Ketubot 105

תשבע בסוף ולא תשבע בתחלה נחלקו עליו בני כהנים גדולים ואמרו תשבע בתחלה ובסוף אמר רבי דוסא בן הרכינס כדבריהם אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי יפה אמר חנן לא תשבע אלא בסוף:

She takes an oath at the end of their marriage, i.e., when she learns that her husband died. The oath is to the effect that he did not leave her any funds when he departed overseas, as she is claiming full payment of her marriage contract. And she does not take an oath at the outset of his trip overseas, when she demands support soon after his departure. The sons of High Priests disagreed with Ḥanan’s opinion and said: She takes an oath both at the outset and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said: The halakha is in accordance with their statement, i.e., that of the sons of the High Priests. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said that Ḥanan spoke well: She takes an oath only at the end.

גמ׳ ורמינהי שלשה דייני גזילות היו בירושלים אדמון בן גדאי וחנן המצרי וחנן בן אבישלום קשיא תלת אתרין קשיא גזירות אגזילות

GEMARA: The mishna states that there were two judges who issued decrees [gezeirot] in Jerusalem. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: There were three judges who adjudicated cases of theft [gezeilot] in Jerusalem: Admon ben Gaddai, Ḥanan the Egyptian, and Ḥanan ben Avishalom. The fact that the baraita mentions three judges is difficult, as the mishna includes only two; and the fact that the judges are described in the mishna as those who issue decrees is also difficult as they are described in the baraita as judges who adjudicate cases of theft.

בשלמא תלת אתרין לא קשיא דחשיב ליה קתני דלא חשיב ליה לא קתני אלא גזירות אגזילות קשיא

The Gemara continues: Granted, the contradiction between the statement that there were three judges and the statement that there were two is not difficult, as those who are important to him the tanna teaches in the mishna, and those who are not important to him the tanna does not teach in the mishna. Although there were other judges, the tanna mentioned only those pertinent to the topic at hand. However, the contradiction between the ruling that refers to decrees and the ruling that refers to theft is difficult.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק שהיו גוזרין גזירות על גזילות כדתניא קיטמה נטיעה רבי יוסי אומר גוזרי גזירות שבירושלים אומרים נטיעה בת שנתה שתי כסף בת שתי שנים ארבע כסף

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There is no contradiction, as they would issue decrees concerning matters of theft, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an animal that severed a young plant in the field of another, Rabbi Yosei says that those who issue decrees in Jerusalem said: For a plant one year old, the animal’s owner must pay two silver pieces; for a plant two years old, he pays four silver pieces.

ורמינהי שלשה דייני גזירות היו בירושלים אדמון וחנן ונחום אמר רב פפא מאן תנא נחום רבי נתן היא דתניא רבי נתן אומר אף נחום המדי מגוזרי גזירות שבירושלים היה ולא הודו לו חכמים

The Gemara raises a contradiction between the baraita cited above and another baraita: There were three prominent judges who issued decrees in Jerusalem: Admon, Ḥanan, and Naḥum. In the previous baraita, Naḥum was not listed. Rav Pappa said: Who is the tanna who taught that the third judge was Naḥum? It is Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: Naḥum HaMadi was also among those who would issue decrees in Jerusalem, but the Sages did not agree with his opinion.

ותו ליכא והאמר רבי פנחס אמר רבי אושעיא שלש מאות ותשעים וארבעה בתי דינין היו בירושלים כנגדן בתי כנסיות וכנגדן בתי מדרשות וכנגדן בתי סופרים דיינין טובא הוו וכי קאמרינן אגוזרי גזירות קאמרינן

The Gemara asks: And were there no more judges? Didn’t Rabbi Pineḥas say that Rabbi Oshaya said: There were 394 courts in Jerusalem, and a comparable number of synagogues, and a comparable number of study halls, and a comparable number of houses of teachers of schoolchildren. The Gemara answers: There were many judges, but when we say that there were a small number, it is specifically concerning those who issue decrees that we say so.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי גוזרי גזירות שבירושלים היו נוטלין שכרן תשעים ותשע מנה מתרומת הלשכה לא רצו מוסיפין להם לא רצו אטו ברשיעי עסקינן אלא לא ספקו אף על פי שלא רצו מוסיפין עליהן

§ Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: Those who issue decrees in Jerusalem would take their wages, ninety-nine maneh, equal to 9,900 dinars per year, from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. If they did not wish to do so, one adds to their wages. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: If they did not wish to do so? Does this mean that if they desired higher wages, they were paid more? Is that to say that we are dealing with wicked people who demand wages beyond what they need? Rather, on the contrary, Rav Asi said that if their wages were insufficient for their needs, then even if they did not wish to receive higher wages, one adds to their wages so that they may devote themselves to their communal service.

