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Today's Daf Yomi

March 4, 2016 | ื›ืดื“ ื‘ืื“ืจ ืืณ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

Gittin 82

Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about a man who says while giving the get that the wife is limited in who she can remarry. ย There is a difference of opinion in which case they argue – is it only in the case where he states it as a condition but if he says “except for…” then the get for sure doesn’t work. ย Or is the argument in a case where he says “except for…” but in the case where he states it as a condition, everyone agrees the get is a good get. ย The gemara concludes like the latter and thereby it unfortunately leads to actual cases that the courts have dealt withย where a husband, for example, conditioned a get on his wife not being able to remarry large groups of men (for example, men under 70).

Study Guide Gittin 82


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ื“ืงื ืžื“ืœื’ ื•ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ ื—ื“ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

as it teaches by skipping one by one. The examples given relate to one witness missing, e.g., seven ties and six witnesses, and so on. They do not include a case in which two witnesses are missing, e.g., seven ties and five witnesses. This indicates that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai is only with regard to the signature of one witness. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื”ืื™ ืงืจื•ื‘ ื—ืชื™ื ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืืžืฆืข ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืกื•ืฃ

Abaye said: Learn from it that this relative, who is allowed to sign a folded and tied bill of divorce, can sign if he wants to sign, either at the beginning, as the first signature, in the middle, or at the end.

ืžืžืื™ ืžื“ืœื ืงื‘ืข ืœื™ื” ืžืงื•ื ื•ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืžื›ืœ ืชืœืชื ืžืงื™ื™ืžื™ื ืŸ ื•ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ

From where does Abaye infer this? From the fact that it did not designate a place for him to sign. And learn from it, as well, that from any three of the witnesses who signed on a folded and tied bill of divorce, we can ratify the bill of divorce, i.e., it can be ratified based on their signatures. And we do not need to confirm the signatures specifically of three consecutive witnesses.

ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ ืœืงื‘ืข ืœื™ื” ืžืงื•ื ืœื”ืื™ ืงืจื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœื” ืื• ื‘ืืžืฆืข ืื• ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื•ืœื›ืฉืจ ื‘ื™ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื

As if it enters your mind that we need consecutive witnesses, then they should designate a place for this relative to sign, in the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, and they should then validate the use of many disqualified witnesses. It could have been instituted that every third witness may be disqualified. Since in any group of three witnesses, two of them would be valid, more than one disqualified witness could be allowed. Since it is possible to ratify a bill of divorce by confirming signatures that are not consecutive, and therefore there is concern that the court will rely on two disqualified witnesses, the Sages consequently allowed the use of only one disqualified witness.

ื›ื™ ืืชื• ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืฆื ื•ื”ืฉืœื™ื ืขืœื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืฉื•ืง

With regard to the halakha concerning the dispute in the mishna, it is related that when they came before Rabbi Ami with a question pertaining to a bare bill of divorce that needed more witnesses, he said to the person overseeing: Go out and complete it even with a slave from the general public, in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ื”ื–ื•ืจืง

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืืœื ืœืคืœื•ื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืชื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืกืจื™ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื™ืขืฉื” ื™ื˜ืœื ื• ื”ื™ืžื ื” ื•ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื•ื™ืชื ื ื• ืœื” ื•ื™ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื›ืชื‘ื• ื‘ืชื•ื›ื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื—ื–ืจ ื•ืžื—ืงื• ืคืกื•ืœ

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ella] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

ื’ืžืณ ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื”ืื™ ืืœื ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of this word ella in the husbandโ€™s statement? Does it mean except, i.e., the husband intended to divorce his wife in a manner that would render her permitted to marry only a limited group of men? Or does it mean: On the condition, i.e., the husband intended to grant her full divorce on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so?

ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ื•ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ื”ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืžื•ื“ื• ืœื™ื” ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื

The Gemara elaborates on how this dilemma affects the understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis: Does ella mean except, and therefore it is specifically with regard to the exception of a certain man from the intended divorce that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and hold that the divorce is invalid? This would be because in a case where the husband noted an exception, it is as if he left out part of her bill of divorce; since she is not permitted to remarry anyone she wishes it does not entirely sever the bond between them. But with regard to divorce on the condition that she will not marry a certain man the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer that it is valid, just as is the case with regard to any typical condition which the husband attaches to the divorce of his wife.

ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžื•ื“ื” ื“ื”ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜

Or perhaps this is the meaning of ella: On the condition? Accordingly, it is specifically with regard to divorce on the condition that the wife will not marry a certain man that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and allows her to remarry based on this divorce; but with regard to the exception of a certain man from the womanโ€™s right to remarry he concedes that the divorce is invalid as the husband left out part of her bill of divorce.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืชื ืฉืžืข ื›ืœ ื”ื‘ืชื™ื ืžื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ืืœื ืฉืœ ื’ื•ื™ื ืื™ ืืžืจืช ื‘ืฉืœืžื ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืฉืคื™ืจ ืืœื ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื“ืœื ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ื ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืœื ืžื˜ืžืื™ ื‘ืชื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

Ravina said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following mishna (Negaโ€™im 12:1): All houses become ritually impure through leprous sores of the house except [ella] for those belonging to gentiles. Granted, if you say that the meaning of the word ella is except, this mishna is well understood. But if you say that its meaning is on the condition, the resulting interpretation of this mishna is that the houses of Jews become impure only on the condition that the houses of gentiles do not become impure; consequently, if the houses of gentiles become impure, the houses of Jews do not become impure. Does this interpretation make any sense?

ื•ืขื•ื“ ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืžื™ ืžื˜ืžืื™ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืชืชื™ ื ื’ืข ืฆืจืขืช ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืืจืฅ ืื—ื•ื–ืชื›ื ืืจืฅ ืื—ื•ื–ืชื›ื ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ื•ืื™ืŸ ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืžื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

Moreover, an objection against this interpretation may be raised as follows: Do the houses of gentiles become ritually impure at all? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that from the verse: โ€œAnd I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possessionโ€ (Leviticus 14:34), it is derived that only the land of your possession, i.e., the houses of Jews, becomes impure through leprous sores of the house, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through leprosy? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the meaning of ella is except. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that ella means except.

ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืขืœ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืคืœื•ื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ืขืœ ืžื” ื ื—ืœืงื• ืขืœ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืœื ืชื ืฉืื™ ืœืคืœื•ื ื™

According to this conclusion, our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so; rather, they were in agreement that in that case she is not divorced. With regard to what case did they disagree? It was with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man on the condition that you will not marry so-and-so,

ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืชื™ืจ ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื•ืชื• ื”ืื™ืฉ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืกืจื™ื

as in this case Rabbi Eliezer permits her to marry any man except for that man about whom the condition was made, and the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as in their opinion this divorce is not valid.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ืœื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื”ื›ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion as cited in the baraita? The Gemara answers: The ruling here is just as it is with regard to any typical condition. The husband has the right to attach conditions to the divorce. And how would the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would reason that by attaching any typical condition the husband did not leave out part of the bill of divorce, as it does not diminish the essential act of severance. By contrast, here he left out part of the bill of divorce, as she is not permitted to marry any man she wishes. Therefore, the divorce is invalid.

ื•ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ืื•ืงื™ืžื ื ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ

The Gemara asks: And according to the mishna, which we established as referring to a case of exception, what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion that the divorce takes effect, despite its lack of complete severance?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื–ืงืŸ ืื—ื“ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ืžื‘ื™ืชื• ื•ื”ืœื›ื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื” ืœืื™ืฉ ืื—ืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืœื ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืืœื ืœืื™ืฉ ืื—ืจ ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื”ืื™ ืื™ืฉ ืœื›ืœ ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื™ืฉ

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder that the verse states with regard to divorce: โ€œAnd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2), indicating that even if he divorced her in a manner that only permitted her to marry one other man, she is divorced, i.e., this partial severance takes effect. And the Rabbis would say in response to Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s explanation that this phrase: Another man, which appears in the verse refers not to a specific man but to any man, i.e., it must be permitted for her to marry any man for the divorce to take effect.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื”ื›ื ื•ืืฉื” ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ืžืื™ืฉื” ืœื ื™ืงื—ื• ืืคื™ืœื• ืœื ื ืชื’ืจืฉื” ืืœื ืžืื™ืฉื” ื ืคืกืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ื›ื”ื•ื ื” ืืœืžื ื”ื•ื™ ื’ื™ื˜ื

And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said that the reason for Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion is from the verse here, where it is stated with regard to priests: โ€œNeither may they take a woman divorced from her husbandโ€ (Leviticus 21:7). This verse indicates that even if she was divorced only from her husband, and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcรฉe, i.e., she may not marry a priest even after her husbandโ€™s death. Apparently, all the more so, divorce that excludes certain men from the wifeโ€™s right to remarry is considered a valid bill of divorce. This is certainly the case when the divorce permits her to marry all men with the exception of one.

ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื™ืกื•ืจ ื›ื”ื•ื ื” ืฉืื ื™

And the Rabbis would respond that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, as even a divorce that is otherwise invalid disqualifies a woman from marrying a priest.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืืš ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ

ยง Rabbi Abba raises a dilemma: If this kind of exception is made in a case of betrothal, i.e., the man says to the woman that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for so-and-so, how is this betrothal treated? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื”ื›ื ืืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืงืจืื™ ืื‘ืœ ื”ืชื ืงื ื™ืŸ ืžืขืœื™ื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying only here that the divorce is valid because verses are written that support this proposition, as delineated by Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan; but there, in the case of betrothal, a proper acquisition is necessary, which is not the case when a certain man is excluded from the prohibition to engage in sexual intercourse with her? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: โ€œAnd she departs out of his house,โ€ and the clause: โ€œAnd becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as a basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, teaching that just as divorce takes effect in this manner, so does betrothal?

ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ืงืืžืจื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื ืืœื ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื›ืจื™ืชื•ืช ื•ืœื™ื›ื ืื‘ืœ ื”ืชื ืงื ื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Are the Rabbis saying here that the divorce is invalid only because the severance of the bond between the husband and wife is necessary for the divorce to take effect, and there is no such severance as long as the woman may not marry any man she wishes; but there, in the case of betrothal, any form of acquisition is sufficient for it to take effect? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause beginning: โ€œAnd she departs,โ€ and the clause beginning: โ€œAnd becomes,โ€ that what renders a divorce invalid renders a betrothal invalid as well?

ืœื‘ืชืจ ื“ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ื”ื“ืจ ืคืฉื˜ื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

After Rabbi Abba raised the dilemma he then resolved it in the following manner: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is necessary to compare the halakha in the case of betrothal to the ruling with regard to divorce, based on the juxtaposition between โ€œAnd she departsโ€ and: โ€œAnd becomes.โ€ Therefore, the dispute remains in this case as well.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืื ืชืžืฆื ืœื•ืžืจ ืื™ืชื ืœื“ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื

Abaye said: If you say that Rabbi Abbaโ€™s solution is so, i.e., if you say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that making an exception in a betrothal is valid, the issue of levirate marriage in such cases must be addressed.

ื‘ื ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ื ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืžืชื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ืžืชื™ื‘ืžืช ืœืœื•ื™ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืื ื™ ืงื•ืจื ื‘ื” ืืฉืช ืฉื ื™ ืžืชื™ื

If Reuven came to a woman and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for his brother Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for Reuven, and they both died without children, in this case she performs levirate marriage with their brother Levi, and I do not call her the wife of two dead men. It is stated in tractate Yevamot (31b) that if a woman has a levirate bond with a man due to her two late husbands who were his brothers, she may not perform levirate marriage with him, as it is derived from the verse: โ€œThe wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the familyโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), that the wife of only one dead man performs levirate marriage, not the wife of two. Abaye stated that in the case under discussion the woman may perform levirate marriage with Levi.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืœื ืื”ื ื•

What is the reason that she is not considered to be the wife of two dead men? It is that although her betrothal to Reuven was effective, i.e., it took effect, her betrothal to Shimon was not effective, as it did not render her forbidden to any man to whom she was not already forbidden due to her betrothal to Reuven. Therefore, she is considered only Reuvenโ€™s wife.

ื•ืืœื ืืฉืช ืฉื ื™ ืžืชื™ื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ื ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ื ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ืกืชื ื“ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืœืžื™ืกืจื ืืขืœืžื ื•ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืœืžื™ืกืจื ืืจืื•ื‘ืŸ

Rather, under what circumstances is the case of a wife of two dead men found in this context? It is found in a case where Reuven came and betrothed her, saying that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her without specifying any qualifications. Since Reuvenโ€™s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to everyone except for Shimon, and Shimonโ€™s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to Reuven, the betrothal of both brothers took effect. And if both of them die she may not perform levirate marriage with Levi, as she is the wife of two dead men.

ื‘ืขื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื—ื–ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ืœืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืžื”ื•

Abaye raises a dilemma: If a man said to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for Reuven and Shimon, and he then said to her: You are permitted to marry Reuven and Shimon, what is the halakha?

ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืื™ ื“ืืกืจ ืฉืจื ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืžืื™ ื“ืืกืจ ืฉืจื ื•ืžืื™ ื“ืฉืจื ืืกืจ ืื ืชืžืฆื ืœื•ืžืจ

Do we say that what he forbade initially he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone, including Reuven and Shimon, in which case the severance is complete? Or perhaps what he forbade initially he then permitted, permitting her to marry Reuven and Shimon, and what he permitted initially he then forbade, i.e., he permitted her only to Reuven and Shimon, excluding all other men? If you say

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Gittin 82

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 82

ื“ืงื ืžื“ืœื’ ื•ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ ื—ื“ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

as it teaches by skipping one by one. The examples given relate to one witness missing, e.g., seven ties and six witnesses, and so on. They do not include a case in which two witnesses are missing, e.g., seven ties and five witnesses. This indicates that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai is only with regard to the signature of one witness. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื”ืื™ ืงืจื•ื‘ ื—ืชื™ื ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืืžืฆืข ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ืกื•ืฃ

Abaye said: Learn from it that this relative, who is allowed to sign a folded and tied bill of divorce, can sign if he wants to sign, either at the beginning, as the first signature, in the middle, or at the end.

ืžืžืื™ ืžื“ืœื ืงื‘ืข ืœื™ื” ืžืงื•ื ื•ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืžื›ืœ ืชืœืชื ืžืงื™ื™ืžื™ื ืŸ ื•ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ

From where does Abaye infer this? From the fact that it did not designate a place for him to sign. And learn from it, as well, that from any three of the witnesses who signed on a folded and tied bill of divorce, we can ratify the bill of divorce, i.e., it can be ratified based on their signatures. And we do not need to confirm the signatures specifically of three consecutive witnesses.

ื“ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืจืฆื•ืคื™ืŸ ืœืงื‘ืข ืœื™ื” ืžืงื•ื ืœื”ืื™ ืงืจื•ื‘ ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœื” ืื• ื‘ืืžืฆืข ืื• ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื•ืœื›ืฉืจ ื‘ื™ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ื

As if it enters your mind that we need consecutive witnesses, then they should designate a place for this relative to sign, in the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, and they should then validate the use of many disqualified witnesses. It could have been instituted that every third witness may be disqualified. Since in any group of three witnesses, two of them would be valid, more than one disqualified witness could be allowed. Since it is possible to ratify a bill of divorce by confirming signatures that are not consecutive, and therefore there is concern that the court will rely on two disqualified witnesses, the Sages consequently allowed the use of only one disqualified witness.

ื›ื™ ืืชื• ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืฆื ื•ื”ืฉืœื™ื ืขืœื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืฉื•ืง

With regard to the halakha concerning the dispute in the mishna, it is related that when they came before Rabbi Ami with a question pertaining to a bare bill of divorce that needed more witnesses, he said to the person overseeing: Go out and complete it even with a slave from the general public, in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ื”ื–ื•ืจืง

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืืœื ืœืคืœื•ื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืชื™ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืกืจื™ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื™ืขืฉื” ื™ื˜ืœื ื• ื”ื™ืžื ื” ื•ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื•ื™ืชื ื ื• ืœื” ื•ื™ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื›ืชื‘ื• ื‘ืชื•ื›ื• ืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื—ื–ืจ ื•ืžื—ืงื• ืคืกื•ืœ

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ella] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

ื’ืžืณ ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื”ื• ื”ืื™ ืืœื ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of this word ella in the husbandโ€™s statement? Does it mean except, i.e., the husband intended to divorce his wife in a manner that would render her permitted to marry only a limited group of men? Or does it mean: On the condition, i.e., the husband intended to grant her full divorce on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so?

ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ื•ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื“ื”ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืžื•ื“ื• ืœื™ื” ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื

The Gemara elaborates on how this dilemma affects the understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis: Does ella mean except, and therefore it is specifically with regard to the exception of a certain man from the intended divorce that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and hold that the divorce is invalid? This would be because in a case where the husband noted an exception, it is as if he left out part of her bill of divorce; since she is not permitted to remarry anyone she wishes it does not entirely sever the bond between them. But with regard to divorce on the condition that she will not marry a certain man the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer that it is valid, just as is the case with regard to any typical condition which the husband attaches to the divorce of his wife.

ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ื“ืคืœื™ื’ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžื•ื“ื” ื“ื”ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜

Or perhaps this is the meaning of ella: On the condition? Accordingly, it is specifically with regard to divorce on the condition that the wife will not marry a certain man that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and allows her to remarry based on this divorce; but with regard to the exception of a certain man from the womanโ€™s right to remarry he concedes that the divorce is invalid as the husband left out part of her bill of divorce.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืชื ืฉืžืข ื›ืœ ื”ื‘ืชื™ื ืžื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ืืœื ืฉืœ ื’ื•ื™ื ืื™ ืืžืจืช ื‘ืฉืœืžื ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืฉืคื™ืจ ืืœื ืื™ ืืžืจืช ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื”ื•ื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื“ืœื ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ื ืžื™ื˜ืžื• ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืœื ืžื˜ืžืื™ ื‘ืชื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ

Ravina said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following mishna (Negaโ€™im 12:1): All houses become ritually impure through leprous sores of the house except [ella] for those belonging to gentiles. Granted, if you say that the meaning of the word ella is except, this mishna is well understood. But if you say that its meaning is on the condition, the resulting interpretation of this mishna is that the houses of Jews become impure only on the condition that the houses of gentiles do not become impure; consequently, if the houses of gentiles become impure, the houses of Jews do not become impure. Does this interpretation make any sense?

ื•ืขื•ื“ ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืžื™ ืžื˜ืžืื™ ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืชืชื™ ื ื’ืข ืฆืจืขืช ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืืจืฅ ืื—ื•ื–ืชื›ื ืืจืฅ ืื—ื•ื–ืชื›ื ืžื˜ืžืื” ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ื•ืื™ืŸ ื‘ืชื™ ื’ื•ื™ื ืžื˜ืžืื™ืŸ ื‘ื ื’ืขื™ื ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

Moreover, an objection against this interpretation may be raised as follows: Do the houses of gentiles become ritually impure at all? But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita that from the verse: โ€œAnd I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possessionโ€ (Leviticus 14:34), it is derived that only the land of your possession, i.e., the houses of Jews, becomes impure through leprous sores of the house, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through leprosy? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the meaning of ella is except. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that ella means except.

ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืขืœ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืคืœื•ื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ืขืœ ืžื” ื ื—ืœืงื• ืขืœ ื”ืžื’ืจืฉ ืืฉืชื• ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืœื ืชื ืฉืื™ ืœืคืœื•ื ื™

According to this conclusion, our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so; rather, they were in agreement that in that case she is not divorced. With regard to what case did they disagree? It was with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man on the condition that you will not marry so-and-so,

ืฉืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžืชื™ืจ ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื•ืชื• ื”ืื™ืฉ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืกืจื™ื

as in this case Rabbi Eliezer permits her to marry any man except for that man about whom the condition was made, and the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as in their opinion this divorce is not valid.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืขืœืžื ืœื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื™ื” ื‘ื’ื˜ ื”ื›ื ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืœื” ื‘ื’ื˜

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion as cited in the baraita? The Gemara answers: The ruling here is just as it is with regard to any typical condition. The husband has the right to attach conditions to the divorce. And how would the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would reason that by attaching any typical condition the husband did not leave out part of the bill of divorce, as it does not diminish the essential act of severance. By contrast, here he left out part of the bill of divorce, as she is not permitted to marry any man she wishes. Therefore, the divorce is invalid.

ื•ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ืื•ืงื™ืžื ื ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ

The Gemara asks: And according to the mishna, which we established as referring to a case of exception, what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion that the divorce takes effect, despite its lack of complete severance?

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื ืื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื–ืงืŸ ืื—ื“ ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ืžื‘ื™ืชื• ื•ื”ืœื›ื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื” ืœืื™ืฉ ืื—ืจ ืืคื™ืœื• ืœื ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืืœื ืœืื™ืฉ ืื—ืจ ื”ืจื™ ื–ื• ืžื’ื•ืจืฉืช ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื”ืื™ ืื™ืฉ ืœื›ืœ ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื™ืฉ

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder that the verse states with regard to divorce: โ€œAnd she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2), indicating that even if he divorced her in a manner that only permitted her to marry one other man, she is divorced, i.e., this partial severance takes effect. And the Rabbis would say in response to Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s explanation that this phrase: Another man, which appears in the verse refers not to a specific man but to any man, i.e., it must be permitted for her to marry any man for the divorce to take effect.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืžื”ื›ื ื•ืืฉื” ื’ืจื•ืฉื” ืžืื™ืฉื” ืœื ื™ืงื—ื• ืืคื™ืœื• ืœื ื ืชื’ืจืฉื” ืืœื ืžืื™ืฉื” ื ืคืกืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ื›ื”ื•ื ื” ืืœืžื ื”ื•ื™ ื’ื™ื˜ื

And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said that the reason for Rabbi Eliezerโ€™s opinion is from the verse here, where it is stated with regard to priests: โ€œNeither may they take a woman divorced from her husbandโ€ (Leviticus 21:7). This verse indicates that even if she was divorced only from her husband, and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcรฉe, i.e., she may not marry a priest even after her husbandโ€™s death. Apparently, all the more so, divorce that excludes certain men from the wifeโ€™s right to remarry is considered a valid bill of divorce. This is certainly the case when the divorce permits her to marry all men with the exception of one.

ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืื™ืกื•ืจ ื›ื”ื•ื ื” ืฉืื ื™

And the Rabbis would respond that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, as even a divorce that is otherwise invalid disqualifies a woman from marrying a priest.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืืš ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ

ยง Rabbi Abba raises a dilemma: If this kind of exception is made in a case of betrothal, i.e., the man says to the woman that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for so-and-so, how is this betrothal treated? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื”ื›ื ืืœื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ื™ ืงืจืื™ ืื‘ืœ ื”ืชื ืงื ื™ืŸ ืžืขืœื™ื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying only here that the divorce is valid because verses are written that support this proposition, as delineated by Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoแธฅanan; but there, in the case of betrothal, a proper acquisition is necessary, which is not the case when a certain man is excluded from the prohibition to engage in sexual intercourse with her? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: โ€œAnd she departs out of his house,โ€ and the clause: โ€œAnd becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as a basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, teaching that just as divorce takes effect in this manner, so does betrothal?

ืชื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ืขื“ ื›ืืŸ ืœื ืงืืžืจื™ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื ืืœื ื“ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื›ืจื™ืชื•ืช ื•ืœื™ื›ื ืื‘ืœ ื”ืชื ืงื ื™ืŸ ื›ืœ ื“ื”ื• ืื• ื“ืœืžื ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Are the Rabbis saying here that the divorce is invalid only because the severance of the bond between the husband and wife is necessary for the divorce to take effect, and there is no such severance as long as the woman may not marry any man she wishes; but there, in the case of betrothal, any form of acquisition is sufficient for it to take effect? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause beginning: โ€œAnd she departs,โ€ and the clause beginning: โ€œAnd becomes,โ€ that what renders a divorce invalid renders a betrothal invalid as well?

ืœื‘ืชืจ ื“ืื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœื™ื” ื”ื“ืจ ืคืฉื˜ื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœืจื‘ื ืŸ ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื•ื™ืฆืื” ื•ื”ื™ืชื”

After Rabbi Abba raised the dilemma he then resolved it in the following manner: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is necessary to compare the halakha in the case of betrothal to the ruling with regard to divorce, based on the juxtaposition between โ€œAnd she departsโ€ and: โ€œAnd becomes.โ€ Therefore, the dispute remains in this case as well.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืื ืชืžืฆื ืœื•ืžืจ ืื™ืชื ืœื“ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื

Abaye said: If you say that Rabbi Abbaโ€™s solution is so, i.e., if you say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that making an exception in a betrothal is valid, the issue of levirate marriage in such cases must be addressed.

ื‘ื ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ื ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืžืชื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ืžืชื™ื‘ืžืช ืœืœื•ื™ ื•ืื™ืŸ ืื ื™ ืงื•ืจื ื‘ื” ืืฉืช ืฉื ื™ ืžืชื™ื

If Reuven came to a woman and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for his brother Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for Reuven, and they both died without children, in this case she performs levirate marriage with their brother Levi, and I do not call her the wife of two dead men. It is stated in tractate Yevamot (31b) that if a woman has a levirate bond with a man due to her two late husbands who were his brothers, she may not perform levirate marriage with him, as it is derived from the verse: โ€œThe wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the familyโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:5), that the wife of only one dead man performs levirate marriage, not the wife of two. Abaye stated that in the case under discussion the woman may perform levirate marriage with Levi.

ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืœื ืื”ื ื•

What is the reason that she is not considered to be the wife of two dead men? It is that although her betrothal to Reuven was effective, i.e., it took effect, her betrothal to Shimon was not effective, as it did not render her forbidden to any man to whom she was not already forbidden due to her betrothal to Reuven. Therefore, she is considered only Reuvenโ€™s wife.

ื•ืืœื ืืฉืช ืฉื ื™ ืžืชื™ื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื‘ื ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื‘ื ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ืงื™ื“ืฉื” ืกืชื ื“ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืœืžื™ืกืจื ืืขืœืžื ื•ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื“ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืื”ื ื• ืœืžื™ืกืจื ืืจืื•ื‘ืŸ

Rather, under what circumstances is the case of a wife of two dead men found in this context? It is found in a case where Reuven came and betrothed her, saying that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her without specifying any qualifications. Since Reuvenโ€™s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to everyone except for Shimon, and Shimonโ€™s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to Reuven, the betrothal of both brothers took effect. And if both of them die she may not perform levirate marriage with Levi, as she is the wife of two dead men.

ื‘ืขื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืžืจ ืœื” ื”ืจื™ ืืช ืžื•ืชืจืช ืœื›ืœ ืื“ื ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื—ื–ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืœื” ืœืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ื•ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืžื”ื•

Abaye raises a dilemma: If a man said to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for Reuven and Shimon, and he then said to her: You are permitted to marry Reuven and Shimon, what is the halakha?

ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืื™ ื“ืืกืจ ืฉืจื ืื• ื“ืœืžื ืžืื™ ื“ืืกืจ ืฉืจื ื•ืžืื™ ื“ืฉืจื ืืกืจ ืื ืชืžืฆื ืœื•ืžืจ

Do we say that what he forbade initially he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone, including Reuven and Shimon, in which case the severance is complete? Or perhaps what he forbade initially he then permitted, permitting her to marry Reuven and Shimon, and what he permitted initially he then forbade, i.e., he permitted her only to Reuven and Shimon, excluding all other men? If you say

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