Gittin 83

מאי דאסר שרא לראובן מהו לראובן והוא הדין לשמעון והאי דקאמר לראובן משום דפתח ביה או דלמא לראובן דוקא

that what he initially forbade he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone she wishes, what is the halakha if he said the second time that she is permitted to marry Reuven? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Reuven and the same is true with regard to Shimon, i.e., she is permitted to marry him as well? Is the fact that he mentioned only that she is permitted to marry Reuven because he opened his prior qualification by mentioning him before he mentioned Shimon, but he intended to permit her to marry Shimon as well? Or did he, perhaps, specifically intend to permit her to marry Reuven?

ואם תמצא לומר לראובן דוקא לשמעון מהו לשמעון והוא הדין לראובן והאי דקאמר שמעון משום דסליק מיניה או דלמא לשמעון דוקא

And if you say that he intended to permit her to marry specifically Reuven and not Shimon, what is the halakha if he said that she is permitted to marry Shimon? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Shimon and the same is true with regard to Reuven, and the fact that he mentioned only Shimon is because he ended his initial previous statement by mentioning him? Or perhaps he was specifically referring only to Shimon?

בעי רב אשי אף לשמעון מהו אף אראובן קאי או דלמא אף אעלמא קאי תיקו

Rav Ashi raises another dilemma with regard to the same case: If he said to her the second time: You are also permitted to marry Shimon, what is the halakha? Is the word also referring to Reuven, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to Reuven, or perhaps it is also referring to everyone, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to all men, but not Reuven? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

תנו רבנן לאחר פטירתו של רבי אליעזר נכנסו ארבעה זקנים להשיב על דבריו אלו הן רבי יוסי הגלילי ורבי טרפון ורבי אלעזר בן עזריה ורבי עקיבא

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 9:1): After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four Sages entered the discussion to refute his statement. They were: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.

נענה רבי טרפון ואמר הרי שהלכה זו ונישאת לאחיו של זה שנאסרה עליו ומת בלא בנים לא נמצא זה עוקר דבר מן התורה הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

Rabbi Tarfon responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and this husband died without children, she cannot perform levirate marriage with her husband’s brother, because he is forbidden to her due to the stipulation of her first husband. Is the first husband not found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law through his stipulation? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance. The divorce is not valid, as the Torah would not sanction a manner of divorce that can cause a mitzva to be nullified.

נענה רבי יוסי הגלילי ואמר היכן מצינו אסור לזה ומותר לזה האסור אסור לכל והמותר מותר לכל הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

Rabbi Yosei also responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone, and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that a divorcée can be prohibited from marrying a certain man and permitted to marry all other men. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.

נענה רבי אלעזר בן עזריה ואמר כריתות דבר הכורת בינו לבינה הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: “Scroll of severance,” which is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. This woman, by contrast, is still bound to her husband after their divorce, as his stipulation prevents her from marrying a certain man. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.

נענה רבי עקיבא ואמר הרי שהלכה זו ונשאת לאחד מן השוק והיו לה בנים ונתארמלה או נתגרשה ועמדה ונישאת לזה שנאסרה עליו לא נמצא גט בטל ובניה ממזרים הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from the second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden by her first husband’s condition, isn’t the bill of divorce thereby found to be nullified? And would this not render her children from her second marriage as born from an adulterous relationship [mamzerim], as she is retroactively considered her first husband’s wife? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as the Torah would not enable a divorce that could lead to such a situation.

דבר אחר הרי שהיה זה שנאסרה עליו כהן ומת המגרש לא נמצאת אלמנה אצלו וגרושה אצל כל אדם

Rabbi Akiva continued to offer an alternative refutation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not thereby found to be a widow with regard to him, as she was considered a married woman with regard to this priest even after her divorce, and a divorcée with regard to any other man? Nevertheless, she is forbidden to him too, just as she is forbidden to any other priest.

וקל וחומר מה גרושה שהיא קלה אסורה בשביל צד גירושין שבה אשת איש שהיא חמורה לא כל שכן הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition for a divorcée to marry a priest (see Leviticus 21:14) is a relatively minor prohibition, yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, even though with regard to him she is not a divorcée but a widow, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman, which is a major prohibition, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as this divorce does not permit her to marry any man.

אמר להן רבי יהושע אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה

Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: Even though your objections are valid, one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. After a Sage has passed away one cannot reject his opinion based on a difficulty with it, as he possibly would have provided an answer had it been presented to him while he was still alive.

אמר רבא כולהו אית להו פירכא לבר מדרבי אלעזר בן עזריה דלית ליה פירכא תניא נמי הכי אמר רבי יוסי רואה אני את דברי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה מדברי כולן

Rava said: All of the previously mentioned responses have refutations that can be raised against them except for the response of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which does not have a refutation. The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita, as Rabbi Yosei said: I see the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as preferable to the statements of all the other Sages.

אמר מר נענה רבי טרפון ואמר הרי שהלכה זו ונשאת לאחיו של זה שנאסרה עליו ומת בלא בנים לא נמצא זה עוקר דבר מן התורה עוקר איהו עקר אלא מתנה לעקור דבר מן התורה

The Gemara commences discussion of the baraita: The Master said that Rabbi Tarfon responded, saying: If she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and he died without children, is the first husband not thereby found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the question: Is the first husband not uprooting a matter of Torah law? Is it he who is uprooting the mitzva? Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is stipulating to uproot a matter of Torah law.

מתנה מי קאמר לה לא סגי לה דלא מינסבא ליה לאחוה דההוא גברא אלא גורם לעקור דבר מן התורה

The Gemara questions this assertion as well: Is the husband stipulating to uproot a mitzva? Did he say to her that it is not sufficient if she does not marry the brother of that man, who he rendered forbidden to her? Since he did not stipulate this, he did not uproot the mitzva; it is the woman who uprooted the mitzva by marrying specifically that man’s brother. Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted.

גורם אלא מעתה בת אחיו לא ישא שמא ימות בלא בנים ונמצא גורם לעקור דבר מן התורה היינו פירכא

The Gemara asks: He is causing of matter of Torah law to be uprooted? But if that is so, one should not marry his brother’s daughter lest he die without children, and he will thereby be found to be causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted in that his brother will not be able to perform levirate marriage with his own daughter, and the Sages laud one who marries his brother’s daughter. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Tarfon’s response that Rava was referring to.

ובמאי אילימא בחוץ משרא שרא רבי אליעזר

The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Tarfon refute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the refutation is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry this man after she married another man.

דתניא מודה רבי אליעזר במגרש את אשתו ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני והלכה וניסת לאחד מן השוק ונתארמלה או נתגרשה שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו

As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying by the qualification of her first husband.

אלא בעל מנת

Rather, Rabbi Tarfon’s refutation was clearly stated with regard to a case where the woman was divorced on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so. A condition still applies after the woman remarries and its violation nullifies the divorce retroactively.

נענה רבי יוסי הגלילי ואמר היכן מצינו אסור לזה ומותר לזה האסור אסור לכל והמותר מותר לכל ולא והרי תרומה וקדשים שאסורה לזה ומותרת לזה באיסור אשה קא אמרינן

The baraita states that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili responded, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. The Gemara asks: Is there not such an example? Aren’t teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, and sacrificial meat forbidden to this group, i.e., non-priests (see Leviticus 22:10), and permitted to that group, i.e., priests? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a forbidden woman.

והרי עריות באישות קאמרינן

The Gemara asks: Aren’t those women with whom relations are prohibited due to familial ties forbidden to some men, i.e., their relatives, and permitted to others? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a woman who is forbidden due to marriage.

הרי אשת איש היינו פירכא

The Gemara asks: Isn’t a married woman forbidden to all men but permitted to her husband? The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s response that Rava was referring to.

ובמאי אילימא בעל מנת הרי הותרה אצלו בזנות אלא בחוץ

The Gemara clarifies: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the divorce was granted on the condition that she not marry a certain man, she is not entirely forbidden to him, as she is permitted to engage in licentiousness with him; the condition was with regard to marriage, not licentiousness. Rather, he clearly raised the objection with regard to a case where the husband told his wife that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, rendering her entirely forbidden to that man.

נענה רבי עקיבא ואמר הרי שהלכה זו ונישאת לאחד מן השוק והיו לה בנים ונתארמלה או נתגרשה ועמדה ונשאת לזה שנאסרה עליו לא נמצא גט בטל ובניה ממזרין

The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from this second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden, isn’t the bill of divorce thereby nullified? And would this not render her children mamzerim?

אי הכי בכולה תנאי דעלמא נמי לא תנסיב דלמא לא מקיימא ליה לתנאיה ונמצא גט בטל ובניה ממזרין היינו פירכא

The Gemara asks: If that is so, and there is a concern that she will eventually violate the condition, in a case of any typical condition that the husband attaches to the divorce she should not remarry either, lest she not fulfill his condition and the bill of divorce be found to be nullified and her children be rendered mamzerim. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Akiva’s response that Rava was referring to.