קרנא הוה שקיל איסתירא מזכאי ואיסתירא מחייב ודאין להו דינא והיכי עביד הכי והכתיב ושוחד לא תקח

The Gemara relates: The Sage Karna would take an istera, a small coin, from the innocent party, and an istera from the guilty party, i.e., he would charge both parties that came to him for judgment, and then he would judge their case. The Gemara asks: But how could he do so? Isn’t it written: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8), which indicates that a judge may not take money from either of the two litigants?

וכי תימא הני מילי היכא דלא שקיל מתרוייהו דלמא אתי לאצלויי דינא קרנא כיון דשקיל מתרוייהו לא אתי לאצלויי דינא וכי לא אתי לאצלויי דינא מי שרי

And if you say that this prohibition against taking a bribe applies only when a judge does not take from both parties, as there is a concern that perhaps he may come to pervert the judgment in favor of the party that gave him the bribe, whereas in the case of Karna, since he took from both parties he will not come to pervert the judgment, who says that the verse is referring only to those circumstances? Is it permitted to take a bribe even in a case when one will not pervert the judgment?

והתניא ושוחד לא תקח מה תלמוד לומר אם ללמד שלא לזכות את החייב ושלא לחייב את הזכאי הרי כבר נאמר לא תטה משפט אלא אפילו לזכות את הזכאי ולחייב את החייב אמרה תורה ושוחד לא תקח

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8); what is the meaning when the verse states this? If it comes to teach that one should not acquit the guilty and one should not convict the innocent due to a bribe, it is already stated: “You shall not wrest judgment” (Deuteronomy 16:19). Rather, this verse teaches that even if the purpose of the bribe is to ensure that one acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, the Torah nevertheless says: “And you shall take no bribe.” This indicates that it is prohibited for a judge to receive anything from the litigants, even if there is no concern at all that justice will be perverted.

הני מילי היכא דשקיל בתורת שוחד קרנא בתורת אגרא הוה שקיל ובתורת אגרא מי שרי והתנן הנוטל שכר לדון דיניו בטלין הני מילי אגר דינא קרנא אגר בטילא הוה שקיל

The Gemara answers: This applies only when one takes the money in the form of a bribe, even if he does not intend to pervert the judgment, whereas Karna took the money in the form of a salary, not a bribe. The Gemara asks: But is it permitted to take money from litigants in the form of a salary? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 58b): With regard to one who takes a salary to judge cases, his judgments are void? The Gemara answers: This applies only when he took money as his compensation for judging the case, whereas Karna accepted the money as compensation for unemployment, i.e., as he could not engage in his usual work while dealing with the case, he would take compensation for this unemployment.

ואגר בטילא מי שרי והתניא מכוער הדיין שנוטל שכר לדון אלא שדינו דין היכי דמי אילימא אגר דינא דינו דין והתניא הנוטל שכר לדון דיניו בטילין אלא אגר בטילא וקתני מכוער הדיין

The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to take money as compensation for unemployment? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Ugly is the judge who takes a salary to judge cases; however, his judgments are valid judgments? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this baraita? If we say that it is referring to one who accepted money as his compensation for judging, are his judgments valid judgments? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 58b): With regard to one who takes a salary to judge cases, his judgments are void? Rather, it must certainly be referring to a situation where he takes money as compensation for unemployment, and yet the baraita teaches: Ugly is the judge.

הני מילי בטילא דלא מוכחא קרנא בטילא דמוכחא הוה שקיל דהוה תהי באמברא דחמרא ויהבי ליה זוזא

The Gemara answers: This statement that the judge is ugly applies only when the fact that he is taking a salary for his unemployment is not evident, as he was not engaged in some other type of work at the time. Karna, however, would take money for his unemployment when it was evident that he was taking time off work to judge the case, as he was examining people’s wine stores [ambara] to see which casks would last and which were going sour, and they would pay him one dinar as a salary. Consequently, when Karna paused from his work to deal with a case, it was clear that he was losing money.

כי הא דרב הונא כי הוה אתי דינא לקמיה אמר להו הבו לי גברא דדלי לי בחריקאי ואידון לכו דינא

This resembles an incident involving Rav Huna. When people would come for judgment before him, he would say to them: As I am unable to take time off from my work, give me a man who can draw water for me, to irrigate the fields in my place, and I will judge your case.

אמר רבי אבהו בא וראה כמה סמויות עיניהן של מקבלי שוחד אדם חש בעיניו נותן ממון לרופא ספק מתרפא ספק אינו מתרפא והן נוטלין שוה פרוטה ומסמין עיניהן שנאמר כי השוחד יעור פקחים

Rabbi Abbahu said: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who accept bribes, and how they ruin themselves. If a person has pain in his eyes, he gives a doctor money, and even then it is uncertain whether he will be healed or whether he will not be healed. And yet those judges take the value of a peruta, a small amount of money as a bribe, and actively blind their eyes, as it is stated: “For a bribe blinds those who have sight” (Exodus 23:8).

תנו רבנן כי השוחד יעור עיני חכמים קל וחומר לטפשין ויסלף דברי צדיקים קל וחומר לרשעים מידי טפשים ורשעים בני דינא נינהו אלא הכי קאמר כי השוחד יעור עיני חכמים אפילו חכם גדול ולוקח שוחד אינו נפטר מן העולם בלא סמיות הלב ויסלף דברי צדיקים

The Sages taught: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly blind the eyes of fools. “And perverts the words of the righteous” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly pervert the statements of the wicked. The Gemara asks: Are fools and the wicked suitable for judgment, i.e., to be appointed as judges? Rather, this is what the tanna of the baraita said: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”; even if he were very wise but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without suffering blindness of the heart, i.e., he will eventually turn foolish. “And perverts the words of the righteous”;

אפילו צדיק גמור ולוקח שוחד אינו נפטר מן העולם בלא טירוף דעת

even if he is completely righteous but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without becoming demented.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר דרש רב נחמן בר כהן מאי דכתיב מלך במשפט יעמיד ארץ ואיש תרומות יהרסנה אם דומה דיין למלך שאינו צריך לכלום יעמיד ארץ ואם דומה לכהן שמחזר על הגרנות יהרסנה

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rav Naḥman bar Kohen interpreted a verse homiletically as follows. What is the meaning of that which is written: “The king by justice establishes the land, but he who exacts gifts [terumot] overthrows it” (Proverbs 29:4)? If a judge is like a king, in that he does not need anything and is not dependent on anyone, he establishes the land, i.e., he can serve as a judge. But if he is like a priest, who seeks out his terumot from various granaries, as he is dependent on others, he overthrows the land.

אמר רבה בר רב שילא האי דיינא דשאיל שאילתא פסול למידן דינא ולא אמרן אלא דלית ליה לאושולי אבל אית ליה לאושולי לית לן בה

§ Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: This judge who borrows items from others is disqualified from rendering judgment because it is as though he accepts a salary. And we said this only in a case where he does not have articles to lend out to others but is constantly borrowing without lending objects in turn. However, if he has items to lend out to others, we have no problem with it.

איני והא רבא שאיל שאילתא מדבי בר מריון אף על גב דלא שיילי מיניה התם לאחשובינהו הוא דבעי

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rava would borrow items from the house of bar Maryon even though they would not borrow from him. The Gemara answers: There, he wanted to cause them to be considered more important in the community. Rava was very wealthy and did not need to borrow for his own benefit. On the contrary, by borrowing from the house of bar Maryon he raised their standing in the community.

אמר רבא מאי טעמא דשוחדא כיון דקביל ליה שוחדא מיניה איקרבא ליה דעתיה לגביה והוי כגופיה ואין אדם רואה חובה לעצמו מאי שוחד שהוא חד אמר רב פפא לא לידון איניש דינא למאן דרחים ליה ולא למאן דסני ליה דרחים ליה לא חזי ליה חובה דסני ליה לא חזי ליה זכותא

Rava said: What is the reason for the prohibition against taking a bribe? Once a judge accepts a bribe from one party, his thoughts draw closer to him and he becomes like his own self, and a person does not find fault in himself. The Gemara notes that the term itself alludes to this idea: What is the meaning of shoḥad, bribe? It can be read as: Shehu ḥad, as he is one, i.e., at one mind with the litigant. Rav Pappa said: A person should not judge a case involving one whom he loves, nor involving one whom he hates. He should not judge one whom he loves, as he will not find any fault in him, while with regard to one whom he hates, he will not find any merit in him.

