Today's Daf Yomi
August 8, 2023 | 讻状讗 讘讗讘 转砖驻状讙
-
This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
-
Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.
Gittin 84
诪住转讘专讗 讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚驻住拽讛 驻住拽讛
It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbis, that once he separates her, he has separated her entirely. By rendering her entirely permitted for one day he dissolves the bond between them and the divorce takes effect.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞砖讗讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗
搂 The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:7) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so, she may not marry that man, but if she marries him the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband.
诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讜 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讬讛谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转爪讗
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? She is forbidden from marrying whom? Rav Na岣an said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., she may not marry the man mentioned by her husband in the condition, lest people say that these people are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries another man she need not leave him.
讜诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讬讛 讜砖专讬谞谉 讗砖转 讗讬砖 诇注诇诪讗
The Gemara asks: Do we not remove her from him, thereby allowing a married woman to marry anyone, due to a rabbinic decree, lest people say that the husband is giving her as a gift? As long as the condition that she would marry a specific man is not fulfilled, she is a married woman by Torah law.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讜 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讚诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉
Rather, Rav Na岣an said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., the man who was specified in the condition, lest people say that they are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries him she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree.
讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇讜 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 转谞砖讗 讛讗 诇讗讞专 转谞砖讗 讜讛讗 讘注讬 拽讬讜诪讬 诇转谞讗讛
Rava said to Rav Na岣an: It may be inferred from your statement that it is specifically to him that she may not get married, but she may marry another man ab initio. But isn鈥檛 she required to fulfill the condition by marrying the specified man before marrying someone else?
讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗驻砖专 讚诪讬谞住讘讗 讛讬讜诐 讜诪讬讙专砖讛 诇诪讞专 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇转谞讗讛 讜诇讛讱 讚驻诇讬讙转 注诇讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 拽诪讚诪讬转 诇讬讛 讚讗转诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 诇诪讞专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇 讬讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 砖诪讗 讬讬砖谉 诇诪讞专
And if you would say that it is possible for her to get married today to someone else and get divorced from him tomorrow and then fulfill her condition by marrying the specified man, and you can compare it to that halakha over which you disagree with Rav Yehuda. As it was stated with regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam] for my eyes today if I will sleep tomorrow, Rav Yehuda says that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow, causing the vow to have been violated today, retroactively.
讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讬讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪讗 讬讬砖谉 诇诪讞专
And Rav Na岣an says: He may sleep today, as there is currently no prohibition, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sleep tomorrow, as he will be careful not to sleep. This dispute pertains to the general issue of a prohibition that will take effect retroactively if a condition is not fulfilled. Rav Yehuda holds that the prohibition must be observed until the condition is fulfilled, whereas Rav Na岣an maintains that it is not necessary to observe the prohibition, as he assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Here too, perhaps Rav Na岣an allows the woman to marry another man because she can fulfill the condition after she is divorced from him.
讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 讘讚讬讚讬讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诪讘专讬讝 谞驻砖讬讛 讘住讬诇讜讗转讗 讜诇讗 谞讗讬诐 讛讻讗 讘讚讬讚讛 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讬讙专讜砖讬
How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the vow, the fulfillment of the condition is in his capability, as, if he wants to prevent himself from falling asleep he can prick himself with thorns [silevata] and he will not fall asleep. Here, is it in the woman鈥檚 power to get divorced? Perhaps her husband will not agree to divorce her and the condition will not be fulfilled.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 诇讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讜转讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讚讘注讬讗 拽讬讜诪讬讛 诇转谞讗讛
Rather, Rava said that the baraita should be interpreted in the following manner: This woman may marry neither the man who was specified in the condition nor another man. She may not marry him lest people say that these men are giving their wives to each other as a gift, and she may not marry another man because she is required to fulfill the condition.
讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讚诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诇讗讞专 转爪讗 讚讘注讬讗 诇拽讬讜诪讬讛 诇转谞讗讛
And if she marries the specified man she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him, as she is required to fulfill the condition before marrying another man.
转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讗讞专 转爪讗
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: This woman may marry neither him nor another man, but if she marries him she need not leave him. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转注诇讬 诇专拽讬注 注诇 诪谞转 砖转专讚讬 诇转讛讜诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘诇注讬 拽谞讛 砖诇 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘讬讗讬 诇讬 拽谞讛 讘谉 诪讗讛 讗诪讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转注讘专讬 讗转 讛讬诐 讛讙讚讜诇 讘专讙诇讬讱 讗讬谞讜 讙讟
搂 The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky, or on the condition that you descend to the depths of the sea, or on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed, or on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed, or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea, i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, by foot, or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讻诇 转谞讗讬 砖讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇讜 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讘住讜驻讜 讜讛转谞讛 注诇讬讜 诪转讞讬诇转讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪驻诇讬讙讛 讘讚讘专讬诐 讜讻砖专
Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, as the condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said the following principle: With regard to any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet even so the husband stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing. It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, and therefore the divorce is valid without her fulfilling the condition.
讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇 砖讗驻砖专 诇讜 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讘住讜驻讜 讜讛转谞讛 注诇讬讜 讘转讞讬诇转讜 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 讛讗 讗讬 讗驻砖专 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
Rav Na岣an says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: The language of the mishna is also precisely formulated in support of this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that can be fulfilled in the end and the husband stipulated it initially, his condition stands (Bava Metzia 94a). Consequently, if his condition cannot be fulfilled it is void. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.
讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 诪讛讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讬讗 讛讬讗 专讘讗 讗诪专 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讜诇拽讬讗
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat, what is the halakha? Abaye said: It is the same. This is also a condition that cannot be fulfilled, as it is forbidden by Torah law. Therefore, the condition is void. Rava said: It is possible for her to eat it and be flogged for it. Consequently, the condition can be fulfilled, although it is forbidden for her to do so.
诇讗讘讬讬 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 诇专讘讗 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专
The Gemara elaborates: According to Abaye, the principle stated by Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima serves to include a condition to eat pig meat. When a tanna states a general principle, it expands the halakha beyond the specific case mentioned previously. In this case, the stating of the principle serves to apply the halakha to a condition subject to a Torah prohibition, in addition to a physical impossibility. According to Rava, when Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, the limiting term of: Like this, serves to emphasize that only when there is a condition that cannot be physically fulfilled is the bill of divorce valid, and serves to exclude a condition to eat pig meat, which cannot be fulfilled due to a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if she does not fulfill this condition the divorce is invalid.
诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘注诇讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 谞转拽讬讬诐 讛转谞讗讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转讘注诇讬 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪讗 谞讘注诇讛 诇讛谉
The Gemara raises an objection to Rava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, and the condition is fulfilled, this is a valid bill of divorce. And if the condition is not fulfilled then it is not a valid bill of divorce. If he says to her: On the condition that you do not engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, she is permitted to remarry, as we are not concerned that perhaps she engaged in sexual intercourse with them.
讜讗讬诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘注诇讬 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诇讗讘讬讬 谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讗 拽砖讬讗
But the baraita does not teach that the condition is binding when the husband says: On the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, which is forbidden by Torah law. According to Abaye it works out well, as in his opinion a condition that violates Torah law is void. According to Rava it is difficult.
讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讜诇拽讬讗 驻诇讜谞讬 谞诪讬 讗驻砖专 讚诪砖讞讚讗 讘讬讛 讘诪诪讜谞讗 讗诇讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘讚讬讚讛 拽讬讬诪讗 谞讛讬 讚讗讬讛讬 注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 诪讬 注讘讚讬 讗讬住讜专讗
The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: Granted, with regard to pig meat it is possible for her to eat it and be flogged. Similarly, if the condition is that she engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, it is also possible for her to bribe him with money to engage in sexual intercourse with her. But with regard to the case of my father or your father, is it in her power to engage in sexual intercourse with them? Though she can potentially perform a forbidden act in order to fulfill her desire to get married, would my father or your father perform a forbidden act? They certainly would not cooperate. Therefore, this is a condition that cannot be fulfilled, and it is considered hyperbole.
诇专讘讗 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专
Based on this analysis, according to Rava, Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his principle in order to include the condition of my father and your father, as this condition is also considered impossible to fulfill. And the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude the condition of eating pig meat, in which case the divorce is not valid unless she fulfills the condition.
诇讗讘讬讬 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 驻诇讜谞讬
And according to Abaye this principle was stated to include the case of a condition that she should eat pig meat, and the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude a condition that she should engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, in which case the divorce takes effect only once the condition is fulfilled, as it is possible to fulfill this condition in a permitted manner.
诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 讝专讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 谞讝讬专讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖转讬 讬讬谉 谞转拽讬讬诐 讛转谞讗讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 诇专讘讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讗讘讬讬 拽砖讬讗
The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita (Tosefta 6:10): If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat; or similarly, if she was a non-priestess, i.e., the daughter of an Israelite, and he stipulated: On the condition that you partake of teruma; or if she was a nazirite and he stipulated: On the condition that you drink wine (see Numbers 6:3); in all of these cases, if the condition is fulfilled it is a valid bill of divorce, and if not, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This works out well according to Rava, who holds that a condition that she should perform a forbidden act is binding; according to Abaye it is difficult.
讗诪专 诇讱 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 住讘专转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讛讬讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗
The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: Do you hold that this ruling is agreed upon by everyone? That is not the case. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, maintaining that even a condition that cannot be fulfilled is a valid condition.
讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇
The Gemara challenges: Regardless of the issue of a condition that cannot be fulfilled, derive that this condition is void from the fact that the husband is stipulating counter to that which is written in the Torah, and there is a principle that with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.
讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讻讙讜谉 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注讜谞转讛 讚讛讜讗 拽讗 注拽专 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讛讬 拽讗 注拽专讛
Rav Adda son of Rav Ika said in response: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as a man who betroths a woman on the condition that he will not be obligated to provide her with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as there he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition. But here, it is she who is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition and not him.
诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬谞讗 讻诇讜诐 拽讗 注拽专讛 讗讬讛讬 讗诇讗 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇转谞讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讬砖转讻讞 讚讗讬讛讜 拽讗 注拽专
Ravina strongly objects to this response: Isn鈥檛 she uprooting it only in order to fulfill his condition? It is therefore found that he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by attaching this condition to the divorce.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讻讙讜谉 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注讜谞转讛 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讗 注拽专 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗 住讙讬讗 讚诇讗 讗讻诇讛 诇讗 转讬讻讜诇 讜诇讗 转讬讙专砖
Rather, Ravina said: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, that his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as that of a man who stipulates that he will not be obligated to provide his wife with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as by attaching this condition he is definitely uprooting a matter of Torah law. But here, is he saying to her that it is not possible for her not to eat? She may not eat and not get divorced. The condition does not counter Torah law in and of itself, as the wife has the choice of whether or not to fulfill it.
讻讬爪讚 讬注砖讛 讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讻讜壮 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讛讬讗
搂 It is stated in the mishna: What should he do after giving her the bill of divorce and stipulating that she is not permitted to so-and-so? He should take it from her, and hand it to her again, and say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that? 岣zkiyya said that it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转谞谞讜 诇讛 讜讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛讬 讙讬讟讱
As it is taught in a baraita: If a husband gives his wife a bill of divorce without her knowledge, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that it does not take effect until he takes it from her, and hands it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is not necessary for him to hand it to her a second time; rather, it is sufficient for him to tell her that he is giving her a bill of divorce. The mishna is therefore in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the husband must hand it to her again.
专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讚讬诇讻讜谉 讗诪专 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜拽谞讗转讜 诇讬驻住诇 讘讜 诇讻讛讜谞讛
Rabbi Yo岣nan said: You can even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Your Sage, referring to Rav Kahana, who came from Babylonia to study in Eretz Yisrael, said that it is different here, since the wife has already acquired the bill of divorce with regard to her becoming disqualified from marrying into the priesthood due to it, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that he need not take it back and give it to her again. Since the bill of divorce was already partially effective, it is in the wife鈥檚 possession and cannot be used by the husband to divorce her in full unless she gives it back to him and he gives it to her again. Therefore, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees that he must give it to her a second time.
讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 转谞谉
搂 It is stated in the mishna that if the husband wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, it is invalid even if he subsequently erased it. Rav Safra said: We learned in the mishna that the bill is invalid only if he wrote the qualification inside the bill of divorce, not if he stated it orally.
驻砖讬讟讗 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 转谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗驻讬诇讜 注诇 驻讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉
The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as we learned in the mishna explicitly that he wrote it inside. The Gemara answers: Rav Safra stated this lest you say that this matter applies only when the qualification was written after the essential part of the bill of divorce, which contains the names of the husband and wife and the date, but before the essential part was written; even if the qualification was stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid, as it was written with the intention that the wife would not be permitted to marry any man. Rav Safra therefore teaches us that only a written qualification in the bill of divorce renders it invalid, and an oral statement does not render it invalid. Consequently, the husband can hand this bill of divorce to his wife without stating the qualification and it will be valid.
讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗驻讬诇讜 注诇 驻讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇
And Rava said: They taught that it is specifically writing the qualification that invalidates the bill of divorce only when the qualification is stated after the writing of the essential part. But if the qualification is stated before the essential part of the bill of divorce is written, even if it is stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid.
讜讗讝讚讗 专讘讗 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 诇讛谞讛讜 讚讻转讘讬 讙讬讟讬 砖转拽讜 砖转讜拽讬 诇讘注诇 注讚 讚讻转讘讬转讜 诇讬讛 诇转讜专祝 讚讙讬讟讗
And Rava followed his line of reasoning, as Rava said to those who write bills of divorce: Silence the husband until you write the essential part of the bill of divorce, lest he state a condition, thereby rendering the bill of divorce invalid.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻诇 讛转谞讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讘讙讟 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 讞讜抓 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘
The Sages taught: All conditions that are written in a bill of divorce invalidate it, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Any qualification that invalidates the divorce when stated orally by the husband while he hands the bill of divorce to his wife invalidates it when written, and any qualification that does not invalidate it when stated orally does not invalidate it when written. Therefore, issuing a qualification that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, which invalidates the divorce when stated orally, invalidates it as well when written, whereas attaching a standard condition, which does not invalidate it when stated orally, does not invalidate it when written.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讚专讘讬 住讘专 讙讝专讬谞谉 注诇 诪谞转 讗讟讜 讞讜抓 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讙讝专讬谞谉 注诇 诪谞转 讗讟讜 讞讜抓 讗讘诇 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝
Rabbi Zeira said: This dispute applies to a case where the condition was written in the bill of divorce before the essential part was written, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates the bill of divorce due to a case of an exception, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates it due to a case of an exception. But if it was written after the essential part,
-
This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
-
Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.
Subscribe to Hadran's Daf Yomi
Want to explore more about the Daf?
See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners
Gittin 84
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
诪住转讘专讗 讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚驻住拽讛 驻住拽讛
It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbis, that once he separates her, he has separated her entirely. By rendering her entirely permitted for one day he dissolves the bond between them and the divorce takes effect.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转谞砖讗讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗
搂 The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:7) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so, she may not marry that man, but if she marries him the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband.
诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讜 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讬讛谉 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转爪讗
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? She is forbidden from marrying whom? Rav Na岣an said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., she may not marry the man mentioned by her husband in the condition, lest people say that these people are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries another man she need not leave him.
讜诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诪讬谞讬讛 讜砖专讬谞谉 讗砖转 讗讬砖 诇注诇诪讗
The Gemara asks: Do we not remove her from him, thereby allowing a married woman to marry anyone, due to a rabbinic decree, lest people say that the husband is giving her as a gift? As long as the condition that she would marry a specific man is not fulfilled, she is a married woman by Torah law.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讜 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讚诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉
Rather, Rav Na岣an said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., the man who was specified in the condition, lest people say that they are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries him she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree.
讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇讜 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 转谞砖讗 讛讗 诇讗讞专 转谞砖讗 讜讛讗 讘注讬 拽讬讜诪讬 诇转谞讗讛
Rava said to Rav Na岣an: It may be inferred from your statement that it is specifically to him that she may not get married, but she may marry another man ab initio. But isn鈥檛 she required to fulfill the condition by marrying the specified man before marrying someone else?
讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗驻砖专 讚诪讬谞住讘讗 讛讬讜诐 讜诪讬讙专砖讛 诇诪讞专 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇转谞讗讛 讜诇讛讱 讚驻诇讬讙转 注诇讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 拽诪讚诪讬转 诇讬讛 讚讗转诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 诇诪讞专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇 讬讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 砖诪讗 讬讬砖谉 诇诪讞专
And if you would say that it is possible for her to get married today to someone else and get divorced from him tomorrow and then fulfill her condition by marrying the specified man, and you can compare it to that halakha over which you disagree with Rav Yehuda. As it was stated with regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam] for my eyes today if I will sleep tomorrow, Rav Yehuda says that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow, causing the vow to have been violated today, retroactively.
讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讬讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪讗 讬讬砖谉 诇诪讞专
And Rav Na岣an says: He may sleep today, as there is currently no prohibition, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sleep tomorrow, as he will be careful not to sleep. This dispute pertains to the general issue of a prohibition that will take effect retroactively if a condition is not fulfilled. Rav Yehuda holds that the prohibition must be observed until the condition is fulfilled, whereas Rav Na岣an maintains that it is not necessary to observe the prohibition, as he assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Here too, perhaps Rav Na岣an allows the woman to marry another man because she can fulfill the condition after she is divorced from him.
讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 讘讚讬讚讬讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诪讘专讬讝 谞驻砖讬讛 讘住讬诇讜讗转讗 讜诇讗 谞讗讬诐 讛讻讗 讘讚讬讚讛 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讬讙专讜砖讬
How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the vow, the fulfillment of the condition is in his capability, as, if he wants to prevent himself from falling asleep he can prick himself with thorns [silevata] and he will not fall asleep. Here, is it in the woman鈥檚 power to get divorced? Perhaps her husband will not agree to divorce her and the condition will not be fulfilled.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 诇讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专讜 谞砖讜转讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬谉 讘诪转谞讛 诇讗讞专 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讚讘注讬讗 拽讬讜诪讬讛 诇转谞讗讛
Rather, Rava said that the baraita should be interpreted in the following manner: This woman may marry neither the man who was specified in the condition nor another man. She may not marry him lest people say that these men are giving their wives to each other as a gift, and she may not marry another man because she is required to fulfill the condition.
讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 讚诪砖讜诐 讙讝专讛 诇讗 诪驻拽讬谞谉 诇讗讞专 转爪讗 讚讘注讬讗 诇拽讬讜诪讬讛 诇转谞讗讛
And if she marries the specified man she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him, as she is required to fulfill the condition before marrying another man.
转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讜 诇讗 转爪讗 诇讗讞专 转爪讗
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: This woman may marry neither him nor another man, but if she marries him she need not leave him. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转注诇讬 诇专拽讬注 注诇 诪谞转 砖转专讚讬 诇转讛讜诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘诇注讬 拽谞讛 砖诇 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘讬讗讬 诇讬 拽谞讛 讘谉 诪讗讛 讗诪讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转注讘专讬 讗转 讛讬诐 讛讙讚讜诇 讘专讙诇讬讱 讗讬谞讜 讙讟
搂 The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky, or on the condition that you descend to the depths of the sea, or on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed, or on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed, or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea, i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, by foot, or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟 讻诇诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讻诇 转谞讗讬 砖讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇讜 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讘住讜驻讜 讜讛转谞讛 注诇讬讜 诪转讞讬诇转讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪驻诇讬讙讛 讘讚讘专讬诐 讜讻砖专
Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, as the condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said the following principle: With regard to any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet even so the husband stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing. It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, and therefore the divorce is valid without her fulfilling the condition.
讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 转讬诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇 砖讗驻砖专 诇讜 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讘住讜驻讜 讜讛转谞讛 注诇讬讜 讘转讞讬诇转讜 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 讛讗 讗讬 讗驻砖专 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
Rav Na岣an says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k says: The language of the mishna is also precisely formulated in support of this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that can be fulfilled in the end and the husband stipulated it initially, his condition stands (Bava Metzia 94a). Consequently, if his condition cannot be fulfilled it is void. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.
讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 诪讛讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讬讗 讛讬讗 专讘讗 讗诪专 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讜诇拽讬讗
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat, what is the halakha? Abaye said: It is the same. This is also a condition that cannot be fulfilled, as it is forbidden by Torah law. Therefore, the condition is void. Rava said: It is possible for her to eat it and be flogged for it. Consequently, the condition can be fulfilled, although it is forbidden for her to do so.
诇讗讘讬讬 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 诇专讘讗 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专
The Gemara elaborates: According to Abaye, the principle stated by Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima serves to include a condition to eat pig meat. When a tanna states a general principle, it expands the halakha beyond the specific case mentioned previously. In this case, the stating of the principle serves to apply the halakha to a condition subject to a Torah prohibition, in addition to a physical impossibility. According to Rava, when Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, the limiting term of: Like this, serves to emphasize that only when there is a condition that cannot be physically fulfilled is the bill of divorce valid, and serves to exclude a condition to eat pig meat, which cannot be fulfilled due to a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if she does not fulfill this condition the divorce is invalid.
诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘注诇讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 谞转拽讬讬诐 讛转谞讗讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转讘注诇讬 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 讗讬谉 讞讜砖砖讬谉 砖诪讗 谞讘注诇讛 诇讛谉
The Gemara raises an objection to Rava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, and the condition is fulfilled, this is a valid bill of divorce. And if the condition is not fulfilled then it is not a valid bill of divorce. If he says to her: On the condition that you do not engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, she is permitted to remarry, as we are not concerned that perhaps she engaged in sexual intercourse with them.
