬诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讙讟 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

he is saying to her that it will be valid once the sun comes out in the morning. And if the husband dies during the night, before sunrise, then this will be a bill of divorce after his death and is therefore invalid.

注诇 诪谞转 砖转爪讗 讞诪讛 诪谞专转讬拽讛 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讗讜诪专 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬

But if he said to her: On the condition that the sun will emerge from its sheath, then he is saying to his wife that the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively from now once the sun emerges. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讗诐 转爪讗 诪专 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讻诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 诪专 诇讗 住讘专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗诐 诪转讬 讙专讬讚讗

The tanna鈥檌m disagreed only in the case of one who said to his wife: This will be your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath, and the husband died during the night. One Sage, referred to as: Our Rabbis, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and it is as if the husband said: From today if I die, or as if he said: From now if I die. And one Sage, the unattributed tanna of the mishna, does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is as if the husband said only: If I die, in which case the bill of divorce is not valid because it cannot take effect after the husband鈥檚 death.

讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讙讟 诇讗砖转讬 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻转讘讜 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna states that if a husband says to others: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and they wrote it within the twelve months but gave it to her after twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: It is a valid bill of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇讬诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讻转讘 讙讟 注诇 转谞讗讬 讻砖专 诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 驻住讜诇 讜砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 诪讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讜讗诪专 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻转讘讜 诪注讻砖讬讜 讜转谞讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 讜专讘谞谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讬 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讬

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei holds that in general, if he wrote a bill of divorce on condition then it is valid, even if the condition was not fulfilled? Rav Ashi replied: No, actually I could say to you that according to Rabbi Yosei it is invalid if the condition is not fulfilled, and here it is different. Since he could have said: If I do not come back within twelve months, write and give the bill of divorce to my wife, which would emphasize that they may write the document only if he does not come; but instead he said: Write and give a bill of divorce if I do not come back, this is what the husband is saying: Write the bill of divorce from now, and give it to my wife if I do not come back within twelve months. And what do the Rabbis hold? They hold that it is no different whether the husband formulates his instructions like this and it is no different if the husband formulates his instructions like that. The court cannot differentiate based on the minor differences in the formulation.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗讞专 砖讘讜注 砖谞讛 诇讗讞专 砖谞讛 讞讚砖 诇讗讞专 讞讚砖 砖讘转

搂 Since the mishna discussed conditions dependent on time, the Gemara cites a baraita on a similar topic. The Sages taught: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after a seven-year Sabbatical cycle, the word after means that the bill of divorce is not valid until a full year after the conclusion of the seven-year cycle. If he said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after one year, it is not valid until one month after the end of that year. If he said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after one month, it is not valid until one week after the end of the month.

诇讗讞专 砖讘转 诪讗讬 讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗住讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讗诪专 讞讚 讘砖讘讗 讜转专讬 讜转诇转讗 讘转专 砖讘转讗 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讗 讜诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 拽诪讬 砖讘转讗

The Gemara clarifies other similar cases not mentioned in the baraita. If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after a week, then what is the halakha? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Zeira sat before Rabbi Asi, and some say that it was Rabbi Asi who sat before Rabbi Yo岣nan, and he said the following: Sunday and Monday and Tuesday are called after Shabbat. Wednesday and Thursday and Friday are all called prior to Shabbat.

转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 诇讗讞专 讛专讙诇 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 谞驻拽 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚专砖讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讜拽诇住讜讛 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 拽诇住讜讛 讗诇诪讗 诇讬转 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If a man says: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back after the pilgrimage Festival, then the document is valid only thirty days after the festival. Rabbi 岣yya went out and taught this halakha in public in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they praised it. He then taught it in the name of the majority, as an unattributed opinion, and they did not praise it. Apparently, the halakha is not in accordance with this ruling. Consequently, the Sages did not praise Rabbi 岣yya when he taught it as if it were a majority ruling, as that would cause it to be accepted as halakha.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讬 砖讗讞讝讜

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛讝讜专拽 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讜讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讗讜 讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讝专拽讜 诇讛 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讗讜 讘转讜讱 讞爪专讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讜讗 注诪讛 讘诪讟讛 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 诇转讜讱 讞讬拽讛 讗讜 诇转讜讱 拽诇转讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转

MISHNA: In a case of one who throws a bill of divorce to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard at the time, then she is divorced as though he placed the bill of divorce in her hand. If he threw it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even if the bill of divorce is with her in the bed, she is not divorced. If he threw the bill of divorce into her lap, or into her basket [kaltah], she is divorced, even if she was in her husband鈥檚 house at the time.

