Ketubot 31

וקרע שיראין של חבירו

and at the same time he tore another’s silk [shira’in]. The question is whether the liability to receive the death penalty exempts him from the liability for payment incurred at precisely the same moment.

גופא אמר רב חסדא מודה רבי נחוניא בן הקנה בגונב חלבו של חבירו ואכלו שהוא חייב שכבר נתחייב בגנבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור חלב לימא פליגא דרבי אבין דאמר רבי אבין הזורק חץ מתחילת ארבע לסוף ארבע וקרע שיראין בהליכתו פטור שעקירה צורך הנחה היא הכא נמי הגבהה צורך אכילה היא

§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana concedes in the case of one who steals another’s forbidden fat and eats it that he is obligated to pay for the fat, as he is already liable for theft before he comes to violate the prohibition against eating forbidden fat. The Gemara comments: Let us say that Rav Ḥisda disagrees with Rabbi Avin, as Rabbi Avin said: One who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, thereby performing a prohibited labor for which he is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and the arrow ripped silk as it proceeds, is exempt from the obligation to pay for the silk because he is liable for the more severe punishment for desecrating Shabbat. Although the silk was ripped prior to completion of the prohibited labor, as the arrow had not yet come to rest, he is nevertheless exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement. The prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat is comprised of lifting of the object and placement. Once he shot the arrow, its movement through the air is a continuation of his act of Shabbat desecration, for which he is liable to be executed. Here, too, say that lifting the fat is a prerequisite for eating, and therefore he should be exempt from payment.

הכי השתא התם אי אפשר להנחה בלא עקירה הכא אפשר לאכילה בלא הגבהה דאי בעי גחין ואכיל אי נמי התם אי בעי לאהדורה לא מצי מהדר לה הכא מצי מהדר לה

The Gemara refutes this argument: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the arrow, placement is impossible without lifting, as placement without lifting is not a labor prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, lifting and placement are a single unit. In contrast, here, eating is possible without lifting as, if one wishes, he could bend down and eat without lifting the food to his mouth. Alternatively, there is another difference between the cases: There, in the case of the arrow, even if he seeks to take back the arrow after shooting it, he cannot take it back; therefore, lifting and placement constitute one action. Here, he could replace the fat after lifting it.

מאי איכא בין האי לישנא להאי לישנא איכא בינייהו המעביר סכין ברשות הרבים וקרע שיראין בהליכתו להך לישנא דאמרת אי אפשר להנחה בלא עקירה הכא נמי אי אפשר להנחה בלא עקירה להך לישנא דאמרת לא מצי מהדר לה הכא מצי מהדר לה

The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between this formulation, where the criterion is whether the second stage could be performed independent of the first stage, and that formulation, where the criterion is whether the second stage is inevitable after performing the first stage? The Gemara responds: There is a practical difference between them with regard to one who carries a knife in the public domain and tears silk as he proceeds. According to that formulation, where you said: Lifting is a prerequisite for placement, here too, lifting is a prerequisite for placement. As these two stages are inexorably connected, they constitute one action, and the one carrying the knife is exempt from paying the damages. Conversely, according to that formulation where you said: He cannot take back the arrow and that is why they are considered one action, here, he can take back the knife; therefore, lifting and placement are separate actions and he is not exempt from punishment for the damages that he caused.

גופא אמר רבי אבין הזורק חץ מתחלת ארבע לסוף ארבע וקרע שיראין בהליכתו פטור שעקירה צורך הנחה היא מתיב רב ביבי בר אביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שכבר נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור סקילה היה מגרר ויוצא מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור שבת וגניבה באין כאחד

§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rabbi Avin said: With regard to one who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits and the arrow rips silk as it proceeds, he is exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised an objection from that which is taught in a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain, a violation punishable by stoning. However, if he did not lift the purse but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, dragging and exiting, he is exempt, as the prohibition against theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated simultaneously when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property and into the public domain.

ואמאי הכא נמי לימא הגבהה צורך הוצאה היא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהגביהו על מנת להצניעו ונמלך עליו והוציאו

Rav Beivai concludes: But why is he liable if he carried the purse? Here, too, let us say that lifting is a prerequisite for carrying out, and therefore the theft was performed in the course of performance of the prohibited labor and he is exempt. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he lifted the pouch in order to conceal it in the same domain, not to carry it out into the public domain, and he reconsidered his plan with regard to the purse and carried it out. In that case the act of lifting was not performed for the purpose of carrying out. Therefore, he is not exempt from the obligation to pay for the theft.

וכי האי גוונא מי חייב והאמר רב סימון אמר רבי אמי אמר רבי יוחנן המפנה חפצים מזוית לזוית ונמלך עליהם והוציאן פטור שלא היתה עקירה משעה ראשונה לכך

The Gemara asks: And in a case like that, where he reconsidered, is one liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat? But didn’t Rav Simon say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who moves objects from one corner of his house to another corner on Shabbat, and he reconsidered his plan in their regard after lifting them and carried them out into the public domain, he is exempt, as the act of lifting was not initially performed for that purpose of carrying from one domain to another. Here, too, since the thief did not lift the pouch with the intention of carrying it out, he is not liable to be stoned.

לא תימא על מנת להצניעו אלא אימא על מנת להוציאו הכא במאי עסקינן כשעמד

The Gemara emends the previous answer: Do not say that he lifted it in order to conceal it; rather, say that he lifted it in order to carry it out. Nevertheless, the case of shooting the arrow and the case of stealing the purse are different, as with what case are we dealing here? It is a case where he stopped in the courtyard before taking the pouch out to the public domain. Therefore, the initial lifting is exclusively theft and not the start of a prohibited labor, as by stopping, he separated the lifting from the carrying out.

עמד למאי אי לכתף אורחיה הוא אלא בעומד לפוש אבל לכתף מאי

The Gemara asks: This is a case where he stopped. For what purpose did he stop? If he stopped in order to adjust the burden on his shoulder, that is the typical manner of proceeding and would not be considered an interruption in the process of carrying out the object. Rather, it must be in a case of one who stopped to rest, and when he resumes moving he initiates a separate action. The Gemara infers: But if he stopped in order to adjust the burden on his shoulder, what is the halakha?

פטור אדתני היה מגרר ויוצא מגרר ויוצא פטור נפלוג וניתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים בעומד לפוש אבל לכתף פטור

He would be exempt. If that is the case, rather than teaching: If he was dragging and exiting, dragging and exiting, he is exempt, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case of carrying itself, as follows: In what case are these matters stated? It is in a case where he stopped to rest; however, if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulder, he is exempt.

אלא הא מני בן עזאי היא דאמר מהלך כעומד דמי אבל זורק מאי פטור ניפלוג [וניתני] בדידה במה דברים אמורים במהלך אבל זורק פטור

Rather, the Gemara explains why one is liable in the case where he carries the purse. In accordance with whose opinion was this halakha taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, who said: The legal status of one who walks is like that of one who stops, as each step constitutes a pause between the actions of lifting and placement. Therefore, the initial lifting is not part of the prohibited labor of carrying out. The Gemara infers: But if one throws the object into another domain, what is the halakha? He would be exempt from payment, as the lifting is the start of the prohibited labor of carrying out. If so, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself, without resorting to the case of dragging and exiting, as follows: In what case are these matters stated? It is in the case of one who walks, so that there is separation between lifting and carrying out, and therefore the theft and the desecration of Shabbat are not simultaneous. However, one who throws is exempt from payment, as liability for carrying out and for theft are incurred simultaneously.

מגרר ויוצא איצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא אין דרך הוצאה בכך קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of ben Azzai, that would in fact be a more appropriate distinction; however, the case of one who was dragging and exiting was necessary for the tanna to teach because it includes a novel element, as it might enter your mind to say that this is not a typical manner of carrying out, and one is not liable to be executed for performing a prohibited labor in an atypical manner. Therefore, it teaches us that this too is a manner of carrying out.

ובמאי אי ברברבי אורחיה הוא אי בזוטרי לאו אורחיה הוא אלא במיצעי

And the Gemara asks: In what case is this so? If it is in the case of large purses, obviously dragging is its typical manner, and there is nothing novel in this. If it is in the case of small purses, dragging is certainly not its typical manner, and one would certainly not be liable. Rather, it must be referring to intermediate-sized purses. Although they are not always carried out in this manner, since they are sometimes dragged, the novelty is that he is liable for desecrating Shabbat and exempt from the payment.

ודאפקיה להיכא אי דאפקיה לרשות הרבים איסור שבת איכא איסור גניבה ליכא אי דאפקיה לרשות היחיד איסור גניבה איכא איסור שבת ליכא לא צריכא דאפקיה לצידי רשות הרבים

The Gemara continues: And in this case, to where did he carry out the pouch? If he carried it out from the owner’s private domain to the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition of Shabbat; however, there is no violation of the prohibition against theft, as one does not acquire an item by pulling it into the public domain. If he carried it out from the owner’s private domain to his own private domain, there is violation of the prohibition against theft; however, there is no violation of the prohibition of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary only in a case where he carried it out to the sides of the public domain. This is referring to the area in the public domain adjacent to the houses located on its sides, demarcated from the thoroughfare by small pegs and not by a full-fledged partition.

וכמאן אי כרבי אליעזר דאמר צידי רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמו איסור שבת איכא איסור גניבה ליכא אי כרבנן דאמרי צידי רשות הרבים לאו כרשות הרבים דמו איסור גניבה איכא איסור שבת ליכא

The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion is this taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is like that of the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition of Shabbat; however, there is no violation of the prohibition against theft. If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is not like that of the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition against theft; however, there is no violation of the prohibition of Shabbat.

לעולם כרבי אליעזר וכי אמר רבי אליעזר צידי רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמו הני מילי לענין חיובא דשבת דזימנין דדחקי רבים ועיילי להתם אבל לענין מיקנא קני מאי טעמא דהא לא שכיחי רבים

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and when Rabbi Eliezer said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is like that of the public domain, that applies only with regard to the liability for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat, as occasionally the multitudes crowd and enter there. However, with regard to the matter of acquiring an object, one acquires it by dragging it there. What is the reason for this halakha? It is due to the fact that the public is not typically found there, and acquisition can be effected in a place where the multitudes are not typically found.

רב אשי אמר כגון שצירף ידו למטה משלשה וקיבלו כדרבא דאמר רבא ידו של אדם חשובה לו כארבעה על ארבעה רב אחא מתני הכי

Rav Ashi said: Actually, one is exempt when one dragged the object into the public domain in a case where he joined his hand to his other hand at a height below three handbreadths off the ground and received the purse by passing it from one hand into the other as soon as he brought it into the public domain. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: A person’s hand is considered like four by four handbreadths for him. Therefore, an object placed in one’s hand is considered placed with regard to Shabbat, and since his hand is his personal domain he has also acquired the stolen item. Rav Aḥa taught the entire discussion this way, as above.

רבינא מתני לעולם דאפקיה לרשות הרבים וברשות הרבים נמי קנה ותרוייהו בדיוקא דהא מתניתין קמיפלגי דתנן היה מושכו ויוצא ומת ברשות בעלים פטור הגביהו או שהוציאו מרשות בעלים ומת חייב

Ravina taught otherwise: Actually, it is a case where one carried out the object to the public domain, and in the public domain he also acquires the stolen object by removing it from the owner’s domain, even if he does not transfer it to his own domain. The Gemara comments: And the two of them, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to the inference of this mishna, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 79a) with regard to one who stole an animal: If he was pulling the animal and exiting, and it died in the domain of the owner, the thief is exempt from payment because he did not yet acquire the animal and therefore did not assume liability for its death through circumstances beyond his control. If he lifted it or took it out of the owner’s domain, thereby acquiring the animal, and it died, the thief is liable to pay its value because it died in his possession.

רבינא דייק מרישא רב אחא דייק מסיפא רבינא דייק מרישא היה מושכו ויוצא ומת ברשות בעלים פטור טעמא דמת ברשות בעלים הא הוציאו מרשות בעלים ומת חייב רב אחא דייק מסיפא הגביהו או שהוציאו הוצאה דומיא דהגבהה מה הגבהה דאתי לרשותיה אף הוצאה נמי דאתי לרשותיה

Ravina inferred his conclusion from the first clause of the mishna, and Rav Aḥa inferred his conclusion from the latter clause. Ravina inferred his conclusion from the first clause: If he was pulling the animal and exiting, and it died in the domain of the owner, the thief is exempt from payment. The reason that the thief is exempt is that the animal died in the owner’s domain; by inference, if he took it out of the owner’s domain and it died, he is liable because the thief acquires the item by its very removal from the owner’s property, even to the public domain. Rav Aḥa inferred his conclusion from the latter clause of the mishna: If he lifted it or took it out of the owner’s domain, he is liable. Based on the juxtaposition of the two, taking the animal out is similar to lifting it: Just as lifting is an act of acquisition through which the animal comes into his domain, so too, taking it out is referring to a case where it comes into his domain.

לרב אחא קשיא רישא לרבינא קשיא סיפא רישא לרב אחא לא קשיא כמה דלא אתי לרשותיה רשות בעלים קרינא ביה סיפא לרבינא לא קשיא הוצאה דומיא דהגבהה לא אמרינן

The Gemara observes: For Rav Aḥa the first clause of the mishna is difficult, while for Ravina the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers: The first clause is not difficult for Rav Aḥa, as he could explain it as follows: As long as the animal has not come into one’s domain, even if it has left the owner’s property, we continue to call it the owner’s domain. Similarly, the latter clause is not difficult for Ravina, as in his opinion we do not say: Taking the animal out is similar to lifting it. Therefore, the mishna’s ruling is that the thief acquires the animal merely through its removal from the owner’s property.

הבא על אחותו ועל אחות אביו כו׳ ורמינהו אלו הן הלוקין הבא על אחותו ועל אחות אביו ועל אחות אמו ועל אחות אשתו ועל אשת אחיו ועל אשת אחי אביו ועל הנדה

§ The mishna continues: Similarly, one who has forced relations with his sister, i.e., he rapes her, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife after they divorced, or with a menstruating woman, there is a fine paid. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from the following mishna (Makkot 13a): And these people are flogged: One who has relations with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruating woman. Anyone who intentionally has relations with any of these women is punished with lashes.