讜讗讬诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讘注诇讬 诇讗讘讗 讜诇讗讘讬讱 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诇讗讘讬讬 谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讗 拽砖讬讗
But the baraita does not teach that the condition is binding when the husband says: On the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, which is forbidden by Torah law. According to Abaye it works out well, as in his opinion a condition that violates Torah law is void. According to Rava it is difficult.
讗诪专 诇讱 专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讜诇拽讬讗 驻诇讜谞讬 谞诪讬 讗驻砖专 讚诪砖讞讚讗 讘讬讛 讘诪诪讜谞讗 讗诇讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讘讚讬讚讛 拽讬讬诪讗 谞讛讬 讚讗讬讛讬 注讘讚讗 讗讬住讜专讗 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 诪讬 注讘讚讬 讗讬住讜专讗
The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: Granted, with regard to pig meat it is possible for her to eat it and be flogged. Similarly, if the condition is that she engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, it is also possible for her to bribe him with money to engage in sexual intercourse with her. But with regard to the case of my father or your father, is it in her power to engage in sexual intercourse with them? Though she can potentially perform a forbidden act in order to fulfill her desire to get married, would my father or your father perform a forbidden act? They certainly would not cooperate. Therefore, this is a condition that cannot be fulfilled, and it is considered hyperbole.
诇专讘讗 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗讘讗 讜讗讘讬讱 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专
Based on this analysis, according to Rava, Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his principle in order to include the condition of my father and your father, as this condition is also considered impossible to fulfill. And the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude the condition of eating pig meat, in which case the divorce is not valid unless she fulfills the condition.
诇讗讘讬讬 讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讻讝讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 驻诇讜谞讬
And according to Abaye this principle was stated to include the case of a condition that she should eat pig meat, and the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude a condition that she should engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, in which case the divorce takes effect only once the condition is fulfilled, as it is possible to fulfill this condition in a permitted manner.
诪讬转讬讘讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘砖专 讞讝讬专 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 讝专讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讗讻诇讬 讘转专讜诪讛 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 谞讝讬专讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转砖转讬 讬讬谉 谞转拽讬讬诐 讛转谞讗讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 诇专讘讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讗讘讬讬 拽砖讬讗
The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita (Tosefta 6:10): If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat; or similarly, if she was a non-priestess, i.e., the daughter of an Israelite, and he stipulated: On the condition that you partake of teruma; or if she was a nazirite and he stipulated: On the condition that you drink wine (see Numbers 6:3); in all of these cases, if the condition is fulfilled it is a valid bill of divorce, and if not, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This works out well according to Rava, who holds that a condition that she should perform a forbidden act is binding; according to Abaye it is difficult.
讗诪专 诇讱 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 住讘专转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讛讬讗 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗
The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: Do you hold that this ruling is agreed upon by everyone? That is not the case. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, maintaining that even a condition that cannot be fulfilled is a valid condition.
讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 讛讜讗 讜讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇
The Gemara challenges: Regardless of the issue of a condition that cannot be fulfilled, derive that this condition is void from the fact that the husband is stipulating counter to that which is written in the Torah, and there is a principle that with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.
讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讻讙讜谉 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注讜谞转讛 讚讛讜讗 拽讗 注拽专 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讗讬讛讬 拽讗 注拽专讛
Rav Adda son of Rav Ika said in response: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as a man who betroths a woman on the condition that he will not be obligated to provide her with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as there he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition. But here, it is she who is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition and not him.
诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬谞讗 讻诇讜诐 拽讗 注拽专讛 讗讬讛讬 讗诇讗 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇转谞讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讗讬砖转讻讞 讚讗讬讛讜 拽讗 注拽专
Ravina strongly objects to this response: Isn鈥檛 she uprooting it only in order to fulfill his condition? It is therefore found that he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by attaching this condition to the divorce.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讻讙讜谉 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注讜谞转讛 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讗 注拽专 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗 住讙讬讗 讚诇讗 讗讻诇讛 诇讗 转讬讻讜诇 讜诇讗 转讬讙专砖
Rather, Ravina said: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, that his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as that of a man who stipulates that he will not be obligated to provide his wife with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as by attaching this condition he is definitely uprooting a matter of Torah law. But here, is he saying to her that it is not possible for her not to eat? She may not eat and not get divorced. The condition does not counter Torah law in and of itself, as the wife has the choice of whether or not to fulfill it.
