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Today's Daf Yomi

July 28, 2022 | 讻状讟 讘转诪讜讝 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 22

Today’s daf is dedicated by Tova and David Kestenbaum in honor of the engagement of their son, Gilad, to Noa Goldrich, daughter of Adina (ob”m) and Rafi Goldrich of Chashmonaim.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Manes and Silvia Kogan in honor of their children, Daniela, Ilan and Abby. 讬讛讬 专爪讜谉 砖讛壮 讬诪诇讗 诪砖讗诇讜转 诇讘诐 诇讟讜讘讛.

A number of situations are raised where judges may testify about each other in which they are not believed or it may just look like there is some untruth. If a woman says she was married but divorced or she was taken into captivity but not raped by a gentile, in what circumstances is she believed/not believed? If there were witnesses that she was married/taken into captivity, she is not believed. But if she was already remarried, we allow her to stay married. What is the source for believing her in the case that there were no witnesses and since she is the one who forbade herself, we believe her when she says she is now permitted? If a woman said she was married and then said she is single, we do not believe her, unless she can provide us with a good reason as to why she said she was married, as in the case of a woman who was trying to avoid inappropriate suitors. There is a debate regarding a case where there is contradictory testimony about whether the husband died or divorced her 鈥 if she already remarried, can she stay remarried? Rabbi Yochanan distinguishes between the case of death and divorce 鈥 why? Three different explanations are brought.

转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讬 注专注专 讚驻讙诐 诪砖驻讞讛 讙诇讜讬 诪诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 注专注专 讚讙讝诇谞讜转讗 讜拽讗诪专讬 讛谞讬 讬讚注讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讚注讘讚 转砖讜讘讛

the witnesses who testified that he is unfit and the judges who testified that he is fit are two witnesses and two witnesses who contradict them, and in that case, the allegation of theft is not completely eliminated. If it was a challenge based on an allegation of flawed lineage, e.g., he is a Canaanite slave and therefore unfit to serve as a judge, that is a mere revealing of a matter that will ultimately be revealed in any case and does not require actual testimony. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest preventing the judges from asserting his fitness after they signed. The Gemara concludes: Actually, I will say to you that it was a challenge based on an allegation of theft, and these judges say: We know about him that he repented and is now fit to serve as a judge. In that case, their testimony does not contradict the original testimony that he was guilty of theft.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讛讗 诪诇转讗 诪专讘讬 讗讘讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讜讗讬 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚诪谉 注讻讜 砖讻讞转讛 砖诇砖讛 砖讬砖讘讜 诇拽讬讬诐 讗转 讛砖讟专 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛诐 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇诪讬讻转讘 讘诪讜转讘 转诇转讗 讛讜讬谞讗 讜讞讚 诇讬转讜讛讬

Rabbi Zeira said: This matter, I heard from Rabbi Abba, and if it was not for Rabbi Abba of Akko, I would have forgotten it. With regard to a case of three judges who convened as a tribunal to ratify a document, and one of them died before signing the ratification, the surviving judges must emend the standard formula of the ratification and write: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer alive. In that way it is clear that although only two judges signed, the document was ratified by three judges.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讜讗讬 讻转讘 讘讬讛 砖讟专讗 讚谞谉 谞驻拽 诇拽讚诪谞讗 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 转讜 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讜讚诇诪讗 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝 讛讜讗 讜讻讚砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 砖谞拽专讗 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: And if the judges wrote in the ratification: This document was produced before us, the court; they no longer need to add that they were three judges, as, when unmodified, the term court connotes a tribunal of three judges. The Gemara asks: And perhaps it was an impudent court, and that is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; however, because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court be comprised of three judges, they are called an impudent court. Therefore, writing: Before us, the court, does not rule out the possibility that the document was ratified by fewer than three judges.

讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚专讘谞讗 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讚讘讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讚砖诪讜讗诇 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜讗诪专 诇谞讗 专讘谞讗 讗砖讬

The Gemara answers: It is clear that the document was ratified by the requisite three judges, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, which presumably conforms to rabbinic protocol. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the Rabbis of the court of Rav Ashi hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel and they convened an impudent court, whose ruling is binding. The Gemara answers: It is clear, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, and our teacher Rav Ashi said to us how to ratify the document.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讛讬讬转讬 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 砖讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 讜讗诐 讬砖 注讚讬诐 砖讛讬转讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讛讬讗 讗讜诪专转 讙专讜砖讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讗诪专讛 谞砖讘讬转讬 讜讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 砖讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 讜讗诐 讬砖 注讚讬诐 砖谞砖讘讬转 讜讛讬讗 讗讜诪专转 讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讗诐 诪砖谞砖讗转 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorc茅e, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorc茅e, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 诪谞讬谉 诇讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 砖谞讗诪专 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 诇讗砖讛 诇讗讬砖 讗住专讛 讛讝讛 讛转讬专讛

GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to this man [la鈥檌sh hazeh] as a wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off 鈥渢o the man [la鈥檌sh]鈥 without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says 鈥渢his [hazeh],鈥 thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband.

诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 住讘专讗 讛讬讗 讛讜讗 讗住专讛 讜讛讜讗 砖专讬 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讬谉 诇讗讘 砖谞讗诪谉 诇讗住讜专 讗转 讘转讜 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 砖谞讗诪专 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to derive this from the verse? It is based on logic: He rendered her forbidden and he rendered her permitted. Rather, where this verse is necessary, is in order to derive the halakha that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: From where in the Torah is it derived that a father is deemed credible to render his daughter forbidden? It is derived as it is stated: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to the man [la鈥檌sh]鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:16). The Gemara asks: Why do I need the subsequent term 鈥渢his [hazeh]鈥?

诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 讛讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讬讘诐

The Gemara explains: The verse is necessary to derive the halakha that Rabbi Yona taught; as Rabbi Yona taught in a baraita that in the verse: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to this man,鈥 written in the context of a husband slandering his wife, 鈥渢his鈥 is written to infer: The halakhot in this passage apply to a man who slanders his wife and not to the yavam, in the case of levirate marriage.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 驻谞讜讬讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 讜讛讗 砖讜讜讬讛 诇谞驻砖讛 讞转讬讻讛 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 驻谞讜讬讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讗诐 谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转

The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible.

讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讙讚讜诇讛 砖讛讬转讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讘谞讜讬 讜拽驻爪讜 注诇讬讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讗诪专讛 诇讛诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗谞讬 诇讬诪讬诐 注诪讚讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讛 专讗讬转 诇注砖讜转 讻谉 讗诪专讛 诇讛诐 讘转讞诇讛 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬 讗谞砖讬诐 砖讗讬谞诐 诪讛讜讙谞讬诐 讗诪专转讬 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗谞讬 注讻砖讬讜 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬 讗谞砖讬诐 诪讛讜讙谞讬诐 注诪讚转讬 讜拽讚砖转讬 讗转 注爪诪讬 讜讝讜 讛诇讻讛 讛注诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 砖专 讛讘讬专讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讗讜砖讗 讜讗诪专讜 讗诐 谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转

And there was also an incident involving an important woman who was outstanding in beauty, and many men were clamoring to betroth her. And she said to them: I am already betrothed. Sometime later she arose and betrothed herself to a man. The Sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do so? She said to them: Initially, when unscrupulous people approached me seeking to marry me, I said: I am betrothed. Now that scrupulous people approached me, I arose and betrothed myself to one of them. And the Gemara notes: This halakha was raised by Rav A岣 Sar HaBira before the Sages in Usha, the seat of the Sanhedrin, and the Sages said: If she provided a rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诪专讘 讗诪专讛 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗祝 讘讝讜 讗诐 谞转谞讛

Shmuel raised a dilemma before Rav: If a woman said to her husband: I am ritually impure as I am menstruating, and then said: I am pure, what is the halakha? Is she permitted based on her latter statement, or did she render herself an entity of prohibition with her first statement and therefore remains forbidden? Rav said to him: Even in that case, if she provided a

讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转 转谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗专讘注讬诐 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 诇讗 注讘讚 砖诪讜讗诇 注讜讘讚讗 讘谞驻砖讬讛

rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible. The Gemara relates: Shmuel learned this halakha from him forty times to ensure that he would not forget it, and even so, when confronted with a similar situation, Shmuel did not rely on that lenient ruling and did not take action with regard to himself and his wife.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转讬 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 讗讘诇 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 诇讗 转爪讗

The Sages taught that if two witnesses say: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die; or if two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry as there is no unequivocal testimony that she is unmarried. And if she remarried, she need not leave her husband. Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei says: She must leave her husband. And Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei said: When do I say that she must leave her husband? It is in a case where witnesses came to testify that she is still married and she remarried thereafter. However, if she remarried and the witnesses came thereafter, she need not leave her husband based on the uncertainty created by contradictory witnesses.

诪讻讚讬 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讻讙讜谉 砖谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讗讜诪专转 讘专讬 诇讬

The Gemara asks: After all, they are two witnesses testifying that she is married and two witnesses testifying that she is not; how then can the ruling be that after remarrying she need not leave her husband? In that case, one who engages in intercourse with her stands liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. For any prohibition whose certain violation renders one liable to bring a sin-offering, its uncertain violation renders one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. Rav Sheshet said: This is a case where she married one of her witnesses who testified that she is unmarried. As far as he is concerned, there is no uncertainty. The Gemara asks: She herself stands liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty, as she has no independent knowledge whether her husband died. The Gemara answers that this is a case where she says: It is clear to me that he died.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 转爪讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan said that if two witnesses say: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried she need not leave her husband. If two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried she must leave her husband.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转专讙诪讛 讘注讚 讗讞讚 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讛讬诪谞讜讛讜 专讘谞谉 讻讘讬 转专讬 讜讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讚 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement, where, if she remarried, she need not leave her husband, and what is the different in the second clause, where, if she remarried, she must leave her husband? Abaye said: Interpret Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement in a case where each testimony was given by one witness. If one witness says: The husband died, the Sages instituted an ordinance and accorded him credibility like that of two witnesses in order to enable his wife to remarry. And that is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: Wherever the Torah deemed one witness credible, his legal status there is that of two witnesses. And the legal status of that second witness who says: He did not die, is that of one witness, and the statement of one witness has no validity in a place where there is the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, she need not leave her husband.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘 讗住讬 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讛住专 诪诪讱 注拽砖讜转 驻讛 讜诇讝讜转 砖驻转讬诐 讛专讞拽 诪诪讱

The Gemara asks: If so, that this is a case of the testimony of two witnesses against the testimony of one witness, it should be permitted for her to remarry even ab initio. The Gemara answers that she may not remarry ab initio due to the opinion of Rav Asi, as Rav Asi said that in any case of uncertainty, the verse 鈥淩emove from you a crooked mouth, and perverse lips put far from you鈥 (Proverbs 4:24) applies. Although it is not a strictly prohibited action, it is, nevertheless, inappropriate.

住讬驻讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讗砖转 讗讬砖 拽诪住讛讚讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 谞转讙专砖讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讚 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

In the latter clause of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement, where one witness says: This woman was divorced, and one witness says: She was not divorced, both of them are testifying that she was a married woman, and that witness who says: She was divorced, is one witness, and the statement of one wit-ness has no validity in a place where there is the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, even if she remarried she must leave her husband.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜专讗讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讘讙专讜砖讬谉 讜诇讗 专讗讛 讘诪讬转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪讬转讛 讗讬谞讛 讬讻讜诇讛 诪讻讞砖转讜 讙专讜砖讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诪讻讞砖转讜

Rava explained the difference between the two cases in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement and said: Actually it is a case where they are two witnesses testifying that she is married and two testifying that she is not, and Rabbi Yo岣nan saw the statement of Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei as correct in the case of divorce but did not see it as correct in the case of death. What is the reason that he distinguishes between the two cases? In the case of death, if ultimately her husband returns alive, she is unable to deny that he is alive. Therefore, the woman鈥檚 decision to remarry is credible, as if she were not certain that he was dead, she would not have remarried. However, in the case of divorce, if her husband returns and claims that he did not divorce her, she is able to deny his claim. Therefore, her decision to remarry is suspect, and the Sages penalized her and established that she must leave her husband.

讜诪讬 讞爪讬驻讛 讻讜诇讬 讛讗讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 诇讘注诇讛 讙专砖转谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 诪注讬讝讛 驻谞讬讛 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注讬 诇讛 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注讬 诇讛 诪注讬讝讛 讜诪注讬讝讛

The Gemara asks: And is the woman impudent to that extent, that she would lie in the presence of her husband and claim that he divorced her? But didn鈥檛 Rav Hamnuna say with regard to a woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, she is deemed credible, as there is a presumption that a woman is not insolent in the presence of her husband? The Gemara answers: This statement that she is not insolent applies only in a case where there are no witnesses who are supporting her; however, in a case where there are witnesses who are supporting her, she would certainly be insolent.

专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专讬 注讚讬诐 注讻砖讬讜 诪转 注讻砖讬讜 讙讬专砖讛 诪讬转讛 诇讬讻讗 诇讘专讜专讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 诇讘专讜专讛 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讛 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗讞讝讬 诇谉 讙讬讟讬讱

Rav Asi explained the difference between the two cases in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement and said that it is a case where the witnesses say: He died now, or: He divorced her now. With regard to the husband鈥檚 death, there is no way to immediately clarify whether or not he is dead. With regard to divorce there is a way to immediately clarify whether or not he divorced her, as we say to the woman: If it is so that this is what happened, show us your bill of divorce. Since the testimony was that the divorce was now, it is not feasible that she lost the bill of divorce. If she fails to produce the bill of divorce, the witnesses that testify that she is divorced are apparently false witnesses. Therefore, even if she remarried she must leave her husband.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转拽讚砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转拽讚砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 转爪讗

The Sages taught: In a case where two witnesses say: This woman was betrothed, and two witnesses say: She was not betrothed, this woman may not marry another, and if she remarried, she need not leave her husband. In a case where two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried, she must leave her husband.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 22: Self-incrimination, to a Degree

What is a "Beit Din chatzuf"? When the court isn't quite proper, but its acts are upheld. Also, a new...

Ketubot 22

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Ketubot 22

转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讬 注专注专 讚驻讙诐 诪砖驻讞讛 讙诇讜讬 诪诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 注专注专 讚讙讝诇谞讜转讗 讜拽讗诪专讬 讛谞讬 讬讚注讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讚注讘讚 转砖讜讘讛

the witnesses who testified that he is unfit and the judges who testified that he is fit are two witnesses and two witnesses who contradict them, and in that case, the allegation of theft is not completely eliminated. If it was a challenge based on an allegation of flawed lineage, e.g., he is a Canaanite slave and therefore unfit to serve as a judge, that is a mere revealing of a matter that will ultimately be revealed in any case and does not require actual testimony. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest preventing the judges from asserting his fitness after they signed. The Gemara concludes: Actually, I will say to you that it was a challenge based on an allegation of theft, and these judges say: We know about him that he repented and is now fit to serve as a judge. In that case, their testimony does not contradict the original testimony that he was guilty of theft.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讛讗 诪诇转讗 诪专讘讬 讗讘讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讜讗讬 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讚诪谉 注讻讜 砖讻讞转讛 砖诇砖讛 砖讬砖讘讜 诇拽讬讬诐 讗转 讛砖讟专 讜诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛诐 爪专讬讻讬谉 诇诪讬讻转讘 讘诪讜转讘 转诇转讗 讛讜讬谞讗 讜讞讚 诇讬转讜讛讬

Rabbi Zeira said: This matter, I heard from Rabbi Abba, and if it was not for Rabbi Abba of Akko, I would have forgotten it. With regard to a case of three judges who convened as a tribunal to ratify a document, and one of them died before signing the ratification, the surviving judges must emend the standard formula of the ratification and write: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer alive. In that way it is clear that although only two judges signed, the document was ratified by three judges.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讜讗讬 讻转讘 讘讬讛 砖讟专讗 讚谞谉 谞驻拽 诇拽讚诪谞讗 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 转讜 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讜讚诇诪讗 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝 讛讜讗 讜讻讚砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 砖谞讬诐 砖讚谞讜 讚讬谞讬讛诐 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 砖谞拽专讗 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞爪讜祝

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: And if the judges wrote in the ratification: This document was produced before us, the court; they no longer need to add that they were three judges, as, when unmodified, the term court connotes a tribunal of three judges. The Gemara asks: And perhaps it was an impudent court, and that is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; however, because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court be comprised of three judges, they are called an impudent court. Therefore, writing: Before us, the court, does not rule out the possibility that the document was ratified by fewer than three judges.

讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚专讘谞讗 讗砖讬 讜讚诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讚讘讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讚砖诪讜讗诇 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讚讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜讗诪专 诇谞讗 专讘谞讗 讗砖讬

The Gemara answers: It is clear that the document was ratified by the requisite three judges, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, which presumably conforms to rabbinic protocol. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the Rabbis of the court of Rav Ashi hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel and they convened an impudent court, whose ruling is binding. The Gemara answers: It is clear, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, and our teacher Rav Ashi said to us how to ratify the document.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讛讬讬转讬 讜讙专讜砖讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 砖讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 讜讗诐 讬砖 注讚讬诐 砖讛讬转讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讜讛讬讗 讗讜诪专转 讙专讜砖讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讗诪专讛 谞砖讘讬转讬 讜讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 砖讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 讜讗诐 讬砖 注讚讬诐 砖谞砖讘讬转 讜讛讬讗 讗讜诪专转 讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讗诐 诪砖谞砖讗转 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转爪讗

MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorc茅e, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorc茅e, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 诪谞讬谉 诇讛驻讛 砖讗住专 讛讜讗 讛驻讛 砖讛转讬专 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 砖谞讗诪专 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 诇讗砖讛 诇讗讬砖 讗住专讛 讛讝讛 讛转讬专讛

GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to this man [la鈥檌sh hazeh] as a wife鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off 鈥渢o the man [la鈥檌sh]鈥 without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says 鈥渢his [hazeh],鈥 thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband.

诇诪讛 诇讬 拽专讗 住讘专讗 讛讬讗 讛讜讗 讗住专讛 讜讛讜讗 砖专讬 诇讛 讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 拽专讗 诇讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 诪谞讬谉 诇讗讘 砖谞讗诪谉 诇讗住讜专 讗转 讘转讜 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 砖谞讗诪专 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to derive this from the verse? It is based on logic: He rendered her forbidden and he rendered her permitted. Rather, where this verse is necessary, is in order to derive the halakha that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: From where in the Torah is it derived that a father is deemed credible to render his daughter forbidden? It is derived as it is stated: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to the man [la鈥檌sh]鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:16). The Gemara asks: Why do I need the subsequent term 鈥渢his [hazeh]鈥?

诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讗转 讘转讬 谞转转讬 诇讗讬砖 讛讝讛 讛讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讬讘诐

The Gemara explains: The verse is necessary to derive the halakha that Rabbi Yona taught; as Rabbi Yona taught in a baraita that in the verse: 鈥淚 gave my daughter to this man,鈥 written in the context of a husband slandering his wife, 鈥渢his鈥 is written to infer: The halakhot in this passage apply to a man who slanders his wife and not to the yavam, in the case of levirate marriage.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 驻谞讜讬讛 讗谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 讜讛讗 砖讜讜讬讛 诇谞驻砖讛 讞转讬讻讛 讚讗讬住讜专讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专讛 讗砖转 讗讬砖 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 驻谞讜讬讛 讗谞讬 讗讬谞讛 谞讗诪谞转 讜讗诐 谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转

The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible.

讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讙讚讜诇讛 砖讛讬转讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讘谞讜讬 讜拽驻爪讜 注诇讬讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讗诪专讛 诇讛诐 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗谞讬 诇讬诪讬诐 注诪讚讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诪专讜 诇讛 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讛 专讗讬转 诇注砖讜转 讻谉 讗诪专讛 诇讛诐 讘转讞诇讛 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬 讗谞砖讬诐 砖讗讬谞诐 诪讛讜讙谞讬诐 讗诪专转讬 诪拽讜讚砖转 讗谞讬 注讻砖讬讜 砖讘讗讜 注诇讬 讗谞砖讬诐 诪讛讜讙谞讬诐 注诪讚转讬 讜拽讚砖转讬 讗转 注爪诪讬 讜讝讜 讛诇讻讛 讛注诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 砖专 讛讘讬专讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讗讜砖讗 讜讗诪专讜 讗诐 谞转谞讛 讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转

And there was also an incident involving an important woman who was outstanding in beauty, and many men were clamoring to betroth her. And she said to them: I am already betrothed. Sometime later she arose and betrothed herself to a man. The Sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do so? She said to them: Initially, when unscrupulous people approached me seeking to marry me, I said: I am betrothed. Now that scrupulous people approached me, I arose and betrothed myself to one of them. And the Gemara notes: This halakha was raised by Rav A岣 Sar HaBira before the Sages in Usha, the seat of the Sanhedrin, and the Sages said: If she provided a rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诪专讘 讗诪专讛 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 讜讞讝专讛 讜讗诪专讛 讟讛讜专讛 讗谞讬 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗祝 讘讝讜 讗诐 谞转谞讛

Shmuel raised a dilemma before Rav: If a woman said to her husband: I am ritually impure as I am menstruating, and then said: I am pure, what is the halakha? Is she permitted based on her latter statement, or did she render herself an entity of prohibition with her first statement and therefore remains forbidden? Rav said to him: Even in that case, if she provided a

讗诪转诇讗 诇讚讘专讬讛 谞讗诪谞转 转谞讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讗专讘注讬诐 讝讬诪谞讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 诇讗 注讘讚 砖诪讜讗诇 注讜讘讚讗 讘谞驻砖讬讛

rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible. The Gemara relates: Shmuel learned this halakha from him forty times to ensure that he would not forget it, and even so, when confronted with a similar situation, Shmuel did not rely on that lenient ruling and did not take action with regard to himself and his wife.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗讬诪转讬 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 转爪讗 讘讝诪谉 砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗转 讗讘诇 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 诇讗 转爪讗

The Sages taught that if two witnesses say: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die; or if two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry as there is no unequivocal testimony that she is unmarried. And if she remarried, she need not leave her husband. Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei says: She must leave her husband. And Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei said: When do I say that she must leave her husband? It is in a case where witnesses came to testify that she is still married and she remarried thereafter. However, if she remarried and the witnesses came thereafter, she need not leave her husband based on the uncertainty created by contradictory witnesses.

诪讻讚讬 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讗讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讻讙讜谉 砖谞砖讗转 诇讗讞讚 诪注讚讬讛 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 拽讬讬诪讗 讘讗讜诪专转 讘专讬 诇讬

The Gemara asks: After all, they are two witnesses testifying that she is married and two witnesses testifying that she is not; how then can the ruling be that after remarrying she need not leave her husband? In that case, one who engages in intercourse with her stands liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. For any prohibition whose certain violation renders one liable to bring a sin-offering, its uncertain violation renders one liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty. Rav Sheshet said: This is a case where she married one of her witnesses who testified that she is unmarried. As far as he is concerned, there is no uncertainty. The Gemara asks: She herself stands liable to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty, as she has no independent knowledge whether her husband died. The Gemara answers that this is a case where she says: It is clear to me that he died.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪转 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 诪转 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 转爪讗

Rabbi Yo岣nan said that if two witnesses say: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried she need not leave her husband. If two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried she must leave her husband.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转专讙诪讛 讘注讚 讗讞讚 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诪转 讛讬诪谞讜讛讜 专讘谞谉 讻讘讬 转专讬 讜讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讛讗诪讬谞讛 转讜专讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讛专讬 讻讗谉 砖谞讬诐 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讚 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement, where, if she remarried, she need not leave her husband, and what is the different in the second clause, where, if she remarried, she must leave her husband? Abaye said: Interpret Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement in a case where each testimony was given by one witness. If one witness says: The husband died, the Sages instituted an ordinance and accorded him credibility like that of two witnesses in order to enable his wife to remarry. And that is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: Wherever the Torah deemed one witness credible, his legal status there is that of two witnesses. And the legal status of that second witness who says: He did not die, is that of one witness, and the statement of one witness has no validity in a place where there is the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, she need not leave her husband.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚专讘 讗住讬 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讛住专 诪诪讱 注拽砖讜转 驻讛 讜诇讝讜转 砖驻转讬诐 讛专讞拽 诪诪讱

The Gemara asks: If so, that this is a case of the testimony of two witnesses against the testimony of one witness, it should be permitted for her to remarry even ab initio. The Gemara answers that she may not remarry ab initio due to the opinion of Rav Asi, as Rav Asi said that in any case of uncertainty, the verse 鈥淩emove from you a crooked mouth, and perverse lips put far from you鈥 (Proverbs 4:24) applies. Although it is not a strictly prohibited action, it is, nevertheless, inappropriate.

住讬驻讗 注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 谞转讙专砖讛 讜注讚 讗讞讚 讗讜诪专 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讗砖转 讗讬砖 拽诪住讛讚讬 讜讛讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 谞转讙专砖讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讞讚 讜讗讬谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 讗讞讚 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讬诐

In the latter clause of Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement, where one witness says: This woman was divorced, and one witness says: She was not divorced, both of them are testifying that she was a married woman, and that witness who says: She was divorced, is one witness, and the statement of one wit-ness has no validity in a place where there is the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, even if she remarried she must leave her husband.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 转专讬 讜转专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜专讗讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讘专讬讜 砖诇 专讘讬 诪谞讞诐 讘专 讬讜住讬 讘讙专讜砖讬谉 讜诇讗 专讗讛 讘诪讬转讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪讬转讛 讗讬谞讛 讬讻讜诇讛 诪讻讞砖转讜 讙专讜砖讬谉 讬讻讜诇讛 诪讻讞砖转讜

Rava explained the difference between the two cases in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement and said: Actually it is a case where they are two witnesses testifying that she is married and two testifying that she is not, and Rabbi Yo岣nan saw the statement of Rabbi Mena岣m bar Yosei as correct in the case of divorce but did not see it as correct in the case of death. What is the reason that he distinguishes between the two cases? In the case of death, if ultimately her husband returns alive, she is unable to deny that he is alive. Therefore, the woman鈥檚 decision to remarry is credible, as if she were not certain that he was dead, she would not have remarried. However, in the case of divorce, if her husband returns and claims that he did not divorce her, she is able to deny his claim. Therefore, her decision to remarry is suspect, and the Sages penalized her and established that she must leave her husband.

讜诪讬 讞爪讬驻讛 讻讜诇讬 讛讗讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讛讗砖讛 砖讗诪专讛 诇讘注诇讛 讙专砖转谞讬 谞讗诪谞转 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 诪注讬讝讛 驻谞讬讛 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注讬 诇讛 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注讬 诇讛 诪注讬讝讛 讜诪注讬讝讛

The Gemara asks: And is the woman impudent to that extent, that she would lie in the presence of her husband and claim that he divorced her? But didn鈥檛 Rav Hamnuna say with regard to a woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, she is deemed credible, as there is a presumption that a woman is not insolent in the presence of her husband? The Gemara answers: This statement that she is not insolent applies only in a case where there are no witnesses who are supporting her; however, in a case where there are witnesses who are supporting her, she would certainly be insolent.

专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专讬 注讚讬诐 注讻砖讬讜 诪转 注讻砖讬讜 讙讬专砖讛 诪讬转讛 诇讬讻讗 诇讘专讜专讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 诇讘专讜专讛 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讛 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗讞讝讬 诇谉 讙讬讟讬讱

Rav Asi explained the difference between the two cases in Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement and said that it is a case where the witnesses say: He died now, or: He divorced her now. With regard to the husband鈥檚 death, there is no way to immediately clarify whether or not he is dead. With regard to divorce there is a way to immediately clarify whether or not he divorced her, as we say to the woman: If it is so that this is what happened, show us your bill of divorce. Since the testimony was that the divorce was now, it is not feasible that she lost the bill of divorce. If she fails to produce the bill of divorce, the witnesses that testify that she is divorced are apparently false witnesses. Therefore, even if she remarried she must leave her husband.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转拽讚砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转拽讚砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 诇讗 转爪讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞转讙专砖讛 讜砖谞讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 谞转讙专砖讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗 转谞砖讗 讜讗诐 谞砖讗转 转爪讗

The Sages taught: In a case where two witnesses say: This woman was betrothed, and two witnesses say: She was not betrothed, this woman may not marry another, and if she remarried, she need not leave her husband. In a case where two witnesses say: This woman was divorced, and two witnesses say: She was not divorced, this woman may not remarry. And if she remarried, she must leave her husband.

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