Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
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Summary
Following the presentation of Raba bar Ulla’s interpretation, the Gemara introduces five alternative explanations of the Mishna. After surveying these options, it clarifies why each sage rejected the competing positions, highlighting the specific logical or textual difficulties inherent in each.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
Chullin 3
חֶרֶב הֲרֵי הוּא כֶּחָלָל, אַב הַטּוּמְאָה הוּא, לְטַמְּיֵיהּ לְסַכִּין, וַאֲזַל סַכִּין וְטַמִּיתֵיהּ לְבָשָׂר!
It is derived from the juxtaposition of “slain” to “sword” that the halakhic status of a sword or any other metal vessel that comes into contact with a corpse is like that of a corpse itself. Similarly, if a metal utensil comes in contact with a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, it assumes his status. Therefore, since the impure person is a primary source of ritual impurity, let him render the knife impure, rendering it as well a primary source of impurity, and the knife then goes and renders the flesh impure.
אֶלָּא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּשֶׁרֶץ, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁבָּדַק קְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִים, בֵּין בְּצוֹר בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה.
Rather, it is a case where the person became impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal; as he assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not render vessels impure, the knife remains ritually pure. And if you wish, say instead that actually he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is a case where one examined the stalk of a reed, which is a flat wooden vessel that does not become ritually impure, to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks, and slaughtered with it, as it is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter an animal with any sharp object, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט.
§ Abaye said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew is standing over him and ensuring that he slaughters properly; but if the Jew merely exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, the Samaritan may not slaughter the animal.
וְאִם שָׁחַט, חוֹתֵךְ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
And if the Samaritan slaughtered the animal without supervision, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Since Samaritans are meticulous with regard to the meat that they eat and eat meat only from an animal that was slaughtered properly, the Jew may partake of the meat. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, there is concern that the animal was not slaughtered properly, and it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַכּוּתִי – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו שָׁחֵיט אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say in that case: When a Jew is standing over him, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְיוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא? וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ נָכְרִי בַּחֲנוּתוֹ וְיִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר! הָתָם מִי קָתָנֵי ״מַנִּיחַ״? ״הַמַּנִּיחַ״ קָתָנֵי, דִּיעֲבַד.
Rava said: And in a case where a Jew exits and enters, is it not permitted for the Samaritan to slaughter the animal ab initio? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Avoda Zara 69a): In the case of one who leaves a gentile in his store in which there is wine, and a Jew exits and enters, the wine is permitted? Just as there, the sporadic presence of the Jew is sufficient to ensure that the gentile will refrain from touching the wine, it should be sufficient in the case of a Samaritan who slaughters an animal as well. The Gemara rejects that proof. There, in the case of the store, does the tanna teach: One leaves a gentile ab initio? The tanna teaches: One who leaves, after the fact. Consequently, there is no proof from there that the Jew’s sporadic presence is sufficient to permit slaughter by a Samaritan ab initio.
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: אֵין הַשּׁוֹמֵר צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת יוֹשֵׁב וּמְשַׁמֵּר, אֶלָּא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר.
Rather, proof can be cited from the mishna here (Avoda Zara 61a): In a case where barrels of wine belonging to a Jew are in the possession of a gentile, and a Jew was tasked with supervising those barrels, the supervisor need not be continuously sitting and supervising to ensure that the gentile does not touch the wine; rather, even if the supervisor exits and enters, the wine is permitted. This mishna clearly indicates that exiting and entering is sufficient even ab initio.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
Rather, Rava said in resolution of the apparent contradiction similar to the resolution proposed by Abaye, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew exits and enters; but if the Jew does not exit and enter and instead came and found that the Samaritan slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא אַכּוּתִי? הָא אָמְרַתְּ: אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס שָׁחֵיט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say that if a Jew is present, then even if he exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. מְשׁוּמָּד לְמַאי? לֶאֱכוֹל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן, וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן
§ Rav Ashi said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Jewish transgressor [meshummad]. The Gemara asks: A transgressor of what sort? The Gemara answers: It is one whose transgression is to eat unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, i.e., for his convenience. And the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal,
בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ. אֲבָל לֹא בָּדַק וְנָתַן לוֹ – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּינוֹ אַחֲרָיו. נִמְצֵאת סַכִּינוֹ יָפָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. But if one did not examine the knife and give it to the transgressor, the transgressor may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if the transgressor slaughtered an animal, one examines his knife after his slaughter. If his knife is found to be perfectly smooth, it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא אַיִּשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד? אִי דְּבָדַק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, הָא אָמְרַתְּ שׁוֹחֵט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! אֶלָּא דְּלֹא בָּדַק. אִי דְּאִיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – לִיבְדְּקֵיהּ הַשְׁתָּא, וְאִי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – כִּי אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מַאי הָוֵי? דִּלְמָא בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה שָׁחֵיט! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Jewish transgressor who slaughters. The Gemara asks: In what case? If it is a case where one examined a knife and gave it to the transgressor, didn’t you say in that case that the transgressor may slaughter ab initio? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where one did not examine the knife. If it is a case where the knife is available, let him examine the knife now to make sure that there are no nicks. And if it is a case where the knife is not available, then when others see him slaughter, what of it? How can one eat from what he slaughtered? Perhaps he slaughtered the animal with a notched knife. The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּמְחִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּמְחִין וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין.
§ Ravina said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is an expert in the halakhot of ritual slaughter slaughters; all experts are qualified to slaughter, and this is the halakha even if they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל אֵין יוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ, אִם יוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where people know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter. But if people do not know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter, he may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if he slaughtered an animal, one examines him; if he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּמְחִין, בְּבוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְקַמַּן דְּלִיבְדְּקֵיהּ.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not experts. The Gemara rejects the possibility that they are not experts, as in that case, if one examines him after the slaughter to determine his expertise in the halakhot of ritual slaughter, it is sufficient. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can examine him.
וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּחְזָקִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּחְזָקִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים וְלֹא נִתְעַלֵּף, אֲבָל לֹא שָׁחַט לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִתְעַלֵּף. וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאָמַר: ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְעַלַּפְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
And there are those who say that Ravina said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting slaughters; all those established concerning this are qualified to slaughter, even if it is not known if they are experts. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times he may not slaughter an animal ab initio, lest he faint. And if he slaughtered an animal and said: It is clear to me that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין, וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דְּלִישַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, didn’t you say that if one said after the slaughter: It is clear to me that I did not faint, it is sufficient? The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can ask him whether he fainted.
רָבִינָא וְרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא, כְּאַבַּיֵּי וְרָבָא וְרַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמְרִי, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לְהוּ ״וְכוּלָּן״.
The Gemara summarizes: Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Abaye, Rava, and Rav Ashi due to the fact that the phrase in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult for them.
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ הָכָא עִיקָּר – אַדְּרַבָּה, הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי.
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Rabba bar Ulla, who interprets the mishna as referring to the case of a ritually impure person; according to that version that you said: The mishna here is the primary source for the halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, the other amora’im reject this interpretation because, on the contrary, the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals.
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ: הָתָם עִיקָּר, וְהָכָא אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין גּוּפֵיהּ לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת קֹדֶשׁ לָאו כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
The amora’im also reject the interpretation according to that other version that you said: The mishna there is the primary source, and here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered non-sacred animals, he teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered sacrificial animals as well. The reason is that it was not necessary for the tanna to teach the case itself of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, as in the opinion of the other amora’im, the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is not like that of sacrificial food, and it is permitted to render such food impure.
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרָבִינָא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּמְחִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין לָא – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Ravina; according to that version that he said: Experts, yes, may slaughter ab initio, but those that it is not known that they are experts, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Therefore, even if it is not known whether they are experts, their slaughter is valid.
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּחְזָקִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין לָא – לְעִלּוֹפֵי לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
According to that version that Ravina said: People who are established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, yes, they may slaughter ab initio, but people who are not established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that we are not concerned for the possibility of fainting.
רָבָא לָא אָמַר כְּאַבַּיֵּי, כִּי קוּשְׁיֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא, הָתָם לָא נָגַע, הָכָא נָגַע.
Rava did not say a resolution like that of Abaye, that the mishna is referring to a Samaritan, in accordance with the difficulty that he raised from the halakha of wine belonging to a Jew to which a gentile has access. Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rava, that a Samaritan may slaughter ab initio if a Jew enters and exits, because there, in the case of wine, the gentile does not touch the wine; therefore, it is sufficient if the Jew enters and exits. Here, in the case of slaughter, the Samaritan touches the animal in the course of slaughter, and he can disqualify the slaughter in an instant. Therefore, Abaye holds that it is insufficient for a Jew to enter and exit.
רַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמַר כְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, קָסָבַר: כּוּתִים גֵּרֵי אֲרָיוֹת הֵן.
Rav Ashi did not say a resolution like that of both of them, Abaye and Rava, because he holds: Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and their conversion is void; therefore, their halakhic status is that of a gentile, whose slaughter is not valid.
אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרַב אָשֵׁי, לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּרָבָא. אֶלָּא רָבָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כִּשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ?
Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rav Ashi, who interprets the mishna as referring to a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, because he does not hold that which Rava said, that such a transgressor may slaughter ab initio if his knife is examined beforehand by someone reliable. But as for Rava, what is the reason that he did not say a resolution in accordance with his own statement of halakha with regard to the slaughter of a transgressor and explain the mishna in the manner that Rav Ashi did?
לִדְבָרָיו דְּאַבָּיֵי קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: When Rava explained that the tanna in the mishna is referring to the slaughter of a Samaritan, he stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Abaye in order to resolve the difficulty that Abaye raised; but he himself does not hold accordingly.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחִיטַת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted ab initio. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there is a Jew standing over him and supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly. But if the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ
Similarly, if the Jew found in the possession of a Samaritan
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Chullin 3
חֶרֶב הֲרֵי הוּא כֶּחָלָל, אַב הַטּוּמְאָה הוּא, לְטַמְּיֵיהּ לְסַכִּין, וַאֲזַל סַכִּין וְטַמִּיתֵיהּ לְבָשָׂר!
It is derived from the juxtaposition of “slain” to “sword” that the halakhic status of a sword or any other metal vessel that comes into contact with a corpse is like that of a corpse itself. Similarly, if a metal utensil comes in contact with a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, it assumes his status. Therefore, since the impure person is a primary source of ritual impurity, let him render the knife impure, rendering it as well a primary source of impurity, and the knife then goes and renders the flesh impure.
אֶלָּא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּשֶׁרֶץ, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁבָּדַק קְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִים, בֵּין בְּצוֹר בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה.
Rather, it is a case where the person became impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal; as he assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not render vessels impure, the knife remains ritually pure. And if you wish, say instead that actually he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is a case where one examined the stalk of a reed, which is a flat wooden vessel that does not become ritually impure, to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks, and slaughtered with it, as it is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter an animal with any sharp object, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט.
§ Abaye said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew is standing over him and ensuring that he slaughters properly; but if the Jew merely exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, the Samaritan may not slaughter the animal.
וְאִם שָׁחַט, חוֹתֵךְ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
And if the Samaritan slaughtered the animal without supervision, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Since Samaritans are meticulous with regard to the meat that they eat and eat meat only from an animal that was slaughtered properly, the Jew may partake of the meat. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, there is concern that the animal was not slaughtered properly, and it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַכּוּתִי – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו שָׁחֵיט אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say in that case: When a Jew is standing over him, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְיוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא? וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ נָכְרִי בַּחֲנוּתוֹ וְיִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר! הָתָם מִי קָתָנֵי ״מַנִּיחַ״? ״הַמַּנִּיחַ״ קָתָנֵי, דִּיעֲבַד.