讙诪壮 诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讛 讙讙讛 讞爪专讛 讜拽专驻讬驻讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

GEMARA: From where are these matters derived? What is the basis for the halakha that when the husband throws the bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 house or courtyard, the divorce takes effect? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught: The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: 鈥淎nd gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), from which I have derived that she is divorced only if he actually places it in her hand. But from where do I derive that she is divorced even if he places it on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure? The verse states: 鈥淎nd gives it,鈥 indicating that she is divorced in any case, regardless of the manner in which he gives her the bill of divorce.

讜转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讙讘讬 讙谞讘 讬讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讜 讙讙讜 讞爪专讜 讜拽专驻讬驻讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛诪爪讗 转诪爪讗 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

And that is also taught in a baraita with regard to a thief. It is written: 鈥淚f the theft be found in his hand鈥 (Exodus 22:3), from which I have derived that one is liable for theft only when the stolen item was found in his hand. But from where do I derive that one is liable for theft even if it was found on his roof, in his courtyard, or in his enclosure, i.e., if the item reached his domain and he secured it with the intent to steal it? The verse states: 鈥淚f the theft be found,鈥 indicating that he is liable in any case, whether it was found in his hand or in his domain.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙讟 诪砖讜诐 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讛 诪讙专砖讛 讗讘诇 讙谞讘 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘注诇 讻讜专讞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases. As if the Torah had taught us only with regard to a bill of divorce, one could have said: Because a husband divorces his wife against her will, the divorce is effective regardless of how the husband places the document in her possession. But a thief, who is not accountable for theft that he performs against his will, say no, he is liable only when he actually steals the item with his hand, and not when it enters his domain by other means.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讙谞讘 诪砖讜诐 讚拽谞住讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 讗讘诇 讙讟 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if the Torah had taught us only with regard to a thief, one could have said: Because the Merciful One penalized the thief, obligating him to pay double the value of the item, it is clear that the Torah is strict with a thief. Similarly, the Torah also deemed him responsible for an item that was not actually in his hand. But with regard to a bill of divorce, say no, the divorce is not effective unless the husband places the document in her hand. Therefore, it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases.

讞爪专讛 诪讛 砖拽谞转讛 讗砖讛 拽谞讛 讘注诇讛

搂 It was taught in the mishna that if the husband threw the bill of divorce into his wife鈥檚 courtyard, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: How can she own a courtyard of her own? There is a principle: That which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband, which indicates that the husband has the rights to all profits generated by his wife鈥檚 property. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the courtyard belongs to him for the duration of their marriage.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱

Rabbi Elazar says: The mishna is referring to a case where the husband writes to his wife: I have no legal dealings or involvement in your property, thereby relinquishing any ownership rights to her property.

讜讻讬 讻转讘 诇讛 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: And when he writes this to her, what of it? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says to another with whom he owns a field in a partnership: I have no rights and claims to this field, or: I have no involvement with it, or: My hand is removed from it; it is as though he said nothing, since these expressions are not considered to be a withdrawal of his rights to the field.

讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讜注讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讜讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 谞讞诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讛 砖诇讗 讬专砖谞讛

The Gemara answers: They say in the school of Rabbi Yannai: The case is one where he writes to her and she is still only betrothed; he has yet to obtain ownership of her property, being that his rights to his wife鈥檚 property are only actuated at the time of the marriage. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says: With regard to an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., it is not an inheritance from his father, a person can stipulate about it from the outset that he should not inherit it, and this condition is effective in annulling his rights to the inheritance. This teaches that as long as the property has not yet entered his possession, he can withdraw his rights to it.

讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: One who says:

讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜

I do not want to avail myself of the ordinance of the Sages that was instituted on my behalf, such as in this scenario, we listen to him.

诪讗讬 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讻讜诇讛 讗砖讛 砖转讗诪专 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谞讬 谞讬讝讜谞讬转 讜讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: What is referred to by the words: Such as in this scenario? What case did Rava refer to that he indicated that in similar situations the halakha is the same? The Gemara explains that Rava was referring to that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I do not wish to be sustained by you, and I will not do work for you. Although the Sages instituted on her behalf that she would be sustained in exchange for her work, she has the choice of waiving that right if she prefers to retain her earnings. Rava adds that in any similar case where the Sages instituted an ordinance for one鈥檚 benefit, he can say that he does not wish to accept this rabbinic ordinance if it does not assist him.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讟讜 讬讚讛 诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讗诇讗 讙讬讟讛 讜讬讚讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Rava said that one can resolve the question about the wife鈥檚 ability to acquire a bill of divorce in a courtyard in a more direct way: Is that to say that her hand is not acquired by her husband? Yet despite the fact that he owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives a bill of divorce in her hand. Rather, one must say that her bill of divorce and her hand, i.e., her complete ownership over her hand, enter her possession simultaneously. Since the bill of divorce releases her from her obligations to her husband, at that moment she acquires full rights to her hand. Here too, in the case of her courtyard, one can say that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, as her husband鈥檚 rights to her property are terminated at the time of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 专讘讗 讬讚 讚讗砖讛 拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 谞讛讬 讚拽谞讬 诇讬讛 诇诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讬讚讛 讙讜驻讛 诪讬 拽谞讬 诇讬讛

