Why didn’t the Mishna mention a case of one who claimed that they borrowed money from another, but already paid it back? Why didn’t it mention the case of one who said “Your father lent me money but I paid him back half.” Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis disagree regarding that case – what does each hold and why? Why is it different than a standard case of modeh b’miktzat, one who admits to part of the claim, who is obligated to swear regarding the half in question? The Mishna brings another case where one is believed as we only know of the claim at all from what the person told us and therefore, they are believed about the rest. The case is regarding verification of signature on a document. When the witnesses verified their signatures, they claimed they were forced into it or were too young to testify or were disqualified witnesses. Rami bar Chama limits one of the cases of the Mishna but there are two versions as to which one he is limiting. How does the Mishna work with the principle that once one has testified, one can no longer change their testimony? How does it work with the principle that a person does not come to court and self-incriminate themselves? A braita brings a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding the law in our Mishna. The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rabbi Meir’s opinion.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Mark Goldstein in honor of his wife, Rena Septee Goldstein, on the occasion of their 44th anniversary.
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Mark Goldstein in honor of his wife, Rena Septee Goldstein, on the occasion of their 44th anniversary.
Ketubot 18
דִּסְתַם יְהוּדָה וּגְלִיל כִּשְׁעַת חֵירוּם דָּמוּ.
The Gemara answers: The reason that the tanna cited specifically a case where each is located in a different land is that the standard situation with regard to travel between Judea and the Galilee is tantamount to a crisis period, as war was commonplace, and there was a strip of Samaritan territory between Judea and the Galilee.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״מָנֶה לָוִיתִי מִמְּךָ וּפְרַעְתִּיו לָךְ״, שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא לָוָה מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: פְּרַעְתִּיו — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְפׇרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים.
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: I borrowed one hundred dinars from you and repaid the loan to you, that he is deemed credible. The Gemara answers: The tanna chose not to teach that case of the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted due to the fact that the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If there are witnesses that he borrowed money from another, and he says: I repaid the loan, he is not deemed credible. However, the tanna would not be able to distinguish between a case where witnesses testify and a case where there are no witnesses, as don’t we hold that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the borrower need not repay the loan in the presence of witnesses? Therefore, even if witnesses testify that he took the loan, his claim that he repaid the loan is accepted.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס — שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן!
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession in the form of a loan, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, that his claim is deemed credible.
אַלִּיבָּא דְמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן — הָא אָמְרִי מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — הָא אָמַר שְׁבוּעָה בָּעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There is a tannaitic dispute with regard to that case and the case that the Gemara suggested does not correspond to either opinion. In accordance with whose opinion would the mishna be taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in that case he is the equivalent of one returning a lost article? Since the son is unaware that the borrower owes his father money, and the borrower takes the initiative and admits that he owes part of the sum that he borrowed, it is as if he returned a lost article, and clearly his claim is accepted and no oath is required. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, didn’t he say that in that case the borrower is required to take an oath, and only then is his claim accepted?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ — הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע, וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
This dispute is as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when although no one claimed that another owes him money, a person takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. How so? If one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is required to take an oath that he repaid half, and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. And the Rabbis say: In that case he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost article, and is exempt from taking an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב לֵית לֵיהּ מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה פָּטוּר? אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן. וְהָאָמַר מָר: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not of the opinion that one who returns a lost article is exempt from taking an oath that he did not take part of the sum? He returns what he admitted taking without an oath. Rav says: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor makes a claim against him. The lender’s minor son claims that the borrower did not repay any part of the loan to his father. The borrower’s claim comes in response to that claim. Therefore, his admission is not at all comparable to returning a lost article. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: One does not take an oath on the basis of the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor? Due to their lack of cognition, they are not deemed halakhically competent to require another to take an oath based on their claim.
מַאי קָטָן — גָּדוֹל. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ קָטָן — דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא. אִי הָכִי: טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ? טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הִיא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: In Rav’s statement, what is the meaning of minor? It means one who reached majority, and is therefore halakhically competent. And why does Rav call him a minor? It is due to the fact that with regard to his father’s matters, he is the equivalent of a minor, as he is uncertain about the particulars of his father’s dealings. If so, i.e., that the son making the claim has already reached majority, the language of the baraita is imprecise. Why does the tanna refer to this case as one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim? This is not his own claim; it is the claim of others. The Gemara answers: The baraita employed that language for the following reason: It is the claim of others, but he is taking an oath on the basis of his own partial admission.
כּוּלְּהִי טַעֲנָתָא, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara asks: All claims where an oath is required are cases of a claim of others and his own admission. However, in the baraita, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov introduces his opinion with the phrase: There are times, indicating that the case to which he is referring, that of one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim, is not the standard case of taking an oath.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע — חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ. וְהַאי בְּכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלִכְפְּרֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כְּפַר לֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו הוּא.
Rather, the Gemara suggests an alternative explanation of the tannaitic dispute. Here, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba said: Why did the Torah say that one who makes a partial admission in response to the claim is required to take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor as to deny his debt. Presumably, this borrower who made a partial admission would have liked to deny the entire loan, and the fact that he did not deny the entire loan is due to the fact that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor.
וּבְכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִישְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, וְסָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵה לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ. וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
And, as a result, he would have liked to admit to him that he owes him the entire loan. And the reason that he did not admit to him that he owes him the entire loan is so that he may temporarily avoid paying him. And he rationalizes doing so, saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have money, and then I will repay him. Due to the concern that the partial admission is motivated by that rationalization and the claim of the lender is true, the Merciful One says: Impose an oath upon him so that he will admit that he owes him the entire loan.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ, אֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, וְהִלְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ — מֵעִיז. וּמִדְּלֹא הֵעִיז — מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains: It is no different with regard to the creditor himself, and it is no different with regard to his son. The debtor would not be so insolent as to deny the debt. And therefore, he is not considered as one returning a lost article on his own initiative. Rather, he is considered as one who partially admits his debt in response to a claim, and is therefore required to take an oath. However, the Rabbis maintain: In the presence of the creditor one would not be insolent, but in the presence of his son, who did not lend him the money, he would be insolent and deny the claim entirely. Since he had the option of completely denying the loan and opted to admit to part of the claim, he is considered as one returning a lost article and his claim is accepted without an oath.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעֵדִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ: כְּתַב יָדֵינוּ הוּא זֶה, אֲבָל אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ, קְטַנִּים הָיִינוּ, פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת הָיִינוּ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִים. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא כְּתַב יָדָם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה כְּתַב יָדָם יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין.
MISHNA: With regard to the witnesses who said in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled to sign, or we were minors when we signed, or we were disqualified witnesses, e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, they are deemed credible. Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. However, if there are other witnesses who testify that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges on a document from another place, enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document are not deemed credible. The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן״. אֲבָל ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין.
GEMARA: With regard to the latter clause in the mishna, in which it is stated that if there is independent corroboration of the signatures of the witnesses the document is not invalidated based on their testimony, Rami bar Ḥama says: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where they said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat. Their testimony incriminates them, as they testified falsely for money, and the principle is: The testimony of one who incriminates himself is not accepted. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, they are deemed credible, as that testimony is not self-incriminating, since in that case it is permitted to testify falsely.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ?! כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד — שׁוּב אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד. וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עַל פֶּה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר — לָא, וְהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עֵדִים הַחֲתוּמִים עַל הַשְּׁטָר — נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנֶּחְקְרָה עֵדוּתָן בְּבֵית דִּין!
Rava said to Rami bar Ḥama: Is it within their power to retract their testimony? There is a principle: Once a witness stated his testimony in court, he cannot again state testimony that contradicts his previous testimony. And if you say that this principle applies specifically to oral testimony, but with regard to testimony in a document, no, the principle does not apply and one may retract that testimony, didn’t Reish Lakish say: The legal status of witnesses who are signatories on the document becomes like those whose testimony was cross-examined in court. Therefore, just as one may not retract oral testimony, neither may he retract written testimony.
אֶלָּא, כִּי אִתְּמַר — אַרֵישָׁא אִתְּמַר: הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין, אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת, אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן — אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין. מַאי טַעְמָא: אֵין אָדָם מֵשִׂים עַצְמוֹ רָשָׁע.
Rather, when the statement of Rami bar Ḥama is stated, it is stated with regard to the first clause of the mishna, that if there is no independent corroboration of their signatures they are deemed credible. Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, as in that case they do not incriminate themselves. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat, they are not deemed credible. What is the reason that they are not deemed credible? It is based on the principle: One does not render himself wicked, and self-incriminating testimony is not accepted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין נֶאֱמָנִים לְפוֹסְלוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמָנִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן כִּי טַעְמַיְיהוּ, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי טַעְמָא? בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת, מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא מִידָּק דָּיֵיק וּמַחְתֵּם. קְטַנִּים נָמֵי, כִּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ:
§ The Sages taught: Witnesses who testify to invalidate their signatures on a document are not deemed credible to invalidate the document; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, their opinion corresponds to their reasoning stated previously: The mouth that prohibited it, i.e., ratified the document, is the mouth that permitted it, i.e., invalidated the promissory note. However, according to Rabbi Meir, what is the reason that their testimony to invalidate the document is not accepted? Granted, their testimony that they were disqualified witnesses is not accepted, as the lender himself initially ascertains that the witnesses are fit to testify and only then signs them on the document. Similarly, according to Rabbi Meir, their testimony that they were minors is also not accepted, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Reish Lakish said:
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The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
Oceanside NY, United States
After all the hype on the 2020 siyum I became inspired by a friend to begin learning as the new cycle began.with no background in studying Talmud it was a bit daunting in the beginning. my husband began at the same time so we decided to study on shabbat together. The reaction from my 3 daughters has been fantastic. They are very proud. It’s been a great challenge for my brain which is so healthy!
Modi’in, Israel
After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.
London, United Kingdom
Raanana, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba
Jerusalem, Israel
Minneapolis, MN, United States
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Jerusalem, Israel
Jerusalem, Israel
Blacksburg, United States
In January 2020 on a Shabbaton to Baltimore I heard about the new cycle of Daf Yomi after the siyum celebration in NYC stadium. I started to read “ a daily dose of Talmud “ and really enjoyed it . It led me to google “ do Orthodox women study Talmud? “ and found HADRAN! Since then I listen to the podcast every morning, participate in classes and siyum. I love to learn, this is amazing! Thank you
Atlanta, United States
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Jerusalem, Israel
I started learning Daf Yomi inspired by תָּפַסְתָּ מְרוּבֶּה לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ, תָּפַסְתָּ מוּעָט תָּפַסְתָּ. I thought I’d start the first page, and then see. I was swept up into the enthusiasm of the Hadran Siyum, and from there the momentum kept building. Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur gives me an anchor, a connection to an incredible virtual community, and an energy to face whatever the day brings.
בית שמש, Israel
Palo Alto, CA, United States
It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
See video
Raanana, Israel
Richmond, CA, United States
When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!
Jerusalem, Israel
Ketubot 18
דִּסְתַם יְהוּדָה וּגְלִיל כִּשְׁעַת חֵירוּם דָּמוּ.
The Gemara answers: The reason that the tanna cited specifically a case where each is located in a different land is that the standard situation with regard to travel between Judea and the Galilee is tantamount to a crisis period, as war was commonplace, and there was a strip of Samaritan territory between Judea and the Galilee.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״מָנֶה לָוִיתִי מִמְּךָ וּפְרַעְתִּיו לָךְ״, שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא לָוָה מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: פְּרַעְתִּיו — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְפׇרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים.
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: I borrowed one hundred dinars from you and repaid the loan to you, that he is deemed credible. The Gemara answers: The tanna chose not to teach that case of the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted due to the fact that the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If there are witnesses that he borrowed money from another, and he says: I repaid the loan, he is not deemed credible. However, the tanna would not be able to distinguish between a case where witnesses testify and a case where there are no witnesses, as don’t we hold that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the borrower need not repay the loan in the presence of witnesses? Therefore, even if witnesses testify that he took the loan, his claim that he repaid the loan is accepted.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס — שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן!
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession in the form of a loan, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, that his claim is deemed credible.
אַלִּיבָּא דְמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן — הָא אָמְרִי מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — הָא אָמַר שְׁבוּעָה בָּעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There is a tannaitic dispute with regard to that case and the case that the Gemara suggested does not correspond to either opinion. In accordance with whose opinion would the mishna be taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in that case he is the equivalent of one returning a lost article? Since the son is unaware that the borrower owes his father money, and the borrower takes the initiative and admits that he owes part of the sum that he borrowed, it is as if he returned a lost article, and clearly his claim is accepted and no oath is required. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, didn’t he say that in that case the borrower is required to take an oath, and only then is his claim accepted?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ — הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע, וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
This dispute is as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when although no one claimed that another owes him money, a person takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. How so? If one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is required to take an oath that he repaid half, and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. And the Rabbis say: In that case he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost article, and is exempt from taking an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב לֵית לֵיהּ מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה פָּטוּר? אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן. וְהָאָמַר מָר: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not of the opinion that one who returns a lost article is exempt from taking an oath that he did not take part of the sum? He returns what he admitted taking without an oath. Rav says: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor makes a claim against him. The lender’s minor son claims that the borrower did not repay any part of the loan to his father. The borrower’s claim comes in response to that claim. Therefore, his admission is not at all comparable to returning a lost article. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: One does not take an oath on the basis of the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor? Due to their lack of cognition, they are not deemed halakhically competent to require another to take an oath based on their claim.
מַאי קָטָן — גָּדוֹל. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ קָטָן — דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא. אִי הָכִי: טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ? טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הִיא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: In Rav’s statement, what is the meaning of minor? It means one who reached majority, and is therefore halakhically competent. And why does Rav call him a minor? It is due to the fact that with regard to his father’s matters, he is the equivalent of a minor, as he is uncertain about the particulars of his father’s dealings. If so, i.e., that the son making the claim has already reached majority, the language of the baraita is imprecise. Why does the tanna refer to this case as one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim? This is not his own claim; it is the claim of others. The Gemara answers: The baraita employed that language for the following reason: It is the claim of others, but he is taking an oath on the basis of his own partial admission.
כּוּלְּהִי טַעֲנָתָא, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara asks: All claims where an oath is required are cases of a claim of others and his own admission. However, in the baraita, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov introduces his opinion with the phrase: There are times, indicating that the case to which he is referring, that of one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim, is not the standard case of taking an oath.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע — חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ. וְהַאי בְּכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלִכְפְּרֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כְּפַר לֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו הוּא.
Rather, the Gemara suggests an alternative explanation of the tannaitic dispute. Here, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba said: Why did the Torah say that one who makes a partial admission in response to the claim is required to take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor as to deny his debt. Presumably, this borrower who made a partial admission would have liked to deny the entire loan, and the fact that he did not deny the entire loan is due to the fact that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor.
וּבְכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִישְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, וְסָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵה לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ. וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
And, as a result, he would have liked to admit to him that he owes him the entire loan. And the reason that he did not admit to him that he owes him the entire loan is so that he may temporarily avoid paying him. And he rationalizes doing so, saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have money, and then I will repay him. Due to the concern that the partial admission is motivated by that rationalization and the claim of the lender is true, the Merciful One says: Impose an oath upon him so that he will admit that he owes him the entire loan.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ, אֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, וְהִלְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ — מֵעִיז. וּמִדְּלֹא הֵעִיז — מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains: It is no different with regard to the creditor himself, and it is no different with regard to his son. The debtor would not be so insolent as to deny the debt. And therefore, he is not considered as one returning a lost article on his own initiative. Rather, he is considered as one who partially admits his debt in response to a claim, and is therefore required to take an oath. However, the Rabbis maintain: In the presence of the creditor one would not be insolent, but in the presence of his son, who did not lend him the money, he would be insolent and deny the claim entirely. Since he had the option of completely denying the loan and opted to admit to part of the claim, he is considered as one returning a lost article and his claim is accepted without an oath.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעֵדִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ: כְּתַב יָדֵינוּ הוּא זֶה, אֲבָל אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ, קְטַנִּים הָיִינוּ, פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת הָיִינוּ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִים. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא כְּתַב יָדָם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה כְּתַב יָדָם יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין.
MISHNA: With regard to the witnesses who said in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled to sign, or we were minors when we signed, or we were disqualified witnesses, e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, they are deemed credible. Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. However, if there are other witnesses who testify that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges on a document from another place, enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document are not deemed credible. The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן״. אֲבָל ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין.
GEMARA: With regard to the latter clause in the mishna, in which it is stated that if there is independent corroboration of the signatures of the witnesses the document is not invalidated based on their testimony, Rami bar Ḥama says: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where they said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat. Their testimony incriminates them, as they testified falsely for money, and the principle is: The testimony of one who incriminates himself is not accepted. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, they are deemed credible, as that testimony is not self-incriminating, since in that case it is permitted to testify falsely.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ?! כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד — שׁוּב אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד. וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עַל פֶּה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר — לָא, וְהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עֵדִים הַחֲתוּמִים עַל הַשְּׁטָר — נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנֶּחְקְרָה עֵדוּתָן בְּבֵית דִּין!
Rava said to Rami bar Ḥama: Is it within their power to retract their testimony? There is a principle: Once a witness stated his testimony in court, he cannot again state testimony that contradicts his previous testimony. And if you say that this principle applies specifically to oral testimony, but with regard to testimony in a document, no, the principle does not apply and one may retract that testimony, didn’t Reish Lakish say: The legal status of witnesses who are signatories on the document becomes like those whose testimony was cross-examined in court. Therefore, just as one may not retract oral testimony, neither may he retract written testimony.
אֶלָּא, כִּי אִתְּמַר — אַרֵישָׁא אִתְּמַר: הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין, אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת, אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן — אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין. מַאי טַעְמָא: אֵין אָדָם מֵשִׂים עַצְמוֹ רָשָׁע.
Rather, when the statement of Rami bar Ḥama is stated, it is stated with regard to the first clause of the mishna, that if there is no independent corroboration of their signatures they are deemed credible. Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, as in that case they do not incriminate themselves. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat, they are not deemed credible. What is the reason that they are not deemed credible? It is based on the principle: One does not render himself wicked, and self-incriminating testimony is not accepted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין נֶאֱמָנִים לְפוֹסְלוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמָנִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן כִּי טַעְמַיְיהוּ, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי טַעְמָא? בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת, מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא מִידָּק דָּיֵיק וּמַחְתֵּם. קְטַנִּים נָמֵי, כִּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ:
§ The Sages taught: Witnesses who testify to invalidate their signatures on a document are not deemed credible to invalidate the document; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, their opinion corresponds to their reasoning stated previously: The mouth that prohibited it, i.e., ratified the document, is the mouth that permitted it, i.e., invalidated the promissory note. However, according to Rabbi Meir, what is the reason that their testimony to invalidate the document is not accepted? Granted, their testimony that they were disqualified witnesses is not accepted, as the lender himself initially ascertains that the witnesses are fit to testify and only then signs them on the document. Similarly, according to Rabbi Meir, their testimony that they were minors is also not accepted, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Reish Lakish said:
