Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ellen Cherrick in loving memory of her mother, Udy Katz Cherrick, z”l, on her 13th yahrzeit.
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Summary
Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita – Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other?
The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah.
The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute.
Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava’s ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday.
A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava’s position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav’s meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ellen Cherrick in loving memory of her mother, Udy Katz Cherrick, z”l, on her 13th yahrzeit.
Chullin 4
דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִים, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
a string [dekurya] of birds, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat the meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא, רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא. אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא: טַעְמָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לָא.
In arriving at their respective interpretations of the mishna, Abaye inferred from the first clause of the baraita and Rava inferred from the latter clause of the baraita. Abaye inferred from the first clause: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted in a case where there is a Jew actively supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly, that the reason it is permitted is that the Jew is standing over him. But if the Jew exits and enters, then no, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא, טַעְמָא דְּבָא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.
Rava inferred from the latter clause: If the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. The reason that it is necessary to administer this test is due only to the fact that the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal. But in a case where the Jew exits and enters, it is permitted to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered ab initio.
וּלְאַבָּיֵי קַשְׁיָא סֵיפָא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי ״בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ״ קָרֵי לֵיהּ. וּלְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי כְּעוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו דָּמֵי.
The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Abaye, the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: The tanna also characterizes the case where a Jew exits and enters as a case of: If the Jew came and found the Samaritan. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Rava, the first clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: The case where a Jew exits and enters is also considered like a case where the Jew is standing over him, and it is included in that halakha.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִין, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ כּוּ׳. אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא הַאי הוּא דַּהֲוָה שָׁחֵיט שַׁפִּיר!
§ The baraita continues: Similarly, if the Jew found a string of birds in the possession of a Samaritan, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Why is that a reliable indication? Let us be concerned that perhaps it is this bird alone, whose head the Jew severed, that the Samaritan slaughtered properly, and the rest are unslaughtered carcasses.
אָמַר רַב מְנַשֶּׁה: (סִימָן: מַכְנִיס, אִיזְמֵל, בִּזְכָרִים) בְּמַכְנִיסָן תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.
Rav Menashe said an answer to this question. Before presenting his answer, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for the three statements of Rav Menashe cited in this tractate, this one and two others: Inserts, a scalpel (see 31a), into rams (see 51a). Rav Menashe’s answer is as follows: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew inserts the string of birds under the corners of his garment and hands the Samaritan the head of one of the birds. In that way, the Samaritan has no way of knowing from which bird the head was taken. If he ate it, apparently all the birds were slaughtered properly.
וְדִלְמָא סִימָנָא הֲוָה יָהֵיב לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: דִּמְמַסְמֵס לֵיהּ מַסְמוֹסֵי.
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the Samaritan placed a distinguishing mark in that bird, indicating to him that it is the kosher one. Rav Mesharshiyya said: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew crushed the head that he gave the Samaritan, thereby rendering it indistinguishable from the others.
וְדִלְמָא קָסָבְרִי כּוּתִים: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה?
The Gemara challenges this answer: And perhaps the Samaritans hold there is no source for the slaughter of a bird in the Torah. Therefore, the fact that the Samaritan ate the bird’s head is no proof that the bird was properly slaughtered.
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, שְׁהִיָּיה, דְּרָסָה, חֲלָדָה, הַגְרָמָה, וְעִיקּוּר – מִי כְּתִיבָן?
The Gemara rejects that possibility: And according to your reasoning, those actions that disqualify the slaughter of an animal: Interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife, concealing the knife in the course of an inverted slaughter, diverting [hagrama] the knife from the place of slaughter, and ripping the simanim from their place before cutting them, are they written in the Torah?
אֶלָּא, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ.
Rather, even though the details are not all written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced those disqualifications, they embraced them, and a Jew may rely on their slaughter; when they eat from the meat, it is permitted for a Jew to eat the meat as well. Here too, although the requirement of ritual slaughter for a bird is not written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced the mitzva of ritual slaughter, they embraced it in the same manner that it is performed by Jews.
וְאַחְזוּק וְלָא אַחְזוּק בִּדְלָא כְּתִיבָא, תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.
And with regard to mitzvot that are not written explicitly in the Torah that Samaritans embraced, the question of whether they are presumed to fulfill them in the manner that Jews fulfill them or they are not presumed to do so is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, because the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot like Jews and do not know the precise nature of leaven prohibited by the Torah.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. Therefore, one may assume that they prepared the matza properly.
אָמַר מָר: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת. קָסָבַר: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר.
The Gemara proceeds to analyze that baraita. The Master said: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if the matza is permitted one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva, the tanna teaches us that they are expert. Rabbi Elazar deems it prohibited to eat the matza of Samaritans on Passover, due to the fact that the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot. He holds that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דִּכְתִיבָא וְלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דִּכְתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אִי אַחְזוּק – אִין, אִי לָא אַחְזוּק – לָא.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. The Gemara raises an objection: That is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is written but with regard to which the Samaritans did not embrace it. The first tanna holds: Once the mitzva is written in the Torah, even if there is no knowledge that they embraced it, Samaritans can be relied upon to perform it properly. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Even with regard to a mitzva written in the Torah, if they embraced its observance, yes, one may rely on the Samaritans, but if they did not embrace its observance, no, one may not rely on them.
אִי הָכִי, ״כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים״ – ״אִם הֶחְזִיקוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the formulation of his statement is imprecise. He said: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews; this indicates that one may rely upon Samaritans to observe those mitzvot even if they are not written in the Torah. Therefore, he should have said: If they embraced, which addresses the statement of the first tanna. Contrary to the first tanna, who said that one may rely upon Samaritans with regard to any mitzva that is written, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one may rely upon them only if they embraced the mitzva.
אֶלָּא, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא וְאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ – נָמֵי לָא; רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזוּק – אַחְזוּק.
Rather, there is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is not written and with regard to which the Samaritans embraced its observance. The first tanna holds: Since it is not written, even though they embraced its observance one may also not rely upon them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once it is known that they embraced observance of a mitzva, they embraced the mitzva and one may rely upon them.
גּוּפָא אָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד, אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ With regard to the statement of Rava cited earlier (3a), the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal, one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered.
מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא הֶתֵּירָא וְאִיסּוּרָא, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason? Since in this case there is the option to slaughter the animal in a permitted manner or to slaughter the animal in a prohibited manner, such a transgressor would not intentionally forsake the permitted manner and eat food slaughtered in a prohibited manner. Since he has a knife that was examined and the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, the food is presumed to be permitted, and there is no concern that perhaps he intentionally sabotaged the slaughter.
אִי הָכִי, כִּי לָא בְּדַק נָמֵי, מִיטְרָח לָא טָרַח.
The Gemara challenges: If so, then even in a case where the Jew did not examine the knife, it should be permitted to eat from the animal slaughtered by the transgressor. The Gemara answers: It is prohibited because if the transgressor discovers that the knife is flawed, he does not exert himself to replace it with a knife with a smooth blade.
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: תַּנְיָא דִּמְסַיַּיע לָךְ, חֲמֵצָן שֶׁל עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה אַחַר הַפֶּסַח
The Sages said to Rava: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: With regard to the leavened bread of transgressors, who do not eradicate their leavened bread before Passover, after Passover
מוּתָּר מִיָּד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין.
it is permitted immediately, due to the fact that they exchange the forbidden leavened bread in their possession with permitted leavened bread belonging to gentiles immediately after Passover.
סַבְרוּהָ, הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְקָתָנֵי: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין, אַלְמָא לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
The Sages who cited this proof assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? They assumed it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is forbidden after Passover by Torah law. The Gemara comments: And nevertheless it is taught that it is permitted due to the fact that the transgressors exchange their leavened bread with that of gentiles. Apparently, even one who performs transgressions does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, where the permitted food is easily accessible.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּרַבָּנַן, וְכִי מְקִילִּינַן – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא – לָא מְקִילִּינַן!
The Gemara asks: From where in the baraita can this be proven? Perhaps the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is prohibited after Passover by rabbinic law. And accordingly, when we are lenient it is with regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, whereas with regard to prohibitions by Torah law, e.g., the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass, we are not lenient.
וְתִיהְוֵי נָמֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מִי קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר הֶחְלִיפוּ״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּחְלִיפִין קָתָנֵי, דְּוַדַּאי מַחְלִיפִין. וּמָה בִּדְרַבָּנַן לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara answers: And let the baraita be even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Does the tanna teach: As I say that they exchanged their leavened bread for the leavened bread of a gentile, which would indicate that it is an assumption? He teaches: Due to the fact that they exchange, as a statement of fact, as they certainly exchange. And if in cases involving prohibitions by rabbinic law the transgressor does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, then in prohibitions by Torah law is it not all the more so reasonable that he would not forsake the permitted in favor of the forbidden?
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ, הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי, וַאֲפִילּוּ עָרֵל, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי עָרֵל הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא מֵתוּ אֶחָיו מֵחֲמַת מִילָּה – הַאי יִשְׂרָאֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, וְקָא סָבַר מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rava: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan, and even an uncircumcised man, and even a Jewish transgressor. The Gemara asks: This uncircumcised man, what are the circumstances? If we say that he is an uncircumcised man whose brothers died due to circumcision and the concern is that he might suffer a similar fate, clearly he may slaughter, as he is a full-fledged Jew and not a transgressor at all. Rather, it is obvious that he is a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised, as he refuses to be circumcised, and the tanna holds that he may nevertheless slaughter an animal since a transgressor concerning one matter is not a transgressor concerning the entire Torah.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי מְשׁוּמָּד הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אַחֵר – הַיְינוּ מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, אֶלָּא לָאו מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר, וְכִדְרָבָא.
Say the latter clause of the baraita: And even a Jewish transgressor. This transgressor, what are the circumstances? If he is a transgressor concerning another matter besides eating unslaughtered animal carcasses, that is identical to the case of a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised. Rather, is it not that he is a transgressor concerning the same matter of eating unslaughtered carcasses, and the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who said that one may even rely on the slaughter of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, ab initio?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר לָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּדָשׁ בֵּיהּ – כְּהֶתֵּירָא דָּמֵי לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכִדְרַב עָנָן, דְּאָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
The Gemara rejects that proof: No, actually I will say to you: The slaughter of a transgressor concerning the same matter is not valid. What is the reason? It is that since he has become accustomed to performance of that transgression, it is like a permitted act for him, and the concern is that he is not at all careful to slaughter the animal properly. Rather, the transgressor mentioned in the baraita is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Anan, as Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בִּיהוֹשָׁפָט מֶלֶךְ יְהוּדָה שֶׁנֶּהֱנָה מִסְּעוּדַת אַחְאָב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּזְבַּח לוֹ אַחְאָב צֹאן וּבָקָר לָרֹב וְלָעָם אֲשֶׁר עִמּוֹ וַיְסִיתֵהוּ לַעֲלוֹת אֶל רָמֹת גִּלְעָד״.
§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself: Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters, as we found with regard to Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, who partook of the feast prepared by Ahab, king of Israel, who was a transgressor with regard to idol worship, as it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him to go up with him to Ramoth Gilead” (II Chronicles 18:2).
וְדִלְמָא מִיזְבָּח זְבַח, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל! ״וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, וְדִלְמָא בִּדְבָרִים, אֵין הֲסָתָה בִּדְבָרִים.
The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps Ahab slaughtered the animals, but Jehoshaphat did not eat the meat of those animals. The Gemara explains: It is written: “And incited him,” indicating that there was an element of persuasion that presumably involved food. The Gemara challenges this explanation: And perhaps Ahab incited him with his words. The Gemara answers: There is no incitement with words.
וְלָא? וְהָכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ״! בַּאֲכִילָה וּבִשְׁתִיָּה, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַתְּסִיתֵנִי בוֹ לְבַלְּעוֹ חִנָּם״! לְמַעְלָה שָׁאנֵי.
The Gemara asks: And is there not incitement with words? But isn’t it written: “If your brother…entices you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7)? The Gemara answers: There too the incitement is with eating and with drinking. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written that God said to Satan, who denounced Job: “And you incited Me against him, to destroy him gratuitously” (Job 2:3)? Clearly Satan did not incite God with food and drink. The Gemara answers: Incitement against the One on High is different, as the term is used metaphorically. By contrast, incitement with regard to people involves food and drink.
וְדִלְמָא מִשְׁתָּא אִשְׁתִּי, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל? מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁתִיָּה – דְּאָמְרִינַן: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, אֲכִילָה נָמֵי – מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps Jehoshaphat drank at the feast but did not eat. The Gemara responds: What is different about drinking wine with Ahab that it would be permitted? It would be permitted because we say: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah and therefore his wine is not forbidden. With regard to eating a transgressor’s food too, a transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, the meat of an animal that he slaughters is not forbidden.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? שְׁתִיָּה – סְתָם יֵינָן הוּא, וַעֲדַיִין לֹא נֶאֱסַר יֵינָן שֶׁל גּוֹיִם, אֲבָל אֲכִילָה – אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? With regard to drinking, Ahab’s wine is considered ordinary wine of gentiles, and the ordinary wine of gentiles was not yet prohibited, as the Sages issued that decree only several generations later. Therefore, it was permitted for Jehoshaphat to drink Ahab’s wine. But with regard to eating, I will say to you: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, it was prohibited for Jehoshaphat to eat the meat from the animals slaughtered by Ahab.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ דְּמַלְכָּא מִשְׁתְּיָא בְּלָא מֵיכְלָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״וַיִּזְבַּח … וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, בַּמָּה הֱסִיתוֹ – בִּזְבִיחָה.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say: It is clear that Jehoshaphat ate at the feast, as it is not typical conduct of a king to drink wine without eating. And if you wish, say instead: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him,” is written, indicating: With what did Ahab incite Jehoshaphat? It was with slaughter of an animal. Apparently, it is permitted to eat from an animal slaughtered by a transgressor with regard to idol worship.
וְדִלְמָא עוֹבַדְיָה זְבַח? ״לָרוֹב״ כְּתִיב, עוֹבַדְיָה לָא הֲוָה סָפֵיק.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps Obadiah, who was the majordomo of Ahab’s household and a righteous man, slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: “In abundance” is written, and Obadiah would not have managed to slaughter all the animals himself.
וְדִלְמָא שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים זְבוּח, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִשְׁאַרְתִּי בְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים כׇּל הַבִּרְכַּיִם אֲשֶׁר לֹא כָרְעוּ לַבַּעַל וְגוֹ׳״, טַמּוֹרֵי הֲווֹ מִיטַּמְּרִי מֵאִיזֶבֶל.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the seven thousand righteous people slaughtered the animals, as it is written: “And I will leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth that has not kissed it” (I Kings 19:18). The Gemara rejects that suggestion: They were hiding from Jezebel, Ahab’s wife, and would not have gone to the palace to slaughter animals for the feast.
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דְאַחְאָב הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ? לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps, although Ahab was an idolater, the men in the employ of Ahab were upstanding people, not idolaters, and they slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind, as it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked” (Proverbs 29:12).
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט נָמֵי לָא הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכוּל גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט, זְבוּח עוֹבַדְיָה אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat were also not upstanding, and the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat ate, and the animals that Obadiah slaughtered, Jehoshaphat ate.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, מִדְּ״מוֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״, הָא לִדְבַר אֱמֶת – מְשָׁרְתָיו צַדִּיקִים.
The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind; from the fact that it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked,” it may be inferred that if a ruler hearkens to matters of truth, all his servants are righteous.
וְדִלְמָא זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכַל אַחְאָב וְגַבְרֵיהּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט וְגַבְרֵיהּ?
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, Ahab and his men ate, and the animals that the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat slaughtered, Jehoshaphat and his men ate.
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In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
I’ve been wanting to do Daf Yomi for years, but always wanted to start at the beginning and not in the middle of things. When the opportunity came in 2020, I decided: “this is now the time!” I’ve been posting my journey daily on social media, tracking my progress (#DafYomi); now it’s fully integrated into my daily routines. I’ve also inspired my partner to join, too!
Teaneck, United States
Chullin 4
דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִים, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
a string [dekurya] of birds, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat the meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא, רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא. אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא: טַעְמָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לָא.
In arriving at their respective interpretations of the mishna, Abaye inferred from the first clause of the baraita and Rava inferred from the latter clause of the baraita. Abaye inferred from the first clause: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted in a case where there is a Jew actively supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly, that the reason it is permitted is that the Jew is standing over him. But if the Jew exits and enters, then no, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא, טַעְמָא דְּבָא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.
Rava inferred from the latter clause: If the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. The reason that it is necessary to administer this test is due only to the fact that the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal. But in a case where the Jew exits and enters, it is permitted to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered ab initio.
וּלְאַבָּיֵי קַשְׁיָא סֵיפָא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי ״בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ״ קָרֵי לֵיהּ. וּלְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי כְּעוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו דָּמֵי.
The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Abaye, the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: The tanna also characterizes the case where a Jew exits and enters as a case of: If the Jew came and found the Samaritan. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Rava, the first clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: The case where a Jew exits and enters is also considered like a case where the Jew is standing over him, and it is included in that halakha.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִין, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ כּוּ׳. אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא הַאי הוּא דַּהֲוָה שָׁחֵיט שַׁפִּיר!
§ The baraita continues: Similarly, if the Jew found a string of birds in the possession of a Samaritan, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Why is that a reliable indication? Let us be concerned that perhaps it is this bird alone, whose head the Jew severed, that the Samaritan slaughtered properly, and the rest are unslaughtered carcasses.
אָמַר רַב מְנַשֶּׁה: (סִימָן: מַכְנִיס, אִיזְמֵל, בִּזְכָרִים) בְּמַכְנִיסָן תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.
Rav Menashe said an answer to this question. Before presenting his answer, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for the three statements of Rav Menashe cited in this tractate, this one and two others: Inserts, a scalpel (see 31a), into rams (see 51a). Rav Menashe’s answer is as follows: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew inserts the string of birds under the corners of his garment and hands the Samaritan the head of one of the birds. In that way, the Samaritan has no way of knowing from which bird the head was taken. If he ate it, apparently all the birds were slaughtered properly.
וְדִלְמָא סִימָנָא הֲוָה יָהֵיב לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: דִּמְמַסְמֵס לֵיהּ מַסְמוֹסֵי.
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the Samaritan placed a distinguishing mark in that bird, indicating to him that it is the kosher one. Rav Mesharshiyya said: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew crushed the head that he gave the Samaritan, thereby rendering it indistinguishable from the others.
וְדִלְמָא קָסָבְרִי כּוּתִים: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה?
The Gemara challenges this answer: And perhaps the Samaritans hold there is no source for the slaughter of a bird in the Torah. Therefore, the fact that the Samaritan ate the bird’s head is no proof that the bird was properly slaughtered.
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, שְׁהִיָּיה, דְּרָסָה, חֲלָדָה, הַגְרָמָה, וְעִיקּוּר – מִי כְּתִיבָן?
The Gemara rejects that possibility: And according to your reasoning, those actions that disqualify the slaughter of an animal: Interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife, concealing the knife in the course of an inverted slaughter, diverting [hagrama] the knife from the place of slaughter, and ripping the simanim from their place before cutting them, are they written in the Torah?
אֶלָּא, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ.
Rather, even though the details are not all written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced those disqualifications, they embraced them, and a Jew may rely on their slaughter; when they eat from the meat, it is permitted for a Jew to eat the meat as well. Here too, although the requirement of ritual slaughter for a bird is not written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced the mitzva of ritual slaughter, they embraced it in the same manner that it is performed by Jews.
וְאַחְזוּק וְלָא אַחְזוּק בִּדְלָא כְּתִיבָא, תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.
And with regard to mitzvot that are not written explicitly in the Torah that Samaritans embraced, the question of whether they are presumed to fulfill them in the manner that Jews fulfill them or they are not presumed to do so is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, because the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot like Jews and do not know the precise nature of leaven prohibited by the Torah.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. Therefore, one may assume that they prepared the matza properly.
אָמַר מָר: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת. קָסָבַר: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר.
The Gemara proceeds to analyze that baraita. The Master said: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if the matza is permitted one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva, the tanna teaches us that they are expert. Rabbi Elazar deems it prohibited to eat the matza of Samaritans on Passover, due to the fact that the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot. He holds that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דִּכְתִיבָא וְלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דִּכְתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אִי אַחְזוּק – אִין, אִי לָא אַחְזוּק – לָא.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. The Gemara raises an objection: That is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is written but with regard to which the Samaritans did not embrace it. The first tanna holds: Once the mitzva is written in the Torah, even if there is no knowledge that they embraced it, Samaritans can be relied upon to perform it properly. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Even with regard to a mitzva written in the Torah, if they embraced its observance, yes, one may rely on the Samaritans, but if they did not embrace its observance, no, one may not rely on them.
אִי הָכִי, ״כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים״ – ״אִם הֶחְזִיקוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the formulation of his statement is imprecise. He said: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews; this indicates that one may rely upon Samaritans to observe those mitzvot even if they are not written in the Torah. Therefore, he should have said: If they embraced, which addresses the statement of the first tanna. Contrary to the first tanna, who said that one may rely upon Samaritans with regard to any mitzva that is written, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one may rely upon them only if they embraced the mitzva.
אֶלָּא, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא וְאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ – נָמֵי לָא; רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזוּק – אַחְזוּק.
Rather, there is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is not written and with regard to which the Samaritans embraced its observance. The first tanna holds: Since it is not written, even though they embraced its observance one may also not rely upon them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once it is known that they embraced observance of a mitzva, they embraced the mitzva and one may rely upon them.
גּוּפָא אָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד, אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ With regard to the statement of Rava cited earlier (3a), the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal, one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered.
מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא הֶתֵּירָא וְאִיסּוּרָא, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason? Since in this case there is the option to slaughter the animal in a permitted manner or to slaughter the animal in a prohibited manner, such a transgressor would not intentionally forsake the permitted manner and eat food slaughtered in a prohibited manner. Since he has a knife that was examined and the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, the food is presumed to be permitted, and there is no concern that perhaps he intentionally sabotaged the slaughter.
אִי הָכִי, כִּי לָא בְּדַק נָמֵי, מִיטְרָח לָא טָרַח.
The Gemara challenges: If so, then even in a case where the Jew did not examine the knife, it should be permitted to eat from the animal slaughtered by the transgressor. The Gemara answers: It is prohibited because if the transgressor discovers that the knife is flawed, he does not exert himself to replace it with a knife with a smooth blade.
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: תַּנְיָא דִּמְסַיַּיע לָךְ, חֲמֵצָן שֶׁל עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה אַחַר הַפֶּסַח
The Sages said to Rava: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: With regard to the leavened bread of transgressors, who do not eradicate their leavened bread before Passover, after Passover
מוּתָּר מִיָּד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין.
it is permitted immediately, due to the fact that they exchange the forbidden leavened bread in their possession with permitted leavened bread belonging to gentiles immediately after Passover.
סַבְרוּהָ, הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְקָתָנֵי: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין, אַלְמָא לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
The Sages who cited this proof assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? They assumed it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is forbidden after Passover by Torah law. The Gemara comments: And nevertheless it is taught that it is permitted due to the fact that the transgressors exchange their leavened bread with that of gentiles. Apparently, even one who performs transgressions does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, where the permitted food is easily accessible.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּרַבָּנַן, וְכִי מְקִילִּינַן – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא – לָא מְקִילִּינַן!
