Are you obligated in a hanging guilt offering if there was doubt regarding one piece or only if there were two pieces (and it is known that one was forbidden and one was not and is it unclear which one he/she ate)? What is the logic of each of the opinions? Can one voluntarily offer a hangling guilt offering even if there is no particular potential sin? If there is knowledge in between acts that one may have eaten something forbidden and therefore one brings multiple hanging guilt offerings, if it is later determined that both were actually forbidden and is now olbigated to bring a sin offering to complete the atonement, is one obligated one or two offerings?
This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
Keritot 18
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: סָפֵק בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן – יוֹצִיא, וְהַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר, וְחַיָּיב בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי. הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
The Gemara raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam. In such a case he must divorce her, but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And to atone for the possibility that they engaged in forbidden intercourse, they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ אֹתְיוֹם – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן. נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן – טְמֵאִין מִסָּפֵק וּפְטוּרִין מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
The Gemara raised another objection to Rabbi Zeira from a mishna (Nidda 14a): If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, the woman and her husband are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they are each liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara again answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב וְאַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וְאָכַל אַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן אָכַל – חַיָּיב. חֲתִיכָה, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלָהּ – פָּטוּר.
§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: In a case where one had two pieces of fat before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. But if there was only one piece before him and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? קָסָבַר: שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת – אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא, חֲתִיכָה אַחַת – לָא (קָבְעָה) [אִיקְּבַע] אִיסּוּרָא.
Rav Naḥman said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? He holds that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a prohibited piece before him, and nevertheless he proceeded to eat one of them. By contrast, he is exempt in the case of one uncertain piece, as the prohibition was not established.
מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא לְשֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרֵיהּ?
The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the reasoning for Rav’s opinion given by Rav Naḥman, that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, and the reasoning given by Rabbi Zeira, that if there is one piece it is impossible to identify its prohibition?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב וְאַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וּבָא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וּבָא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה, לְרָבָא – לֵיכָּא ״מִצְווֹת״ בְּעִידָּנָא דַּאֲכַל יִשְׂרָאֵל. לְרַבִּי זֵירָא – אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרֵיהּ. לְרַב נַחְמָן – אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where someone had two pieces of fat before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat. And a gentile came and ate the first piece, and then a Jew came and ate the second piece. According to Rava he is exempt, because at the time when the Jew ate the uncertain piece there was only one piece present, which does not fulfill the requirement of two items, as derived from the word mitzvot in the verse. According to Rabbi Zeira he is exempt because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, as both pieces are gone. But according to Rav Naḥman he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, as the presence of a prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a forbidden piece there at one point.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי – חַיָּיבִין עַל חֶלְבּוֹ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי! רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָא בָּעֵי קְבִיעוּתָא לְאִיסּוּרָא.
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a koy, one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. Rav Naḥman answered: Rabbi Eliezer does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: סָפֵק בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן, אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן – יוֹצִיא וְהַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר, וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
Rava raised another objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, and therefore he must divorce her; but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Once again, the Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלּוֹ – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן, נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ אֹתְיוֹם – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן, נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן – טְמֵאִים מִסָּפֵק וּפְטוּרִין מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי!
Rava raised a final objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna: If blood was found on his cloth, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days and they are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, they are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If it was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they each is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אִישְׁתִּיק. לְבָתַר דִּנְפַק אֲמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אֲמַרִי לֵיהּ דְּהָא מַנִּי רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּלָא בָּעֵי קְבִיעוּתָא לְאִיסּוּרָא?
When presented with this last objection, Rav Naḥman was silent and did not reply. After Rava left he said: What is the reason I did not say to him, i.e., I should have said to him, that in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בַּחוּץ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: If one slaughters an animal designated as a provisional guilt offering outside the Temple, Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering despite the fact that it is possible the owner of the first provisional guilt offering never violated any transgression and therefore was never obligated to bring his provisional guilt offering. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Meir it is not necessary for the prohibition to be established for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קָאֵי.
The Gemara asks: But why did Rav Naḥman say that he could have responded to Rava’s contradiction by claiming the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Let him say to him that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as was the response to the previous objections. The Gemara explains that this is what Rav Naḥman is teaching us: That the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir is that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says an established prohibition is not required for one to be obligated in a provisional guilt offering.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: חֲתִיכָה, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וַאֲכָלָהּ – בָּאנוּ לְמַחֲלוֹקֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וַחֲכָמִים.
§ Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: If there was a piece of fat before someone and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. In a mishna on 25a, Rabbi Eliezer states that one may bring a voluntary provisional guilt offering whenever he pleases. The Rabbis disagree and maintain that a provisional guilt offering may be brought only in a case of actual uncertainty whether one performed a sin for which he would be liable to bring a sin offering.
לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, מַאי אִירְיָא כִּי אַכְלַהּ? אֲפִילּוּ לָא אַכְלַהּ נָמֵי! דְּהָתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם!
The Gemara asks: Why did Rav specifically choose a case where one ate the item of uncertain status in order to exemplify the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? Even if he had not eaten anything, Rabbi Eliezer would also permit him to bring a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אַלִּיבָּא דְּבָבָא בֶּן בּוּטָא, דִּתְנַן: אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵית סָפֵק.
Rav Ashi said: Rav mentioned a case involving the consumption of an item whose status is uncertain in order to teach the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer in accordance with the opinion of Bava ben Buta, as we learned in the mishna: They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for the day after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur atones for all uncertain sins. He said: If they would have allowed me to do so I would have brought a provisional guilt offering even on that day. But they say to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. For this reason Rav presents a scenario where an item whose status is uncertain was consumed, in order to allow for the potential uncertainty that would justify bringing a provisional guilt offering.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וְאַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב, בָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, בָּא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה – חַיָּיב, וְכֵן כֶּלֶב, וְכֵן עוֹרֵב. בָּא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, בָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה – פָּטוּר. וְרַבִּי מְחַיֵּיב.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one had before him two pieces of fat, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, if a Jew came and ate the first piece and then a gentile came and ate the second, the Jew is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. And the same applies if a dog ate the second piece and the same is true if a raven ate it. But if a gentile came and ate the first piece and then a Jew came and ate the second piece, the Jew is exempt, because at the time that he ate the uncertain piece there was only one item of uncertainty. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as he does not maintain that two items are required for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה בְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב. הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּמֵזִיד, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי מְחַיֵּיב. אָכַל שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּמֵזִיד – פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם.
The baraita continues: If the Jew ate the first piece unwittingly and the second intentionally, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for the first piece. But if he ate the first piece intentionally and the second piece unwittingly, he is exempt, because at the time that he ate the second piece, only one piece was present. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring an offering. If he ate both of them intentionally, he is exempt from bringing anything.
שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּשׁוֹגֵג – שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּיבִין. הַשֵּׁנִי לֹא מִן הַדִּין, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר פָּטוּר – קָבַעְתָּ אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּחַטָּאת.
The baraita concludes: If two Jews each ate one of two items, each of them unwittingly, each of them is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, albeit for different reasons. The first is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering in case he ate the forbidden piece. By contrast, the second one is not strictly obligated by law, as he unwittingly ate the uncertain piece when there was no other piece present. Rather, the reason he is obligated is that if you say he is exempt, you have in effect established that the first individual is obligated to bring a sin offering. One might think that the second individual is exempt because he definitely ate the permitted piece, which would mean the first one ate the forbidden piece and he must therefore bring a sin offering.
וּמַנּוּ? אִי רַבִּי – מִן הַדִּין וּמִן הַדִּין הוּא! אִי רַבָּנַן – מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא נִקְבַּע רִאשׁוֹן בְּחַטָּאת, נֵימָא לֵיהּ לְשֵׁנִי: אַיְיתִי חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה?! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי:
The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, why does the baraita say the second individual is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering merely as a precaution and not by law? It is certainly by law that the second is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that one is obligated even for an uncertainty involving a single item. If it is in accordance with the Rabbis, can it be correct that merely in order to prevent a misunderstanding and ensure that we do not establish the first one as obligated to bring a sin offering, that we would say to the second individual: Bring and slaughter a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard? After all, he is not obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Rav Ashi said in response:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם. הִילְכָּךְ, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי וְאַתְנִי: אִי אָכַל רִאשׁוֹן שׁוּמָּן, הוּא אָכַל חֵלֶב – לֶיהֱוֵי כַּפָּרָה, וְאִי לָא – לֶיהֱוֵי נְדָבָה.
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says a person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day. Therefore, we say to the second person: Volunteer and bring a provisional guilt offering, to prevent the first individual from bringing an unwarranted sin offering. And he should stipulate: If the first person ate the piece of permitted fat, that means that he himself ate the forbidden fat and consequently the offering should be an atonement for his own transgression. And if not, i.e., if the first person ate the forbidden fat and he himself committed no transgression, let it be a gift offering.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אָכַל סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע לוֹ, סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע לוֹ – רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמֵּבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת – כָּךְ מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
The Sages taught in a baraita: A person unwittingly ate a piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was subsequently informed of its questionable status. He then unwittingly ate another piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was again informed of its questionable status. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one if he was later informed that they were all pieces of forbidden fat, so too, in these cases of uncertainty he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מֵבִיא אֶלָּא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״ – אֲפִילּוּ עַל שְׁגָגוֹת הַרְבֵּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אֶחָת.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda; Rabbi Elazar; and Rabbi Shimon all say: He is obligated to bring only one provisional guilt offering, as it is stated: “And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning the unwitting error which he committed unwittingly and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:18). It is derived from the verse’s double mention of his unwitting status, for which he is liable to bring one offering, that a person is obligated to bring only one offering even for many unwitting sins, despite the fact that he was informed of the uncertainty in between each instance of consumption.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת.
With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement in the baraita, Rabbi Zeira says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a principle with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for several unwitting transgressions: Knowledge of the questionable status of an uncertain case prior to each subsequent transgression divides them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings when one later learns that he definitely committed unwitting transgressions. In the case of the baraita, as he was informed prior to each instance of consumption of the uncertain status of the fat he ate before his subsequent consumption of uncertain fat, he is obligated to bring a sin offering for each instance of consumption if he later discovers he actually sinned.
רָבָא אָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, אֶלָּא הָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה וַדַּאי מֵבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, כָּךְ אִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעַת סָפֵק מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rava says: Knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression does not divide them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of consumption that the piece he ate was prohibited before eating each subsequent piece he would have been liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had knowledge of the uncertain status of the piece he ate before eating each subsequent piece, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. According to Rava, uncertain knowledge does not divide the unwitting transgressions to the extent that one is obligated to bring multiple sin offerings. Only definite knowledge renders one liable to bring multiple sin offerings.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרָא דִּידִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת? דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יְדִיעוֹת אֵין מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, וְחַטָּאת אַחַת מֵבִיא, אַמַּאי מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?
Abaye said to Rava: And you? Do you not hold that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression divides them with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for each one? As, if it enters your mind to say that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression does not divide them with regard to multiple sin offerings, and therefore one brings only one sin offering, why does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rule that he brings a provisional guilt offering for each and every one, when he had knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption?
וְהָתַנְיָא, כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: כֹּל שֶׁחֲלוּקִין בְּחַטָּאוֹת – חֲלוּקִין בַּאֲשָׁמוֹת!
After all, isn’t it taught in a baraita: The principle with regard to the matter is as follows: In any case where separate transgressions are divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple sin offerings, they are also considered divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple provisional guilt offerings in cases of uncertainty. If one does not bring several sin offerings in a case of definite transgression, he is not obligated to bring several provisional guilt offerings in a case of uncertainty either.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: וּלְדִידָךְ, דְּאָמְרַתְּ יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, אָכַל כְּזַיִת חֵלֶב לִפְנֵי יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וּכְזַיִת חֵלֶב אַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים, וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בִּמְקוֹם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָאֵי – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת?
Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: And according to you, that you said knowledge of uncertainty prior to each transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, if that is so, what would you say about the following case: Someone ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur itself stands in place of a provisional guilt offering, i.e., it atones for any prior uncertain transgression, if he later learned that both pieces were in fact forbidden fat, would you say that so too, Yom Kippur divides the two actions and that he is obligated to bring two sin offerings?
הָא בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] אַכְלִינּוּן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּיוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים מְכַפַּר עַל דְּלָא מִתְיְדַע לֵיהּ? דִּילְמָא וְהוּא דְּמִתְיְדַע לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: הוֹדַע וְלֹא הוֹדַע תְּנַן.
But this cannot be correct, as he ate both of them in a single lapse of awareness and there was no knowledge of sin to divide them. Rather, it stands to reason that like Yom Kippur, knowledge of uncertainty does not divide transgressions into multiple sin offering obligations. Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: That case in which Yom Kippur occurred in between transgressions is not comparable to having knowledge of uncertainty between each transgression. Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur atones for sins that were unknown to him? Perhaps it atones only for sins that were known to him. Rava said to him in reply: We learned this explicitly in a mishna (Shevuot 2b): Yom Kippur atones for sins whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: מָה אִילּוּ אָכַל כְּזַיִת חֵלֶב שַׁחֲרִית בְּיוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וּכְזַיִת חֵלֶב בְּמִנְחָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמִיחַיַּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת?
The Gemara cites another version of the difficulty raised against Abaye’s opinion: Some say that Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: Since Yom Kippur serves to divide the two acts of consumption into two obligations, similar to knowledge of the questionable status of fat according to Abaye, what is the halakha in the following case: If one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on the morning of Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon of Yom Kippur, so too would he be obligated to bring two sin offerings? This cannot be correct, as both olive-bulks were consumed in a single lapse of awareness.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים כֹּל שַׁעְתָּא מְכַפַּר? דִּילְמָא כּוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא מֵאוּרְתָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חַנָּה: תְּרָדָא, תַּנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁבָּא לְיָדוֹ סְפֵק עֲבֵירָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אֲפִילּוּ עִם חֲשֵׁיכָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁכׇּל הַיּוֹם מְכַפֵּר!
Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur provides atonement at every hour of the day? Perhaps the entire day as a single unit serves to provide atonement only when it begins, in the evening? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to him: Fool [terada]! It is taught in a mishna (25a): With regard to one who encountered uncertainty concerning whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.
מֵתִיב רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: אָכַל וְשָׁתָה בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אַחַת. וְהָא בֵּין אֲכִילָה לִשְׁתִיָּיה אִי אֶפְשָׁר דְּלֹא הֲוָה שְׁהוּת בַּיּוֹם, דְּמִתְיְידַע לֵיהּ וְכַפַּר לֵיהּ, דְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בִּמְקוֹם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָאֵי, וְקָתָנֵי: ״אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אֶחָת״.
Rav Idi bar Avin raises another objection to Abaye’s opinion from a mishna (Yoma 81a): If one ate and drank unwittingly on Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot it was Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But according to Abaye he should be liable to bring two sin offerings, as between the eating and the drinking it is impossible that there was no interval of even a minimal amount of time during the day. That interval of time would allow him to gain knowledge of the possible transgression, and therefore it should serve to atone for him, as Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt offering. And yet it is taught in the mishna: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, לִיחַיַּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת! אָמְרִי: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא – לְרַבִּי, הָא – רַבָּנַן הִיא.
Rav Idi bar Avin concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings for each one, this lapse of time on Yom Kippur should serve to divide his two transgressions and therefore he should be liable to bring two sin offerings. The Sages say in response: When Rabbi Zeira said that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each unwitting transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, he was clarifying the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. By contrast, this mishna, which indicates that the passage of time on Yom Kippur does not divide transgressions into obligations for separate sin offerings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי הִיא, דְּקָתָנֵי: שָׁתָה צִיר אוֹ מוּרְיָיס – פָּטוּר. הָא חוֹמֶץ – חַיָּיב,
The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it follows that the first clause is also in accordance with his opinion. This is significant, as that same mishna later teaches (Yoma 81a): If on Yom Kippur one drank the salty liquid in which fish are pickled, or fish brine [morayes], he is exempt. One can infer: But if he drank vinegar he is liable.
וּמַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: חוֹמֶץ אֵין מֵשִׁיב אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, חוֹמֶץ מֵשִׁיב אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ. וּמִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רַבִּי! אָמְרִי: סֵיפָא – רַבִּי, רֵישָׁא – רַבָּנַן.
And who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Vinegar does not revive the spirit, i.e., it does not have the status of a beverage, and therefore one who drinks it on Yom Kippur is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that vinegar does revive the spirit and is therefore considered like a beverage. And from the fact that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first clause must also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Sages say in response: That is not necessarily so, as one can say the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi whereas the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא: אָכַל הַיּוֹם אָכַל לְמָחָר, נֶהֱנָה הַיּוֹם נֶהֱנָה לְמָחָר, אָכַל הַיּוֹם נֶהֱנָה לְמָחָר, נֶהֱנָה הַיּוֹם אָכַל לְמָחָר, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן וְעַד שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים, מִנַּיִן שֶׁהֵן מִצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה?
Rava raised another objection to Abaye from a baraita: One is obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property only if he derived benefit of at least the value of one peruta from the property. If one unwittingly ate from consecrated property today and ate again tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from consecrated property today and again derived benefit tomorrow, or if he ate from the property today and derived benefit from it tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from it today and ate from it tomorrow, even if the time between them was as long as from now until three years later, from where is it derived that they combine with each other to amount to one peruta-worth of benefit and thereby render him obligated to bring a guilt offering?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּמְעוֹל מַעַל״ – רִיבָּה. וְאַמַּאי, הָא כַּיפַּר עֲלֵיהּ יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים!
