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Today's Daf Yomi

March 7, 2016 | 讻状讝 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 85

Before the main section of the get toref was written, if the husband tells the sofer that he plans to permit his wife to everyone except one man but he doesn’t ask the sofer to write that in the get, does that ruin聽the get and he needs to write a new one? 聽Rava and Rav Safra argue about this. 聽Does writing a condition in a get invalidate the get? 聽Argument between Rebbi and the rabbis. 聽What if the husband says that she is permitted to all men except for those she is forbidden to by law? 聽There is a difference depending on the severity of the law. 聽What if he separates from her but leaves over one of the rights a husband has to a wife like being able to cancel her vows, not allowing her to eat truma, etc.? 聽What is the basic text that needs to be written in the get? 聽There is a disagreement in the mishna and then later developments in the time of the gemara. 聽See attached file for the text of an actual get and a hebrew translation of it. Also attached is an English translation – courtesy: ITIM. Study Guide Gittin 85

讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讻砖专 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讻转讘讜 讜讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 讗讘诇 注诇 诪谞转 诇讗 驻住讬诇 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

everyone agrees that it is valid. And the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. As if you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the qualification is written before the essential part of the bill of divorce, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And if you wish, say that it is referring to a case where the qualification is written after the essential part, and everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, agrees with regard to its ruling.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讚专讘讬 住讘专 讙讝专讬谞谉 讗讟讜 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讙讝专讬谞谉 讗讟讜 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇

And Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the condition is written after the essential part, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree rendering the bill of divorce invalid due to a case where the condition is written before the essential part, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree due to a case where it is written before the essential part. But if it is written before the essential part, everyone agrees that it is invalid.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讻转讘讜 讜讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 讗讘诇 注诇 诪谞转 诇讗 驻住讬诇 讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 讛讬讗

And accordingly, the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. It is referring to a case where he wrote the condition after the essential part, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a condition written after the essential part does not render the bill of divorce invalid.

转谞讬 讗讘讜讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻转讘 讙讟 注诇 转谞讗讬 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讜讛讗 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讬讙讬

The father of Rabbi Avin taught a baraita before Rabbi Zeira: If one wrote a conditional bill of divorce, everyone agrees that it is invalid. Rabbi Zeira asked him: Everyone agrees that it is invalid? But don鈥檛 they disagree about this?

讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讻砖专 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝

Rabbi Zeira therefore modified the baraita in accordance with his opinion: Rather, say that everyone agrees that it is valid. And what are the circumstances in which both sides agree that it is valid? It is referring to a case where the condition is written after the essential part of the bill of divorce.

讜诇讬诪讗 讛专讬 讝讛 驻住讜诇 讜专讘讬 转谞讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗转谞讬讬讛 讻砖专 讘驻住讜诇 诪讬讞诇祝 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讗 诪讬讞诇祝 诇讬讛

The Gemara counters: Let Rabbi Zeira say an alternative modification of the baraita: It is invalid, omitting the words: Everyone agrees, and this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: The tanna taught him that everyone agrees, which is a conspicuous statement. Although he may conceivably confuse the word valid with invalid, he certainly does not confuse the phrase: It is, with the phrase: Everyone agrees. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira modified the baraita the way he did.

诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 诇讗讞讬 讜诇讗讞讬讱 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 讜诇讻诇 诪讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讻砖专

MISHNA: If a man says to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except to marry my father or to marry your father, to marry my brother or to marry your brother, to marry a slave or to marry a gentile, or to marry anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, the divorce is valid. Since these men cannot betroth her anyway, his qualification is meaningless.

讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 诪诪讝专转 讜谞转讬谞讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇诪诪讝专 讜诇谞转讬谉 讜讻诇 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讛 注诇讬讜 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘注讘讬专讛 驻住讜诇

If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except for when doing so violates the following: The prohibition against a widow being married to a High Priest; the prohibition against a divorc茅e or a yevama who performed 岣litza [岣lutza] being married to a common priest; a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman being married to an Israelite man; an Israelite woman being married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite man; or marrying anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, even if this betrothal would be a transgression, such as in the aforementioned cases; in all of these cases the divorce is invalid. His statement renders it a partial divorce, as the woman is still not permitted to marry any man who is eligible to betroth her.

讙诪壮 讻诇诇讗 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 砖讗专 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇诇讗 讚住讬驻讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 砖讗专 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讻讙讜谉 注诪讜谞讬 讜诪讜讗讘讬 谞转讬谞讬 诪爪专讬 讜讗讚讜诪讬

GEMARA: The stating of the generalization in the first clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable to receive karet for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, who are not listed explicitly in the mishna. The stating of the generalization in the last clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable by a prohibition for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, such as an Ammonite and a Moabite, a Gibeonite, an Egyptian, and an Edomite (Deuteronomy 23:4, 8鈥9). Although they are all prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with her due to a prohibition or a positive mitzva, she can legally become betrothed to them.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讞讜抓 诪拽讚讜砖讬 拽讟谉 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗讜 讘专 讛讜讬讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for a betrothal to so-and-so, who is a minor boy at that time, what is the halakha? Do we say that now, since he is in any event not eligible for betrothal, as a minor boy cannot betroth a woman, the husband鈥檚 qualification does not prohibit his wife to anyone, and it is a complete act of severance? Or perhaps, since he will reach eligibility for betrothal, is the husband鈥檚 qualification considered as prohibiting her to someone to whom betrothal could apply?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 拽讟谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讗讘讬讛

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to this dilemma in a baraita: A minor girl can get divorced from her husband even if she was betrothed to him through her father鈥檚 betrothal, i.e., her father betrothed her to her husband (see Deuteronomy 22:16).

讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讗诇讗 讗转讬讗 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗转讬讗 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛

Why can she? But don鈥檛 we need there to be a broad similarity between the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, as derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs,鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as the basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? Accordingly, since she will not be eligible to receive her own betrothal until she reaches majority, she should not be able to receive her bill of divorce. Rather, evidently, since she will eventually reach the age of eligibility to receive her own betrothal she is considered essentially eligible for betrothal now as well. Here also, since the minor boy, whom the husband prohibited the wife from marrying, will reach the age of eligibility for betrothal, the divorce is invalid.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 诪讛讜 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讗讬转讬诇讬讚 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注转讬讚讬 讚诪转讬讬诇讚讬

Rava raised another dilemma: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for those who will be born in the future, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event they are not yet born, the qualification is void, as it pertains to people who do not exist? Or perhaps they are considered forbidden to her as they will be born in the future.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 讗诐 讗讬转讗 注讘讚 讜讙讜讬 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讙讬讬专讬

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid; if it is so that future situations are taken into account, a slave and a gentile are also likely to convert. Therefore, the husband is prohibiting her from marrying a man whom she might be able to marry in the future, which should render the divorce invalid. Evidently, only the present situation is taken into consideration.

讛谞讱 诇讗讜 诇讗讬讙讬讜专讬 拽讬讬诪讬 讛谞讬 诇讗讬转讬诇讜讚讬 拽讬讬诪讬

The Gemara rejects this solution: Those people do not stand before the court ready to convert. It is only a possibility that they will convert, as there is no reason to assume that they will do so. By contrast, these people who will be born stand ready to be born. Therefore, this solution cannot be inferred from the mishna.

讞讜抓 诪讘注诇 讗讞讜转讛 诪讛讜 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讚诪转讛 讗讞讜转讛 讜讞讝讬讗 诇讬讛

Rava raised another dilemma: If he permits her to marry any man except for her sister鈥檚 husband, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event she is not yet fit for him, as sexual intercourse between them is punishable by karet, the divorce is valid? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that sometimes a woman鈥檚 sister dies and she is thereby fit to marry her husband?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 注讘讚 讜讙讜讬 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讙讬讬专讬 讙讬专讜转 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诪讬转讛 砖讻讬讞讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid. And a slave and a gentile are also potentially fit to marry her as they are likely to convert. Evidently, only the current situation is taken into account. The Gemara rejects this; whereas conversion is uncommon, death is common.

讞讜抓 诪讝谞讜转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖讬讬专 讘讘讬讗讛

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to any man except for your licentiousness, meaning she may get married to any man but she may not engage in sexual intercourse outside of a second marriage, as she is still rendered a married woman in that regard, what is the halakha in this case? Is the divorce valid? Should it be reasoned that with regard to marriage he did not leave anything out of the divorce, as she is permitted to marry any man, or perhaps he left out part of the divorce with regard to sexual intercourse?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘谞讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讝谞讜转 讜诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 砖讬讬专 讛讗 诇讗讞专 砖讬讬专

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution in the mishna: If the husband says while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby forbidden to my father or to your father, the divorce is valid. And with regard to what action is this stated? If we say that it is with regard to marriage, are my father and your father eligible for marriage? Her betrothal to them would not take effect. Rather, is it not with regard to them engaging in licentiousness with her? And it may be inferred from the mishna that only if he renders her forbidden to my father or to your father is it not considered as if he left out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid; but if he renders her forbidden to engage in licentiousness with another man, it is considered as if he left out part of the divorce, and it will not take effect.

讚诇诪讗 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讚注讘专 讜讗讬谞住讬讘

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is referring to marriage, where the father transgresses the prohibition and marries her anyway. Therefore, the halakha with regard to licentiousness cannot be inferred from here.

讞讜抓 诪砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛 诪讛讜 讘讻讚专讻讛 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讻讘讬 讗砖讛 讻转讬讘

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to any man except for engaging in intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to typical sexual intercourse he did not leave out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid? Or perhaps from the fact that the expression: 鈥淐ohabitations of a woman鈥 (Leviticus 20:13), is written in the plural, it is derived that typical and atypical sexual intercourse have the same status, and accordingly this is considered a partial divorce, and it will not take effect.

讞讜抓 诪讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises a similar dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to marry any man: Except for the halakhot of the nullification of your vows, i.e., no man who marries her can nullify her vows other than her ex-husband, who retains his power to do so, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: 鈥淗er husband may sustain it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), that a husband鈥檚 power to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows is an intrinsic component of being married, and therefore this divorce is not a complete severance?

讞讜抓 诪转专讜诪转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 讻住驻讜 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your partaking of teruma, i.e., if she marries a priest she will not be able to partake of teruma, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: 鈥淭he purchase of his money, he may eat of it鈥 (Leviticus 22:11), indicating that a priest鈥檚 wife partakes of teruma because she is his acquisition, and that if she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, then his acquisition of her is not complete?