אמר אביי האי צורבא מרבנן דמרחמין ליה בני מתא לאו משום דמעלי טפי אלא משום דלא מוכח להו במילי דשמיא

Abaye said: With regard to this Torah scholar who is beloved by the residents of his town, it is not because he is a superior Sage than others; rather, it is because he does not reprove them in Heavenly matters. He is beloved because he is not strict with them with regard to the observance of mitzvot.

אמר רבא מריש הוה אמינא הני בני מחוזא כולהו רחמו לי כיון דהואי דיינא אמינא מינייהו סנו לי ומינייהו רחמו לי כיון דחזאי דמאן דמיחייב ליה האידנא קא זכי למחר אמינא אם מרחם כולהו רחמו לי אי מסנו כולהו סנו לי

Rava said: At first I would say that all these residents of Meḥoza love me; however, once I became a judge I said that some of them hate me and some of them love me, as I assumed that their feelings toward me depended on the success of their case. When I saw that the one I declared guilty today would be found innocent the following day, I realized that my rulings do not determine their attitudes, and therefore I said: If they love, then they all love me, and if they hate, then they all hate me, regardless of what happens in the courtroom.

תנו רבנן ושוחד לא תקח אינו צריך לומר שוחד ממון אלא אפילו שוחד דברים נמי אסור מדלא כתיב בצע לא תקח היכי דמי שוחד דברים

§ The Sages taught: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8). It is not necessary to say that this includes bribery by means of money; however, even verbal bribery, assisting by means of speech, is also prohibited. The halakha that a bribe is not necessarily monetary is derived from the fact that it is not written: And you shall take no profit. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of bribing with words?

כי הא דשמואל הוה עבר במברא אתא ההוא גברא יהיב ליה ידיה אמר ליה מאי עבידתיך אמר ליה דינא אית לי אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא

The Gemara explains: This can be demonstrated by that episode involving Shmuel, who was once crossing a river on a narrow ferry. A certain man came along and gave him a hand to help him out of the ferryboat. Shmuel said to him: What are you doing in this place? The man said to him: I have a case to present before you for judgment. Shmuel said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, as you did me a favor. Although no money changed hands, a bond was formed between the pair.

אמימר הוה יתיב וקא דאין דינא פרח גדפא ארישיה אתא ההוא גברא שקליה אמר ליה מאי עבידתיך אמר ליה דינא אית לי אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא מר עוקבא הוה שדי רוקא קמיה אתא ההוא גברא כסייה אמר ליה מאי עבידתיך אמר ליה דינא אית לי אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא

The Gemara relates a similar story. Ameimar was sitting and judging a case when a feather floated and landed on his head. A certain man came by and removed it from his head. Ameimar said to him: What are you doing here? He said to him: I have a case to present before you. Ameimar said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, due to the favor you performed for me. The Gemara likewise relates: There was spittle lying before Mar Ukva. A certain man came by and covered it. He said to him: What are you doing here? He said to him: I have a case to present before you. Mar Ukva said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case.

רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי הוה רגיל אריסיה דהוה מייתי ליה כל מעלי שבתא כנתא דפירי יומא חד אייתי ליה בחמשה בשבתא אמר ליה מאי שנא האידנא אמר ליה דינא אית לי ואמינא אגב אורחי אייתי ליה למר לא קביל מיניה אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא

The Gemara cites another incident. The sharecropper of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was accustomed to bringing him a basket [kanta] full of fruits every Shabbat eve. One day, he brought him the basket on a Thursday. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: What is different that you came early now, this week? The sharecropper said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the basket of fruits, as in any case I am coming on Thursday, the day the courts are in session. Rabbi Yishmael did not accept the basket of fruits from him, and he said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case.