Rava said: And in a case where a Jew exits and enters, is it not permitted for the Samaritan to slaughter the animal ab initio? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Avoda Zara 69a): In the case of one who leaves a gentile in his store in which there is wine, and a Jew exits and enters, the wine is permitted? Just as there, the sporadic presence of the Jew is sufficient to ensure that the gentile will refrain from touching the wine, it should be sufficient in the case of a Samaritan who slaughters an animal as well. The Gemara rejects that proof. There, in the case of the store, does the tanna teach: One leaves a gentile ab initio? The tanna teaches: One who leaves, after the fact. Consequently, there is no proof from there that the Jew’s sporadic presence is sufficient to permit slaughter by a Samaritan ab initio.
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: אֵין הַשּׁוֹמֵר צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת יוֹשֵׁב וּמְשַׁמֵּר, אֶלָּא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר.
Rather, proof can be cited from the mishna here (Avoda Zara 61a): In a case where barrels of wine belonging to a Jew are in the possession of a gentile, and a Jew was tasked with supervising those barrels, the supervisor need not be continuously sitting and supervising to ensure that the gentile does not touch the wine; rather, even if the supervisor exits and enters, the wine is permitted. This mishna clearly indicates that exiting and entering is sufficient even ab initio.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
Rather, Rava said in resolution of the apparent contradiction similar to the resolution proposed by Abaye, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew exits and enters; but if the Jew does not exit and enter and instead came and found that the Samaritan slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא אַכּוּתִי? הָא אָמְרַתְּ: אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס שָׁחֵיט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say that if a Jew is present, then even if he exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. מְשׁוּמָּד לְמַאי? לֶאֱכוֹל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן, וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן
§ Rav Ashi said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Jewish transgressor [meshummad]. The Gemara asks: A transgressor of what sort? The Gemara answers: It is one whose transgression is to eat unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, i.e., for his convenience. And the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal,
בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ. אֲבָל לֹא בָּדַק וְנָתַן לוֹ – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּינוֹ אַחֲרָיו. נִמְצֵאת סַכִּינוֹ יָפָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. But if one did not examine the knife and give it to the transgressor, the transgressor may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if the transgressor slaughtered an animal, one examines his knife after his slaughter. If his knife is found to be perfectly smooth, it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא אַיִּשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד? אִי דְּבָדַק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, הָא אָמְרַתְּ שׁוֹחֵט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! אֶלָּא דְּלֹא בָּדַק. אִי דְּאִיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – לִיבְדְּקֵיהּ הַשְׁתָּא, וְאִי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – כִּי אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מַאי הָוֵי? דִּלְמָא בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה שָׁחֵיט! קַשְׁיָא.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Jewish transgressor who slaughters. The Gemara asks: In what case? If it is a case where one examined a knife and gave it to the transgressor, didn’t you say in that case that the transgressor may slaughter ab initio? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where one did not examine the knife. If it is a case where the knife is available, let him examine the knife now to make sure that there are no nicks. And if it is a case where the knife is not available, then when others see him slaughter, what of it? How can one eat from what he slaughtered? Perhaps he slaughtered the animal with a notched knife. The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּמְחִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּמְחִין וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין.
§ Ravina said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is an expert in the halakhot of ritual slaughter slaughters; all experts are qualified to slaughter, and this is the halakha even if they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל אֵין יוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ, אִם יוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where people know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter. But if people do not know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter, he may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if he slaughtered an animal, one examines him; if he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּמְחִין, בְּבוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְקַמַּן דְּלִיבְדְּקֵיהּ.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not experts. The Gemara rejects the possibility that they are not experts, as in that case, if one examines him after the slaughter to determine his expertise in the halakhot of ritual slaughter, it is sufficient. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can examine him.
וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּחְזָקִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּחְזָקִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים וְלֹא נִתְעַלֵּף, אֲבָל לֹא שָׁחַט לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִתְעַלֵּף. וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאָמַר: ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְעַלַּפְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
And there are those who say that Ravina said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting slaughters; all those established concerning this are qualified to slaughter, even if it is not known if they are experts. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times he may not slaughter an animal ab initio, lest he faint. And if he slaughtered an animal and said: It is clear to me that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין, וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דְּלִישַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, didn’t you say that if one said after the slaughter: It is clear to me that I did not faint, it is sufficient? The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can ask him whether he fainted.
רָבִינָא וְרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא, כְּאַבַּיֵּי וְרָבָא וְרַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמְרִי, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לְהוּ ״וְכוּלָּן״.
The Gemara summarizes: Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Abaye, Rava, and Rav Ashi due to the fact that the phrase in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult for them.
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ הָכָא עִיקָּר – אַדְּרַבָּה, הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי.
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Rabba bar Ulla, who interprets the mishna as referring to the case of a ritually impure person; according to that version that you said: The mishna here is the primary source for the halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, the other amora’im reject this interpretation because, on the contrary, the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals.
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ: הָתָם עִיקָּר, וְהָכָא אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין גּוּפֵיהּ לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת קֹדֶשׁ לָאו כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
The amora’im also reject the interpretation according to that other version that you said: The mishna there is the primary source, and here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered non-sacred animals, he teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered sacrificial animals as well. The reason is that it was not necessary for the tanna to teach the case itself of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, as in the opinion of the other amora’im, the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is not like that of sacrificial food, and it is permitted to render such food impure.
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרָבִינָא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּמְחִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין לָא – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Ravina; according to that version that he said: Experts, yes, may slaughter ab initio, but those that it is not known that they are experts, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Therefore, even if it is not known whether they are experts, their slaughter is valid.
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּחְזָקִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין לָא – לְעִלּוֹפֵי לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
According to that version that Ravina said: People who are established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, yes, they may slaughter ab initio, but people who are not established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that we are not concerned for the possibility of fainting.
רָבָא לָא אָמַר כְּאַבַּיֵּי, כִּי קוּשְׁיֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא, הָתָם לָא נָגַע, הָכָא נָגַע.
Rava did not say a resolution like that of Abaye, that the mishna is referring to a Samaritan, in accordance with the difficulty that he raised from the halakha of wine belonging to a Jew to which a gentile has access. Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rava, that a Samaritan may slaughter ab initio if a Jew enters and exits, because there, in the case of wine, the gentile does not touch the wine; therefore, it is sufficient if the Jew enters and exits. Here, in the case of slaughter, the Samaritan touches the animal in the course of slaughter, and he can disqualify the slaughter in an instant. Therefore, Abaye holds that it is insufficient for a Jew to enter and exit.
רַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמַר כְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, קָסָבַר: כּוּתִים גֵּרֵי אֲרָיוֹת הֵן.
Rav Ashi did not say a resolution like that of both of them, Abaye and Rava, because he holds: Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and their conversion is void; therefore, their halakhic status is that of a gentile, whose slaughter is not valid.
אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרַב אָשֵׁי, לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּרָבָא. אֶלָּא רָבָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כִּשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ?
Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rav Ashi, who interprets the mishna as referring to a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, because he does not hold that which Rava said, that such a transgressor may slaughter ab initio if his knife is examined beforehand by someone reliable. But as for Rava, what is the reason that he did not say a resolution in accordance with his own statement of halakha with regard to the slaughter of a transgressor and explain the mishna in the manner that Rav Ashi did?
לִדְבָרָיו דְּאַבָּיֵי קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: When Rava explained that the tanna in the mishna is referring to the slaughter of a Samaritan, he stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Abaye in order to resolve the difficulty that Abaye raised; but he himself does not hold accordingly.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחִיטַת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted ab initio. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there is a Jew standing over him and supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly. But if the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ
Similarly, if the Jew found in the possession of a Samaritan