讞讜抓 诪讬专讜砖转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇砖讗专讜 讜讬专砖 讗讜转讛 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your inheritance, i.e., her future husband will not be considered her husband with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps since it is derived that a husband inherits from his wife, who is considered his next of kin, from that which is written: 鈥淭o his kinsman that is next to him of his family and he shall possess it鈥 (Numbers 27:11), then if a husband does not become his wife鈥檚 beneficiary, is their marriage not complete?

讞讜抓 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬讱 讘砖讟专 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗驻砖专 讚诪拽讚砖 诇讛 讘讻住祝 讜讘讘讬讗讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讗讬转拽讜砖 讛讜讜讬讜转 诇讛讚讚讬

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your ability to enter betrothal by receiving a document, i.e., if another man betroths her by giving her a document of betrothal, the betrothal will not take effect, what is the halakha? Do we say that since one can still betroth her with money or with sexual intercourse, the act of severance is complete? Or perhaps is it derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), that the different ways of becoming a wife are compared to each other, so that the inability to perform one of them renders the severance incomplete?

转讬拽讜

The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall all stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

MISHNA: The basic, essential, element of a bill of divorce is: You are hereby permitted to marry any man.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜讚谉 讚讬讛讜讬 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 住驻专 转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜讗讙专转 砖讘讜拽讬谉 讜讙讟 驻讟讜专讬谉 诇诪讛讱 诇讛转谞住讘讗 诇讻诇 讙讘专 讚讬转爪讘讬讬谉 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱

Rabbi Yehuda says that there is also another essential sentence: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce, and a letter of leave, and a bill of dismissal to go to marry any man that you wish. And the basic element of a bill of manumission for a maidservant is: You are hereby a free woman, or: You are hereby your own.

讙诪壮 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 诇讛 诇砖驻讞转讜 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐

GEMARA: It is obvious that if one stated in a bill of divorce for his wife: You are hereby a free woman, he has stated nothing, as that is not a statement of divorce. Similarly, if one stated in a bill of manumission for his maidservant: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, he has stated nothing, as that is not a statement of manumission.

讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 诪讛讜 诇讙诪专讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讜 诇诪诇讗讻讛 拽讗诪专 诇讛

The Gemara asks: If he stated in a bill of divorce for his wife: You are hereby your own, what is the halakha? Is he saying to her: You are entirely your own, meaning that she has full control over her status and may marry another man? Or is he saying to her: You are your own with regard to work, meaning that she may keep the revenue from her work? If so, this is not a statement of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞谉 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 讜诪讛 注讘讚讗 讚拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讙讜驻讬讛 讻讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 拽谞讬 讙讜驻讬讛 讗砖讛 讚诇讗 拽谞讬 讙讜驻讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a solution that we learned in the mishna: The basic element of a bill of manumission is: You are hereby a free woman, or: You are hereby your own. And just as with regard to a slave, whose body is acquired by the master, if the master states in a bill of manumission for the slave: You are hereby your own, the slave acquires his body, all the more so with regard to a wife, whose body is not acquired by her husband, is it not clear that by his writing in a bill of divorce: You are hereby your own, she is completely released from their marriage?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诇讜 诇注讘讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讱 诪讛讜

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If he stated in a bill of manumission for his slave: I have no business with you, what is the halakha? Is this a valid statement of manumission?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞讬谉 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 专讘 讞谞讬谉 诪讞讜讝谞讗讛 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讜讻专 注讘讚讜 诇讙讜讬 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜爪专讬讱 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 诪专讘讜 专讗砖讜谉 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖诇讗 讻转讘 注诇讬讜 讗讜谞讜 讗讘诇 讻转讘 注诇讬讜 讗讜谞讜 讝讛讜 砖讞专讜专讜

Rav 岣nin said to Rav Ashi, and some say that it was Rav 岣nin from Me岣za who said this to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a solution that we learned in a baraita: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his first master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is when the master did not write his document for the slave when he sold him; but if he wrote his document for him, that is the slave鈥檚 bill of manumission.

诪讗讬 讗讜谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讻砖转讘专讞 诪诪谞讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讱

The Gemara asks: What is the phrase: His document, referring to? Rav Sheshet says that he writes for him as follows: When you will escape from the gentile to whom I sold you, I have no business with you. Consequently, as soon as he escapes his gentile master in any manner, he is entirely emancipated. It may be derived from here that the statement: I have no business with you, is valid with regard to manumission.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜讚谉 讚讬讛讜讬 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 住驻专 转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜讗讙专转 砖讘讜拽讬谉 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 诪讜讻讞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚讘讛讗讬 讙讬讟讗 拽讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛

搂 It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says that in addition to the statement: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, there is another essential sentence in the bill of divorce: And this [veden] that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter [ve鈥檌ggeret] of leave. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that ambiguous intimations are valid intimations. An incomplete statement is sufficient as long as the intention is clear from the context. And therefore, even if he does not write for her explicitly: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, the bill of divorce is valid as it is evident that he is divorcing her with this bill of divorce.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 讜讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 讚诪讜讻讞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚讘讛讗讬 讙讬讟讗 拽讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讗讘诇 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 讗诪专讬 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 讙专砖讛 讜砖讟专讗 专讗讬讛 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that ambiguous intimations are not valid intimations, and therefore the reason that the bill of divorce is valid is that he writes for her: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, so it is evident that he is divorcing her with this bill of divorce. But if he does not write for her: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, people will say that he is divorcing her orally, and will mistakenly assume that the husband鈥檚 statement to her when he hands her the bill of divorce is what causes the divorce to take effect, and that the document is merely evidence of the divorce, rather than the divorce itself.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讗讬 诪讗谉 讚讻转讘 讙讬讟讗 诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 讜讚讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 讜讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讜讚谉

