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Today's Daf Yomi

March 4, 2016 | 讻状讚 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Gittin 82

Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about a man who says while giving the get that the wife is limited in who she can remarry. 聽There is a difference of opinion in which case they argue – is it only in the case where he states it as a condition but if he says “except for…” then the get for sure doesn’t work. 聽Or is the argument in a case where he says “except for…” but in the case where he states it as a condition, everyone agrees the get is a good get. 聽The gemara concludes like the latter and thereby it unfortunately leads to actual cases that the courts have dealt with聽where a husband, for example, conditioned a get on his wife not being able to remarry large groups of men (for example, men under 70).

Study Guide Gittin 82


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讚拽讗 诪讚诇讙 讜转谞讬 讞讚 讞讚 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

as it teaches by skipping one by one. The examples given relate to one witness missing, e.g., seven ties and six witnesses, and so on. They do not include a case in which two witnesses are missing, e.g., seven ties and five witnesses. This indicates that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai is only with regard to the signature of one witness. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗讬 拽专讜讘 讞转讬诐 讗讬 讘注讬 讘讬谉 讘转讞讬诇讛 讘讬谉 讘讗诪爪注 讘讬谉 讘住讜祝

Abaye said: Learn from it that this relative, who is allowed to sign a folded and tied bill of divorce, can sign if he wants to sign, either at the beginning, as the first signature, in the middle, or at the end.

诪诪讗讬 诪讚诇讗 拽讘注 诇讬讛 诪拽讜诐 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讻诇 转诇转讗 诪拽讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 专爪讜驻讬谉

From where does Abaye infer this? From the fact that it did not designate a place for him to sign. And learn from it, as well, that from any three of the witnesses who signed on a folded and tied bill of divorce, we can ratify the bill of divorce, i.e., it can be ratified based on their signatures. And we do not need to confirm the signatures specifically of three consecutive witnesses.

讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 专爪讜驻讬谉 诇拽讘注 诇讬讛 诪拽讜诐 诇讛讗讬 拽专讜讘 讘转讞讬诇讛 讗讜 讘讗诪爪注 讗讜 讘住讜祝 讜诇讻砖专 讘讬讛 讟讜讘讗

As if it enters your mind that we need consecutive witnesses, then they should designate a place for this relative to sign, in the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, and they should then validate the use of many disqualified witnesses. It could have been instituted that every third witness may be disqualified. Since in any group of three witnesses, two of them would be valid, more than one disqualified witness could be allowed. Since it is possible to ratify a bill of divorce by confirming signatures that are not consecutive, and therefore there is concern that the court will rely on two disqualified witnesses, the Sages consequently allowed the use of only one disqualified witness.

讻讬 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 爪讗 讜讛砖诇讬诐 注诇讬讜 注讘讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽

With regard to the halakha concerning the dispute in the mishna, it is related that when they came before Rabbi Ami with a question pertaining to a bare bill of divorce that needed more witnesses, he said to the person overseeing: Go out and complete it even with a slave from the general public, in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讝讜专拽

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 诇驻诇讜谞讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪转讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜住专讬诐 讻讬爪讚 讬注砖讛 讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转谞谞讜 诇讛 讜讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讞讝专 讜诪讞拽讜 驻住讜诇

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ella] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讗讬 讗诇讗 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讗讜 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of this word ella in the husband鈥檚 statement? Does it mean except, i.e., the husband intended to divorce his wife in a manner that would render her permitted to marry only a limited group of men? Or does it mean: On the condition, i.e., the husband intended to grant her full divorce on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so?

讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讜讘讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟 讗讘诇 讘注诇 诪谞转 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗

The Gemara elaborates on how this dilemma affects the understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis: Does ella mean except, and therefore it is specifically with regard to the exception of a certain man from the intended divorce that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and hold that the divorce is invalid? This would be because in a case where the husband noted an exception, it is as if he left out part of her bill of divorce; since she is not permitted to remarry anyone she wishes it does not entirely sever the bond between them. But with regard to divorce on the condition that she will not marry a certain man the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer that it is valid, just as is the case with regard to any typical condition which the husband attaches to the divorce of his wife.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 讜讘注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 讚驻诇讬讙 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讚专讘谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讞讜抓 诪讜讚讛 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟

Or perhaps this is the meaning of ella: On the condition? Accordingly, it is specifically with regard to divorce on the condition that the wife will not marry a certain man that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and allows her to remarry based on this divorce; but with regard to the exception of a certain man from the woman鈥檚 right to remarry he concedes that the divorce is invalid as the husband left out part of her bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 讻诇 讛讘转讬诐 诪讟诪讗讬谉 讘谞讙注讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诇 讙讜讬诐 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 注诇 诪谞转 讚诇讗 诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讬砖专讗诇 讛讗 诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诇讗 诪讟诪讗讬 讘转讬 讬砖专讗诇

Ravina said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following mishna (Nega鈥檌m 12:1): All houses become ritually impure through leprous sores of the house except [ella] for those belonging to gentiles. Granted, if you say that the meaning of the word ella is except, this mishna is well understood. But if you say that its meaning is on the condition, the resulting interpretation of this mishna is that the houses of Jews become impure only on the condition that the houses of gentiles do not become impure; consequently, if the houses of gentiles become impure, the houses of Jews do not become impure. Does this interpretation make any sense?

讜注讜讚 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诪讬 诪讟诪讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讜谞转转讬 谞讙注 爪专注转 讘讘讬转 讗专抓 讗讞讜讝转讻诐 讗专抓 讗讞讜讝转讻诐 诪讟诪讗讛 讘谞讙注讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诪讟诪讗讬谉 讘谞讙注讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Moreover, an objection against this interpretation may be raised as follows: Do the houses of gentiles become ritually impure at all? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that from the verse: 鈥淎nd I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possession鈥 (Leviticus 14:34), it is derived that only the land of your possession, i.e., the houses of Jews, becomes impure through leprous sores of the house, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through leprosy? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the meaning of ella is except. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that ella means except.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注诇 讛诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 砖讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 诪讛 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 讛诪讙专砖 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转谞砖讗讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬

According to this conclusion, our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so; rather, they were in agreement that in that case she is not divorced. With regard to what case did they disagree? It was with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man on the condition that you will not marry so-and-so,

砖专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪转讬专 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪讗讜转讜 讛讗讬砖 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜住专讬诐

as in this case Rabbi Eliezer permits her to marry any man except for that man about whom the condition was made, and the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as in their opinion this divorce is not valid.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 讜专讘谞谉 讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 诇讬讛 讘讙讟 讛讻讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion as cited in the baraita? The Gemara answers: The ruling here is just as it is with regard to any typical condition. The husband has the right to attach conditions to the divorce. And how would the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would reason that by attaching any typical condition the husband did not leave out part of the bill of divorce, as it does not diminish the essential act of severance. By contrast, here he left out part of the bill of divorce, as she is not permitted to marry any man she wishes. Therefore, the divorce is invalid.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

The Gemara asks: And according to the mishna, which we established as referring to a case of exception, what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion that the divorce takes effect, despite its lack of complete severance?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讝拽谉 讗讞讚 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讬爪讗讛 诪讘讬转讜 讜讛诇讻讛 讜讛讬转讛 诇讗讬砖 讗讞专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讗讞专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗讬 讗讬砖 诇讻诇 讗讬砖 讜讗讬砖

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder that the verse states with regard to divorce: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), indicating that even if he divorced her in a manner that only permitted her to marry one other man, she is divorced, i.e., this partial severance takes effect. And the Rabbis would say in response to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 explanation that this phrase: Another man, which appears in the verse refers not to a specific man but to any man, i.e., it must be permitted for her to marry any man for the divorce to take effect.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讛讻讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 诇讗 讬拽讞讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬砖讛 谞驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗诇诪讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗

And Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the reason for Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion is from the verse here, where it is stated with regard to priests: 鈥淣either may they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7). This verse indicates that even if she was divorced only from her husband, and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorc茅e, i.e., she may not marry a priest even after her husband鈥檚 death. Apparently, all the more so, divorce that excludes certain men from the wife鈥檚 right to remarry is considered a valid bill of divorce. This is certainly the case when the divorce permits her to marry all men with the exception of one.

讜专讘谞谉 讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬

And the Rabbis would respond that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, as even a divorce that is otherwise invalid disqualifies a woman from marrying a priest.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛讬讗讱 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉

Rabbi Abba raises a dilemma: If this kind of exception is made in a case of betrothal, i.e., the man says to the woman that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for so-and-so, how is this betrothal treated? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘讬 拽专讗讬 讗讘诇 讛转诐 拽谞讬谉 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬谞谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying only here that the divorce is valid because verses are written that support this proposition, as delineated by Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yo岣nan; but there, in the case of betrothal, a proper acquisition is necessary, which is not the case when a certain man is excluded from the prohibition to engage in sexual intercourse with her? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house,鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as a basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, teaching that just as divorce takes effect in this manner, so does betrothal?

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 讚讘注讬谞谉 讻专讬转讜转 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讘诇 讛转诐 拽谞讬谉 讻诇 讚讛讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Are the Rabbis saying here that the divorce is invalid only because the severance of the bond between the husband and wife is necessary for the divorce to take effect, and there is no such severance as long as the woman may not marry any man she wishes; but there, in the case of betrothal, any form of acquisition is sufficient for it to take effect? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause beginning: 鈥淎nd she departs,鈥 and the clause beginning: 鈥淎nd becomes,鈥 that what renders a divorce invalid renders a betrothal invalid as well?

诇讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讛讚专 驻砖讟讛 讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讬谞谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

After Rabbi Abba raised the dilemma he then resolved it in the following manner: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is necessary to compare the halakha in the case of betrothal to the ruling with regard to divorce, based on the juxtaposition between 鈥淎nd she departs鈥 and: 鈥淎nd becomes.鈥 Therefore, the dispute remains in this case as well.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讗讬转讗 诇讚专讘讬 讗讘讗

Abaye said: If you say that Rabbi Abba鈥檚 solution is so, i.e., if you say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that making an exception in a betrothal is valid, the issue of levirate marriage in such cases must be addressed.

讘讗 专讗讜讘谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诪注讜谉 讜讘讗 砖诪注讜谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪专讗讜讘谉 讜诪转讜 砖谞讬讛诐 诪转讬讘诪转 诇诇讜讬 讜讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 讗砖转 砖谞讬 诪转讬诐

If Reuven came to a woman and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for his brother Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for Reuven, and they both died without children, in this case she performs levirate marriage with their brother Levi, and I do not call her the wife of two dead men. It is stated in tractate Yevamot (31b) that if a woman has a levirate bond with a man due to her two late husbands who were his brothers, she may not perform levirate marriage with him, as it is derived from the verse: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), that the wife of only one dead man performs levirate marriage, not the wife of two. Abaye stated that in the case under discussion the woman may perform levirate marriage with Levi.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚专讗讜讘谉 讗讛谞讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 讗讛谞讜

What is the reason that she is not considered to be the wife of two dead men? It is that although her betrothal to Reuven was effective, i.e., it took effect, her betrothal to Shimon was not effective, as it did not render her forbidden to any man to whom she was not already forbidden due to her betrothal to Reuven. Therefore, she is considered only Reuven鈥檚 wife.

讜讗诇讗 讗砖转 砖谞讬 诪转讬诐 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖讘讗 专讗讜讘谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诪注讜谉 讜讘讗 砖诪注讜谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗讜讘谉 讗讛谞讜 诇诪讬住专讗 讗注诇诪讗 讜拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚砖诪注讜谉 讗讛谞讜 诇诪讬住专讗 讗专讗讜讘谉

Rather, under what circumstances is the case of a wife of two dead men found in this context? It is found in a case where Reuven came and betrothed her, saying that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her without specifying any qualifications. Since Reuven鈥檚 betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to everyone except for Shimon, and Shimon鈥檚 betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to Reuven, the betrothal of both brothers took effect. And if both of them die she may not perform levirate marriage with Levi, as she is the wife of two dead men.

讘注讬 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜

Abaye raises a dilemma: If a man said to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for Reuven and Shimon, and he then said to her: You are permitted to marry Reuven and Shimon, what is the halakha?

诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 讜诪讗讬 讚砖专讗 讗住专 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专

Do we say that what he forbade initially he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone, including Reuven and Shimon, in which case the severance is complete? Or perhaps what he forbade initially he then permitted, permitting her to marry Reuven and Shimon, and what he permitted initially he then forbade, i.e., he permitted her only to Reuven and Shimon, excluding all other men? If you say

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Gittin 82

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 82

讚拽讗 诪讚诇讙 讜转谞讬 讞讚 讞讚 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

as it teaches by skipping one by one. The examples given relate to one witness missing, e.g., seven ties and six witnesses, and so on. They do not include a case in which two witnesses are missing, e.g., seven ties and five witnesses. This indicates that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai is only with regard to the signature of one witness. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗讬 拽专讜讘 讞转讬诐 讗讬 讘注讬 讘讬谉 讘转讞讬诇讛 讘讬谉 讘讗诪爪注 讘讬谉 讘住讜祝

Abaye said: Learn from it that this relative, who is allowed to sign a folded and tied bill of divorce, can sign if he wants to sign, either at the beginning, as the first signature, in the middle, or at the end.

