Rav and Shmuel differ on the case referred to in the Mishna regarding a minor who refuses. Is it referring to a minor who actually refused (mi’un) or is it referring to a minor who could potentially refuse? Shmuel said it is one who actually refused, which is consistent with a statement he made elsewhere which lists halachic differences between a minor who refused and a minor who was divorced. Why was it necessary to make that list if those differences can be derived from our Mishna (according to Shmuel’s version) and another Mishna (Yevamot 108a)? Shmuel added one new issue that wasn’t mentioned in either place and therefore mentioned the others as well. A suggestion is made that the debate between Rav and Shmuel is also a subject of debate among tannaim. However, the suggestion is rejected. The worn clothing does not go to “her” according to the Mishna. Which “her” is it referring to, meaning, which case in the Mishna? When it says in the Mishna that they do not receive their ketuba, to which part/s of the ketuba is this referring? If there are rumors about a woman that she was with another man, does she lose her worn clothing? If a man married an aylonit or a kohen gadol married a widow and he knew beforehand that she was an aylonit/widow, does she lose her ketuba anyway? Is there a distinction in this regard between the case of an aylonit and the case of the widow with a kohen gadol? Can we derive an answer to this question from the language of our Mishna? If a woman got married and made an agreement with her husband that he would support her daughter (from her previous marriage) for five years, and they get divorced, he still needs to continue to support her. This is even true if she remarries and makes her new husband commit the same. They both need to provide the support – one gives it in the form of food and the other gives the value of what he would have spent on her food. If the daughter gets married, her husband provides the food and the other two provide her with money at the value of the food they committed to her mother. She also has an advantage over the mother’s husband’s heirs as she is a creditor and can therefore collect her money from liened property whereas they can only collect it from unliened property. A debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is brought regarding one who says to another “I owe you (a certain amount of) money.” Can we collect based on that statement alone or not? Can we bring support for one of the opinions from our Mishna?
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Today’s daily daf tools:
Ketubot 101
יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים.
One who leaves the marriage union through a bill of divorce is required to wait three months before remarrying.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא כּוּלְּהוּ: הַמְמָאֶנֶת בְּאִישׁ — הוּא מוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וְהִיא מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו, וְלֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. נָתַן לָהּ גֵּט — הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וְהִיא אֲסוּרָה בִּקְרוֹבָיו, וּפְסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה.
The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us by telling us all of this? We already learned it all in Yevamot (108a): In the case of one who refuses to continue living with a certain man, he is permitted to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, and she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.
The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention that if she receives a bill of divorce, she is required to wait three months before remarrying, as we did not learn that halakha in the mishna. Once Shmuel mentioned the difference between one who refuses to continue living with her husband and one who is divorced, he mentioned the other differences between the two cases.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם, וְאֵין בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וְלֹא בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וְלֹא בַּהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ, וְאֵינוֹ מִיטַּמֵּא לָהּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: אֵינָהּ כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר, אֶלָּא שֶׁצְּרִיכָה מֵיאוּן.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is nothing, i.e., has no legal impact, when she is married off not by her father, and her husband is not entitled to any lost article that she finds, and not to her earnings; and he is not able to annul her vows; and he does not inherit from her; nor does he become impure for her if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is not that of his wife in every sense, only that she requires a refusal in order to leave the marriage.
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם, וּבַעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ, וְיוֹרְשָׁהּ, וּמִיטַּמֵּא לָהּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר, אֶלָּא שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּמֵיאוּן.
Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is something, i.e., has legal impact, and her husband is entitled to any lost article that she finds and to her earnings; and he is able to annul her vows; and he inherits from her; and he becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except for the fact that she leaves this union through refusal and does not need a bill of divorce.
לֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?
Shall we say that Rav said that she does not receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that her marriage did not take effect, and that Shmuel said that she does receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that her marriage did take effect?
אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי.
The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that a minor girl’s marriage has no legal standing and, as Rav said, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: שְׁמוּאֵל כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְרַב: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָתָם אֶלָּא מִדִּידַהּ לְדִידֵיהּ, אֲבָל מִדִּידֵיהּ לְדִידַהּ — לָא.