搂 The Gemara relates several rulings concerning the precise terminology to be used in writing a bill of divorce. Abaye said: This person who writes a bill of divorce should not write the word meaning: And this, by spelling it vav, dalet, yod, nun, as that can be misread as having the vowel of a 岣rik under the letter dalet, not a tzeire. Read with a 岣rik, it indicates: And there is a law that we should get divorced. Rather, he should make sure to write the word meaning: And this, without a yod, so that it is clear that it should be read with a tzeire.

讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 讗讬讙专转 讚诪砖诪注 讗讬讙专转 讗诇讗 讗讙专转 讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 诇讬诪讛讱 讚诪砖诪注 诇讬 诪讛讱 讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 诇诪讞讱 讚诪砖诪注 讻讬 讞讜讻讗

And he should not write the word meaning: A letter, by spelling it alef, yod, gimmel, reish, tav, as that can be confused with another identically spelled word that indicates a roof. Rather, he should write the word meaning: A letter, without a yod. And he should not write: To go, by spelling it lamed, yod, mem, heh, khaf, as that could be read as a conjunction which indicates: For me from this. And he should be sure not to write lim岣kh, i.e., he must be careful that the letter heh not look like a 岣t, as that indicates that it is like a joke.

讚讬转讬讛讜讬讬讬谉 讚讬转讬爪讘讬讬讬谉 转诇转讗 转诇转讗 讬讜讚讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 转讛讜讬讬谉 讜转爪讘讬讬谉 讜诇讜专讻讬讛 诇讜讬讜 讚转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜诇讜讬讜 讚砖讘讜拽讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 转专讬讻讬谉 讜砖讘讬拽讬谉

Abaye continues: In the clause: That you shall be permitted to go marry any man that you wish, the words ditihevyin and dititzviyin must include three instances of the letter yod in a row in each word, as with only two instances of the letter yod these words indicate: That they shall be [tehevyan], and: That they wish [titzviyan], referring to other women. And he should extend the vav of teirukhin and the vav of shevukin, as otherwise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and those words spelled with a yod indicate divorced [terikhin] and left [shevikin] women. In other words, it will change the meaning from describing the document as one that divorces or sends away to describing the women as divorced and sent away.

讜诇讜专讻讬讛 诇讜讬讜 讚讻讚讜 讚诪砖诪注 讜讻讚讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讻转讜讘 诇讗讬转谞住讘讗 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬转谞住讘讗 讗诇讗 诇讛转谞住讘讗

And in the clause: And now [ukhedu] I have dismissed and ousted and divorced you, he should extend the vav of khedu, as other-wise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and spelled with a yod it indicates: And with nothing [ukhedi]. And in the expression: To go marry [lehitnasseva] he should not write le鈥檌tnasseva with an alef and a yod, as, if he leaves space between the letters it will indicate: Will not get married [la yitnasseva]. Rather, he should write lehitnasseva, with a heh and without a yod, so there will be no room for this error.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜讚谉 讗讜 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讚谉

A dilemma was raised before them: Do we need to write: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce, and a letter of leave, and a bill of dismissal to go to marry any man that you wish, or do we not need to write the clause beginning with the words: And this? Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda or the Rabbis?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗转拽讬谉 专讘讗 讘讙讬讟讬 讗讬讱 驻诇谞讬讗 讘专 驻诇谞讬讗 驻讟专 讜转专讬讱 讬转 驻诇讜谞讬转讗 讗讬谞转转讬讛 讚讛讜转 讗讬谞转转讬讛 诪谉 拽讚诐 讚谞讗 诪讬讜诪讗 讚谞谉 讜诇注诇诐 讜讗讬诇讜 讜讚谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专

Come and hear a solution, as Rava instituted the following wording in bills of divorce: We saw how so-and-so, son of so-and-so, dismissed and divorced so-and-so, his wife, who was his wife from beforehand, from this day and forever. But he did not state the clause beginning with the words: And this.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讻讜诇讛讜 诪讬 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara challenges this solution: And according to your reasoning, did Rava state all of the other necessary clauses of a bill of divorce? Rather, we need to write them even though they were not mentioned explicitly in Rava鈥檚 formulation. Here too, we need to write the clause beginning with the words: And this, even though it was not mentioned specifically by Rava.

诪讬讜诪讗 讚谞谉 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

搂 The Gemara analyzes the wording instituted by Rava: The expression: From this day, is written to the exclusion of the statement of Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and therefore it is not necessary to write the expression: From this day. Rava added this expression to take the opposite opinion into account.

讜诇注诇诐

The expression: And forever,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Gittin 85

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 85

讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讻砖专 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讻转讘讜 讜讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 讗讘诇 注诇 诪谞转 诇讗 驻住讬诇 讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

everyone agrees that it is valid. And the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. As if you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the qualification is written before the essential part of the bill of divorce, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And if you wish, say that it is referring to a case where the qualification is written after the essential part, and everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, agrees with regard to its ruling.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讚专讘讬 住讘专 讙讝专讬谞谉 讗讟讜 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讙讝专讬谞谉 讗讟讜 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇

And Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the condition is written after the essential part, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree rendering the bill of divorce invalid due to a case where the condition is written before the essential part, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree due to a case where it is written before the essential part. But if it is written before the essential part, everyone agrees that it is invalid.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讻转讘讜 讜讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 讗讘诇 注诇 诪谞转 诇讗 驻住讬诇 讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讜专讘谞谉 讛讬讗

And accordingly, the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. It is referring to a case where he wrote the condition after the essential part, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a condition written after the essential part does not render the bill of divorce invalid.

转谞讬 讗讘讜讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讻转讘 讙讟 注诇 转谞讗讬 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讜讛讗 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讬讙讬

The father of Rabbi Avin taught a baraita before Rabbi Zeira: If one wrote a conditional bill of divorce, everyone agrees that it is invalid. Rabbi Zeira asked him: Everyone agrees that it is invalid? But don鈥檛 they disagree about this?

讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讻砖专 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝

Rabbi Zeira therefore modified the baraita in accordance with his opinion: Rather, say that everyone agrees that it is valid. And what are the circumstances in which both sides agree that it is valid? It is referring to a case where the condition is written after the essential part of the bill of divorce.

讜诇讬诪讗 讛专讬 讝讛 驻住讜诇 讜专讘讬 转谞讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗转谞讬讬讛 讻砖专 讘驻住讜诇 诪讬讞诇祝 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诇讗 诪讬讞诇祝 诇讬讛

The Gemara counters: Let Rabbi Zeira say an alternative modification of the baraita: It is invalid, omitting the words: Everyone agrees, and this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: The tanna taught him that everyone agrees, which is a conspicuous statement. Although he may conceivably confuse the word valid with invalid, he certainly does not confuse the phrase: It is, with the phrase: Everyone agrees. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira modified the baraita the way he did.

诪转谞讬壮 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 诇讗讞讬 讜诇讗讞讬讱 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 讜诇讻诇 诪讬 砖讗讬谉 诇讛 注诇讬讜 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讻砖专

MISHNA: If a man says to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except to marry my father or to marry your father, to marry my brother or to marry your brother, to marry a slave or to marry a gentile, or to marry anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, the divorce is valid. Since these men cannot betroth her anyway, his qualification is meaningless.

讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 讗诇诪谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讙讚讜诇 讙专讜砖讛 讜讞诇讜爪讛 诇讻讛谉 讛讚讬讜讟 诪诪讝专转 讜谞转讬谞讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 诇诪诪讝专 讜诇谞转讬谉 讜讻诇 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讛 注诇讬讜 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘注讘讬专讛 驻住讜诇

If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except for when doing so violates the following: The prohibition against a widow being married to a High Priest; the prohibition against a divorc茅e or a yevama who performed 岣litza [岣lutza] being married to a common priest; a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman being married to an Israelite man; an Israelite woman being married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite man; or marrying anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, even if this betrothal would be a transgression, such as in the aforementioned cases; in all of these cases the divorce is invalid. His statement renders it a partial divorce, as the woman is still not permitted to marry any man who is eligible to betroth her.

讙诪壮 讻诇诇讗 讚专讬砖讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 砖讗专 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇诇讗 讚住讬驻讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 砖讗专 讞讬讬讘讬 诇讗讜讬谉 讻讙讜谉 注诪讜谞讬 讜诪讜讗讘讬 谞转讬谞讬 诪爪专讬 讜讗讚讜诪讬

GEMARA: The stating of the generalization in the first clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable to receive karet for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, who are not listed explicitly in the mishna. The stating of the generalization in the last clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable by a prohibition for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, such as an Ammonite and a Moabite, a Gibeonite, an Egyptian, and an Edomite (Deuteronomy 23:4, 8鈥9). Although they are all prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with her due to a prohibition or a positive mitzva, she can legally become betrothed to them.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讞讜抓 诪拽讚讜砖讬 拽讟谉 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗讜 讘专 讛讜讬讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗转讬 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for a betrothal to so-and-so, who is a minor boy at that time, what is the halakha? Do we say that now, since he is in any event not eligible for betrothal, as a minor boy cannot betroth a woman, the husband鈥檚 qualification does not prohibit his wife to anyone, and it is a complete act of severance? Or perhaps, since he will reach eligibility for betrothal, is the husband鈥檚 qualification considered as prohibiting her to someone to whom betrothal could apply?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 拽讟谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬 讗讘讬讛

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to this dilemma in a baraita: A minor girl can get divorced from her husband even if she was betrothed to him through her father鈥檚 betrothal, i.e., her father betrothed her to her husband (see Deuteronomy 22:16).

讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讗诇讗 讗转讬讗 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗转讬讗 诇讻诇诇 讛讜讬讛

Why can she? But don鈥檛 we need there to be a broad similarity between the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, as derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs,鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as the basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? Accordingly, since she will not be eligible to receive her own betrothal until she reaches majority, she should not be able to receive her bill of divorce. Rather, evidently, since she will eventually reach the age of eligibility to receive her own betrothal she is considered essentially eligible for betrothal now as well. Here also, since the minor boy, whom the husband prohibited the wife from marrying, will reach the age of eligibility for betrothal, the divorce is invalid.