诪诪讗讬 诪讚诇讗 拽讘注 诇讬讛 诪拽讜诐 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讻诇 转诇转讗 诪拽讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 专爪讜驻讬谉

From where does Abaye infer this? From the fact that it did not designate a place for him to sign. And learn from it, as well, that from any three of the witnesses who signed on a folded and tied bill of divorce, we can ratify the bill of divorce, i.e., it can be ratified based on their signatures. And we do not need to confirm the signatures specifically of three consecutive witnesses.

讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 专爪讜驻讬谉 诇拽讘注 诇讬讛 诪拽讜诐 诇讛讗讬 拽专讜讘 讘转讞讬诇讛 讗讜 讘讗诪爪注 讗讜 讘住讜祝 讜诇讻砖专 讘讬讛 讟讜讘讗

As if it enters your mind that we need consecutive witnesses, then they should designate a place for this relative to sign, in the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, and they should then validate the use of many disqualified witnesses. It could have been instituted that every third witness may be disqualified. Since in any group of three witnesses, two of them would be valid, more than one disqualified witness could be allowed. Since it is possible to ratify a bill of divorce by confirming signatures that are not consecutive, and therefore there is concern that the court will rely on two disqualified witnesses, the Sages consequently allowed the use of only one disqualified witness.

讻讬 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 爪讗 讜讛砖诇讬诐 注诇讬讜 注讘讚 诪谉 讛砖讜拽

With regard to the halakha concerning the dispute in the mishna, it is related that when they came before Rabbi Ami with a question pertaining to a bare bill of divorce that needed more witnesses, he said to the person overseeing: Go out and complete it even with a slave from the general public, in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 讛讝讜专拽

 

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 诇驻诇讜谞讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪转讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜住专讬诐 讻讬爪讚 讬注砖讛 讬讟诇谞讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讬讞讝讜专 讜讬转谞谞讜 诇讛 讜讬讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讻转讘讜 讘转讜讻讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讞讝专 讜诪讞拽讜 驻住讜诇

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ella] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讗讬 讗诇讗 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讗讜 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of this word ella in the husband鈥檚 statement? Does it mean except, i.e., the husband intended to divorce his wife in a manner that would render her permitted to marry only a limited group of men? Or does it mean: On the condition, i.e., the husband intended to grant her full divorce on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so?

讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讜讘讞讜抓 讛讜讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟 讗讘诇 讘注诇 诪谞转 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗

The Gemara elaborates on how this dilemma affects the understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis: Does ella mean except, and therefore it is specifically with regard to the exception of a certain man from the intended divorce that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and hold that the divorce is invalid? This would be because in a case where the husband noted an exception, it is as if he left out part of her bill of divorce; since she is not permitted to remarry anyone she wishes it does not entirely sever the bond between them. But with regard to divorce on the condition that she will not marry a certain man the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer that it is valid, just as is the case with regard to any typical condition which the husband attaches to the divorce of his wife.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 讜讘注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 讚驻诇讬讙 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讚专讘谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讞讜抓 诪讜讚讛 讚讛讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟

Or perhaps this is the meaning of ella: On the condition? Accordingly, it is specifically with regard to divorce on the condition that the wife will not marry a certain man that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and allows her to remarry based on this divorce; but with regard to the exception of a certain man from the woman鈥檚 right to remarry he concedes that the divorce is invalid as the husband left out part of her bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 讻诇 讛讘转讬诐 诪讟诪讗讬谉 讘谞讙注讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诇 讙讜讬诐 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 砖驻讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 注诇 诪谞转 讛讜讗 注诇 诪谞转 讚诇讗 诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讬砖专讗诇 讛讗 诪讬讟诪讜 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诇讗 诪讟诪讗讬 讘转讬 讬砖专讗诇

Ravina said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following mishna (Nega鈥檌m 12:1): All houses become ritually impure through leprous sores of the house except [ella] for those belonging to gentiles. Granted, if you say that the meaning of the word ella is except, this mishna is well understood. But if you say that its meaning is on the condition, the resulting interpretation of this mishna is that the houses of Jews become impure only on the condition that the houses of gentiles do not become impure; consequently, if the houses of gentiles become impure, the houses of Jews do not become impure. Does this interpretation make any sense?

讜注讜讚 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诪讬 诪讟诪讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讜谞转转讬 谞讙注 爪专注转 讘讘讬转 讗专抓 讗讞讜讝转讻诐 讗专抓 讗讞讜讝转讻诐 诪讟诪讗讛 讘谞讙注讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讘转讬 讙讜讬诐 诪讟诪讗讬谉 讘谞讙注讬诐 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讞讜抓 讛讜讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Moreover, an objection against this interpretation may be raised as follows: Do the houses of gentiles become ritually impure at all? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that from the verse: 鈥淎nd I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possession鈥 (Leviticus 14:34), it is derived that only the land of your possession, i.e., the houses of Jews, becomes impure through leprous sores of the house, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through leprosy? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the meaning of ella is except. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that ella means except.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注诇 讛诪讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪驻诇讜谞讬 砖讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 注诇 诪讛 谞讞诇拽讜 注诇 讛诪讙专砖 讗砖转讜 讜讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 注诇 诪谞转 砖诇讗 转谞砖讗讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬

According to this conclusion, our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so; rather, they were in agreement that in that case she is not divorced. With regard to what case did they disagree? It was with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man on the condition that you will not marry so-and-so,

砖专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪转讬专 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪讗讜转讜 讛讗讬砖 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜住专讬诐

as in this case Rabbi Eliezer permits her to marry any man except for that man about whom the condition was made, and the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as in their opinion this divorce is not valid.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 讜专讘谞谉 讻诇 转谞讗讬 讚注诇诪讗 诇讗 砖讬讬专 诇讬讛 讘讙讟 讛讻讗 砖讬讬专 诇讛 讘讙讟

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion as cited in the baraita? The Gemara answers: The ruling here is just as it is with regard to any typical condition. The husband has the right to attach conditions to the divorce. And how would the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would reason that by attaching any typical condition the husband did not leave out part of the bill of divorce, as it does not diminish the essential act of severance. By contrast, here he left out part of the bill of divorce, as she is not permitted to marry any man she wishes. Therefore, the divorce is invalid.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讘讞讜抓 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

The Gemara asks: And according to the mishna, which we established as referring to a case of exception, what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion that the divorce takes effect, despite its lack of complete severance?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讝拽谉 讗讞讚 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讬爪讗讛 诪讘讬转讜 讜讛诇讻讛 讜讛讬转讛 诇讗讬砖 讗讞专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛转讬专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讗讞专 讛专讬 讝讜 诪讙讜专砖转 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗讬 讗讬砖 诇讻诇 讗讬砖 讜讗讬砖

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder that the verse states with regard to divorce: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), indicating that even if he divorced her in a manner that only permitted her to marry one other man, she is divorced, i.e., this partial severance takes effect. And the Rabbis would say in response to Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 explanation that this phrase: Another man, which appears in the verse refers not to a specific man but to any man, i.e., it must be permitted for her to marry any man for the divorce to take effect.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讛讻讗 讜讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 诪讗讬砖讛 诇讗 讬拽讞讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬砖讛 谞驻住诇讛 诪谉 讛讻讛讜谞讛 讗诇诪讗 讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗

And Rabbi Yo岣nan said that the reason for Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion is from the verse here, where it is stated with regard to priests: 鈥淣either may they take a woman divorced from her husband鈥 (Leviticus 21:7). This verse indicates that even if she was divorced only from her husband, and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorc茅e, i.e., she may not marry a priest even after her husband鈥檚 death. Apparently, all the more so, divorce that excludes certain men from the wife鈥檚 right to remarry is considered a valid bill of divorce. This is certainly the case when the divorce permits her to marry all men with the exception of one.

讜专讘谞谉 讗讬住讜专 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讗谞讬

And the Rabbis would respond that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, as even a divorce that is otherwise invalid disqualifies a woman from marrying a priest.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讛讬讗讱 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉

Rabbi Abba raises a dilemma: If this kind of exception is made in a case of betrothal, i.e., the man says to the woman that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for so-and-so, how is this betrothal treated? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讬讘讬 拽专讗讬 讗讘诇 讛转诐 拽谞讬谉 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬谞谉 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying only here that the divorce is valid because verses are written that support this proposition, as delineated by Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yo岣nan; but there, in the case of betrothal, a proper acquisition is necessary, which is not the case when a certain man is excluded from the prohibition to engage in sexual intercourse with her? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: 鈥淎nd she departs out of his house,鈥 and the clause: 鈥淎nd becomes another man鈥檚 wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as a basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, teaching that just as divorce takes effect in this manner, so does betrothal?