When they disagree, they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Shmuel is in accordance with the literal opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rav says that when Rabbi Yehoshua said there that a minor girl has a legal status of his wife in every sense, it was only with regard to her obligations toward him. But with regard to his obligations toward her, since according to Torah law they are not married, the Sages could not obligate the husband to pay her anything.
וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִיָּיא לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אֲמַרְתְּ לַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג, אֲבָל נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל, אִית לַהּ.
§ The mishna teaches that a girl who refuses to continue living with her husband, a woman who is forbidden by rabbinic law as a secondary relative, and an ailonit are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract and are not entitled to their worn clothes. Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel: They taught that she is not entitled to her worn clothes only with regard to the worn-out items of usufruct property [nikhsei melog], but she does have rights to the worn-out items of her guaranteed property [tzon barzel].
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַמְּמָאֶנֶת, אִי דְּאִיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי שָׁקְלָא. וְאִי דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידִי לָא שָׁקְלָא!
Rav Pappa discussed it and wondered: To which part of the mishna is this referring? If we say that it is referring to one who refuses to continue living with her husband, then if the worn-out articles are still in existence, she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. Since the marriage is annulled, she takes whatever belongs to her. And if they are no longer in existence and were completely worn out over the course of time, then she does not take compensation for either of them, as the husband was within his rights to make use of them.
אֶלָּא אַאַיְילוֹנִית: אִי דְּאִיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי שָׁקְלָא, אִי דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ — אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג דְּבִרְשׁוּתַהּ קָיְימִי — אִית לַהּ, נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל דְּלָאו בִּרְשׁוּתַהּ קָיְימִי — לֵית לַהּ!
Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to an ailonit. This too is difficult as, in that case, if the articles are still in existence she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. If they are no longer in existence, then Shmuel should have stated the opposite and said: With regard to the usufruct property, which remains in her possession during the marriage, she does receive compensation for it in the event that the marriage is annulled. However, she does not receive compensation for the guaranteed property, which does not remain in her possession during the marriage but in the possession of her husband.
אֶלָּא אַשְּׁנִיָּה, וּקְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן לְדִידַהּ בְּדִידֵיהּ וּלְדִידֵיהּ בְּדִידַהּ.
Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to a secondary forbidden relative, and the rationale for this halakha is that the Sages penalized both the husband and the wife for violating a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages assigned a penalty to her with regard to his obligations to her, and she is not reimbursed for the worn-out usufruct property. And they assigned a penalty to him with regard to her obligations to him so that he is responsible for reimbursing her for the worn-out guaranteed property.
אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִדְּרַב כָּהֲנָא: עַיִּילָא לֵיהּ גְּלִימָא — קַרְנָא הָוֵי, וְלָא מִכַּסֵּי לַהּ וְאָזֵיל עַד דְּבָלֵי.
Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Kahana that if a wife brought home to her husband a cloak after they were already married, it is viewed as capital, and he may not go and cover himself with it until it wears out. With regard to land that the wife obtains during the marriage, the husband has the right to benefit from it by consuming its produce. From the fact that Rav Kahana stated that it is only in this particular case that the woman is not reimbursed for clothing that became worn out through her husband’s use, one can infer that generally, the husband does not have the right to use a garment she obtains, to the degree that it becomes worn out.
וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן פֵּירָא הָוֵי! דְּרַב נַחְמָן פְּלִיגָא.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say that use of the cloak is considered the produce of her property, to which the husband is entitled? The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Naḥman is in disagreement with that opinion.
אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת, יֵשׁ לָהֶן.
§ The mishna teaches that these specific women are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract. Shmuel said: They taught this only with regard to the principal of the marriage contract, which the Sages instituted for all women, amounting to one hundred dinars for a widow and two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, the additional sum listed in the marriage contract, which their husband specified for them of his own accord, is considered a gift and they are entitled to it.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה, כְּגוֹן הַמְמָאֶנֶת וְחַבְרוֹתֶיהָ — אֵין לָהֶן מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת — יֵשׁ לָהֶן.
The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita: Women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, for example, one who refused to remain married to her husband, and her companions, they are not entitled to the principal of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. But as for the additional sum stipulated in the marriage contract that the husband added of his own accord, they are entitled to it.
נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים יוֹצְאוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה, כְּגוֹן עוֹבֶרֶת עַל דָּת וְחַבְרוֹתֶיהָ — אֵין לָהֶן תּוֹסֶפֶת, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מָנֶה מָאתַיִם. וְהַיּוֹצֵאת מִשּׁוּם שֵׁם רָע — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁלְּפָנֶיהָ וְיוֹצְאָה.
However, women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are divorced without receiving payment for their marriage contract, for example, a woman who violates the precepts of halakha or Jewish custom, and her companions, are not entitled to the additional sum stipulated by their husbands in the marriage contract. And since they violated and transgressed the mitzvot, it is all the more so that they are not entitled to receive the principal one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, as the Sages penalized them and negated all of their husband’s obligations that are recorded in the marriage contract. And one who is divorced because she received a bad reputation for licentiousness takes what is left of her usufruct property and is divorced.
מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: זִינְּתָה לֹא הִפְסִידָה
The Gemara notes: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A woman who was licentious has not lost
בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
her right to her worn clothes that are in existence. She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: זִינְּתָה — הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם הִיא זִינְּתָה, כֵּלֶיהָ מִי זַנַּאי? תָּנֵי: לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
The tanna teaches a baraita before Rav Naḥman: A woman who was licentious lost her right to her extant, worn clothes, i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. He said to him: If she was unfaithful and engaged in sexual intercourse with another, were her items also licentious? Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore teach the opposite: A woman who was licentious has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מְנַחֵם סְתִימְתָּאָה, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זִינְּתָה — לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
Similarly, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This baraita taught by the tanna is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem, the unattributed, as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. However, the Rabbis say that if she was licentious, she has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.
אִם מִתְּחִלָּה נָשְׂאָה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אַיְלוֹנִית — אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה, אַלְמָנָה — אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה.
§ The mishna teaches that if, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rav Huna said: An ailonit is a wife and she is not a wife, while a widow who is married to a High Priest is entirely a wife.
אַיְלוֹנִית אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה: הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אַלְמָנָה אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה: בֵּין הִכִּיר בָּהּ, בֵּין לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara explains: An ailonit is sometimes treated as a wife and she is sometimes not treated as a wife. How so? If he knew about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract like any other wife. But if he did not know about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entirely considered a wife. Whether he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her whether he did not know this about her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
וְרַב יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה. הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
And Rav Yehuda says: Both the ailonit and the widow are sometimes treated as a wife and sometimes not treated as a wife. Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. But if he did not know about her that she was a widow, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
מֵיתִיבִי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. הָא סְתָמָא — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna’s statement from a baraita: If he married the woman with the presumption that she is so, that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, and it is found that she is so as he thought from the start, then she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. One can infer from here: If he married her without specification, and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
לָא תֵּימָא: הָא סְתָמָא אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁאֵינָהּ כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara answers: Do not say this implies that if he married her without specification she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rather, say the following inference: If he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
אֲבָל סְתָמָא מַאי — אִית לַהּ, אַדְּתָנֵי בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לַשְׁמְעִינַן סְתָמָא, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הָא!
The Gemara asks: But if he married her without specification, what would the halakha be? The halakha would be that she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead of teaching the case where he married her with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so and she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, let him teach us the case where he marries her without specification. If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then all the more so in this case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.
וְעוֹד, תָּנֵי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּיָדוּעַ וְנִמְצֵאת בְּיָדוּעַ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב הוּנָא!
And further, it is taught explicitly in another baraita: If he married her knowing that she has a deficiency, and it is found that she does have the deficiency as was known, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If he married her without specification, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.