讻讬爪讚 讬注砖讛 讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讻讜壮 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讛讬讗
搂 It is stated in the mishna: What should he do after giving her the bill of divorce and stipulating that she is not permitted to so-and-so? He should take it from her, and hand it to her again, and say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that? 岣zkiyya said that it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转谞谞讜 诇讛 讜讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛讬 讙讬讟讱
As it is taught in a baraita: If a husband gives his wife a bill of divorce without her knowledge, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that it does not take effect until he takes it from her, and hands it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is not necessary for him to hand it to her a second time; rather, it is sufficient for him to tell her that he is giving her a bill of divorce. The mishna is therefore in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the husband must hand it to her again.
专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讚讬诇讻讜谉 讗诪专 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜拽谞讗转讜 诇讬驻住诇 讘讜 诇讻讛讜谞讛
Rabbi Yo岣nan said: You can even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Your Sage, referring to Rav Kahana, who came from Babylonia to study in Eretz Yisrael, said that it is different here, since the wife has already acquired the bill of divorce with regard to her becoming disqualified from marrying into the priesthood due to it, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that he need not take it back and give it to her again. Since the bill of divorce was already partially effective, it is in the wife鈥檚 possession and cannot be used by the husband to divorce her in full unless she gives it back to him and he gives it to her again. Therefore, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees that he must give it to her a second time.
讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 讗诪专 专讘 住驻专讗 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 转谞谉
搂 It is stated in the mishna that if the husband wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, it is invalid even if he subsequently erased it. Rav Safra said: We learned in the mishna that the bill is invalid only if he wrote the qualification inside the bill of divorce, not if he stated it orally.
驻砖讬讟讗 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 转谞谉 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗驻讬诇讜 注诇 驻讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉
The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as we learned in the mishna explicitly that he wrote it inside. The Gemara answers: Rav Safra stated this lest you say that this matter applies only when the qualification was written after the essential part of the bill of divorce, which contains the names of the husband and wife and the date, but before the essential part was written; even if the qualification was stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid, as it was written with the intention that the wife would not be permitted to marry any man. Rav Safra therefore teaches us that only a written qualification in the bill of divorce renders it invalid, and an oral statement does not render it invalid. Consequently, the husband can hand this bill of divorce to his wife without stating the qualification and it will be valid.
讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讗驻讬诇讜 注诇 驻讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇
And Rava said: They taught that it is specifically writing the qualification that invalidates the bill of divorce only when the qualification is stated after the writing of the essential part. But if the qualification is stated before the essential part of the bill of divorce is written, even if it is stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid.
讜讗讝讚讗 专讘讗 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 诇讛谞讛讜 讚讻转讘讬 讙讬讟讬 砖转拽讜 砖转讜拽讬 诇讘注诇 注讚 讚讻转讘讬转讜 诇讬讛 诇转讜专祝 讚讙讬讟讗
And Rava followed his line of reasoning, as Rava said to those who write bills of divorce: Silence the husband until you write the essential part of the bill of divorce, lest he state a condition, thereby rendering the bill of divorce invalid.
转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻诇 讛转谞讗讬谉 驻讜住诇讬谉 讘讙讟 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 讜讻诇 砖讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 讞讜抓 砖驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 注诇 驻讛 讗讬谞讜 驻讜住诇 讘讻转讘
The Sages taught: All conditions that are written in a bill of divorce invalidate it, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Any qualification that invalidates the divorce when stated orally by the husband while he hands the bill of divorce to his wife invalidates it when written, and any qualification that does not invalidate it when stated orally does not invalidate it when written. Therefore, issuing a qualification that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, which invalidates the divorce when stated orally, invalidates it as well when written, whereas attaching a standard condition, which does not invalidate it when stated orally, does not invalidate it when written.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇驻谞讬 讛转讜专祝 讚专讘讬 住讘专 讙讝专讬谞谉 注诇 诪谞转 讗讟讜 讞讜抓 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讙讝专讬谞谉 注诇 诪谞转 讗讟讜 讞讜抓 讗讘诇 诇讗讞专 讛转讜专祝
Rabbi Zeira said: This dispute applies to a case where the condition was written in the bill of divorce before the essential part was written, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates the bill of divorce due to a case of an exception, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates it due to a case of an exception. But if it was written after the essential part,