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛讻讗 讗诇讗 讚讘注讬谞谉 讻专讬转讜转 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讘诇 讛转诐 拽谞讬谉 讻诇 讚讛讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Are the Rabbis saying here that the divorce is invalid only because the severance of the bond between the husband and wife is necessary for the divorce to take effect, and there is no such severance as long as the woman may not marry any man she wishes; but there, in the case of betrothal, any form of acquisition is sufficient for it to take effect? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause beginning: 鈥淎nd she departs,鈥 and the clause beginning: 鈥淎nd becomes,鈥 that what renders a divorce invalid renders a betrothal invalid as well?

诇讘转专 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讛讚专 驻砖讟讛 讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讘注讬谞谉 讜讬爪讗讛 讜讛讬转讛

After Rabbi Abba raised the dilemma he then resolved it in the following manner: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is necessary to compare the halakha in the case of betrothal to the ruling with regard to divorce, based on the juxtaposition between 鈥淎nd she departs鈥 and: 鈥淎nd becomes.鈥 Therefore, the dispute remains in this case as well.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专 讗讬转讗 诇讚专讘讬 讗讘讗

Abaye said: If you say that Rabbi Abba鈥檚 solution is so, i.e., if you say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that making an exception in a betrothal is valid, the issue of levirate marriage in such cases must be addressed.

讘讗 专讗讜讘谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诪注讜谉 讜讘讗 砖诪注讜谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪专讗讜讘谉 讜诪转讜 砖谞讬讛诐 诪转讬讘诪转 诇诇讜讬 讜讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 讗砖转 砖谞讬 诪转讬诐

If Reuven came to a woman and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for his brother Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for Reuven, and they both died without children, in this case she performs levirate marriage with their brother Levi, and I do not call her the wife of two dead men. It is stated in tractate Yevamot (31b) that if a woman has a levirate bond with a man due to her two late husbands who were his brothers, she may not perform levirate marriage with him, as it is derived from the verse: 鈥淭he wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:5), that the wife of only one dead man performs levirate marriage, not the wife of two. Abaye stated that in the case under discussion the woman may perform levirate marriage with Levi.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚专讗讜讘谉 讗讛谞讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 讗讛谞讜

What is the reason that she is not considered to be the wife of two dead men? It is that although her betrothal to Reuven was effective, i.e., it took effect, her betrothal to Shimon was not effective, as it did not render her forbidden to any man to whom she was not already forbidden due to her betrothal to Reuven. Therefore, she is considered only Reuven鈥檚 wife.

讜讗诇讗 讗砖转 砖谞讬 诪转讬诐 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 砖讘讗 专讗讜讘谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讞讜抓 诪砖诪注讜谉 讜讘讗 砖诪注讜谉 讜拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讚拽讬讚讜砖讬 专讗讜讘谉 讗讛谞讜 诇诪讬住专讗 讗注诇诪讗 讜拽讬讚讜砖讬 讚砖诪注讜谉 讗讛谞讜 诇诪讬住专讗 讗专讗讜讘谉

Rather, under what circumstances is the case of a wife of two dead men found in this context? It is found in a case where Reuven came and betrothed her, saying that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her without specifying any qualifications. Since Reuven鈥檚 betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to everyone except for Shimon, and Shimon鈥檚 betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to Reuven, the betrothal of both brothers took effect. And if both of them die she may not perform levirate marriage with Levi, as she is the wife of two dead men.

讘注讬 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐 讞讜抓 诪专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 讜讞讝专 讜讗诪专 诇讛 诇专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 诪讛讜

Abaye raises a dilemma: If a man said to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for Reuven and Shimon, and he then said to her: You are permitted to marry Reuven and Shimon, what is the halakha?

诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讗讬 讚讗住专 砖专讗 讜诪讗讬 讚砖专讗 讗住专 讗诐 转诪爪讗 诇讜诪专

Do we say that what he forbade initially he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone, including Reuven and Shimon, in which case the severance is complete? Or perhaps what he forbade initially he then permitted, permitting her to marry Reuven and Shimon, and what he permitted initially he then forbade, i.e., he permitted her only to Reuven and Shimon, excluding all other men? If you say

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