讞讜抓 诪谉 讛谞讜诇讚讬诐 诪讛讜 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讗讬转讬诇讬讚 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注转讬讚讬 讚诪转讬讬诇讚讬

Rava raised another dilemma: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for those who will be born in the future, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event they are not yet born, the qualification is void, as it pertains to people who do not exist? Or perhaps they are considered forbidden to her as they will be born in the future.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 讗诐 讗讬转讗 注讘讚 讜讙讜讬 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讙讬讬专讬

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid; if it is so that future situations are taken into account, a slave and a gentile are also likely to convert. Therefore, the husband is prohibiting her from marrying a man whom she might be able to marry in the future, which should render the divorce invalid. Evidently, only the present situation is taken into consideration.

讛谞讱 诇讗讜 诇讗讬讙讬讜专讬 拽讬讬诪讬 讛谞讬 诇讗讬转讬诇讜讚讬 拽讬讬诪讬

The Gemara rejects this solution: Those people do not stand before the court ready to convert. It is only a possibility that they will convert, as there is no reason to assume that they will do so. By contrast, these people who will be born stand ready to be born. Therefore, this solution cannot be inferred from the mishna.

讞讜抓 诪讘注诇 讗讞讜转讛 诪讛讜 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讚诪转讛 讗讞讜转讛 讜讞讝讬讗 诇讬讛

Rava raised another dilemma: If he permits her to marry any man except for her sister鈥檚 husband, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event she is not yet fit for him, as sexual intercourse between them is punishable by karet, the divorce is valid? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that sometimes a woman鈥檚 sister dies and she is thereby fit to marry her husband?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇注讘讚 讜诇讙讜讬 注讘讚 讜讙讜讬 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讙讬讬专讬 讙讬专讜转 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诪讬转讛 砖讻讬讞讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid. And a slave and a gentile are also potentially fit to marry her as they are likely to convert. Evidently, only the current situation is taken into account. The Gemara rejects this; whereas conversion is uncommon, death is common.

讞讜抓 诪讝谞讜转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖讬讬专 讘讘讬讗讛

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to any man except for your licentiousness, meaning she may get married to any man but she may not engage in sexual intercourse outside of a second marriage, as she is still rendered a married woman in that regard, what is the halakha in this case? Is the divorce valid? Should it be reasoned that with regard to marriage he did not leave anything out of the divorce, as she is permitted to marry any man, or perhaps he left out part of the divorce with regard to sexual intercourse?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬转讜讛 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘谞讬 谞砖讜讗讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讝谞讜转 讜诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 砖讬讬专 讛讗 诇讗讞专 砖讬讬专

Rav Na岣an said to him: You learned the solution in the mishna: If the husband says while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby forbidden to my father or to your father, the divorce is valid. And with regard to what action is this stated? If we say that it is with regard to marriage, are my father and your father eligible for marriage? Her betrothal to them would not take effect. Rather, is it not with regard to them engaging in licentiousness with her? And it may be inferred from the mishna that only if he renders her forbidden to my father or to your father is it not considered as if he left out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid; but if he renders her forbidden to engage in licentiousness with another man, it is considered as if he left out part of the divorce, and it will not take effect.

讚诇诪讗 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讚注讘专 讜讗讬谞住讬讘

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is referring to marriage, where the father transgresses the prohibition and marries her anyway. Therefore, the halakha with regard to licentiousness cannot be inferred from here.

讞讜抓 诪砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛 诪讛讜 讘讻讚专讻讛 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讻讘讬 讗砖讛 讻转讬讘

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to any man except for engaging in intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to typical sexual intercourse he did not leave out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid? Or perhaps from the fact that the expression: 鈥淐ohabitations of a woman鈥 (Leviticus 20:13), is written in the plural, it is derived that typical and atypical sexual intercourse have the same status, and accordingly this is considered a partial divorce, and it will not take effect.

讞讜抓 诪讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises a similar dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to marry any man: Except for the halakhot of the nullification of your vows, i.e., no man who marries her can nullify her vows other than her ex-husband, who retains his power to do so, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: 鈥淗er husband may sustain it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), that a husband鈥檚 power to nullify his wife鈥檚 vows is an intrinsic component of being married, and therefore this divorce is not a complete severance?

讞讜抓 诪转专讜诪转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 讻住驻讜 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your partaking of teruma, i.e., if she marries a priest she will not be able to partake of teruma, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: 鈥淭he purchase of his money, he may eat of it鈥 (Leviticus 22:11), indicating that a priest鈥檚 wife partakes of teruma because she is his acquisition, and that if she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, then his acquisition of her is not complete?

讞讜抓 诪讬专讜砖转讬讱 诪讛讜 讘谞砖讜讗讬谉 讛讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇砖讗专讜 讜讬专砖 讗讜转讛 讻转讬讘

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your inheritance, i.e., her future husband will not be considered her husband with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps since it is derived that a husband inherits from his wife, who is considered his next of kin, from that which is written: 鈥淭o his kinsman that is next to him of his family and he shall possess it鈥 (Numbers 27:11), then if a husband does not become his wife鈥檚 beneficiary, is their marriage not complete?

讞讜抓 诪拽讬讚讜砖讬讱 讘砖讟专 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗驻砖专 讚诪拽讚砖 诇讛 讘讻住祝 讜讘讘讬讗讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛 讗讬转拽讜砖 讛讜讜讬讜转 诇讛讚讚讬

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your ability to enter betrothal by receiving a document, i.e., if another man betroths her by giving her a document of betrothal, the betrothal will not take effect, what is the halakha? Do we say that since one can still betroth her with money or with sexual intercourse, the act of severance is complete? Or perhaps is it derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), that the different ways of becoming a wife are compared to each other, so that the inability to perform one of them renders the severance incomplete?

转讬拽讜

The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall all stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

MISHNA: The basic, essential, element of a bill of divorce is: You are hereby permitted to marry any man.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜讚谉 讚讬讛讜讬 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 住驻专 转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜讗讙专转 砖讘讜拽讬谉 讜讙讟 驻讟讜专讬谉 诇诪讛讱 诇讛转谞住讘讗 诇讻诇 讙讘专 讚讬转爪讘讬讬谉 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱

Rabbi Yehuda says that there is also another essential sentence: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce, and a letter of leave, and a bill of dismissal to go to marry any man that you wish. And the basic element of a bill of manumission for a maidservant is: You are hereby a free woman, or: You are hereby your own.

讙诪壮 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖转讜 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 诇讛 诇砖驻讞转讜 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐

GEMARA: It is obvious that if one stated in a bill of divorce for his wife: You are hereby a free woman, he has stated nothing, as that is not a statement of divorce. Similarly, if one stated in a bill of manumission for his maidservant: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, he has stated nothing, as that is not a statement of manumission.

讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 诪讛讜 诇讙诪专讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讜 诇诪诇讗讻讛 拽讗诪专 诇讛

The Gemara asks: If he stated in a bill of divorce for his wife: You are hereby your own, what is the halakha? Is he saying to her: You are entirely your own, meaning that she has full control over her status and may marry another man? Or is he saying to her: You are your own with regard to work, meaning that she may keep the revenue from her work? If so, this is not a statement of divorce.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞谉 讙讜驻讜 砖诇 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 讛专讬 讗转 讘转 讞讜专讬谉 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 讜诪讛 注讘讚讗 讚拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讙讜驻讬讛 讻讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讗转 诇注爪诪讱 拽谞讬 讙讜驻讬讛 讗砖讛 讚诇讗 拽谞讬 讙讜驻讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a solution that we learned in the mishna: The basic element of a bill of manumission is: You are hereby a free woman, or: You are hereby your own. And just as with regard to a slave, whose body is acquired by the master, if the master states in a bill of manumission for the slave: You are hereby your own, the slave acquires his body, all the more so with regard to a wife, whose body is not acquired by her husband, is it not clear that by his writing in a bill of divorce: You are hereby your own, she is completely released from their marriage?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诇讜 诇注讘讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讱 诪讛讜

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If he stated in a bill of manumission for his slave: I have no business with you, what is the halakha? Is this a valid statement of manumission?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞讬谉 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 专讘 讞谞讬谉 诪讞讜讝谞讗讛 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讜讻专 注讘讚讜 诇讙讜讬 讬爪讗 诇讞讬专讜转 讜爪专讬讱 讙讟 砖讞专讜专 诪专讘讜 专讗砖讜谉 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖诇讗 讻转讘 注诇讬讜 讗讜谞讜 讗讘诇 讻转讘 注诇讬讜 讗讜谞讜 讝讛讜 砖讞专讜专讜

Rav 岣nin said to Rav Ashi, and some say that it was Rav 岣nin from Me岣za who said this to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a solution that we learned in a baraita: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his first master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is when the master did not write his document for the slave when he sold him; but if he wrote his document for him, that is the slave鈥檚 bill of manumission.

诪讗讬 讗讜谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讻砖转讘专讞 诪诪谞讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讱

The Gemara asks: What is the phrase: His document, referring to? Rav Sheshet says that he writes for him as follows: When you will escape from the gentile to whom I sold you, I have no business with you. Consequently, as soon as he escapes his gentile master in any manner, he is entirely emancipated. It may be derived from here that the statement: I have no business with you, is valid with regard to manumission.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜讚谉 讚讬讛讜讬 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 住驻专 转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜讗讙专转 砖讘讜拽讬谉 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 诪讜讻讞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚讘讛讗讬 讙讬讟讗 拽讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛

搂 It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says that in addition to the statement: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, there is another essential sentence in the bill of divorce: And this [veden] that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter [ve鈥檌ggeret] of leave. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that ambiguous intimations are valid intimations. An incomplete statement is sufficient as long as the intention is clear from the context. And therefore, even if he does not write for her explicitly: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, the bill of divorce is valid as it is evident that he is divorcing her with this bill of divorce.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讬讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讻讬讞讜转 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬诐 讜讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 讚诪讜讻讞讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚讘讛讗讬 讙讬讟讗 拽讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讗讘诇 诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讚谉 讗诪专讬 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 讙专砖讛 讜砖讟专讗 专讗讬讛 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that ambiguous intimations are not valid intimations, and therefore the reason that the bill of divorce is valid is that he writes for her: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, so it is evident that he is divorcing her with this bill of divorce. But if he does not write for her: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce and a letter of leave, people will say that he is divorcing her orally, and will mistakenly assume that the husband鈥檚 statement to her when he hands her the bill of divorce is what causes the divorce to take effect, and that the document is merely evidence of the divorce, rather than the divorce itself.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讗讬 诪讗谉 讚讻转讘 讙讬讟讗 诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 讜讚讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 讜讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讜讚谉

搂 The Gemara relates several rulings concerning the precise terminology to be used in writing a bill of divorce. Abaye said: This person who writes a bill of divorce should not write the word meaning: And this, by spelling it vav, dalet, yod, nun, as that can be misread as having the vowel of a 岣rik under the letter dalet, not a tzeire. Read with a 岣rik, it indicates: And there is a law that we should get divorced. Rather, he should make sure to write the word meaning: And this, without a yod, so that it is clear that it should be read with a tzeire.

讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 讗讬讙专转 讚诪砖诪注 讗讬讙专转 讗诇讗 讗讙专转 讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 诇讬诪讛讱 讚诪砖诪注 诇讬 诪讛讱 讜诇讗 诇讻转讜讘 诇诪讞讱 讚诪砖诪注 讻讬 讞讜讻讗

And he should not write the word meaning: A letter, by spelling it alef, yod, gimmel, reish, tav, as that can be confused with another identically spelled word that indicates a roof. Rather, he should write the word meaning: A letter, without a yod. And he should not write: To go, by spelling it lamed, yod, mem, heh, khaf, as that could be read as a conjunction which indicates: For me from this. And he should be sure not to write lim岣kh, i.e., he must be careful that the letter heh not look like a 岣t, as that indicates that it is like a joke.

讚讬转讬讛讜讬讬讬谉 讚讬转讬爪讘讬讬讬谉 转诇转讗 转诇转讗 讬讜讚讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 转讛讜讬讬谉 讜转爪讘讬讬谉 讜诇讜专讻讬讛 诇讜讬讜 讚转讬专讜讻讬谉 讜诇讜讬讜 讚砖讘讜拽讬谉 讚诪砖诪注 转专讬讻讬谉 讜砖讘讬拽讬谉

Abaye continues: In the clause: That you shall be permitted to go marry any man that you wish, the words ditihevyin and dititzviyin must include three instances of the letter yod in a row in each word, as with only two instances of the letter yod these words indicate: That they shall be [tehevyan], and: That they wish [titzviyan], referring to other women. And he should extend the vav of teirukhin and the vav of shevukin, as otherwise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and those words spelled with a yod indicate divorced [terikhin] and left [shevikin] women. In other words, it will change the meaning from describing the document as one that divorces or sends away to describing the women as divorced and sent away.

讜诇讜专讻讬讛 诇讜讬讜 讚讻讚讜 讚诪砖诪注 讜讻讚讬 讜诇讗 诇讬讻转讜讘 诇讗讬转谞住讘讗 讚诪砖诪注 诇讗 讬转谞住讘讗 讗诇讗 诇讛转谞住讘讗

And in the clause: And now [ukhedu] I have dismissed and ousted and divorced you, he should extend the vav of khedu, as other-wise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and spelled with a yod it indicates: And with nothing [ukhedi]. And in the expression: To go marry [lehitnasseva] he should not write le鈥檌tnasseva with an alef and a yod, as, if he leaves space between the letters it will indicate: Will not get married [la yitnasseva]. Rather, he should write lehitnasseva, with a heh and without a yod, so there will be no room for this error.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜讚谉 讗讜 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讚谉

A dilemma was raised before them: Do we need to write: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce, and a letter of leave, and a bill of dismissal to go to marry any man that you wish, or do we not need to write the clause beginning with the words: And this? Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda or the Rabbis?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗转拽讬谉 专讘讗 讘讙讬讟讬 讗讬讱 驻诇谞讬讗 讘专 驻诇谞讬讗 驻讟专 讜转专讬讱 讬转 驻诇讜谞讬转讗 讗讬谞转转讬讛 讚讛讜转 讗讬谞转转讬讛 诪谉 拽讚诐 讚谞讗 诪讬讜诪讗 讚谞谉 讜诇注诇诐 讜讗讬诇讜 讜讚谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专

Come and hear a solution, as Rava instituted the following wording in bills of divorce: We saw how so-and-so, son of so-and-so, dismissed and divorced so-and-so, his wife, who was his wife from beforehand, from this day and forever. But he did not state the clause beginning with the words: And this.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讻讜诇讛讜 诪讬 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara challenges this solution: And according to your reasoning, did Rava state all of the other necessary clauses of a bill of divorce? Rather, we need to write them even though they were not mentioned explicitly in Rava鈥檚 formulation. Here too, we need to write the clause beginning with the words: And this, even though it was not mentioned specifically by Rava.

诪讬讜诪讗 讚谞谉 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

搂 The Gemara analyzes the wording instituted by Rava: The expression: From this day, is written to the exclusion of the statement of Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and therefore it is not necessary to write the expression: From this day. Rava added this expression to take the opposite opinion into account.

讜诇注诇诐

The expression: And forever,

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