ובמאי אילימא בחוץ משרא שרא רבי אליעזר

The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the objection is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry so-and-so after she marries another man.

דתניא מודה היה רבי אליעזר במגרש את אשתו ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני והלכה ונשאת לאחד מן השוק ונתארמלה או נתגרשה שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו אלא בעל מנת

As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public, and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying. Rather, Rabbi Akiva’s objection was clearly with regard to a case of a condition that she would not marry so-and-so.

דבר אחר הרי שהיה זה שנאסרה עליו כהן ומת המגרש לא נמצאת אלמנה אצלו וגרושה אצל כל אדם וקל וחומר ומה גרושה שהיא קלה אסורה משום צד גירושין שבה אשת איש חמורה לא כל שכן

The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva added an alternative response: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not found to be a widow with regard to him and a divorcée with regard to any other man? And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition against a divorcée marrying a priest is minor, and yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against relations with a married woman, which is major, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? Therefore, the divorce does not take effect.

ובמאי אילימא בעל מנת

The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case was this objection raised? If we say that it was with regard to a case of a condition,

הרי גרושה אצלו בזנות אלא בחוץ

isn’t the woman a divorcée with regard to engaging in licentious behavior with him? The husband stipulated that she not marry that man, but he did not prohibit her from engaging in licentious behavior with him. Therefore, she is considered a divorcée with regard to him as well. This removes the a fortiori inference, as with regard to all other men she is not considered married at all. Rather, the objection was clearly raised with regard to a case of exception.

ורבי עקיבא אי חוץ סבירא ליה לותיב חוץ ואי על מנת סבירא ליה לותיב על מנת

The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Akiva holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of an exception, he should raise an objection with regard to an exception, and if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of a stipulation, he should raise an objection with regard to a case of a stipulation. Why does he raise one objection with regard to an exception and then another with regard to a stipulation?

רבי עקיבא שמיע ליה דאיכא דאמר חוץ ואיכא דאמר על מנת מאן דאמר חוץ האי פירכא ומאן דאמר על מנת האי פירכא

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva heard that there is someone who states Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling with regard to an exception, and there is someone else who states it with regard to a stipulation. He therefore raised objections with regard to both exceptions and stipulations; according to the one who says that it is with regard to an exception, this is the refutation, and according to the one who says that it is with regard to a stipulation, that is the refutation.

ומאי פירכא אי נימא איסור כהונה שאני הא רבי אליעזר נמי מאיסור כהונה קא מייתי ליה

The Gemara asks: What is the refutation that Rava found for Rabbi Akiva’s second objection? If we say that it is that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, and therefore the halakhot of adultery and divorce cannot be inferred from it, doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer also derive his opinion from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood? Rabbi Yoḥanan stated (82b) that Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is derived from the verse that states with regard to priests: “Neither may they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), indicating that even if a woman was divorced only from her husband and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcée.

רבא כרבי ינאי משום זקן אחד קא מתני

The Gemara answers: Rava taught his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who said in the name of one elder that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is derived not from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, but from the verse: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which indicates that even if he divorced her in a manner that permitted her to marry only one other man, the divorce takes effect. Therefore, Rava refutes Rabbi Akiva’s latter objection by claiming that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different from other prohibitions and cannot be compared to them.

אמר להן רבי יהושע אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה למימרא דרבי יהושע כוותיה סבירא ליה והא איהו נמי מיפרך קפריך

It is stated in the baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: One does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn’t he also raise a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion?

הכי קאמר להו לדידי נמי אית לי פירכא מיהו בין לדידי בין לדידכו אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה

The Gemara answers that this is what he was saying to them: I also have a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, but both my objection and yours should not be raised, as one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death.

ומאי פירכא דרבי יהושע דתניא אמר רבי יהושע מקיש קודמי הויה שניה לקודמי הויה ראשונה מה קודמי הויה ראשונה דלא אגידא באיניש אחרינא אף קודמי הויה שניה דלא אגידא באיניש אחרינא

The Gemara asks: And what is Rabbi Yehoshua’s refutation? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua said that the passage: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:1–2), juxtaposes the woman’s status before the second marriage to her status before the first marriage. It should be derived from here that just as before the first marriage she is not bound to another man, so too, before the second marriage she is not bound to another man. Therefore, a woman cannot remarry if she is still bound to her ex-husband due to a qualification that prohibits her from marrying a certain man.

גופא מודה רבי אליעזר במגרש אשתו ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני והלכה ונישאת לאחד מן השוק ונתארמלה או נתגרשה שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying.