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Was it difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect divorce by placing a bill of divorce in the hand of a woman? Why is this difficult? Though the rights to her earnings belong to the husband, does her hand itself belong to him? Therefore, since a woman owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives the bill of divorce in her hand; and it is not necessary to apply the principle that the bill of divorce and her hand enter her possession simultaneously. Therefore, there is no proof that the bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讬讚 讛注讘讚 拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讘砖讟专 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 讙讟讜 讜讬讚讜 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪讬专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Rav Ashi said to him: It was difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect emancipation by placing a bill of manumission in the hand of a slave, as follows: According to the one who says that a slave can be emancipated with a bill of manumission by receiving the bill himself, one can ask: How is this effective? Isn鈥檛 the hand of a slave like the hand of his master, as the master owns the slave鈥檚 body? Therefore, when the master gives the bill of manumission to his slave, it is as though he gave it to himself, and the bill is never considered as having reached the slave鈥檚 domain. How can the slave be emancipated in this manner? Rather, one must say that his bill of manumission and his hand enter his possession simultaneously. So too, with regard to a woman鈥檚 courtyard, one can explain that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讛讛讜讗 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讚讻转讘 诇讛 讙讬讟讗 诇讚讘讬转讛讜 讘讛讚讬 驻谞讬讗 讚诪注诇讬 砖讘转讗 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇诪讬转讘讬讛 诇讛 诇诪讞专 转拽祝 诇讬讛 注诇诪讗 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讝讬诇讜 讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讬拽谞讬讛 谞讬讛诇讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讚讜讻转讗 讚讬转讬讘 讘讬讛 讙讬讟讗 讜转讬讝诇 讗讬讛讬 讜转讬讞讜讚 讜转驻转讞 讜转讞讝讬拽 讘讬讛

搂 The Gemara relates that there was a certain person on his deathbed who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife toward the evening of the coming of the Shabbat, but he did not manage to give it to her. The next day his condition intensified and he was unable to give her the bill of divorce. People came before Rava to ask what they should do. He said to them: Go tell him to transfer to her ownership of that place where the bill of divorce is resting, and she should go and close the door and open it and assert ownership over it, thereby acquiring the place together with the bill of divorce that is in it.

讚转谞谉 谞注诇 讙讚专 驻专抓 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讜 讞讝拽讛

As we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 42a): If one locked, fenced in, or breached any amount, this is a valid act of taking possession through which land is acquired.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 注讬诇讬砖 诇专讘讗 诪讛 砖拽谞转讛 讗砖讛 拽谞讛 讘注诇讛 讗讬讻住讬祝

Rav Ilish said to Rava: How will it help for her to acquire the place, since that which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband? Rava was embarrassed that he issued an incorrect ruling.

诇住讜祝 讗讬讙诇讬 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗专讜住讛 讛讜讗讬 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讗诪专讜 讘谞砖讜讗讛 讬讗诪专讜 讘讗专讜住讛 讛讚专 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 讗专讜住讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 谞砖讜讗讛 讙讬讟讛 讜讞爪讬专讛 讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚

Ultimately, it was revealed that she was a betrothed woman. Rava said: I ruled correctly, as even if they said with regard to a married woman that everything she acquires belongs to her husband, would they say the same with regard to a betrothed woman? A betrothed woman鈥檚 hand is not considered to be like the hand of her husband. Rava then said: There is no difference if she is a betrothed woman, and there is no difference if she is a married woman, as her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

讜讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘讗 诪注讬拽专讗 讻讬 讗诪专讛 专讘讗 讗讛讗讬 诪注砖讛 讗诪专讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rava already say this halakha, that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, at the outset? The Gemara answers: When Rava said this halakha, he said it in connection with this very incident.

讜讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讘爪讚 讘讬转讛 讜讘爪讚 讞爪专讛 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讗 讘讟讘专讬讗 讜讞爪专讛 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讛讬讗 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讜讞爪专讛 讘讟讘专讬讗 诪讙讜专砖转

搂 It was taught in the mishna that if a husband throws his wife a bill of divorce and she is in her house, then she is divorced. Ulla says: This is only if she is standing next to her house and next to her courtyard, as only then will her house and courtyard acquire it for her. Rabbi Oshaya says: Even if she is in Tiberius and her courtyard is in Tzippori, or if she is in Tzippori and her courtyard is in Tiberius, she is divorced.

讜讛讗 讛讬讗 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讜讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讛讬讗 讻诪讬 砖讘转讜讱 讘讬转讛 讜讛讬讗 讻诪讬 砖讘转讜讱 讞爪专讛 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讞爪专 诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 讛讬讗 诪转讙专砖转

The Gemara challenges this: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the mishna that she is in her house and in her courtyard? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: And she is considered to be like one who is in her house; and she is considered to be like one who is in her courtyard. This means that since it is a courtyard that is secured with her knowledge, it is as though she is there, and she is divorced.

诇讬诪讗 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗转专讘讗讬 讜诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗转专讘讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Ulla, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. Consequently, it has the same halakhot as her hand, so that just as her hand is close to her, so too, her courtyard must be close to her in order for her to acquire the bill of divorce through it. And one Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of agency, and therefore, like an agent, her courtyard can acquire the bill of divorce for her when she is far away.

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 诪专 住讘专 讻讬讚讛 诪讛 讬讚讛 讘住诪讜讻讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讘住诪讜讻讛

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. They disagree about how it is compared to her hand. One Sage, Ulla, holds that it is entirely like her hand. Just as her actual hand is next to her, so too, her courtyard, which is an extension of her hand, acquires the bill of divorce when it is next to her.

讜讗讬讚讱 讗讬 诪讛 讬讚讛 讘讚讘讜拽讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讘讚讘讜拽讛 讗诇讗 讻讬讚讛 诪讛 讬讚讛 诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 讗祝 讞爪专讛 讛诪砖转诪专转 诇讚注转讛 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讞爪专讛 讛诪砖转诪专转 砖诇讗 诇讚注转讛

And the other Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that if you derive matters in this way, you should say that just as her actual hand is attached to her, so too, her courtyard can acquire a bill of divorce only when it is attached to her, which cannot be. Rather, the comparison is as follows: Her courtyard is like her actual hand, and just as her hand is secured with her knowledge, so too, only her courtyard that is consciously secured by her can acquire a bill of divorce for her. This serves to exclude her courtyard that is not consciously secured by her, i.e., that she has no control over, which cannot acquire a bill of divorce for her, since it is not similar to her hand.

讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讝专拽 诇讛 讙讬讟讗 诇讚讘讬转讛讜 讛讜讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讗讝诇 讙讬讟讗 谞驻诇 讘驻讬住诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 讛讜讬讗 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 注诇 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 驻诇讙 诇讬讛 专砖讜转讗 诇谞驻砖讬讛 讜讗讬 诇讗 讞讚讗 专砖讜转讗 讛讬讗

搂 The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who threw a bill of divorce to his wife while she was standing in a courtyard. The bill of divorce went and fell onto a board of wood. Rav Yosef said: We see the precise circumstance: If the board encompassed an area of four cubits by four cubits, it thereby is considered to be a separate domain of its own and is not included in the courtyard within which she was standing, and she is consequently not divorced. And if the board was not that large, it is part of the courtyard and it is all one domain, and she is therefore divorced.

讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚讬讚讛 讻讬 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚讬讚讬讛 讻讬 诇讗 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara clarifies: With what are we dealing here? If we say that the incident occurred in her courtyard, if the board had an area of four cubits, what of it? Since the board belongs to her as well, it should still be an effective divorce. Rather, say that the incident occurred in his courtyard; but then, even if the board did not have an area of four cubits, what of it? Since none of it belongs to her, why would it be an effective divorce?

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讜砖诇讛 诪拽讜诐 讚讞讚 诪拽讜诐 诪讜砖诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 转专讬 诪拽讜诪讜转 诇讗 诪讜砖诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he lent her the place, i.e., the courtyard, as a means to acquire the bill of divorce. And since people lend one place, but people do not lend two places, if the board is considered to be a separate domain then it was not included in the courtyard that was lent to her, and it would therefore not be an effective divorce.

讜诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讙讘讜讛 注砖专讛 讗讘诇 讙讘讜讛 注砖专讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛讜讬 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转

The Gemara notes: And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was not ten handbreadths higher than the courtyard. But if the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was ten handbreadths higher, even though the board did not have an area of four cubits, it is still considered to be a separate domain.

讜诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛

And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell does not have

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