רַב הוּנָא מַתְנִיתִין אַטְעִיתֵיהּ. הוּא סָבַר: מִדְּקָא מְפַלֵּיג בְּאַיְלוֹנִית וְלָא קָמְפַלֵּיג בְּאַלְמָנָה, מִכְּלָל דְּאַלְמָנָה אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְתָמָא נָמֵי אִית לַהּ, וְלָא הִיא: כִּי קָתָנֵי לַהּ לְאַלְמָנָה, אַפְּלוּגְתָּא דְּאַיְלוֹנִית קָאֵי.
The Gemara explains: Rav Huna was misled by the language of the mishna and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the halakha. He thought that since the mishna differentiates between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware with regard to an ailonit, but the mishna does not differentiate with regard to a widow, by inference one can say that with regard to a widow, even where one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, that is not so. When the mishna teaches the halakha of the widow, it is based on the differentiation stated with regard to the ailonit. The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an ailonit, to apply in the case of the widow as well.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת
הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים — חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים.
MISHNA: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years.
נִיסֵּת לְאַחֵר, וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. לֹא יֹאמַר הָרִאשׁוֹן: לִכְשֶׁתָּבֹא אֶצְלִי אֱזוּנָהּ, אֶלָּא מוֹלִיךְ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ לַמָּקוֹם שֶׁאִמָּהּ.
If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives.
וְכֵן לֹא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם ״הֲרֵי אָנוּ זָנִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאֶחָד״, אֶלָּא אֶחָד זָנָה, וְאֶחָד נוֹתֵן לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת.
And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.
נִיסֵּת — הַבַּעַל נוֹתֵן לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, וְהֵן נוֹתְנִין לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת. מֵתוּ — בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִיזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וְהִיא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב.
If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her.
הַפִּקְּחִים הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִים: עַל מְנָת שֶׁאָזוּן אֶת בִּתֵּךְ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאַתְּ עִמִּי.
The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.
גְּמָ׳ אִתְּמַר: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר.
GEMARA: It was stated with regard to one who says to another: I am obligated to pay you one hundred dinars, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, and Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּקָפָטַר! אִי דְּלָא אָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּקָמְחַיֵּיב?
The Gemara seeks to clarify: What are the circumstances of this case? If he said to the people present: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates him to pay?
לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא קָאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה בִּשְׁטָר״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב — אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדִים״ דָּמֵי. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר, לָא אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא.
The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where he did not say to those present: You are my witnesses. However, here we are dealing with a case where he said to the other: I am obligated to give you one hundred dinars, and he did so in a contract, i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, since his word given through a contract is legally as authoritative as one who said to the bystanders: You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt from payment, because his word given through a contract is legally not sufficiently authoritative to be considered a bona fide admission.
תְּנַן: הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ לָזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים, חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. מַאי לָאו כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא?
The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. We learned in the mishna: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years, is obligated to sustain her for five years. What, is it not that the mishna is discussing a case like this, where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?
Today’s daily daf tools:
Delve Deeper
Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
3 years ago, I joined Rabbanit Michelle to organize the unprecedented Siyum HaShas event in Jerusalem for thousands of women. The whole experience was so inspiring that I decided then to start learning the daf and see how I would go…. and I’m still at it. I often listen to the Daf on my bike in mornings, surrounded by both the external & the internal beauty of Eretz Yisrael & Am Yisrael!
Raanana, Israel
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
I’ve been wanting to do Daf Yomi for years, but always wanted to start at the beginning and not in the middle of things. When the opportunity came in 2020, I decided: “this is now the time!” I’ve been posting my journey daily on social media, tracking my progress (#DafYomi); now it’s fully integrated into my daily routines. I’ve also inspired my partner to join, too!
Teaneck, United States
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Jerusalem, Israel
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!
Hashmonaim, Israel
I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.
Tekoa, Israel
When I began learning Daf Yomi at the beginning of the current cycle, I was preparing for an upcoming surgery and thought that learning the Daf would be something positive I could do each day during my recovery, even if I accomplished nothing else. I had no idea what a lifeline learning the Daf would turn out to be in so many ways.