השיב רבי שמעון בר אלעזר תשובה לדברי רבי אליעזר היכן מצינו שזה אוסר וזה מתיר

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: Where do we find a situation where this person prohibits something and that other person permits it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?

ולא והרי יבמה דבעל אוסר ויבם מתיר

The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there not such a situation? But isn’t there the case of a yevama, a woman whose husband dies childless, and he deems her forbidden to other men while she waits for his brother, her yavam, to perform levirate marriage with her, and the yavam, after performing levirate marriage with her, deems her permitted in the event of divorce or his death?

התם יבם הוא קא אסר לה דאי מבעל הא שריא וקיימא

The Gemara answers: There, it is the yavam who renders her forbidden, since if not for the yavam, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, she would have already been released from her bond to her husband and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the yavam that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.

הרי נדרים דנודר אוסר וחכם מתיר הא אמר רבי יוחנן אין חכם מתיר כלום אלא בחרטה

The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the matter of vows, where the one who takes the vow prohibits something and a halakhic authority renders it permitted by dissolving the vow? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that a halakhic authority dissolves a vow only through regret of the person who took the vow. Since it is necessary for this person to express regret for taking the vow, it is not actually the halakhic authority who causes the dissolution of the vow.

הרי הפרת הבעל דאשה נודרת ובעל מיפר התם כדרב פנחס משמיה דרבא דאמר רב פנחס משמיה דרבא כל הנודרת על דעת בעלה היא נודרת

The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the nullification of a wife’s vows by the husband, where the wife vows, creating a prohibition, and her husband nullifies the vow? The Gemara answers: There it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pineḥas reasoned in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas says in the name of Rava that with regard to any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Therefore, the husband can nullify it.

נענה רבי אלעזר בן עזריה ואמר כריתות דבר הכורת בינו לבינה הא למדת שאין זה כריתות

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the previous baraita. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: “Scroll of severance [keritut],” that is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. You have therefore derived that this divorce, after which the wife is still bound to her husband due to his qualification, is not an act of severance.

ורבנן האי כריתות מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי להו לכדתניא הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תשתי יין על מנת שלא תלכי לבית אביך לעולם אין זה כריתות שלשים יום הרי זה כריתות

The Gemara asks: And what do the other Rabbis, who did not refute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in this manner, do with this term “severance”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They need it for that which is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.

ואידך מכרת כריתות נפקא ואידך כרת כריתות לא דרשי

The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, derive this principle? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.

אמר רבא הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תשתי יין כל ימי חיי אין זה כריתות כל ימי חיי פלוני הרי זה כריתות

§ Rava says that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of my life, that is not an act of severance, as she remains bound to his condition for the rest of his life. If he stipulates that she may not drink wine for all the days of the life of so-and-so, that is an act of severance.

מאי שנא חיי פלוני דדלמא מאית ומקיימא ליה לתנאיה חיי דידיה נמי דלמא מאית ומקיימא ליה לתנאיה

The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where he mentioned the life of so-and-so? Is it because perhaps that person will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition, allowing her to remarry? With regard to his own life it is also true that perhaps he will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition. Why is the divorce invalid in that case?

אלא אימא כל ימי חייכי אין זה כריתות כל ימי חיי או חיי פלוני הרי זה כריתות

Rather, say that if the husband tells her: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of your life, that is not an act of severance, as the wife will never be released from this restriction. If he says: For all the days of my life, or: For all the days of so-and-so’s life, that is an act of severance, as the condition can potentially be fulfilled during her lifetime.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן היום אי את אשתי ולמחר את אשתי מהו תיבעי לרבי אליעזר תיבעי לרבנן

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If a man hands his wife a bill of divorce and says to her: Today you are not my wife, and tomorrow you are my wife, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

תיבעי לרבי אליעזר עד כאן לא קאמר רבי אליעזר התם אלא דלמאן דקא שרי קא שרי לעולם אבל הכא לא או דלמא לא שנא

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying that only there, in the case of the mishna, the divorce is valid because concerning the one whom the husband permits the wife to marry, he permits her to marry him forever, but here, the divorce is not valid as it is limited in time? Or perhaps it is no different from the case in the mishna, and in both cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that the divorce takes effect?

תיבעי לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דלא פסקה מיניה לגמרי אבל הכא כיון דפסקה פסקה

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Perhaps the Rabbis are saying only there that the divorce is invalid because the husband did not separate her from himself entirely, as she is prohibited from marrying a certain man due to his qualification. But here, the divorce takes effect, as once he separates her, even for a limited period of time, he has consequently separated her entirely.

בתר דבעיא הדר פשטה

After Rava raised the dilemma he then resolved it on his own: