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Today's Daf Yomi

August 7, 2023 | 讻壮 讘讗讘 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

Gittin 83

This week’s learning is sponsored by Chani Penstein in loving memory of her father, Mayer Penstein, whose 3rd yahrzeit was on Tu-be’Av. “He loved Torah learning and was a dedicated daf yomi student, he was also very proud of Michelle Cohen Farber.”聽

Today’s daf is sponsored in honor Gila Chana Lawrence who is drafting today into the army! “We are so proud of the Avodat Kodesh that you are doing and hope you manage to always find time to learn Torah! Love, your parents”

诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 诪讛讜 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇砖诪注讜谉 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇专讗讜讘谉 诪砖讜诐 讚驻转讞 讘讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 讚讜拽讗


that what he initially forbade he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone she wishes, what is the halakha if he said the second time that she is permitted to marry Reuven? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Reuven and the same is true with regard to Shimon, i.e., she is permitted to marry him as well? Is the fact that he mentioned only that she is permitted to marry Reuven because he opened his prior qualification by mentioning him before he mentioned Shimon, but he intended to permit her to marry Shimon as well? Or did he, perhaps, specifically intend to permit her to marry Reuven?


讜讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 诇专讗讜讘谉 讚讜拽讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜 诇砖诪注讜谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 砖诪注讜谉 诪砖讜诐 讚住诇讬拽 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 讚讜拽讗


And if you say that he intended to permit her to marry specifically Reuven and not Shimon, what is the halakha if he said that she is permitted to marry Shimon? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Shimon and the same is true with regard to Reuven, and the fact that he mentioned only Shimon is because he ended his initial previous statement by mentioning him? Or perhaps he was specifically referring only to Shimon?


讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讗祝 诇砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜 讗祝 讗专讗讜讘谉 拽讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗祝 讗注诇诪讗 拽讗讬 转讬拽讜


Rav Ashi raises another dilemma with regard to the same case: If he said to her the second time: You are also permitted to marry Shimon, what is the halakha? Is the word also referring to Reuven, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to Reuven, or perhaps it is also referring to everyone, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to all men, but not Reuven? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗讞专 驻讟讬专转讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞讻谞住讜 讗专讘注讛 讝拽谞讬诐 诇讛砖讬讘 注诇 讚讘专讬讜 讗诇讜 讛谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗


The Sages taught (Tosefta 9:1): After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four Sages entered the discussion to refute his statement. They were: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讜诪转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 注讜拽专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Tarfon responded to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and this husband died without children, she cannot perform levirate marriage with her husband鈥檚 brother, because he is forbidden to her due to the stipulation of her first husband. Is the first husband not found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law through his stipulation? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance. The divorce is not valid, as the Torah would not sanction a manner of divorce that can cause a mitzva to be nullified.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜讗诪专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讗住讜专 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专 诇讝讛 讛讗住讜专 讗住讜专 诇讻诇 讜讛诪讜转专 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Yosei also responded to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone, and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion that a divorc茅e can be prohibited from marrying a certain man and permitted to marry all other men. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗诪专 讻专讬转讜转 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: 鈥淪croll of severance,鈥 which is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. This woman, by contrast, is still bound to her husband after their divorce, as his stipulation prevents her from marrying a certain man. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜讛讬讜 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬诐 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from the second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden by her first husband鈥檚 condition, isn鈥檛 the bill of divorce thereby found to be nullified? And would this not render her children from her second marriage as born from an adulterous relationship [mamzerim], as she is retroactively considered her first husband鈥檚 wife? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as the Torah would not enable a divorce that could lead to such a situation.


讚讘专 讗讞专 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 讜诪转 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇讜 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐


Rabbi Akiva continued to offer an alternative refutation of Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not thereby found to be a widow with regard to him, as she was considered a married woman with regard to this priest even after her divorce, and a divorc茅e with regard to any other man? Nevertheless, she is forbidden to him too, just as she is forbidden to any other priest.


讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讛 讙专讜砖讛 砖讛讬讗 拽诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘砖讘讬诇 爪讚 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讘讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 砖讛讬讗 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition for a divorc茅e to marry a priest (see Leviticus 21:14) is a relatively minor prohibition, yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, even though with regard to him she is not a divorc茅e but a widow, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman, which is a major prohibition, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as this divorce does not permit her to marry any man.


讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: Even though your objections are valid, one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. After a Sage has passed away one cannot reject his opinion based on a difficulty with it, as he possibly would have provided an answer had it been presented to him while he was still alive.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讜诇讛讜 讗讬转 诇讛讜 驻讬专讻讗 诇讘专 诪讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 驻讬专讻讗 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讜讗讛 讗谞讬 讗转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 诪讚讘专讬 讻讜诇谉


Rava said: All of the previously mentioned responses have refutations that can be raised against them except for the response of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which does not have a refutation. The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita, as Rabbi Yosei said: I see the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as preferable to the statements of all the other Sages.


讗诪专 诪专 谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讜诪转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 注讜拽专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 注讜拽专 讗讬讛讜 注拽专 讗诇讗 诪转谞讛 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛


The Gemara commences discussion of the baraita: The Master said that Rabbi Tarfon responded, saying: If she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and he died without children, is the first husband not thereby found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the question: Is the first husband not uprooting a matter of Torah law? Is it he who is uprooting the mitzva? Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is stipulating to uproot a matter of Torah law.


诪转谞讛 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗 住讙讬 诇讛 讚诇讗 诪讬谞住讘讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讞讜讛 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讗诇讗 讙讜专诐 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛


The Gemara questions this assertion as well: Is the husband stipulating to uproot a mitzva? Did he say to her that it is not sufficient if she does not marry the brother of that man, who he rendered forbidden to her? Since he did not stipulate this, he did not uproot the mitzva; it is the woman who uprooted the mitzva by marrying specifically that man鈥檚 brother. Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted.


讙讜专诐 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讘转 讗讞讬讜 诇讗 讬砖讗 砖诪讗 讬诪讜转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗 讙讜专诐 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: He is causing of matter of Torah law to be uprooted? But if that is so, one should not marry his brother鈥檚 daughter lest he die without children, and he will thereby be found to be causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted in that his brother will not be able to perform levirate marriage with his own daughter, and the Sages laud one who marries his brother鈥檚 daughter. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞讜抓 诪砖专讗 砖专讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Tarfon refute Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the refutation is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry this man after she married another man.


讚转谞讬讗 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜


As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying by the qualification of her first husband.


讗诇讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


Rather, Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 refutation was clearly stated with regard to a case where the woman was divorced on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so. A condition still applies after the woman remarries and its violation nullifies the divorce retroactively.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜讗诪专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讗住讜专 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专 诇讝讛 讛讗住讜专 讗住讜专 诇讻诇 讜讛诪讜转专 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 转专讜诪讛 讜拽讚砖讬诐 砖讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖讛 拽讗 讗诪专讬谞谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili responded, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. The Gemara asks: Is there not such an example? Aren鈥檛 teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, and sacrificial meat forbidden to this group, i.e., non-priests (see Leviticus 22:10), and permitted to that group, i.e., priests? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a forbidden woman.


讜讛专讬 注专讬讜转 讘讗讬砖讜转 拽讗诪专讬谞谉


The Gemara asks: Aren鈥檛 those women with whom relations are prohibited due to familial ties forbidden to some men, i.e., their relatives, and permitted to others? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a woman who is forbidden due to marriage.


讛专讬 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 a married woman forbidden to all men but permitted to her husband? The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘注诇 诪谞转 讛专讬 讛讜转专讛 讗爪诇讜 讘讝谞讜转 讗诇讗 讘讞讜抓


The Gemara clarifies: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the divorce was granted on the condition that she not marry a certain man, she is not entirely forbidden to him, as she is permitted to engage in licentiousness with him; the condition was with regard to marriage, not licentiousness. Rather, he clearly raised the objection with regard to a case where the husband told his wife that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, rendering her entirely forbidden to that man.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜讛讬讜 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞砖讗转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from this second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden, isn鈥檛 the bill of divorce thereby nullified? And would this not render her children mamzerim?


讗讬 讛讻讬 讘讻讜诇讛 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 转谞住讬讘 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬谉 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: If that is so, and there is a concern that she will eventually violate the condition, in a case of any typical condition that the husband attaches to the divorce she should not remarry either, lest she not fulfill his condition and the bill of divorce be found to be nullified and her children be rendered mamzerim. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞讜抓 诪砖专讗 砖专讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the objection is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry so-and-so after she marries another man.


讚转谞讬讗 诪讜讚讛 讛讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public, and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying. Rather, Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 objection was clearly with regard to a case of a condition that she would not marry so-and-so.