אותיב זוזא דרבנן וקדיינין ליה בהדי דקאזיל ואתי אמר אי בעי טעין הכי ואי בעי טעין הכי אמר תיפח נפשם של מקבלי שוחד ומה אני שלא נטלתי ואם נטלתי שלי נטלתי כך מקבלי שוחד על אחת כמה וכמה:

Rabbi Yishmael seated a pair of rabbinic scholars and they judged the sharecropper’s case. As Rabbi Yishmael was coming and going, he said to himself: If he wants, he could claim this, and if he wants, he could claim that, i.e., he kept thinking of all the ways in which the litigant who brought him the fruits could win his case. He said to himself: Blast the souls of those who accept bribes. If I, who did not accept anything, and if I had accepted, I would have accepted my own property, as it is my sharecropper and the fruits legally belong to me, am nevertheless in this state of mind due to the proposed gift, all the more so are those who actually accept bribes inevitably biased in favor of the one who bribed them.

רבי ישמעאל בר אלישע אייתי ליה ההוא גברא ראשית הגז אמר ליה מהיכא את אמר ליה מדוך פלן ומהתם להכא לא הוה כהן למיתבא ליה אמר ליה דינא אית לי ואמינא אגב אורחאי אייתי ליה למר אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא לא קביל מיניה

The Gemara likewise relates with regard to Rabbi Yishmael bar Elisha, who was a priest, that a certain man once brought him the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: From where are you? The man said to him: I am from such and such a place. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And from there to here was there no priest to whom you could give the first shearing? He said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, and he would not accept the first shearing from him.

אותיב ליה זוגא דרבנן וקדייני ליה בהדי דקאזיל ואתי אמר אי בעי טעין הכי ואי בעי טעין הכי אמר תיפח נפשם של מקבלי שוחד ומה אני שלא נטלתי ואם נטלתי שלי נטלתי כך מקבלי שוחד על אחת כמה וכמה:

Rabbi Yishmael bar Elisha seated a pair of rabbinic scholars and they judged his case. As Rabbi Yishmael was coming and going, he said to himself: If he wants, he could claim this, and if he wants, he could claim that. He said to himself: Blast the souls of those who accept bribes. If I, who did not accept anything, and if I had accepted, I would have accepted my own property, as I am a priest and am entitled to receive the first shearing, am nevertheless in this state of mind, all the more so are those who accept bribes.

רב ענן אייתי ליה ההוא גברא כנתא דגילדני דבי גילי אמר ליה מאי עבידתיך אמר ליה דינא אית לי לא קביל מיניה אמר ליה פסילנא לך לדינא

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who once brought to Rav Anan a basket of small fish [gildanei devei gilei]. He said to him: What are you doing here? The man said to him: I have a case to present before you. Rav Anan would not accept the basket from him, and he said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, due to your actions.

אמר ליה דינא דמר לא בעינא קבולי לקביל מר דלא למנען מר מאקרובי בכורים דתניא ואיש בא מבעל שלישה ויבא לאיש האלהים לחם בכורים עשרים לחם שעורים וכרמל בצקלונו וכי אלישע אוכל בכורים הוה אלא לומר לך כל המביא דורון לתלמיד חכם כאילו מקריב בכורים

The man said to him: I do not need the Master’s judgment. However, let the Master accept my gift anyway, so that the Master does not prevent me from presenting first fruits. What does the mitzva of first fruits have to with this situation? As it is taught in a baraita: “And there came a man came from Ba’al Shalisha, and he brought the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley and fresh ears of corn in his sack” (II Kings 4:42). But did Elisha, the recipient of these gifts, eat first fruits? After all, he was not a priest. Rather, this verse comes to tell you: Whoever brings a gift to a Torah scholar, it is as though he has presented first fruits. This visitor to Rav Anan wished to fulfill this mitzva.

אמר ליה קבולי לא בעינן דאיקביל השתא דאמרת לי טעמא מקבילנא שדריה לקמיה דרב נחמן שלח ליה נידייניה מר להאי גברא דאנא ענן פסילנא ליה לדינא אמר מדשלח לי הכי שמע מינה קריביה הוא הוה קאים דינא דיתמי קמיה אמר

Rav Anan said to him: I do not want to take it from you, but now that you have explained to me the reason that you wish to give it to me I will accept it from you. Rav Anan sent the man to Rav Naḥman, and he also sent him a letter: Let the Master judge this man’s case because I, Anan, am disqualified from judging his cases. Rav Naḥman said to himself: From the fact that he sent me this letter, I can conclude from here that the reason he is disqualified from judging the case is because he is his relative. At that time, a case involving orphans was being heard before Rav Naḥman. He said: