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Today's Daf Yomi

November 30, 2018 | 讻状讘 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Chullin 3

In what specific cases are the different sections of the gemara聽referring to? Six rabbis each bring a different explanation. The gemara explains what motivated each one not to accept the explanation of the others.


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讞专讘 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讻讞诇诇 讗讘 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讛讜讗 诇讟诪讬讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 讜讗讝诇 住讻讬谉 讜讟诪讬转讬讛 诇讘砖专

It is derived from the juxtaposition of 鈥渟lain鈥 to 鈥渟word鈥 that the halakhic status of a sword or any other metal vessel that comes into contact with a corpse is like that of a corpse itself. Similarly, if a metal utensil comes in contact with a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, it assumes his status. Therefore, since the impure person is a primary source of ritual impurity, let him render the knife impure, rendering it as well a primary source of impurity, and the knife then goes and renders the flesh impure.

讗诇讗 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘砖专抓 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘诪转 讜讻讙讜谉 砖讘讚拽 拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛 讜砖讞讟 讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 讘讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬诐 讘讬谉 讘爪讜专 讘讬谉 讘讝讻讜讻讬转 讘讬谉 讘拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛

Rather, it is a case where the person became impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal; as he assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not render vessels impure, the knife remains ritually pure. And if you wish, say instead that actually he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is a case where one examined the stalk of a reed, which is a flat wooden vessel that does not become ritually impure, to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks, and slaughtered with it, as it is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter an animal with any sharp object, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻讜转讬 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 讗讘诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟

Abaye said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew is standing over him and ensuring that he slaughters properly; but if the Jew merely exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, the Samaritan may not slaughter the animal.

讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讘砖专 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 诇讗 讗讻诇讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

And if the Samaritan slaughtered the animal without supervision, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Since Samaritans are meticulous with regard to the meat that they eat and eat meat only from an animal that was slaughtered properly, the Jew may partake of the meat. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, there is concern that the animal was not slaughtered properly, and it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.

讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讻讜转讬 讛讗 讗诪专转 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 砖讞讬讟 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn鈥檛 you say in that case: When a Jew is standing over him, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诇讻转讞诇讛 诇讗 讜讛转谞谉 讛诪谞讬讞 谞讻专讬 讘讞谞讜转讜 讜讬砖专讗诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诪讜转专 讛转诐 诪讬 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬讞 讛诪谞讬讞 拽转谞讬 讚讬注讘讚

Rava said: And in a case where a Jew exits and enters, is it not permitted for the Samaritan to slaughter the animal ab initio? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Avoda Zara 69a): In the case of one who leaves a gentile in his store in which there is wine, and a Jew exits and enters, the wine is permitted? Just as there, the sporadic presence of the Jew is sufficient to ensure that the gentile will refrain from touching the wine, it should be sufficient in the case of a Samaritan who slaughters an animal as well. The Gemara rejects that proof. There, in the case of the store, does the tanna teach: One leaves a gentile ab initio? The tanna teaches: One who leaves, after the fact. Consequently, there is no proof from there that the Jew鈥檚 sporadic presence is sufficient to permit slaughter by a Samaritan ab initio.

讗诇讗 诪讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讛砖讜诪专 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 讬讜砖讘 讜诪砖诪专 讗诇讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诪讜转专

Rather, proof can be cited from the mishna here (Avoda Zara 61a): In a case where barrels of wine belonging to a Jew are in the possession of a gentile, and a Jew was tasked with supervising those barrels, the supervisor need not be continuously sitting and supervising to ensure that the gentile does not touch the wine; rather, even if the supervisor exits and enters, the wine is permitted. This mishna clearly indicates that exiting and entering is sufficient even ab initio.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻讜转讬 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 讗讘诇 讘讗 讜诪爪讗讜 砖砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讘砖专 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 诇讗 讗讻诇讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

Rather, Rava said in resolution of the apparent contradiction similar to the resolution proposed by Abaye, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew exits and enters; but if the Jew does not exit and enter and instead came and found that the Samaritan slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讻讜转讬 讛讗 讗诪专转 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 砖讞讬讟 诇讻转讞诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn鈥檛 you say that if a Jew is present, then even if he exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 诪砖讜诪讚 诇诪讗讬 诇讗讻讜诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 讗讜讻诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉

Rav Ashi said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Jewish transgressor [meshummad]. The Gemara asks: A transgressor of what sort? The Gemara answers: It is one whose transgression is to eat unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, i.e., for his convenience. And the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal,

讘讜讚拽 住讻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讜诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘讚拽 讜谞转谉 诇讜 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讘讜讚拽 住讻讬谞讜 讗讞专讬讜 谞诪爪讗转 住讻讬谞讜 讬驻讛 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. But if one did not examine the knife and give it to the transgressor, the transgressor may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if the transgressor slaughtered an animal, one examines his knife after his slaughter. If his knife is found to be perfectly smooth, it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 讗讬 讚讘讚拽 住讻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讛讗 讗诪专转 砖讜讞讟 诇讻转讞诇讛 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讘讚拽 讗讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 诇讬讘讚拽讬讛 讛砖转讗 讜讗讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 讻讬 讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讚诇诪讗 讘住讻讬谉 驻讙讜诪讛 砖讞讬讟 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Jewish transgressor who slaughters. The Gemara asks: In what case? If it is a case where one examined a knife and gave it to the transgressor, didn鈥檛 you say in that case that the transgressor may slaughter ab initio? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where one did not examine the knife. If it is a case where the knife is available, let him examine the knife now to make sure that there are no nicks. And if it is a case where the knife is not available, then when others see him slaughter, what of it? How can one eat from what he slaughtered? Perhaps he slaughtered the animal with a notched knife. The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讛讻诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉

Ravina said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is an expert in the halakhot of ritual slaughter slaughters; all experts are qualified to slaughter, and this is the halakha even if they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讬讜讚注讬谉 讘讜 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 讘讜 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗诐 讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where people know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter. But if people do not know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter, he may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if he slaughtered an animal, one examines him; if he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讘讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇拽诪谉 讚诇讬讘讚拽讬讛

Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not experts. The Gemara rejects the possibility that they are not experts, as in that case, if one examines him after the slaughter to determine his expertise in the halakhot of ritual slaughter, it is sufficient. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can examine him.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖砖讞讟讜 诇驻谞讬谞讜 砖转讬诐 讜砖诇砖 驻注诪讬诐 讜诇讗 谞转注诇祝 讗讘诇 诇讗 砖讞讟 诇驻谞讬谞讜 砖转讬诐 讜砖诇砖 驻注诪讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 砖诪讗 讬转注诇祝 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞转注诇驻转讬 砖讞讬讟转讜 讻砖专讛

And there are those who say that Ravina said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting slaughters; all those established concerning this are qualified to slaughter, even if it is not known if they are experts. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times he may not slaughter an animal ab initio, lest he faint. And if he slaughtered an animal and said: It is clear to me that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讜讛讗诪专转 讘讘专讬 诇讬 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讚诇讬砖讬讬诇讬讛

Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, didn鈥檛 you say that if one said after the slaughter: It is clear to me that I did not faint, it is sufficient? The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can ask him whether he fainted.

专讘讬谞讗 讜专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讻讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 讜专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诪砖讜诐 讚拽砖讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讻讜诇谉

The Gemara summarizes: Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Abaye, Rava, and Rav Ashi due to the fact that the phrase in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult for them.

讻讜诇讛讜 讻专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讗讚专讘讛 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讚讘拽讚砖讬诐 拽讗讬

All of the other amora鈥檌m did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Rabba bar Ulla, who interprets the mishna as referring to the case of a ritually impure person; according to that version that you said: The mishna here is the primary source for the halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, the other amora鈥檌m reject this interpretation because, on the contrary, the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zeva岣m, which deals with sacrificial animals.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讜讛讻讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讙讜驻讬讛 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 拽讚砖 诇讗讜 讻拽讚砖 讚诪讜

The amora鈥檌m also reject the interpretation according to that other version that you said: The mishna there is the primary source, and here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered non-sacred animals, he teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered sacrificial animals as well. The reason is that it was not necessary for the tanna to teach the case itself of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, as in the opinion of the other amora鈥檌m, the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is not like that of sacrificial food, and it is permitted to render such food impure.

讻讜诇讛讜 讻专讘讬谞讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讗讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诇讗 专讜讘 诪爪讜讬讬谉 讗爪诇 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讛谉

All of the other amora鈥檌m did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Ravina; according to that version that he said: Experts, yes, may slaughter ab initio, but those that it is not known that they are experts, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora鈥檌m disagree because they hold that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Therefore, even if it is not known whether they are experts, their slaughter is valid.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讗讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 诇讗 诇注诇讜驻讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

According to that version that Ravina said: People who are established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, yes, they may slaughter ab initio, but people who are not established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora鈥檌m disagree because they hold that we are not concerned for the possibility of fainting.

专讘讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻讗讘讬讬 讻讬 拽讜砖讬讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘讗 讛转诐 诇讗 谞讙注 讛讻讗 谞讙注

Rava did not say a resolution like that of Abaye, that the mishna is referring to a Samaritan, in accordance with the difficulty that he raised from the halakha of wine belonging to a Jew to which a gentile has access. Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rava, that a Samaritan may slaughter ab initio if a Jew enters and exits, because there, in the case of wine, the gentile does not touch the wine; therefore, it is sufficient if the Jew enters and exits. Here, in the case of slaughter, the Samaritan touches the animal in the course of slaughter, and he can disqualify the slaughter in an instant. Therefore, Abaye holds that it is insufficient for a Jew to enter and exit.

专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻转专讜讬讬讛讜 拽住讘专 讻讜转讬诐 讙专讬 讗专讬讜转 讛谉

Rav Ashi did not say a resolution like that of both of them, Abaye and Rava, because he holds: Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and their conversion is void; therefore, their halakhic status is that of a gentile, whose slaughter is not valid.

讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讛讗 讚专讘讗 讗诇讗 专讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻砖诪注转讬讛

Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rav Ashi, who interprets the mishna as referring to a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, because he does not hold that which Rava said, that such a transgressor may slaughter ab initio if his knife is examined beforehand by someone reliable. But as for Rava, what is the reason that he did not say a resolution in accordance with his own statement of halakha with regard to the slaughter of a transgressor and explain the mishna in the manner that Rav Ashi did?

诇讚讘专讬讜 讚讗讘讬讬 拽讗诪专 讜诇讬讛 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: When Rava explained that the tanna in the mishna is referring to the slaughter of a Samaritan, he stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Abaye in order to resolve the difficulty that Abaye raised; but he himself does not hold accordingly.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖讞讬讟转 讻讜转讬 诪讜转专转 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 讗讘诇 讘讗 讜诪爪讗讜 砖砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

The Sages taught in a baraita: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted ab initio. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there is a Jew standing over him and supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly. But if the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讻讬讜爪讗 讘讜 诪爪讗 讘讬讚讜

Similarly, if the Jew found in the possession of a Samaritan

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Chullin 3

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Chullin 3

讞专讘 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讻讞诇诇 讗讘 讛讟讜诪讗讛 讛讜讗 诇讟诪讬讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 讜讗讝诇 住讻讬谉 讜讟诪讬转讬讛 诇讘砖专

It is derived from the juxtaposition of 鈥渟lain鈥 to 鈥渟word鈥 that the halakhic status of a sword or any other metal vessel that comes into contact with a corpse is like that of a corpse itself. Similarly, if a metal utensil comes in contact with a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, it assumes his status. Therefore, since the impure person is a primary source of ritual impurity, let him render the knife impure, rendering it as well a primary source of impurity, and the knife then goes and renders the flesh impure.

讗诇讗 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘砖专抓 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚讗讬讟诪讬 讘诪转 讜讻讙讜谉 砖讘讚拽 拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛 讜砖讞讟 讘讛 讚转谞讬讗 讘讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬诐 讘讬谉 讘爪讜专 讘讬谉 讘讝讻讜讻讬转 讘讬谉 讘拽专讜诪讬转 砖诇 拽谞讛

Rather, it is a case where the person became impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal; as he assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not render vessels impure, the knife remains ritually pure. And if you wish, say instead that actually he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is a case where one examined the stalk of a reed, which is a flat wooden vessel that does not become ritually impure, to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks, and slaughtered with it, as it is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter an animal with any sharp object, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻讜转讬 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 讗讘诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟

Abaye said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew is standing over him and ensuring that he slaughters properly; but if the Jew merely exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, the Samaritan may not slaughter the animal.

讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讘砖专 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 诇讗 讗讻诇讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

And if the Samaritan slaughtered the animal without supervision, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Since Samaritans are meticulous with regard to the meat that they eat and eat meat only from an animal that was slaughtered properly, the Jew may partake of the meat. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, there is concern that the animal was not slaughtered properly, and it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.

讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讻讜转讬 讛讗 讗诪专转 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 砖讞讬讟 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn鈥檛 you say in that case: When a Jew is standing over him, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诇讻转讞诇讛 诇讗 讜讛转谞谉 讛诪谞讬讞 谞讻专讬 讘讞谞讜转讜 讜讬砖专讗诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诪讜转专 讛转诐 诪讬 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬讞 讛诪谞讬讞 拽转谞讬 讚讬注讘讚

Rava said: And in a case where a Jew exits and enters, is it not permitted for the Samaritan to slaughter the animal ab initio? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Avoda Zara 69a): In the case of one who leaves a gentile in his store in which there is wine, and a Jew exits and enters, the wine is permitted? Just as there, the sporadic presence of the Jew is sufficient to ensure that the gentile will refrain from touching the wine, it should be sufficient in the case of a Samaritan who slaughters an animal as well. The Gemara rejects that proof. There, in the case of the store, does the tanna teach: One leaves a gentile ab initio? The tanna teaches: One who leaves, after the fact. Consequently, there is no proof from there that the Jew鈥檚 sporadic presence is sufficient to permit slaughter by a Samaritan ab initio.

讗诇讗 诪讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讛砖讜诪专 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 讬讜砖讘 讜诪砖诪专 讗诇讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 诪讜转专

Rather, proof can be cited from the mishna here (Avoda Zara 61a): In a case where barrels of wine belonging to a Jew are in the possession of a gentile, and a Jew was tasked with supervising those barrels, the supervisor need not be continuously sitting and supervising to ensure that the gentile does not touch the wine; rather, even if the supervisor exits and enters, the wine is permitted. This mishna clearly indicates that exiting and entering is sufficient even ab initio.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻讜转讬 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 讗讘诇 讘讗 讜诪爪讗讜 砖砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讘砖专 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 诇讗 讗讻诇讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

Rather, Rava said in resolution of the apparent contradiction similar to the resolution proposed by Abaye, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew exits and enters; but if the Jew does not exit and enter and instead came and found that the Samaritan slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讻讜转讬 讛讗 讗诪专转 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讜爪讗 讜谞讻谞住 砖讞讬讟 诇讻转讞诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn鈥檛 you say that if a Jew is present, then even if he exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 诪砖讜诪讚 诇诪讗讬 诇讗讻讜诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 讗讜讻诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉

Rav Ashi said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Jewish transgressor [meshummad]. The Gemara asks: A transgressor of what sort? The Gemara answers: It is one whose transgression is to eat unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, i.e., for his convenience. And the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal,

讘讜讚拽 住讻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讜诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘讚拽 讜谞转谉 诇讜 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讘讜讚拽 住讻讬谞讜 讗讞专讬讜 谞诪爪讗转 住讻讬谞讜 讬驻讛 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. But if one did not examine the knife and give it to the transgressor, the transgressor may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if the transgressor slaughtered an animal, one examines his knife after his slaughter. If his knife is found to be perfectly smooth, it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚 讗讬 讚讘讚拽 住讻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讛讗 讗诪专转 砖讜讞讟 诇讻转讞诇讛 讗诇讗 讚诇讗 讘讚拽 讗讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 诇讬讘讚拽讬讛 讛砖转讗 讜讗讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇住讻讬谉 讻讬 讗讞专讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讚诇诪讗 讘住讻讬谉 驻讙讜诪讛 砖讞讬讟 拽砖讬讗

Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Jewish transgressor who slaughters. The Gemara asks: In what case? If it is a case where one examined a knife and gave it to the transgressor, didn鈥檛 you say in that case that the transgressor may slaughter ab initio? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where one did not examine the knife. If it is a case where the knife is available, let him examine the knife now to make sure that there are no nicks. And if it is a case where the knife is not available, then when others see him slaughter, what of it? How can one eat from what he slaughtered? Perhaps he slaughtered the animal with a notched knife. The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讛讻诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉

Ravina said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is an expert in the halakhot of ritual slaughter slaughters; all experts are qualified to slaughter, and this is the halakha even if they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讬讜讚注讬谉 讘讜 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 讘讜 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗诐 讬讜讚注 诇讜诪专 讛诇讻讜转 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where people know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter. But if people do not know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter, he may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if he slaughtered an animal, one examines him; if he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讘讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇拽诪谉 讚诇讬讘讚拽讬讛

Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not experts. The Gemara rejects the possibility that they are not experts, as in that case, if one examines him after the slaughter to determine his expertise in the halakhot of ritual slaughter, it is sufficient. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can examine him.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讛讻诇 砖讜讞讟讬谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 砖讜讞讟讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖砖讞讟讜 诇驻谞讬谞讜 砖转讬诐 讜砖诇砖 驻注诪讬诐 讜诇讗 谞转注诇祝 讗讘诇 诇讗 砖讞讟 诇驻谞讬谞讜 砖转讬诐 讜砖诇砖 驻注诪讬诐 诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 砖诪讗 讬转注诇祝 讜讗诐 砖讞讟 讜讗诪专 讘专讬 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞转注诇驻转讬 砖讞讬讟转讜 讻砖专讛

And there are those who say that Ravina said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting slaughters; all those established concerning this are qualified to slaughter, even if it is not known if they are experts. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times he may not slaughter an animal ab initio, lest he faint. And if he slaughtered an animal and said: It is clear to me that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.

讞讜抓 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讚讬注讘讚 谞诪讬 诇讗 砖诪讗 讬砖讛讜 砖诪讗 讬讚专住讜 讜砖诪讗 讬讞诇讬讚讜 讜讻讜诇谉 砖砖讞讟讜 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 注诇讛 拽讗讬 讜讗诐 砖讞讟讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.

讗诇讗 讗砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讜讛讗诪专转 讘讘专讬 诇讬 住讙讬 讚诇讬转讬讛 拽诪谉 讚诇讬砖讬讬诇讬讛

Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, didn鈥檛 you say that if one said after the slaughter: It is clear to me that I did not faint, it is sufficient? The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can ask him whether he fainted.

专讘讬谞讗 讜专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讻讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 讜专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诪砖讜诐 讚拽砖讬讗 诇讛讜 讜讻讜诇谉

The Gemara summarizes: Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Abaye, Rava, and Rav Ashi due to the fact that the phrase in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult for them.

讻讜诇讛讜 讻专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讗讚专讘讛 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讚讘拽讚砖讬诐 拽讗讬

All of the other amora鈥檌m did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Rabba bar Ulla, who interprets the mishna as referring to the case of a ritually impure person; according to that version that you said: The mishna here is the primary source for the halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, the other amora鈥檌m reject this interpretation because, on the contrary, the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zeva岣m, which deals with sacrificial animals.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讛转诐 注讬拽专 讜讛讻讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚转谞讗 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 转谞讗 谞诪讬 讟诪讗 讘诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 讟诪讗 讘讞讜诇讬谉 讙讜驻讬讛 诇讗 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 讞讜诇讬谉 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讟讛专转 拽讚砖 诇讗讜 讻拽讚砖 讚诪讜

The amora鈥檌m also reject the interpretation according to that other version that you said: The mishna there is the primary source, and here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered non-sacred animals, he teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered sacrificial animals as well. The reason is that it was not necessary for the tanna to teach the case itself of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, as in the opinion of the other amora鈥檌m, the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is not like that of sacrificial food, and it is permitted to render such food impure.

讻讜诇讛讜 讻专讘讬谞讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讗讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜诪讞讬谉 诇讗 专讜讘 诪爪讜讬讬谉 讗爪诇 砖讞讬讟讛 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讛谉

All of the other amora鈥檌m did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Ravina; according to that version that he said: Experts, yes, may slaughter ab initio, but those that it is not known that they are experts, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora鈥檌m disagree because they hold that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Therefore, even if it is not known whether they are experts, their slaughter is valid.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 讗讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讜讞讝拽讬谉 诇讗 诇注诇讜驻讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉

According to that version that Ravina said: People who are established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, yes, they may slaughter ab initio, but people who are not established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora鈥檌m disagree because they hold that we are not concerned for the possibility of fainting.

专讘讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻讗讘讬讬 讻讬 拽讜砖讬讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘讗 讛转诐 诇讗 谞讙注 讛讻讗 谞讙注

Rava did not say a resolution like that of Abaye, that the mishna is referring to a Samaritan, in accordance with the difficulty that he raised from the halakha of wine belonging to a Jew to which a gentile has access. Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rava, that a Samaritan may slaughter ab initio if a Jew enters and exits, because there, in the case of wine, the gentile does not touch the wine; therefore, it is sufficient if the Jew enters and exits. Here, in the case of slaughter, the Samaritan touches the animal in the course of slaughter, and he can disqualify the slaughter in an instant. Therefore, Abaye holds that it is insufficient for a Jew to enter and exit.

专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻转专讜讬讬讛讜 拽住讘专 讻讜转讬诐 讙专讬 讗专讬讜转 讛谉

Rav Ashi did not say a resolution like that of both of them, Abaye and Rava, because he holds: Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and their conversion is void; therefore, their halakhic status is that of a gentile, whose slaughter is not valid.

讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讛讗 讚专讘讗 讗诇讗 专讘讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻砖诪注转讬讛

Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rav Ashi, who interprets the mishna as referring to a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, because he does not hold that which Rava said, that such a transgressor may slaughter ab initio if his knife is examined beforehand by someone reliable. But as for Rava, what is the reason that he did not say a resolution in accordance with his own statement of halakha with regard to the slaughter of a transgressor and explain the mishna in the manner that Rav Ashi did?

诇讚讘专讬讜 讚讗讘讬讬 拽讗诪专 讜诇讬讛 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: When Rava explained that the tanna in the mishna is referring to the slaughter of a Samaritan, he stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Abaye in order to resolve the difficulty that Abaye raised; but he himself does not hold accordingly.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖讞讬讟转 讻讜转讬 诪讜转专转 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讻砖讬砖专讗诇 注讜诪讚 注诇 讙讘讬讜 讗讘诇 讘讗 讜诪爪讗讜 砖砖讞讟 讞讜转讱 讻讝讬转 讜谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗讻诇讜 诪讜转专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗住讜专 诇讗讻讜诇 诪砖讞讬讟转讜

The Sages taught in a baraita: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted ab initio. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there is a Jew standing over him and supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly. But if the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.

讻讬讜爪讗 讘讜 诪爪讗 讘讬讚讜

Similarly, if the Jew found in the possession of a Samaritan

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