Ketubot 102
לָא, בִּשְׁטָרֵי פְסִיקָתָא, וְכִדְרַב גִּידֵּל.
The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to a case of documents of stipulation that record the amounts that parents agree to provide to their son or daughter, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel.
דְּאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: כַּמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִנְךָ? כָּךְ וְכָךְ. וְכַמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִתְּךָ? כָּךְ וְכָךְ. עָמְדוּ וְקִידְּשׁוּ — קָנוּ. הֵן הֵן הַדְּבָרִים הַנִּקְנִין בַּאֲמִירָה.
As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children, one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.
תָּא שְׁמַע, כָּתַב לְכֹהֵן: ״שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּיב לְךָ חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים״ — חַיָּיב לִיתֵּן לוֹ חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים, וּבְנוֹ אֵינוֹ פָּדוּי.
Come and hear another challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish, based upon the following mishna (Bekhorot 51a): If he wrote to a priest with whom he wants to perform the redemption of his firstborn son: I am obligated to pay you five sela, then he is obligated to give him five sela and his son is not redeemed even once he pays the money. This baraita apparently supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דִּמְשׁוּעְבַּד לֵיהּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא: אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי כָּתַב? כְּדֵי לְבָרֵר לוֹ כֹּהֵן.
The Gemara answers: It is different there, because he is obligated to give the five sela to him by Torah law in order to fulfill his obligation of redeeming his firstborn son, even without writing a contract. The Gemara asks: If that is so, why did he write the contract at all? The Gemara answers: In order to select for himself a specific priest with whom to perform the redemption of his son.
אִי הָכִי, בְּנוֹ אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ פָּדוּי? כִּדְעוּלָּא. דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה — פָּדוּי לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן, וּמַאי טַעְמָא אָמְרוּ בְּנוֹ אֵינוֹ פָּדוּי? גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ פּוֹדִין בִּשְׁטָרוֹת.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, why is his son not redeemed once he pays the money? The Gemara answers: This is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. As Ulla said, by Torah law a son is redeemed when the father gives the money. And for what reason did the Sages say: His son is not redeemed? It is a rabbinic decree that was enacted lest people say that one can redeem a firstborn son with documents, i.e., by giving a document allowing the priest to collect a debt from a third party. This is not effective, since the Torah requires that one redeem his son with actual money.
אָמַר רָבָא, כְּתַנָּאֵי: עָרֵב הַיּוֹצֵא אַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת — גּוֹבֶה מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין.
Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is like a dispute between tanna’im over the same matter in the following mishna (Bava Batra 175b): In a case where a guarantor appears after the signatures in contracts, i.e., someone wrote that he is a guarantor for a loan after the contract was signed, the creditor collects only from the unsold property of the guarantor. Since the guarantee is not viewed as though it were written in the document, it is like a loan by oral agreement, which is collected only from unsold property.
מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְאָמַר: גּוֹבֶה מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. אָמַר לוֹ בֶּן נַנָּס: אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה לֹא מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין וְלֹא מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים.
An incident came before Rabbi Yishmael, and he said: The creditor collects from unsold property. Ben Nannas said to him: He does not collect from the guarantor at all; not from unsold property, nor from liened property that was sold, since what the guarantor wrote has no legal standing whatsoever.
אָמַר לוֹ: לָמָּה? אָמַר לוֹ: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה חוֹנֵק אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בַּשּׁוּק, וּמְצָא[וֹ] חֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ: הַנַּח לוֹ, וַאֲנִי אֶתֵּן לָךְ — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא עַל אֱמוּנָתוֹ הִלְוָהוּ.
Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Why? Ben Nannas said to him: If someone was strangling another in the marketplace and demanding money that is owed to him, and a friend of the victim found him and said to the strangler: Leave him alone and I will give you what you are demanding from him, the friend of the victim is exempt from having to make any payment. This is because the creditor did not lend the money based on his trust in the friend of the victim, as the friend promised to repay the loan only after the money had been loaned. The same should apply in the case of the guarantor who comes after the contracts were already signed.
לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמַר כְּבֶן נַנָּס.
Rava concludes: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that the obligation that one accepts upon himself is binding, and Reish Lakish stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.
אַלִּיבָּא דְּבֶן נַנָּס כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי,
The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of ben Nannas, everyone agrees that if he wrote in a contract: I owe you one hundred dinars, he is not obligated to pay.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הָתָם אֶלָּא דְּשָׁיֵיךְ לֵיהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדָא דְאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל הָכָא לָא שָׁיֵיךְ שִׁיעְבּוּדָא דְאוֹרָיְיתָא.
When they disagree, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yoḥanan stated his ruling in accordance with the simple interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And Reish Lakish holds that Rabbi Yishmael states his opinion only there, in the case of the guarantor, which relates to an obligation of Torah law, since a guarantor is obligated by Torah law to pay. But here, where the case does not relate to an obligation of Torah law, as the man did not owe any money until he accepted this obligation upon himself, even Rabbi Yishmael would exempt him from paying.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: ״כַּמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִנְךָ?״, ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״. ״וְכַמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִתְּךָ?״, ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״. עָמְדוּ וְקִידְּשׁוּ קָנוּ, הֵן הֵן הַדְּבָרִים הַנִּקְנִים בַּאֲמִירָה.
§ The Gemara continues to analyze the matter itself mentioned earlier: Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children and one side says to the other: How much do you give your son? And the second side answers: Such and such amount. How much do you give your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount. Then, if the son and daughter arose and performed the betrothal, all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone, without the need for an additional act of acquisition. The mishna is referring to a document that records such an agreement.
אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתָא דְּרַב בְּבִתּוֹ נַעֲרָה — דְּקָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ, אֲבָל בּוֹגֶרֶת דְּלָא מָטֵי הֲנָאָה לִידֵיהּ — לָא.
Rava said: Rav’s statement is reasonable in a case of a father whose daughter is a young woman, since the father derives benefit from this betrothal. The money given by the groom for the betrothal, as well as the rights to the bride’s marriage contract, belong to the father of the bride. Consequently, he accepts through verbal agreement alone the obligation to pay the money he specified. However, in the case of a grown woman, where the father does not derive benefit from the betrothal because the rights to the betrothal money and marriage contract belong to the woman herself, no, the father does not become obligated to pay the money he specified through verbal agreement alone.
וְהָאֱלֹהִים! אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ בּוֹגֶרֶת. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, אֲבִי הַבֵּן מַאי הֲנָאָה אֲתָא לִידֵיהּ? אֶלָּא בְּהַהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָמִיחַתְּנִי אַהֲדָדֵי גָּמְרִי וּמַקְנִי לַהֲדָדֵי.
Rava continues: But by God! Rav said his ruling even with regard to a grown woman, as, if you do not say so, in the case of the father of the groom, what monetary benefit does he derive from the betrothal? Rather, it must be explained that in exchange for that benefit, i.e., that the groom and bride marry each other, the fathers fully transfer the rights to the respective payments to each other.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב, אוֹ לֹא נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֹא נִיתְּנוּ לִיכָּתֵב.
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Are these matters, i.e., verbal agreements concerning an upcoming marriage, allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract, or are they not allowed to be written down afterward in a proper contract? Rav Ashi said to him: They are not allowed to be written down.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַפִּקְחִין הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאָזוּן אֶת בִּתֵּךְ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאַתְּ עִמִּי״! מַאי ״כּוֹתְבִין״ — אוֹמְרִים.
Ravina raised an objection to this from the mishna: The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. This indicates that one may document these verbal agreements. Rav Ashi responded: What is the meaning of the term write in this case? It means say.
וְקָרֵי לֵיהּ לַאֲמִירָה כְּתִיבָה? אִין, וְהָתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״, וְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ.
Ravina continued to ask: Does the tanna refer to saying as writing? Rav Ashi replied: Yes. And so we learned in the mishna (83a): One who writes to his wife: I have no legal dealings or involvement in your properties, and Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in explanation, that it means: One who says to his wife. This proves that verbal agreements are sometimes referred to in the Mishna as writing.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶם. הָא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶם כּוֹתְבִין. מַאי לָאו שְׁטָרֵי פְסִיקָתָא!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the following mishna (Bava Batra 167b): One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both of them. It may be derived from here that with the consent of both of them, one may write the documents. What, is it not that this mishna is discussing documents of stipulation that specify the agreements accepted by each side before the marriage?
לָא, שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין מַמָּשׁ. כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא. דְּאִיתְּמַר: כְּתָבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ, וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ — רַבָּה וְרָבִינָא אָמְרִי: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא אָמְרִי: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
The Gemara rejects this: No, the discussion concerns actual betrothal documents. In other words, in a case where a man betroths a woman by giving her a document that states: You are hereby betrothed to me, the document must be written with the consent of both the man and the woman, in accordance with the opinions of Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya. As it was stated: If the husband wrote a betrothal document for the sake of a specific woman and gave it to her, but he wrote it without her consent, Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed to this man. Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מֵתוּ — בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִיזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וְהִיא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב.
The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another proof that verbal agreements may be written down, based upon the mishna: If the two husbands died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain for five years, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that they are contractually obligated to pay her. The fact that she is able to repossess liened property indicates that the agreement is recorded in a document.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Here, we are dealing with a case where the woman acquired from each husband the right to her daughter’s sustenance, i.e., they performed an act of acquisition and did not suffice with a mere verbal agreement. Consequently, the agreement may be recorded in a document.
אִי הָכִי, בָּנוֹת נָמֵי! בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ לָזוֹ וְלֹא קָנוּ לָזוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that a proper mode of acquisition was employed, then let the husbands’ own daughters also repossess liened properties that were sold. The Gemara answers: The case is such where they acquired the right to receive sustenance for this daughter of the wife, and they did not acquire this right for that daughter, i.e., they did not perform an act of acquisition confirming their obligations to provide sustenance for their own daughters.
וּמַאי פַּסְקָא? אִיהִי דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן — מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן, בָּנוֹת דְּלָא הֲווֹ בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן — לָא מַהֲנֵי לְהוּ קִנְיָן.
The Gemara asks: What makes it necessary to say that the case is one in which an acquisition was made on behalf of the wife’s daughter and not on behalf of the husbands’ own daughters? The Gemara answers: She, the wife’s daughter from a previous marriage, was present at the time of the transaction when her mother was wed. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. With regard to the daughters of the husbands, who were born after their parents’ marriage and were not present at the time of the transaction, for them the transaction is not effective.
מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי — כְּגוֹן דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ!
The Gemara asks: Are we not also dealing with a situation where the husband’s daughters were present at the time of the transaction? And what are the circumstances that would allow for such a reality? This could occur in a situation such as where each one divorced his wife and then took her back, and they had a daughter from their first marriage.
אֶלָּא: אִיהִי דְּלֵיתַאּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין — מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן, בָּנוֹת דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין — לָא מַהֲנֵי לְהוּ קִנְיָן.
Rather, the distinction is as follows: She, the wife’s daughter, is not included in the stipulation of the court requiring a husband to support his daughters. Consequently, for her the transaction is effective. However, with regard to the husband’s own daughters, who are included in the stipulation of the court, for them the transaction is not effective.
מִגְרָע גָּרְעִי? אֶלָּא: בְּנוֹתָיו הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא — כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין, אֵימַר צְרָרֵי אֶתְפְּסִינְהוּ.
The Gemara wonders about this: Because they are included in the stipulation of the court they are worse off? On the contrary, since the stipulation of the court demands that they be supported, they should wield more power. Rather, this is the reason that his own daughters do not collect from liened property: Since they are included in the stipulation of the court, and it is therefore the norm for fathers to take care to provide their support, say that their father gave them bundles of money while he was still alive. Due to this concern, they cannot repossess liened property. However, in the case of the wife’s daughter, who is not included in the stipulation of the court, there is no concern that the husband gave her anything prior to his death.
לֹא יֹאמַר הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת בַּת אֵצֶל אִמָּהּ.
§ We learned in the mishna that the first husband may not say that he will provide his wife’s daughter with support only when she is with him. Rather, he must bring the sustenance to her in the place where her mother lives. Rav Ḥisda said: That is to say that in a case of divorce, a daughter lives with her mother.
מִמַּאי דְּבִגְדוֹלָה עָסְקִינַן? דִּלְמָא בִּקְטַנָּה עָסְקִינַן, וּמִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה.
The Gemara asks: From where do we know that we are dealing with a case of an adult woman and there is a general guideline that in cases of divorce, a girl lives with her mother? Perhaps we are dealing with a case of a minor girl, and she lives with her mother because of concern for her safety, due to an incident that occurred.
דְּתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ בֵּן קָטָן לְאִמּוֹ, יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב אוֹמְרִים: יְהֵא גָּדֵל אֶצְלֵנוּ, וְאִמּוֹ אוֹמֶרֶת: יְהֵא בְּנִי גָּדֵל אֶצְלִי — מַנִּיחִין אוֹתוֹ אֵצֶל אִמּוֹ, וְאֵין מַנִּיחִין אוֹתוֹ אֵצֶל רָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ. מַעֲשֶׂה הָיָה וּשְׁחָטוּהוּ עֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח!
As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who died and left a minor son to the care of his mother, and the heirs of the father say: The son should grow up with us, and his mother says: My son should grow up with me, the halakha is that one leaves the child with his mother, and one does not leave the child with one who is fit to inherit from him, i.e., the father’s heirs. An incident occurred, and the boy lived with his father’s heirs, and they slaughtered him on the eve of Passover. So too, a minor girl is not left in the care of those who are obligated to sustain her and who have a financial interest in her demise.
אִם כֵּן לִיתְנֵי לְמָקוֹם שֶׁהִיא,
The Gemara answers: If that is so, let the mishna teach that the husband must bring the sustenance to the place where she, the daughter, is located.