Lexington, MA, United States
I started learning the daf during Covid. I’d always wanted to learn Talmud but that wasn’t an option for girls in the small town I grew up in and I struggled to help my younger kids with Hebrew homework let alone read a Hebrew text. I decided to start small by listening to the daf podcast on the way to work each morning. Then I joined the Long Island WhatsApp group. Now I go to the siyyums.
Long Island, United States
Oceanside NY, United States
Bronx, United States
My Daf journey began in August 2012 after participating in the Siyum Hashas where I was blessed as an “enabler” of others. Galvanized into my own learning I recited the Hadran on Shas in January 2020 with Rabbanit Michelle. That Siyum was a highlight in my life. Now, on round two, Daf has become my spiritual anchor to which I attribute manifold blessings.
Englewood NJ, United States
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Haifa, Israel
I am grateful for the structure of the Daf Yomi. When I am freer to learn to my heart’s content, I learn other passages in addition. But even in times of difficulty, I always know that I can rely on the structure and social support of Daf Yomi learners all over the world.
I am also grateful for this forum. It is very helpful to learn with a group of enthusiastic and committed women.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I started learning daf in January, 2020, being inspired by watching the Siyyum Hashas in Binyanei Haumah. I wasn’t sure I would be able to keep up with the task. When I went to school, Gemara was not an option. Fast forward to March, 2022, and each day starts with the daf. The challenge is now learning the intricacies of delving into the actual learning. Hadran community, thank you!
Riverdale, NY, United States
I started learning with rabbis. I needed to know more than the stories. My first teacher to show me “the way of the Talmud” as well as the stories was Samara Schwartz.
Michelle Farber started the new cycle 2 yrs ago and I jumped on for the ride.
I do not look back.
Houston, United States
In my Shana bet at Migdal Oz I attended the Hadran siyum hash”as. Witnessing so many women so passionate about their Torah learning and connection to God, I knew I had to begin with the coming cycle. My wedding (June 24) was two weeks before the siyum of mesechet yoma so I went a little ahead and was able to make a speech and siyum at my kiseh kallah on my wedding day!
Givat Shmuel, Israel
It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.
Northwest Washington, United States
Margo
I started my Talmud journey in 7th grade at Akiba Jewish Day School in Chicago. I started my Daf Yomi journey after hearing Erica Brown speak at the Hadran Siyum about marking the passage of time through Daf Yomi.
Carolyn
I started my Talmud journey post-college in NY with a few classes. I started my Daf Yomi journey after the Hadran Siyum, which inspired both my son and myself.
Merion Station, USA
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
Ketubot 101
יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים.
One who leaves the marriage union through a bill of divorce is required to wait three months before remarrying.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא כּוּלְּהוּ: הַמְמָאֶנֶת בְּאִישׁ — הוּא מוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וְהִיא מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו, וְלֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. נָתַן לָהּ גֵּט — הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וְהִיא אֲסוּרָה בִּקְרוֹבָיו, וּפְסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה.
The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us by telling us all of this? We already learned it all in Yevamot (108a): In the case of one who refuses to continue living with a certain man, he is permitted to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, and she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.
The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention that if she receives a bill of divorce, she is required to wait three months before remarrying, as we did not learn that halakha in the mishna. Once Shmuel mentioned the difference between one who refuses to continue living with her husband and one who is divorced, he mentioned the other differences between the two cases.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם, וְאֵין בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וְלֹא בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וְלֹא בַּהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ, וְאֵינוֹ מִיטַּמֵּא לָהּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: אֵינָהּ כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר, אֶלָּא שֶׁצְּרִיכָה מֵיאוּן.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is nothing, i.e., has no legal impact, when she is married off not by her father, and her husband is not entitled to any lost article that she finds, and not to her earnings; and he is not able to annul her vows; and he does not inherit from her; nor does he become impure for her if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is not that of his wife in every sense, only that she requires a refusal in order to leave the marriage.
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם, וּבַעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ, וְיוֹרְשָׁהּ, וּמִיטַּמֵּא לָהּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר, אֶלָּא שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה בְּמֵיאוּן.
Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of marriage by a minor girl is something, i.e., has legal impact, and her husband is entitled to any lost article that she finds and to her earnings; and he is able to annul her vows; and he inherits from her; and he becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The principle is that her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except for the fact that she leaves this union through refusal and does not need a bill of divorce.
לֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?
Shall we say that Rav said that she does not receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that her marriage did not take effect, and that Shmuel said that she does receive payment of her marriage contract in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that her marriage did take effect?
אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי.
The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that a minor girl’s marriage has no legal standing and, as Rav said, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: שְׁמוּאֵל כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְרַב: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָתָם אֶלָּא מִדִּידַהּ לְדִידֵיהּ, אֲבָל מִדִּידֵיהּ לְדִידַהּ — לָא.
When they disagree, they disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Shmuel is in accordance with the literal opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rav says that when Rabbi Yehoshua said there that a minor girl has a legal status of his wife in every sense, it was only with regard to her obligations toward him. But with regard to his obligations toward her, since according to Torah law they are not married, the Sages could not obligate the husband to pay her anything.
וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִיָּיא לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אֲמַרְתְּ לַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג, אֲבָל נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל, אִית לַהּ.
§ The mishna teaches that a girl who refuses to continue living with her husband, a woman who is forbidden by rabbinic law as a secondary relative, and an ailonit are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract and are not entitled to their worn clothes. Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel: They taught that she is not entitled to her worn clothes only with regard to the worn-out items of usufruct property [nikhsei melog], but she does have rights to the worn-out items of her guaranteed property [tzon barzel].
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַמְּמָאֶנֶת, אִי דְּאִיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי שָׁקְלָא. וְאִי דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידִי לָא שָׁקְלָא!
Rav Pappa discussed it and wondered: To which part of the mishna is this referring? If we say that it is referring to one who refuses to continue living with her husband, then if the worn-out articles are still in existence, she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. Since the marriage is annulled, she takes whatever belongs to her. And if they are no longer in existence and were completely worn out over the course of time, then she does not take compensation for either of them, as the husband was within his rights to make use of them.
אֶלָּא אַאַיְילוֹנִית: אִי דְּאִיתַנְהוּ — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי שָׁקְלָא, אִי דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ — אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: נִכְסֵי מְלוֹג דְּבִרְשׁוּתַהּ קָיְימִי — אִית לַהּ, נִכְסֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל דְּלָאו בִּרְשׁוּתַהּ קָיְימִי — לֵית לַהּ!
Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to an ailonit. This too is difficult as, in that case, if the articles are still in existence she takes both the usufruct and the guaranteed properties. If they are no longer in existence, then Shmuel should have stated the opposite and said: With regard to the usufruct property, which remains in her possession during the marriage, she does receive compensation for it in the event that the marriage is annulled. However, she does not receive compensation for the guaranteed property, which does not remain in her possession during the marriage but in the possession of her husband.
אֶלָּא אַשְּׁנִיָּה, וּקְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן לְדִידַהּ בְּדִידֵיהּ וּלְדִידֵיהּ בְּדִידַהּ.
Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement is in reference to a secondary forbidden relative, and the rationale for this halakha is that the Sages penalized both the husband and the wife for violating a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages assigned a penalty to her with regard to his obligations to her, and she is not reimbursed for the worn-out usufruct property. And they assigned a penalty to him with regard to her obligations to him so that he is responsible for reimbursing her for the worn-out guaranteed property.
אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִדְּרַב כָּהֲנָא: עַיִּילָא לֵיהּ גְּלִימָא — קַרְנָא הָוֵי, וְלָא מִכַּסֵּי לַהּ וְאָזֵיל עַד דְּבָלֵי.
Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Kahana that if a wife brought home to her husband a cloak after they were already married, it is viewed as capital, and he may not go and cover himself with it until it wears out. With regard to land that the wife obtains during the marriage, the husband has the right to benefit from it by consuming its produce. From the fact that Rav Kahana stated that it is only in this particular case that the woman is not reimbursed for clothing that became worn out through her husband’s use, one can infer that generally, the husband does not have the right to use a garment she obtains, to the degree that it becomes worn out.
וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן פֵּירָא הָוֵי! דְּרַב נַחְמָן פְּלִיגָא.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say that use of the cloak is considered the produce of her property, to which the husband is entitled? The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Naḥman is in disagreement with that opinion.
אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת, יֵשׁ לָהֶן.
§ The mishna teaches that these specific women are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract. Shmuel said: They taught this only with regard to the principal of the marriage contract, which the Sages instituted for all women, amounting to one hundred dinars for a widow and two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, the additional sum listed in the marriage contract, which their husband specified for them of his own accord, is considered a gift and they are entitled to it.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה, כְּגוֹן הַמְמָאֶנֶת וְחַבְרוֹתֶיהָ — אֵין לָהֶן מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת — יֵשׁ לָהֶן.
The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita: Women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, for example, one who refused to remain married to her husband, and her companions, they are not entitled to the principal of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. But as for the additional sum stipulated in the marriage contract that the husband added of his own accord, they are entitled to it.
נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים יוֹצְאוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה, כְּגוֹן עוֹבֶרֶת עַל דָּת וְחַבְרוֹתֶיהָ — אֵין לָהֶן תּוֹסֶפֶת, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מָנֶה מָאתַיִם. וְהַיּוֹצֵאת מִשּׁוּם שֵׁם רָע — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁלְּפָנֶיהָ וְיוֹצְאָה.
However, women with regard to whom the Sages said: They are divorced without receiving payment for their marriage contract, for example, a woman who violates the precepts of halakha or Jewish custom, and her companions, are not entitled to the additional sum stipulated by their husbands in the marriage contract. And since they violated and transgressed the mitzvot, it is all the more so that they are not entitled to receive the principal one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, as the Sages penalized them and negated all of their husband’s obligations that are recorded in the marriage contract. And one who is divorced because she received a bad reputation for licentiousness takes what is left of her usufruct property and is divorced.
מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: זִינְּתָה לֹא הִפְסִידָה
The Gemara notes: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A woman who was licentious has not lost
בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
her right to her worn clothes that are in existence. She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: זִינְּתָה — הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם הִיא זִינְּתָה, כֵּלֶיהָ מִי זַנַּאי? תָּנֵי: לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
The tanna teaches a baraita before Rav Naḥman: A woman who was licentious lost her right to her extant, worn clothes, i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. He said to him: If she was unfaithful and engaged in sexual intercourse with another, were her items also licentious? Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore teach the opposite: A woman who was licentious has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מְנַחֵם סְתִימְתָּאָה, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זִינְּתָה — לֹא הִפְסִידָה בְּלָאוֹתֶיהָ קַיָּימִין.
Similarly, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This baraita taught by the tanna is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem, the unattributed, as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. However, the Rabbis say that if she was licentious, she has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.
אִם מִתְּחִלָּה נָשְׂאָה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אַיְלוֹנִית — אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה, אַלְמָנָה — אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה.
§ The mishna teaches that if, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rav Huna said: An ailonit is a wife and she is not a wife, while a widow who is married to a High Priest is entirely a wife.
אַיְלוֹנִית אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה: הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אַלְמָנָה אִשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה: בֵּין הִכִּיר בָּהּ, בֵּין לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara explains: An ailonit is sometimes treated as a wife and she is sometimes not treated as a wife. How so? If he knew about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract like any other wife. But if he did not know about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entirely considered a wife. Whether he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her whether he did not know this about her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
וְרַב יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ אִשָּׁה וְאֵינָהּ אִשָּׁה. הִכִּיר בָּהּ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
And Rav Yehuda says: Both the ailonit and the widow are sometimes treated as a wife and sometimes not treated as a wife. Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. But if he did not know about her that she was a widow, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
מֵיתִיבִי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. הָא סְתָמָא — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna’s statement from a baraita: If he married the woman with the presumption that she is so, that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, and it is found that she is so as he thought from the start, then she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. One can infer from here: If he married her without specification, and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
לָא תֵּימָא: הָא סְתָמָא אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁאֵינָהּ כֵּן, וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara answers: Do not say this implies that if he married her without specification she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rather, say the following inference: If he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
אֲבָל סְתָמָא מַאי — אִית לַהּ, אַדְּתָנֵי בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן וְנִמְצֵאת שֶׁהִיא כֵּן יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לַשְׁמְעִינַן סְתָמָא, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הָא!
The Gemara asks: But if he married her without specification, what would the halakha be? The halakha would be that she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead of teaching the case where he married her with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so and she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, let him teach us the case where he marries her without specification. If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then all the more so in this case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.
וְעוֹד, תָּנֵי: כְּנָסָהּ בְּיָדוּעַ וְנִמְצֵאת בְּיָדוּעַ — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב הוּנָא!
And further, it is taught explicitly in another baraita: If he married her knowing that she has a deficiency, and it is found that she does have the deficiency as was known, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If he married her without specification, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.
רַב הוּנָא מַתְנִיתִין אַטְעִיתֵיהּ. הוּא סָבַר: מִדְּקָא מְפַלֵּיג בְּאַיְלוֹנִית וְלָא קָמְפַלֵּיג בְּאַלְמָנָה, מִכְּלָל דְּאַלְמָנָה אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְתָמָא נָמֵי אִית לַהּ, וְלָא הִיא: כִּי קָתָנֵי לַהּ לְאַלְמָנָה, אַפְּלוּגְתָּא דְּאַיְלוֹנִית קָאֵי.
The Gemara explains: Rav Huna was misled by the language of the mishna and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the halakha. He thought that since the mishna differentiates between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware with regard to an ailonit, but the mishna does not differentiate with regard to a widow, by inference one can say that with regard to a widow, even where one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, that is not so. When the mishna teaches the halakha of the widow, it is based on the differentiation stated with regard to the ailonit. The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an ailonit, to apply in the case of the widow as well.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת
הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים — חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים.
MISHNA: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years.
נִיסֵּת לְאַחֵר, וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. לֹא יֹאמַר הָרִאשׁוֹן: לִכְשֶׁתָּבֹא אֶצְלִי אֱזוּנָהּ, אֶלָּא מוֹלִיךְ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ לַמָּקוֹם שֶׁאִמָּהּ.
If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives.
וְכֵן לֹא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם ״הֲרֵי אָנוּ זָנִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאֶחָד״, אֶלָּא אֶחָד זָנָה, וְאֶחָד נוֹתֵן לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת.
And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.
נִיסֵּת — הַבַּעַל נוֹתֵן לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, וְהֵן נוֹתְנִין לָהּ דְּמֵי מְזוֹנוֹת. מֵתוּ — בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִיזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וְהִיא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב.
If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her.
הַפִּקְּחִים הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִים: עַל מְנָת שֶׁאָזוּן אֶת בִּתֵּךְ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאַתְּ עִמִּי.
The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.
גְּמָ׳ אִתְּמַר: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר.
GEMARA: It was stated with regard to one who says to another: I am obligated to pay you one hundred dinars, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, and Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּקָפָטַר! אִי דְּלָא אָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּקָמְחַיֵּיב?
The Gemara seeks to clarify: What are the circumstances of this case? If he said to the people present: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates him to pay?
לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא קָאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״חַיָּיב אֲנִי לְךָ מָנֶה בִּשְׁטָר״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב — אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְהוּ ״אַתֶּם עֵדִים״ דָּמֵי. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר, לָא אַלִּימָא מִילְּתָא דִשְׁטָרָא.
The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where he did not say to those present: You are my witnesses. However, here we are dealing with a case where he said to the other: I am obligated to give you one hundred dinars, and he did so in a contract, i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, since his word given through a contract is legally as authoritative as one who said to the bystanders: You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt from payment, because his word given through a contract is legally not sufficiently authoritative to be considered a bona fide admission.
תְּנַן: הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּפָסְקָה עִמּוֹ לָזוּן אֶת בִּתָּהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים, חַיָּיב לְזוּנָהּ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. מַאי לָאו כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא?
The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. We learned in the mishna: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years, is obligated to sustain her for five years. What, is it not that the mishna is discussing a case like this, where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?