The baraita answers that the verse states: “If anyone commits a misuse [tim’ol ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:15). The double verb [tim’ol ma’al] extended the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property to a case where the value of individual instances of misuse at different times amount to a total of one peruta. Rava concludes his objection: But why should that be the halakha according to Abaye, who maintains that knowledge of uncertainty, and similarly the day of Yom Kippur, which has the same effect as a provisional guilt offering, divides his actions into separate entities? When the second misuse occurs after Yom Kippur, isn’t his sin atoned for by Yom Kippur? Since his acts of possible transgression are divided, how can they combine to the value of one peruta?
אָמְרִי: כִּי מְכַפַּר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – עַל אִיסּוּרָא, עַל מָמוֹנָא לָא מְכַפַּר.
The Sages say in response: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? Only with regard to ritual prohibitions. But it does not atone with regard to monetary matters. Misuse of consecrated property entails a monetary obligation to restore the value of the principal with the addition of one-fifth. Since Yom Kippur does not exempt one from the monetary obligation entailed by a sin, the two acts of misuse combine to render one obligated to bring a guilt offering.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי מְכַפַּר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – עַל כּוּלֵּיהּ שִׁיעוּרָא, עַל פַּלְגָא דְּשִׁיעוּרָא לָא מְכַפַּר.
The Gemara suggests another answer. If you wish, say instead: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? It atones for sins only if they were committed in their full measure, but it does not atone for sins that one transgressed only by half of their full measure. Consequently, Yom Kippur does not atone for misuse of consecrated property of the value of less than one peruta, which is why the two acts of misuse combine.
וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת,
§ The Gemara cites the opinions of other amora’im with regard to this matter. Similarly, like Rabbi Zeira, Reish Lakish says: Here, in his statement in the baraita above, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that knowledge of uncertain status prior to each possible transgression divides them into separate obligations to bring sin offerings for each one. And like Rava, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees and says: Knowledge of uncertainty does not divide them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings.
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה וַדַּאי מֵבִיא עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, כָּךְ אִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעַת סָפֵק מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of unwitting consumption he would bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had had knowledge of the uncertainty of each piece prior to his subsequent instance of unwitting consumption he would be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. But knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption does not render him obligated to bring multiple sin offerings if he later finds out they were all definitely prohibited.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַיְינוּ דְּקָא תָלֵי לְאָשָׁם בְּחַטָּאת. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, חַטָּאת בְּאָשָׁם מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ! קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is why the baraita is formulated in a manner that indicates the halakha of a provisional guilt offering is dependent upon the halakhot governing the sin offering. Just as knowledge of an unwitting transgression renders one liable to bring a sin offering, so too, knowledge of uncertainty renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. But according to Reish Lakish, the baraita should have taught that the halakha of a sin offering is dependent upon the knowledge of uncertainty necessary to render one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, rather than the other way around. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.
וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרָמֵי דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. אַדְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּתַנְיָא: שְׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָמֵא וְאֶחָד טָהוֹר, וְהָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא נִכְנַס, בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan to another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and it likewise raises a contradiction from one statement of Reish Lakish to another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: There are two paths: one is ritually impure due to a corpse that is buried there and the other one is ritually pure, and it is unknown which path is which. If an individual walked on the first path and did not yet enter the Temple, and then he walked on the second path and afterward unwittingly entered the Temple, being that he certainly contracted ritual impurity after walking down both paths he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity.
הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס – פָּטוּר, בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב. הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס, וְהִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל, וְהָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב.
The baraita continues: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple he is exempt from bringing an offering. But if he then walked on the second path and afterward entered the Temple he is obligated to bring a sin offering, as he was definitely impure on one of the occasions that he entered the Temple. If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and subsequently went through the process of ritual purification, i.e., he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third day and again on the seventh day, and immersed, and then walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering, as he definitely entered the Temple while ritually impure, either on the first occasion or on the second.
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Modi’in, Israel
I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.
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Ashdod, Israel
I started learning with rabbis. I needed to know more than the stories. My first teacher to show me “the way of the Talmud” as well as the stories was Samara Schwartz.
Michelle Farber started the new cycle 2 yrs ago and I jumped on for the ride.
I do not look back.
Jenifer Nech
Houston, United States
It has been a pleasure keeping pace with this wonderful and scholarly group of women.
Janice Block
Beit Shemesh, Israel
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
Vitti Kones
מיתר, ישראל
I am grateful for the structure of the Daf Yomi. When I am freer to learn to my heart’s content, I learn other passages in addition. But even in times of difficulty, I always know that I can rely on the structure and social support of Daf Yomi learners all over the world.
I am also grateful for this forum. It is very helpful to learn with a group of enthusiastic and committed women.
Janice Block
Beit Shemesh, Israel
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Susan Fisher
Raanana, Israel
I had no formal learning in Talmud until I began my studies in the Joint Program where in 1976 I was one of the few, if not the only, woman talmud major. It was superior training for law school and enabled me to approach my legal studies with a foundation . In 2018, I began daf yomi listening to Rabbanit MIchelle’s pod cast and my daily talmud studies are one of the highlights of my life.
Terri Krivosha
Minneapolis, United States
In my Shana bet at Migdal Oz I attended the Hadran siyum hash”as. Witnessing so many women so passionate about their Torah learning and connection to God, I knew I had to begin with the coming cycle. My wedding (June 24) was two weeks before the siyum of mesechet yoma so I went a little ahead and was able to make a speech and siyum at my kiseh kallah on my wedding day!
Sharona Guggenheim Plumb
Givat Shmuel, Israel
After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.
Madeline Cohen
London, United Kingdom
I started the daf at the beginning of this cycle in January 2020. My husband, my children, grandchildren and siblings have been very supportive. As someone who learned and taught Tanach and mefarshim for many years, it has been an amazing adventure to complete the six sedarim of Mishnah, and now to study Talmud on a daily basis along with Rabbanit Michelle and the wonderful women of Hadran.
Rookie Billet
Jerusalem, Israel
My curiosity was peaked after seeing posts about the end of the last cycle. I am always looking for opportunities to increase my Jewish literacy & I am someone that is drawn to habit and consistency. Dinnertime includes a “Guess what I learned on the daf” segment for my husband and 18 year old twins. I also love the feelings of connection with my colleagues who are also learning.
Diana Bloom
Tampa, United States
I learned Mishnayot more than twenty years ago and started with Gemara much later in life. Although I never managed to learn Daf Yomi consistently, I am learning since some years Gemara in depth and with much joy. Since last year I am studying at the International Halakha Scholars Program at the WIHL. I often listen to Rabbanit Farbers Gemara shiurim to understand better a specific sugyiah. I am grateful for the help and inspiration!
Shoshana Ruerup
Berlin, Germany
A friend mentioned that she was starting Daf Yomi in January 2020. I had heard of it and thought, why not? I decided to try it – go day by day and not think about the seven plus year commitment. Fast forward today, over two years in and I can’t imagine my life without Daf Yomi. It’s part of my morning ritual. If I have a busy day ahead of me I set my alarm to get up early to finish the day’s daf
Debbie Fitzerman
Ontario, Canada
About a year into learning more about Judaism on a path to potential conversion, I saw an article about the upcoming Siyum HaShas in January of 2020. My curiosity was piqued and I immediately started investigating what learning the Daf actually meant. Daily learning? Just what I wanted. Seven and a half years? I love a challenge! So I dove in head first and I’ve enjoyed every moment!!
Nickie Matthews
Blacksburg, United States
I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .
Martha Tarazi
Panama, Panama
My first Talmud class experience was a weekly group in 1971 studying Taanit. In 2007 I resumed Talmud study with a weekly group I continue learning with. January 2020, I was inspired to try learning Daf Yomi. A friend introduced me to Daf Yomi for Women and Rabbanit Michelle Farber, I have kept with this program and look forward, G- willing, to complete the entire Shas with Hadran.
Lorri Lewis
Palo Alto, CA, United States
I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!
Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Minnesota, United States
“I got my job through the NY Times” was an ad campaign when I was growing up. I can headline “I got my daily Daf shiur and Hadran through the NY Times”. I read the January 4, 2020 feature on Reb. Michelle Farber and Hadran and I have been participating ever since. Thanks NY Times & Hadran!
Deborah Aschheim
New York, United States
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Michelle Lewis
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Keritot 18
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: סָפֵק בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן – יוֹצִיא, וְהַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר, וְחַיָּיב בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי. הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
The Gemara raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam. In such a case he must divorce her, but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And to atone for the possibility that they engaged in forbidden intercourse, they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ אֹתְיוֹם – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן. נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן – טְמֵאִין מִסָּפֵק וּפְטוּרִין מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
The Gemara raised another objection to Rabbi Zeira from a mishna (Nidda 14a): If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, the woman and her husband are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they are each liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara again answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב וְאַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וְאָכַל אַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן אָכַל – חַיָּיב. חֲתִיכָה, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלָהּ – פָּטוּר.
§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: In a case where one had two pieces of fat before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. But if there was only one piece before him and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? קָסָבַר: שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת – אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא, חֲתִיכָה אַחַת – לָא (קָבְעָה) [אִיקְּבַע] אִיסּוּרָא.
Rav Naḥman said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? He holds that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a prohibited piece before him, and nevertheless he proceeded to eat one of them. By contrast, he is exempt in the case of one uncertain piece, as the prohibition was not established.
מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא לְשֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרֵיהּ?
The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the reasoning for Rav’s opinion given by Rav Naḥman, that one is liable in the case of two pieces because the prohibition was established, and the reasoning given by Rabbi Zeira, that if there is one piece it is impossible to identify its prohibition?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב וְאַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וּבָא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וּבָא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה, לְרָבָא – לֵיכָּא ״מִצְווֹת״ בְּעִידָּנָא דַּאֲכַל יִשְׂרָאֵל. לְרַבִּי זֵירָא – אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרֵיהּ. לְרַב נַחְמָן – אִיקְּבַע אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where someone had two pieces of fat before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat. And a gentile came and ate the first piece, and then a Jew came and ate the second piece. According to Rava he is exempt, because at the time when the Jew ate the uncertain piece there was only one piece present, which does not fulfill the requirement of two items, as derived from the word mitzvot in the verse. According to Rabbi Zeira he is exempt because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, as both pieces are gone. But according to Rav Naḥman he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, as the presence of a prohibition was established, i.e., there was definitely a forbidden piece there at one point.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי – חַיָּיבִין עַל חֶלְבּוֹ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי! רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָא בָּעֵי קְבִיעוּתָא לְאִיסּוּרָא.
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a koy, one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. Rav Naḥman answered: Rabbi Eliezer does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: סָפֵק בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן, אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן – יוֹצִיא וְהַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר, וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.
Rava raised another objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: If one consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old and is the offspring of the first husband, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, and therefore he must divorce her; but the offspring is of unflawed lineage. And they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Once again, the Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלּוֹ – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן, נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ אֹתְיוֹם – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן, נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן – טְמֵאִים מִסָּפֵק וּפְטוּרִין מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְחַיָּיבִין בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי!
Rava raised a final objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna: If blood was found on his cloth, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days and they are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, they are impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If it was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case that they each is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אִישְׁתִּיק. לְבָתַר דִּנְפַק אֲמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אֲמַרִי לֵיהּ דְּהָא מַנִּי רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּלָא בָּעֵי קְבִיעוּתָא לְאִיסּוּרָא?
When presented with this last objection, Rav Naḥman was silent and did not reply. After Rava left he said: What is the reason I did not say to him, i.e., I should have said to him, that in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not require the prohibition to be established in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בַּחוּץ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: If one slaughters an animal designated as a provisional guilt offering outside the Temple, Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering despite the fact that it is possible the owner of the first provisional guilt offering never violated any transgression and therefore was never obligated to bring his provisional guilt offering. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Meir it is not necessary for the prohibition to be established for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קָאֵי.
The Gemara asks: But why did Rav Naḥman say that he could have responded to Rava’s contradiction by claiming the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Let him say to him that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as was the response to the previous objections. The Gemara explains that this is what Rav Naḥman is teaching us: That the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir is that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says an established prohibition is not required for one to be obligated in a provisional guilt offering.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: חֲתִיכָה, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וַאֲכָלָהּ – בָּאנוּ לְמַחֲלוֹקֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וַחֲכָמִים.
§ Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: If there was a piece of fat before someone and it was uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and he ate it, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. In a mishna on 25a, Rabbi Eliezer states that one may bring a voluntary provisional guilt offering whenever he pleases. The Rabbis disagree and maintain that a provisional guilt offering may be brought only in a case of actual uncertainty whether one performed a sin for which he would be liable to bring a sin offering.
לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, מַאי אִירְיָא כִּי אַכְלַהּ? אֲפִילּוּ לָא אַכְלַהּ נָמֵי! דְּהָתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם!
The Gemara asks: Why did Rav specifically choose a case where one ate the item of uncertain status in order to exemplify the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? Even if he had not eaten anything, Rabbi Eliezer would also permit him to bring a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אַלִּיבָּא דְּבָבָא בֶּן בּוּטָא, דִּתְנַן: אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵית סָפֵק.
Rav Ashi said: Rav mentioned a case involving the consumption of an item whose status is uncertain in order to teach the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer in accordance with the opinion of Bava ben Buta, as we learned in the mishna: They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for the day after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur atones for all uncertain sins. He said: If they would have allowed me to do so I would have brought a provisional guilt offering even on that day. But they say to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. For this reason Rav presents a scenario where an item whose status is uncertain was consumed, in order to allow for the potential uncertainty that would justify bringing a provisional guilt offering.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וְאַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב, בָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, בָּא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה – חַיָּיב, וְכֵן כֶּלֶב, וְכֵן עוֹרֵב. בָּא גּוֹי וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, בָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָכַל אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה – פָּטוּר. וְרַבִּי מְחַיֵּיב.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one had before him two pieces of fat, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, if a Jew came and ate the first piece and then a gentile came and ate the second, the Jew is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. And the same applies if a dog ate the second piece and the same is true if a raven ate it. But if a gentile came and ate the first piece and then a Jew came and ate the second piece, the Jew is exempt, because at the time that he ate the uncertain piece there was only one item of uncertainty. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as he does not maintain that two items are required for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
אָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה בְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב. הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּמֵזִיד, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי מְחַיֵּיב. אָכַל שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּמֵזִיד – פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם.
The baraita continues: If the Jew ate the first piece unwittingly and the second intentionally, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for the first piece. But if he ate the first piece intentionally and the second piece unwittingly, he is exempt, because at the time that he ate the second piece, only one piece was present. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him obligated to bring an offering. If he ate both of them intentionally, he is exempt from bringing anything.
שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּשׁוֹגֵג – שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּיבִין. הַשֵּׁנִי לֹא מִן הַדִּין, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר פָּטוּר – קָבַעְתָּ אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּחַטָּאת.
The baraita concludes: If two Jews each ate one of two items, each of them unwittingly, each of them is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, albeit for different reasons. The first is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering in case he ate the forbidden piece. By contrast, the second one is not strictly obligated by law, as he unwittingly ate the uncertain piece when there was no other piece present. Rather, the reason he is obligated is that if you say he is exempt, you have in effect established that the first individual is obligated to bring a sin offering. One might think that the second individual is exempt because he definitely ate the permitted piece, which would mean the first one ate the forbidden piece and he must therefore bring a sin offering.
וּמַנּוּ? אִי רַבִּי – מִן הַדִּין וּמִן הַדִּין הוּא! אִי רַבָּנַן – מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא נִקְבַּע רִאשׁוֹן בְּחַטָּאת, נֵימָא לֵיהּ לְשֵׁנִי: אַיְיתִי חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה?! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי:
The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, why does the baraita say the second individual is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering merely as a precaution and not by law? It is certainly by law that the second is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that one is obligated even for an uncertainty involving a single item. If it is in accordance with the Rabbis, can it be correct that merely in order to prevent a misunderstanding and ensure that we do not establish the first one as obligated to bring a sin offering, that we would say to the second individual: Bring and slaughter a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard? After all, he is not obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. Rav Ashi said in response:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם. הִילְכָּךְ, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי וְאַתְנִי: אִי אָכַל רִאשׁוֹן שׁוּמָּן, הוּא אָכַל חֵלֶב – לֶיהֱוֵי כַּפָּרָה, וְאִי לָא – לֶיהֱוֵי נְדָבָה.
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says a person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day. Therefore, we say to the second person: Volunteer and bring a provisional guilt offering, to prevent the first individual from bringing an unwarranted sin offering. And he should stipulate: If the first person ate the piece of permitted fat, that means that he himself ate the forbidden fat and consequently the offering should be an atonement for his own transgression. And if not, i.e., if the first person ate the forbidden fat and he himself committed no transgression, let it be a gift offering.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אָכַל סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע לוֹ, סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע לוֹ – רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמֵּבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת – כָּךְ מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
The Sages taught in a baraita: A person unwittingly ate a piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was subsequently informed of its questionable status. He then unwittingly ate another piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was again informed of its questionable status. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one if he was later informed that they were all pieces of forbidden fat, so too, in these cases of uncertainty he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מֵבִיא אֶלָּא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״ – אֲפִילּוּ עַל שְׁגָגוֹת הַרְבֵּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אֶחָת.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda; Rabbi Elazar; and Rabbi Shimon all say: He is obligated to bring only one provisional guilt offering, as it is stated: “And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning the unwitting error which he committed unwittingly and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:18). It is derived from the verse’s double mention of his unwitting status, for which he is liable to bring one offering, that a person is obligated to bring only one offering even for many unwitting sins, despite the fact that he was informed of the uncertainty in between each instance of consumption.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת.
With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement in the baraita, Rabbi Zeira says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a principle with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for several unwitting transgressions: Knowledge of the questionable status of an uncertain case prior to each subsequent transgression divides them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings when one later learns that he definitely committed unwitting transgressions. In the case of the baraita, as he was informed prior to each instance of consumption of the uncertain status of the fat he ate before his subsequent consumption of uncertain fat, he is obligated to bring a sin offering for each instance of consumption if he later discovers he actually sinned.
רָבָא אָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, אֶלָּא הָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה וַדַּאי מֵבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, כָּךְ אִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעַת סָפֵק מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rava says: Knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression does not divide them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of consumption that the piece he ate was prohibited before eating each subsequent piece he would have been liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had knowledge of the uncertain status of the piece he ate before eating each subsequent piece, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. According to Rava, uncertain knowledge does not divide the unwitting transgressions to the extent that one is obligated to bring multiple sin offerings. Only definite knowledge renders one liable to bring multiple sin offerings.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרָא דִּידִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת? דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יְדִיעוֹת אֵין מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, וְחַטָּאת אַחַת מֵבִיא, אַמַּאי מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?
Abaye said to Rava: And you? Do you not hold that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression divides them with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for each one? As, if it enters your mind to say that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression does not divide them with regard to multiple sin offerings, and therefore one brings only one sin offering, why does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rule that he brings a provisional guilt offering for each and every one, when he had knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption?
וְהָתַנְיָא, כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: כֹּל שֶׁחֲלוּקִין בְּחַטָּאוֹת – חֲלוּקִין בַּאֲשָׁמוֹת!
After all, isn’t it taught in a baraita: The principle with regard to the matter is as follows: In any case where separate transgressions are divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple sin offerings, they are also considered divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple provisional guilt offerings in cases of uncertainty. If one does not bring several sin offerings in a case of definite transgression, he is not obligated to bring several provisional guilt offerings in a case of uncertainty either.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: וּלְדִידָךְ, דְּאָמְרַתְּ יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, אָכַל כְּזַיִת חֵלֶב לִפְנֵי יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וּכְזַיִת חֵלֶב אַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים, וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בִּמְקוֹם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָאֵי – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת?
Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: And according to you, that you said knowledge of uncertainty prior to each transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, if that is so, what would you say about the following case: Someone ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur itself stands in place of a provisional guilt offering, i.e., it atones for any prior uncertain transgression, if he later learned that both pieces were in fact forbidden fat, would you say that so too, Yom Kippur divides the two actions and that he is obligated to bring two sin offerings?
הָא בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] אַכְלִינּוּן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּיוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים מְכַפַּר עַל דְּלָא מִתְיְדַע לֵיהּ? דִּילְמָא וְהוּא דְּמִתְיְדַע לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: הוֹדַע וְלֹא הוֹדַע תְּנַן.
But this cannot be correct, as he ate both of them in a single lapse of awareness and there was no knowledge of sin to divide them. Rather, it stands to reason that like Yom Kippur, knowledge of uncertainty does not divide transgressions into multiple sin offering obligations. Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: That case in which Yom Kippur occurred in between transgressions is not comparable to having knowledge of uncertainty between each transgression. Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur atones for sins that were unknown to him? Perhaps it atones only for sins that were known to him. Rava said to him in reply: We learned this explicitly in a mishna (Shevuot 2b): Yom Kippur atones for sins whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: מָה אִילּוּ אָכַל כְּזַיִת חֵלֶב שַׁחֲרִית בְּיוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וּכְזַיִת חֵלֶב בְּמִנְחָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמִיחַיַּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת?
The Gemara cites another version of the difficulty raised against Abaye’s opinion: Some say that Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: Since Yom Kippur serves to divide the two acts of consumption into two obligations, similar to knowledge of the questionable status of fat according to Abaye, what is the halakha in the following case: If one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on the morning of Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon of Yom Kippur, so too would he be obligated to bring two sin offerings? This cannot be correct, as both olive-bulks were consumed in a single lapse of awareness.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים כֹּל שַׁעְתָּא מְכַפַּר? דִּילְמָא כּוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא מֵאוּרְתָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חַנָּה: תְּרָדָא, תַּנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁבָּא לְיָדוֹ סְפֵק עֲבֵירָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אֲפִילּוּ עִם חֲשֵׁיכָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁכׇּל הַיּוֹם מְכַפֵּר!
Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur provides atonement at every hour of the day? Perhaps the entire day as a single unit serves to provide atonement only when it begins, in the evening? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to him: Fool [terada]! It is taught in a mishna (25a): With regard to one who encountered uncertainty concerning whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.
מֵתִיב רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: אָכַל וְשָׁתָה בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אַחַת. וְהָא בֵּין אֲכִילָה לִשְׁתִיָּיה אִי אֶפְשָׁר דְּלֹא הֲוָה שְׁהוּת בַּיּוֹם, דְּמִתְיְידַע לֵיהּ וְכַפַּר לֵיהּ, דְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בִּמְקוֹם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָאֵי, וְקָתָנֵי: ״אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אֶחָת״.
Rav Idi bar Avin raises another objection to Abaye’s opinion from a mishna (Yoma 81a): If one ate and drank unwittingly on Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot it was Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But according to Abaye he should be liable to bring two sin offerings, as between the eating and the drinking it is impossible that there was no interval of even a minimal amount of time during the day. That interval of time would allow him to gain knowledge of the possible transgression, and therefore it should serve to atone for him, as Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt offering. And yet it is taught in the mishna: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, לִיחַיַּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת! אָמְרִי: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא – לְרַבִּי, הָא – רַבָּנַן הִיא.
Rav Idi bar Avin concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings for each one, this lapse of time on Yom Kippur should serve to divide his two transgressions and therefore he should be liable to bring two sin offerings. The Sages say in response: When Rabbi Zeira said that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each unwitting transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, he was clarifying the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. By contrast, this mishna, which indicates that the passage of time on Yom Kippur does not divide transgressions into obligations for separate sin offerings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי הִיא, דְּקָתָנֵי: שָׁתָה צִיר אוֹ מוּרְיָיס – פָּטוּר. הָא חוֹמֶץ – חַיָּיב,
The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it follows that the first clause is also in accordance with his opinion. This is significant, as that same mishna later teaches (Yoma 81a): If on Yom Kippur one drank the salty liquid in which fish are pickled, or fish brine [morayes], he is exempt. One can infer: But if he drank vinegar he is liable.
וּמַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: חוֹמֶץ אֵין מֵשִׁיב אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי, חוֹמֶץ מֵשִׁיב אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ. וּמִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רַבִּי! אָמְרִי: סֵיפָא – רַבִּי, רֵישָׁא – רַבָּנַן.
And who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Vinegar does not revive the spirit, i.e., it does not have the status of a beverage, and therefore one who drinks it on Yom Kippur is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that vinegar does revive the spirit and is therefore considered like a beverage. And from the fact that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first clause must also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Sages say in response: That is not necessarily so, as one can say the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi whereas the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא: אָכַל הַיּוֹם אָכַל לְמָחָר, נֶהֱנָה הַיּוֹם נֶהֱנָה לְמָחָר, אָכַל הַיּוֹם נֶהֱנָה לְמָחָר, נֶהֱנָה הַיּוֹם אָכַל לְמָחָר, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן וְעַד שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים, מִנַּיִן שֶׁהֵן מִצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה?
Rava raised another objection to Abaye from a baraita: One is obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property only if he derived benefit of at least the value of one peruta from the property. If one unwittingly ate from consecrated property today and ate again tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from consecrated property today and again derived benefit tomorrow, or if he ate from the property today and derived benefit from it tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from it today and ate from it tomorrow, even if the time between them was as long as from now until three years later, from where is it derived that they combine with each other to amount to one peruta-worth of benefit and thereby render him obligated to bring a guilt offering?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּמְעוֹל מַעַל״ – רִיבָּה. וְאַמַּאי, הָא כַּיפַּר עֲלֵיהּ יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים!
The baraita answers that the verse states: “If anyone commits a misuse [tim’ol ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:15). The double verb [tim’ol ma’al] extended the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property to a case where the value of individual instances of misuse at different times amount to a total of one peruta. Rava concludes his objection: But why should that be the halakha according to Abaye, who maintains that knowledge of uncertainty, and similarly the day of Yom Kippur, which has the same effect as a provisional guilt offering, divides his actions into separate entities? When the second misuse occurs after Yom Kippur, isn’t his sin atoned for by Yom Kippur? Since his acts of possible transgression are divided, how can they combine to the value of one peruta?
אָמְרִי: כִּי מְכַפַּר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – עַל אִיסּוּרָא, עַל מָמוֹנָא לָא מְכַפַּר.
The Sages say in response: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? Only with regard to ritual prohibitions. But it does not atone with regard to monetary matters. Misuse of consecrated property entails a monetary obligation to restore the value of the principal with the addition of one-fifth. Since Yom Kippur does not exempt one from the monetary obligation entailed by a sin, the two acts of misuse combine to render one obligated to bring a guilt offering.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי מְכַפַּר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – עַל כּוּלֵּיהּ שִׁיעוּרָא, עַל פַּלְגָא דְּשִׁיעוּרָא לָא מְכַפַּר.
The Gemara suggests another answer. If you wish, say instead: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? It atones for sins only if they were committed in their full measure, but it does not atone for sins that one transgressed only by half of their full measure. Consequently, Yom Kippur does not atone for misuse of consecrated property of the value of less than one peruta, which is why the two acts of misuse combine.
וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת,
§ The Gemara cites the opinions of other amora’im with regard to this matter. Similarly, like Rabbi Zeira, Reish Lakish says: Here, in his statement in the baraita above, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that knowledge of uncertain status prior to each possible transgression divides them into separate obligations to bring sin offerings for each one. And like Rava, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees and says: Knowledge of uncertainty does not divide them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings.
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה וַדַּאי מֵבִיא עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, כָּךְ אִם הָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעַת סָפֵק מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of unwitting consumption he would bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had had knowledge of the uncertainty of each piece prior to his subsequent instance of unwitting consumption he would be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. But knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption does not render him obligated to bring multiple sin offerings if he later finds out they were all definitely prohibited.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַיְינוּ דְּקָא תָלֵי לְאָשָׁם בְּחַטָּאת. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, חַטָּאת בְּאָשָׁם מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ! קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is why the baraita is formulated in a manner that indicates the halakha of a provisional guilt offering is dependent upon the halakhot governing the sin offering. Just as knowledge of an unwitting transgression renders one liable to bring a sin offering, so too, knowledge of uncertainty renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. But according to Reish Lakish, the baraita should have taught that the halakha of a sin offering is dependent upon the knowledge of uncertainty necessary to render one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, rather than the other way around. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.
וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרָמֵי דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. אַדְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּתַנְיָא: שְׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָמֵא וְאֶחָד טָהוֹר, וְהָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא נִכְנַס, בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan to another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and it likewise raises a contradiction from one statement of Reish Lakish to another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: There are two paths: one is ritually impure due to a corpse that is buried there and the other one is ritually pure, and it is unknown which path is which. If an individual walked on the first path and did not yet enter the Temple, and then he walked on the second path and afterward unwittingly entered the Temple, being that he certainly contracted ritual impurity after walking down both paths he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity.
הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס – פָּטוּר, בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב. הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס, וְהִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל, וְהָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב.
The baraita continues: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple he is exempt from bringing an offering. But if he then walked on the second path and afterward entered the Temple he is obligated to bring a sin offering, as he was definitely impure on one of the occasions that he entered the Temple. If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and subsequently went through the process of ritual purification, i.e., he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third day and again on the seventh day, and immersed, and then walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering, as he definitely entered the Temple while ritually impure, either on the first occasion or on the second.
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