The Gemara asks: From where in the baraita can this be proven? Perhaps the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is prohibited after Passover by rabbinic law. And accordingly, when we are lenient it is with regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, whereas with regard to prohibitions by Torah law, e.g., the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass, we are not lenient.
וְתִיהְוֵי נָמֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מִי קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר הֶחְלִיפוּ״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּחְלִיפִין קָתָנֵי, דְּוַדַּאי מַחְלִיפִין. וּמָה בִּדְרַבָּנַן לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara answers: And let the baraita be even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Does the tanna teach: As I say that they exchanged their leavened bread for the leavened bread of a gentile, which would indicate that it is an assumption? He teaches: Due to the fact that they exchange, as a statement of fact, as they certainly exchange. And if in cases involving prohibitions by rabbinic law the transgressor does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, then in prohibitions by Torah law is it not all the more so reasonable that he would not forsake the permitted in favor of the forbidden?
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ, הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי, וַאֲפִילּוּ עָרֵל, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי עָרֵל הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא מֵתוּ אֶחָיו מֵחֲמַת מִילָּה – הַאי יִשְׂרָאֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, וְקָא סָבַר מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rava: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan, and even an uncircumcised man, and even a Jewish transgressor. The Gemara asks: This uncircumcised man, what are the circumstances? If we say that he is an uncircumcised man whose brothers died due to circumcision and the concern is that he might suffer a similar fate, clearly he may slaughter, as he is a full-fledged Jew and not a transgressor at all. Rather, it is obvious that he is a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised, as he refuses to be circumcised, and the tanna holds that he may nevertheless slaughter an animal since a transgressor concerning one matter is not a transgressor concerning the entire Torah.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי מְשׁוּמָּד הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אַחֵר – הַיְינוּ מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, אֶלָּא לָאו מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר, וְכִדְרָבָא.
Say the latter clause of the baraita: And even a Jewish transgressor. This transgressor, what are the circumstances? If he is a transgressor concerning another matter besides eating unslaughtered animal carcasses, that is identical to the case of a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised. Rather, is it not that he is a transgressor concerning the same matter of eating unslaughtered carcasses, and the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who said that one may even rely on the slaughter of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, ab initio?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר לָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּדָשׁ בֵּיהּ – כְּהֶתֵּירָא דָּמֵי לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכִדְרַב עָנָן, דְּאָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
The Gemara rejects that proof: No, actually I will say to you: The slaughter of a transgressor concerning the same matter is not valid. What is the reason? It is that since he has become accustomed to performance of that transgression, it is like a permitted act for him, and the concern is that he is not at all careful to slaughter the animal properly. Rather, the transgressor mentioned in the baraita is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Anan, as Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בִּיהוֹשָׁפָט מֶלֶךְ יְהוּדָה שֶׁנֶּהֱנָה מִסְּעוּדַת אַחְאָב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּזְבַּח לוֹ אַחְאָב צֹאן וּבָקָר לָרֹב וְלָעָם אֲשֶׁר עִמּוֹ וַיְסִיתֵהוּ לַעֲלוֹת אֶל רָמֹת גִּלְעָד״.
§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself: Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters, as we found with regard to Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, who partook of the feast prepared by Ahab, king of Israel, who was a transgressor with regard to idol worship, as it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him to go up with him to Ramoth Gilead” (II Chronicles 18:2).
וְדִלְמָא מִיזְבָּח זְבַח, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל! ״וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, וְדִלְמָא בִּדְבָרִים, אֵין הֲסָתָה בִּדְבָרִים.
The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps Ahab slaughtered the animals, but Jehoshaphat did not eat the meat of those animals. The Gemara explains: It is written: “And incited him,” indicating that there was an element of persuasion that presumably involved food. The Gemara challenges this explanation: And perhaps Ahab incited him with his words. The Gemara answers: There is no incitement with words.
וְלָא? וְהָכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ״! בַּאֲכִילָה וּבִשְׁתִיָּה, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַתְּסִיתֵנִי בוֹ לְבַלְּעוֹ חִנָּם״! לְמַעְלָה שָׁאנֵי.
The Gemara asks: And is there not incitement with words? But isn’t it written: “If your brother…entices you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7)? The Gemara answers: There too the incitement is with eating and with drinking. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written that God said to Satan, who denounced Job: “And you incited Me against him, to destroy him gratuitously” (Job 2:3)? Clearly Satan did not incite God with food and drink. The Gemara answers: Incitement against the One on High is different, as the term is used metaphorically. By contrast, incitement with regard to people involves food and drink.
וְדִלְמָא מִשְׁתָּא אִשְׁתִּי, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל? מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁתִיָּה – דְּאָמְרִינַן: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, אֲכִילָה נָמֵי – מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps Jehoshaphat drank at the feast but did not eat. The Gemara responds: What is different about drinking wine with Ahab that it would be permitted? It would be permitted because we say: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah and therefore his wine is not forbidden. With regard to eating a transgressor’s food too, a transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, the meat of an animal that he slaughters is not forbidden.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? שְׁתִיָּה – סְתָם יֵינָן הוּא, וַעֲדַיִין לֹא נֶאֱסַר יֵינָן שֶׁל גּוֹיִם, אֲבָל אֲכִילָה – אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? With regard to drinking, Ahab’s wine is considered ordinary wine of gentiles, and the ordinary wine of gentiles was not yet prohibited, as the Sages issued that decree only several generations later. Therefore, it was permitted for Jehoshaphat to drink Ahab’s wine. But with regard to eating, I will say to you: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, it was prohibited for Jehoshaphat to eat the meat from the animals slaughtered by Ahab.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ דְּמַלְכָּא מִשְׁתְּיָא בְּלָא מֵיכְלָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״וַיִּזְבַּח … וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, בַּמָּה הֱסִיתוֹ – בִּזְבִיחָה.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say: It is clear that Jehoshaphat ate at the feast, as it is not typical conduct of a king to drink wine without eating. And if you wish, say instead: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him,” is written, indicating: With what did Ahab incite Jehoshaphat? It was with slaughter of an animal. Apparently, it is permitted to eat from an animal slaughtered by a transgressor with regard to idol worship.
וְדִלְמָא עוֹבַדְיָה זְבַח? ״לָרוֹב״ כְּתִיב, עוֹבַדְיָה לָא הֲוָה סָפֵיק.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps Obadiah, who was the majordomo of Ahab’s household and a righteous man, slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: “In abundance” is written, and Obadiah would not have managed to slaughter all the animals himself.
וְדִלְמָא שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים זְבוּח, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִשְׁאַרְתִּי בְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים כׇּל הַבִּרְכַּיִם אֲשֶׁר לֹא כָרְעוּ לַבַּעַל וְגוֹ׳״, טַמּוֹרֵי הֲווֹ מִיטַּמְּרִי מֵאִיזֶבֶל.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the seven thousand righteous people slaughtered the animals, as it is written: “And I will leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth that has not kissed it” (I Kings 19:18). The Gemara rejects that suggestion: They were hiding from Jezebel, Ahab’s wife, and would not have gone to the palace to slaughter animals for the feast.
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דְאַחְאָב הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ? לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps, although Ahab was an idolater, the men in the employ of Ahab were upstanding people, not idolaters, and they slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind, as it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked” (Proverbs 29:12).
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט נָמֵי לָא הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכוּל גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט, זְבוּח עוֹבַדְיָה אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט.
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat were also not upstanding, and the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat ate, and the animals that Obadiah slaughtered, Jehoshaphat ate.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, מִדְּ״מוֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״, הָא לִדְבַר אֱמֶת – מְשָׁרְתָיו צַדִּיקִים.
The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind; from the fact that it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked,” it may be inferred that if a ruler hearkens to matters of truth, all his servants are righteous.
וְדִלְמָא זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכַל אַחְאָב וְגַבְרֵיהּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט וְגַבְרֵיהּ?
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, Ahab and his men ate, and the animals that the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat slaughtered, Jehoshaphat and his men ate.