讚讘专 讗讞专 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 讜诪转 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇讜 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讙专讜砖讛 砖讛讬讗 拽诇讛 讗住讜专讛 诪砖讜诐 爪讚 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讘讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva added an alternative response: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not found to be a widow with regard to him and a divorc茅e with regard to any other man? And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition against a divorc茅e marrying a priest is minor, and yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against relations with a married woman, which is major, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? Therefore, the divorce does not take effect.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case was this objection raised? If we say that it was with regard to a case of a condition,


讛专讬 讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇讜 讘讝谞讜转 讗诇讗 讘讞讜抓


isn鈥檛 the woman a divorc茅e with regard to engaging in licentious behavior with him? The husband stipulated that she not marry that man, but he did not prohibit her from engaging in licentious behavior with him. Therefore, she is considered a divorc茅e with regard to him as well. This removes the a fortiori inference, as with regard to all other men she is not considered married at all. Rather, the objection was clearly raised with regard to a case of exception.


讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬 讞讜抓 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 诇讜转讬讘 讞讜抓 讜讗讬 注诇 诪谞转 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 诇讜转讬讘 注诇 诪谞转


The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Akiva holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of an exception, he should raise an objection with regard to an exception, and if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of a stipulation, he should raise an objection with regard to a case of a stipulation. Why does he raise one objection with regard to an exception and then another with regard to a stipulation?


专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 讛讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讛讗讬 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva heard that there is someone who states Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 ruling with regard to an exception, and there is someone else who states it with regard to a stipulation. He therefore raised objections with regard to both exceptions and stipulations; according to the one who says that it is with regard to an exception, this is the refutation, and according to the one who says that it is with regard to a stipulation, that is the refutation.


讜诪讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讛讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞诪讬 诪讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛


The Gemara asks: What is the refutation that Rava found for Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 second objection? If we say that it is that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, and therefore the halakhot of adultery and divorce cannot be inferred from it, doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer also derive his opinion from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood? Rabbi Yo岣nan stated (82b) that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 ruling is derived from the verse that states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either may they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7), indicating that even if a woman was divorced only from her husband and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorc茅e.


专讘讗 讻专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讝拽谉 讗讞讚 拽讗 诪转谞讬


The Gemara answers: Rava taught his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who said in the name of one elder that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion is derived not from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, but from the verse: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which indicates that even if he divorced her in a manner that permitted her to marry only one other man, the divorce takes effect. Therefore, Rava refutes Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 latter objection by claiming that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different from other prohibitions and cannot be compared to them.


讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讻讜讜转讬讛 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 诪讬驻专讱 拽驻专讬讱


It is stated in the baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: One does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn鈥檛 he also raise a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion?


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讚讬讚讬 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬 驻讬专讻讗 诪讬讛讜 讘讬谉 诇讚讬讚讬 讘讬谉 诇讚讬讚讻讜 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


The Gemara answers that this is what he was saying to them: I also have a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, but both my objection and yours should not be raised, as one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death.


讜诪讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诪拽讬砖 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 砖谞讬讛 诇拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诪讛 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 讚诇讗 讗讙讬讚讗 讘讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗祝 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 砖谞讬讛 讚诇讗 讗讙讬讚讗 讘讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗


The Gemara asks: And what is Rabbi Yehoshua鈥檚 refutation? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua said that the passage: 鈥淲hen a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1鈥2), juxtaposes the woman鈥檚 status before the second marriage to her status before the first marriage. It should be derived from here that just as before the first marriage she is not bound to another man, so too, before the second marriage she is not bound to another man. Therefore, a woman cannot remarry if she is still bound to her ex-husband due to a qualification that prohibits her from marrying a certain man.


讙讜驻讗 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜


搂 The Gemara discusses the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying.


讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘专 讗诇注讝专 转砖讜讘讛 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 砖讝讛 讗讜住专 讜讝讛 诪转讬专


The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 statement: Where do we find a situation where this person prohibits something and that other person permits it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?


讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 讬讘诪讛 讚讘注诇 讗讜住专 讜讬讘诐 诪转讬专


The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there not such a situation? But isn鈥檛 there the case of a yevama, a woman whose husband dies childless, and he deems her forbidden to other men while she waits for his brother, her yavam, to perform levirate marriage with her, and the yavam, after performing levirate marriage with her, deems her permitted in the event of divorce or his death?


讛转诐 讬讘诐 讛讜讗 拽讗 讗住专 诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讘注诇 讛讗 砖专讬讗 讜拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara answers: There, it is the yavam who renders her forbidden, since if not for the yavam, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, she would have already been released from her bond to her husband and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the yavam that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.


讛专讬 谞讚专讬诐 讚谞讜讚专 讗讜住专 讜讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谉 讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 讘讞专讟讛


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the matter of vows, where the one who takes the vow prohibits something and a halakhic authority renders it permitted by dissolving the vow? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that a halakhic authority dissolves a vow only through regret of the person who took the vow. Since it is necessary for this person to express regret for taking the vow, it is not actually the halakhic authority who causes the dissolution of the vow.


讛专讬 讛驻专转 讛讘注诇 讚讗砖讛 谞讜讚专转 讜讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讛转诐 讻讚专讘 驻谞讞住 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 驻谞讞住 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讻诇 讛谞讜讚专转 注诇 讚注转 讘注诇讛 讛讬讗 谞讜讚专转


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the nullification of a wife鈥檚 vows by the husband, where the wife vows, creating a prohibition, and her husband nullifies the vow? The Gemara answers: There it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pine岣s reasoned in the name of Rava, as Rav Pine岣s says in the name of Rava that with regard to any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband鈥檚 consent that she takes the vow. Therefore, the husband can nullify it.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗诪专 讻专讬转讜转 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


搂 The Gemara resumes discussion of the previous baraita. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: 鈥淪croll of severance [keritut],鈥 that is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. You have therefore derived that this divorce, after which the wife is still bound to her husband due to his qualification, is not an act of severance.


讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


The Gemara asks: And what do the other Rabbis, who did not refute Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion in this manner, do with this term 鈥渟everance鈥? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They need it for that which is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father鈥檚 house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.


讜讗讬讚讱 诪讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 谞驻拽讗 讜讗讬讚讱 讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 诇讗 讚专砖讬


The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, derive this principle? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rava says that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of my life, that is not an act of severance, as she remains bound to his condition for the rest of his life. If he stipulates that she may not drink wine for all the days of the life of so-and-so, that is an act of severance.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讚讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬转 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讞讬讬 讚讬讚讬讛 谞诪讬 讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬转 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where he mentioned the life of so-and-so? Is it because perhaps that person will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition, allowing her to remarry? With regard to his own life it is also true that perhaps he will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition. Why is the divorce invalid in that case?


讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬讻讬 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 讗讜 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rather, say that if the husband tells her: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of your life, that is not an act of severance, as the wife will never be released from this restriction. If he says: For all the days of my life, or: For all the days of so-and-so鈥檚 life, that is an act of severance, as the condition can potentially be fulfilled during her lifetime.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讬讜诐 讗讬 讗转 讗砖转讬 讜诇诪讞专 讗转 讗砖转讬 诪讛讜 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉


Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If a man hands his wife a bill of divorce and says to her: Today you are not my wife, and tomorrow you are my wife, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇诪讗谉 讚拽讗 砖专讬 拽讗 砖专讬 诇注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗


Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying that only there, in the case of the mishna, the divorce is valid because concerning the one whom the husband permits the wife to marry, he permits her to marry him forever, but here, the divorce is not valid as it is limited in time? Or perhaps it is no different from the case in the mishna, and in both cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that the divorce takes effect?


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 驻住拽讛 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚驻住拽讛 驻住拽讛


Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Perhaps the Rabbis are saying only there that the divorce is invalid because the husband did not separate her from himself entirely, as she is prohibited from marrying a certain man due to his qualification. But here, the divorce takes effect, as once he separates her, even for a limited period of time, he has consequently separated her entirely.


讘转专 讚讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟讛


After Rava raised the dilemma he then resolved it on his own:


  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

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Gittin 83

诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 诪讛讜 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇砖诪注讜谉 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇专讗讜讘谉 诪砖讜诐 讚驻转讞 讘讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 讚讜拽讗


that what he initially forbade he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone she wishes, what is the halakha if he said the second time that she is permitted to marry Reuven? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Reuven and the same is true with regard to Shimon, i.e., she is permitted to marry him as well? Is the fact that he mentioned only that she is permitted to marry Reuven because he opened his prior qualification by mentioning him before he mentioned Shimon, but he intended to permit her to marry Shimon as well? Or did he, perhaps, specifically intend to permit her to marry Reuven?


讜讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 诇专讗讜讘谉 讚讜拽讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜 诇砖诪注讜谉 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 砖诪注讜谉 诪砖讜诐 讚住诇讬拽 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 讚讜拽讗


And if you say that he intended to permit her to marry specifically Reuven and not Shimon, what is the halakha if he said that she is permitted to marry Shimon? Did he mean that she is permitted to marry Shimon and the same is true with regard to Reuven, and the fact that he mentioned only Shimon is because he ended his initial previous statement by mentioning him? Or perhaps he was specifically referring only to Shimon?


讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讗祝 诇砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜 讗祝 讗专讗讜讘谉 拽讗讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗祝 讗注诇诪讗 拽讗讬 转讬拽讜


Rav Ashi raises another dilemma with regard to the same case: If he said to her the second time: You are also permitted to marry Shimon, what is the halakha? Is the word also referring to Reuven, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to Reuven, or perhaps it is also referring to everyone, i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to all men, but not Reuven? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗讞专 驻讟讬专转讜 砖诇 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞讻谞住讜 讗专讘注讛 讝拽谞讬诐 诇讛砖讬讘 注诇 讚讘专讬讜 讗诇讜 讛谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗


The Sages taught (Tosefta 9:1): After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four Sages entered the discussion to refute his statement. They were: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讜诪转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 注讜拽专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Tarfon responded to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and this husband died without children, she cannot perform levirate marriage with her husband鈥檚 brother, because he is forbidden to her due to the stipulation of her first husband. Is the first husband not found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law through his stipulation? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance. The divorce is not valid, as the Torah would not sanction a manner of divorce that can cause a mitzva to be nullified.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜讗诪专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讗住讜专 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专 诇讝讛 讛讗住讜专 讗住讜专 诇讻诇 讜讛诪讜转专 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Yosei also responded to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone, and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion that a divorc茅e can be prohibited from marrying a certain man and permitted to marry all other men. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗诪专 讻专讬转讜转 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: 鈥淪croll of severance,鈥 which is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. This woman, by contrast, is still bound to her husband after their divorce, as his stipulation prevents her from marrying a certain man. You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜讛讬讜 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬诐 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from the second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden by her first husband鈥檚 condition, isn鈥檛 the bill of divorce thereby found to be nullified? And would this not render her children from her second marriage as born from an adulterous relationship [mamzerim], as she is retroactively considered her first husband鈥檚 wife? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as the Torah would not enable a divorce that could lead to such a situation.


讚讘专 讗讞专 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 讜诪转 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇讜 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐


Rabbi Akiva continued to offer an alternative refutation of Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not thereby found to be a widow with regard to him, as she was considered a married woman with regard to this priest even after her divorce, and a divorc茅e with regard to any other man? Nevertheless, she is forbidden to him too, just as she is forbidden to any other priest.


讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讛 讙专讜砖讛 砖讛讬讗 拽诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘砖讘讬诇 爪讚 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讘讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 砖讛讬讗 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition for a divorc茅e to marry a priest (see Leviticus 21:14) is a relatively minor prohibition, yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, even though with regard to him she is not a divorc茅e but a widow, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman, which is a major prohibition, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? You have therefore derived that this is not an act of severance, as this divorce does not permit her to marry any man.


讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: Even though your objections are valid, one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. After a Sage has passed away one cannot reject his opinion based on a difficulty with it, as he possibly would have provided an answer had it been presented to him while he was still alive.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讻讜诇讛讜 讗讬转 诇讛讜 驻讬专讻讗 诇讘专 诪讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 驻讬专讻讗 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讜讗讛 讗谞讬 讗转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 诪讚讘专讬 讻讜诇谉


Rava said: All of the previously mentioned responses have refutations that can be raised against them except for the response of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which does not have a refutation. The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a baraita, as Rabbi Yosei said: I see the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as preferable to the statements of all the other Sages.


讗诪专 诪专 谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讬讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讜诪转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讝讛 注讜拽专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 注讜拽专 讗讬讛讜 注拽专 讗诇讗 诪转谞讛 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛


The Gemara commences discussion of the baraita: The Master said that Rabbi Tarfon responded, saying: If she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited from marrying, and he died without children, is the first husband not thereby found to be uprooting a matter of Torah law? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the question: Is the first husband not uprooting a matter of Torah law? Is it he who is uprooting the mitzva? Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is stipulating to uproot a matter of Torah law.


诪转谞讛 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗 住讙讬 诇讛 讚诇讗 诪讬谞住讘讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讞讜讛 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讗诇讗 讙讜专诐 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛


The Gemara questions this assertion as well: Is the husband stipulating to uproot a mitzva? Did he say to her that it is not sufficient if she does not marry the brother of that man, who he rendered forbidden to her? Since he did not stipulate this, he did not uproot the mitzva; it is the woman who uprooted the mitzva by marrying specifically that man鈥檚 brother. Rather, Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband is causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted.


讙讜专诐 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讘转 讗讞讬讜 诇讗 讬砖讗 砖诪讗 讬诪讜转 讘诇讗 讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗 讙讜专诐 诇注拽讜专 讚讘专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: He is causing of matter of Torah law to be uprooted? But if that is so, one should not marry his brother鈥檚 daughter lest he die without children, and he will thereby be found to be causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted in that his brother will not be able to perform levirate marriage with his own daughter, and the Sages laud one who marries his brother鈥檚 daughter. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞讜抓 诪砖专讗 砖专讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Tarfon refute Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the refutation is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry this man after she married another man.


讚转谞讬讗 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞讬住转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜


As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying by the qualification of her first husband.


讗诇讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


Rather, Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 refutation was clearly stated with regard to a case where the woman was divorced on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so. A condition still applies after the woman remarries and its violation nullifies the divorce retroactively.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讜讗诪专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讗住讜专 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专 诇讝讛 讛讗住讜专 讗住讜专 诇讻诇 讜讛诪讜转专 诪讜转专 诇讻诇 讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 转专讜诪讛 讜拽讚砖讬诐 砖讗住讜专讛 诇讝讛 讜诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 讘讗讬住讜专 讗砖讛 拽讗 讗诪专讬谞谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili responded, saying: Where do we find an example of something that is forbidden to this person and permitted to that other person? What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone and what is permitted is permitted to everyone. The Gemara asks: Is there not such an example? Aren鈥檛 teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, and sacrificial meat forbidden to this group, i.e., non-priests (see Leviticus 22:10), and permitted to that group, i.e., priests? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a forbidden woman.


讜讛专讬 注专讬讜转 讘讗讬砖讜转 拽讗诪专讬谞谉


The Gemara asks: Aren鈥檛 those women with whom relations are prohibited due to familial ties forbidden to some men, i.e., their relatives, and permitted to others? The Gemara answers: We are referring to a woman who is forbidden due to marriage.


讛专讬 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 a married woman forbidden to all men but permitted to her husband? The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘注诇 诪谞转 讛专讬 讛讜转专讛 讗爪诇讜 讘讝谞讜转 讗诇讗 讘讞讜抓


The Gemara clarifies: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the divorce was granted on the condition that she not marry a certain man, she is not entirely forbidden to him, as she is permitted to engage in licentiousness with him; the condition was with regard to marriage, not licentiousness. Rather, he clearly raised the objection with regard to a case where the husband told his wife that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, rendering her entirely forbidden to that man.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜讗诪专 讛专讬 砖讛诇讻讛 讝讜 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜讛讬讜 诇讛 讘谞讬诐 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞砖讗转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 诇讗 谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva responded, saying: If she went and married a man from the general public, and she had children with him, and she was subsequently widowed or divorced from this second husband, and she then arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden, isn鈥檛 the bill of divorce thereby nullified? And would this not render her children mamzerim?


讗讬 讛讻讬 讘讻讜诇讛 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 转谞住讬讘 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讜谞诪爪讗 讙讟 讘讟诇 讜讘谞讬讛 诪诪讝专讬谉 讛讬讬谞讜 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara asks: If that is so, and there is a concern that she will eventually violate the condition, in a case of any typical condition that the husband attaches to the divorce she should not remarry either, lest she not fulfill his condition and the bill of divorce be found to be nullified and her children be rendered mamzerim. The Gemara responds: This is the refutation against Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 response that Rava was referring to.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞讜抓 诪砖专讗 砖专讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection? If we say that it was with regard to a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, the objection is irrelevant, as Rabbi Eliezer permits the woman to marry so-and-so after she marries another man.


讚转谞讬讗 诪讜讚讛 讛讬讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public, and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying. Rather, Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 objection was clearly with regard to a case of a condition that she would not marry so-and-so.


讚讘专 讗讞专 讛专讬 砖讛讬讛 讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 讜诪转 讛诪讙专砖 诇讗 谞诪爪讗转 讗诇诪谞讛 讗爪诇讜 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐 讜拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讙专讜砖讛 砖讛讬讗 拽诇讛 讗住讜专讛 诪砖讜诐 爪讚 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 砖讘讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉


The baraita states that Rabbi Akiva added an alternative response: If the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and her ex-husband who divorced her died, is she not found to be a widow with regard to him and a divorc茅e with regard to any other man? And it is therefore an a fortiori inference that just as the prohibition against a divorc茅e marrying a priest is minor, and yet she is forbidden to this priest due to the element of divorce that applies to her, all the more so is it not clear that the prohibition against relations with a married woman, which is major, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? Therefore, the divorce does not take effect.


讜讘诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘注诇 诪谞转


The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case was this objection raised? If we say that it was with regard to a case of a condition,


讛专讬 讙专讜砖讛 讗爪诇讜 讘讝谞讜转 讗诇讗 讘讞讜抓


isn鈥檛 the woman a divorc茅e with regard to engaging in licentious behavior with him? The husband stipulated that she not marry that man, but he did not prohibit her from engaging in licentious behavior with him. Therefore, she is considered a divorc茅e with regard to him as well. This removes the a fortiori inference, as with regard to all other men she is not considered married at all. Rather, the objection was clearly raised with regard to a case of exception.


讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬 讞讜抓 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 诇讜转讬讘 讞讜抓 讜讗讬 注诇 诪谞转 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 诇讜转讬讘 注诇 诪谞转


The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Akiva holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of an exception, he should raise an objection with regard to an exception, and if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of a stipulation, he should raise an objection with regard to a case of a stipulation. Why does he raise one objection with regard to an exception and then another with regard to a stipulation?


专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞讜抓 讛讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讛讗讬 驻讬专讻讗


The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva heard that there is someone who states Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 ruling with regard to an exception, and there is someone else who states it with regard to a stipulation. He therefore raised objections with regard to both exceptions and stipulations; according to the one who says that it is with regard to an exception, this is the refutation, and according to the one who says that it is with regard to a stipulation, that is the refutation.


讜诪讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讛讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞诪讬 诪讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛


The Gemara asks: What is the refutation that Rava found for Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 second objection? If we say that it is that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, and therefore the halakhot of adultery and divorce cannot be inferred from it, doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer also derive his opinion from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood? Rabbi Yo岣nan stated (82b) that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 ruling is derived from the verse that states with regard to priests: 鈥淣either may they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7), indicating that even if a woman was divorced only from her husband and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorc茅e.


专讘讗 讻专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讝拽谉 讗讞讚 拽讗 诪转谞讬


The Gemara answers: Rava taught his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who said in the name of one elder that Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion is derived not from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, but from the verse: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which indicates that even if he divorced her in a manner that permitted her to marry only one other man, the divorce takes effect. Therefore, Rava refutes Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 latter objection by claiming that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different from other prohibitions and cannot be compared to them.


讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讻讜讜转讬讛 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 诪讬驻专讱 拽驻专讬讱


It is stated in the baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: One does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn鈥檛 he also raise a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion?


讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讚讬讚讬 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬 驻讬专讻讗 诪讬讛讜 讘讬谉 诇讚讬讚讬 讘讬谉 诇讚讬讚讻讜 讗讬谉 诪砖讬讘讬谉 讗转 讛讗专讬 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛


The Gemara answers that this is what he was saying to them: I also have a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion, but both my objection and yours should not be raised, as one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death.


讜诪讗讬 驻讬专讻讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诪拽讬砖 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 砖谞讬讛 诇拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诪讛 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 讚诇讗 讗讙讬讚讗 讘讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗祝 拽讜讚诪讬 讛讜讬讛 砖谞讬讛 讚诇讗 讗讙讬讚讗 讘讗讬谞讬砖 讗讞专讬谞讗


The Gemara asks: And what is Rabbi Yehoshua鈥檚 refutation? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua said that the passage: 鈥淲hen a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1鈥2), juxtaposes the woman鈥檚 status before the second marriage to her status before the first marriage. It should be derived from here that just as before the first marriage she is not bound to another man, so too, before the second marriage she is not bound to another man. Therefore, a woman cannot remarry if she is still bound to her ex-husband due to a qualification that prohibits her from marrying a certain man.


讙讜驻讗 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘诪讙专砖 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 讜讛诇讻讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽 讜谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 砖诪讜转专转 诇讝讛 砖谞讗住专讛 注诇讬讜


搂 The Gemara discusses the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying.


讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘专 讗诇注讝专 转砖讜讘讛 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 砖讝讛 讗讜住专 讜讝讛 诪转讬专


The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 statement: Where do we find a situation where this person prohibits something and that other person permits it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?


讜诇讗 讜讛专讬 讬讘诪讛 讚讘注诇 讗讜住专 讜讬讘诐 诪转讬专


The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there not such a situation? But isn鈥檛 there the case of a yevama, a woman whose husband dies childless, and he deems her forbidden to other men while she waits for his brother, her yavam, to perform levirate marriage with her, and the yavam, after performing levirate marriage with her, deems her permitted in the event of divorce or his death?


讛转诐 讬讘诐 讛讜讗 拽讗 讗住专 诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讘注诇 讛讗 砖专讬讗 讜拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara answers: There, it is the yavam who renders her forbidden, since if not for the yavam, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, she would have already been released from her bond to her husband and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the yavam that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.


讛专讬 谞讚专讬诐 讚谞讜讚专 讗讜住专 讜讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谉 讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 讘讞专讟讛


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the matter of vows, where the one who takes the vow prohibits something and a halakhic authority renders it permitted by dissolving the vow? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that a halakhic authority dissolves a vow only through regret of the person who took the vow. Since it is necessary for this person to express regret for taking the vow, it is not actually the halakhic authority who causes the dissolution of the vow.


讛专讬 讛驻专转 讛讘注诇 讚讗砖讛 谞讜讚专转 讜讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讛转诐 讻讚专讘 驻谞讞住 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 驻谞讞住 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讻诇 讛谞讜讚专转 注诇 讚注转 讘注诇讛 讛讬讗 谞讜讚专转


The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 there the nullification of a wife鈥檚 vows by the husband, where the wife vows, creating a prohibition, and her husband nullifies the vow? The Gemara answers: There it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pine岣s reasoned in the name of Rava, as Rav Pine岣s says in the name of Rava that with regard to any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband鈥檚 consent that she takes the vow. Therefore, the husband can nullify it.


谞注谞讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗诪专 讻专讬转讜转 讚讘专 讛讻讜专转 讘讬谞讜 诇讘讬谞讛 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


搂 The Gemara resumes discussion of the previous baraita. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: 鈥淪croll of severance [keritut],鈥 that is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. You have therefore derived that this divorce, after which the wife is still bound to her husband due to his qualification, is not an act of severance.


讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 讻专讬转讜转 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


The Gemara asks: And what do the other Rabbis, who did not refute Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion in this manner, do with this term 鈥渟everance鈥? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They need it for that which is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father鈥檚 house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.


讜讗讬讚讱 诪讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 谞驻拽讗 讜讗讬讚讱 讻专转 讻专讬转讜转 诇讗 讚专砖讬


The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, derive this principle? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转砖转讬 讬讬谉 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rava says that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of my life, that is not an act of severance, as she remains bound to his condition for the rest of his life. If he stipulates that she may not drink wine for all the days of the life of so-and-so, that is an act of severance.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讚讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬转 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讞讬讬 讚讬讚讬讛 谞诪讬 讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬转 讜诪拽讬讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛


The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where he mentioned the life of so-and-so? Is it because perhaps that person will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition, allowing her to remarry? With regard to his own life it is also true that perhaps he will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition. Why is the divorce invalid in that case?


讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬讻讬 讗讬谉 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转 讻诇 讬诪讬 讞讬讬 讗讜 讞讬讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讻专讬转讜转


Rather, say that if the husband tells her: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of your life, that is not an act of severance, as the wife will never be released from this restriction. If he says: For all the days of my life, or: For all the days of so-and-so鈥檚 life, that is an act of severance, as the condition can potentially be fulfilled during her lifetime.


讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讬讜诐 讗讬 讗转 讗砖转讬 讜诇诪讞专 讗转 讗砖转讬 诪讛讜 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉


Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If a man hands his wife a bill of divorce and says to her: Today you are not my wife, and tomorrow you are my wife, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇诪讗谉 讚拽讗 砖专讬 拽讗 砖专讬 诇注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗


Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying that only there, in the case of the mishna, the divorce is valid because concerning the one whom the husband permits the wife to marry, he permits her to marry him forever, but here, the divorce is not valid as it is limited in time? Or perhaps it is no different from the case in the mishna, and in both cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that the divorce takes effect?


转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 驻住拽讛 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚驻住拽讛 驻住拽讛


Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Perhaps the Rabbis are saying only there that the divorce is invalid because the husband did not separate her from himself entirely, as she is prohibited from marrying a certain man due to his qualification. But here, the divorce takes effect, as once he separates her, even for a limited period of time, he has consequently separated her entirely.


讘转专 讚讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟讛


After Rava raised the dilemma he then resolved it on his own:


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