This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
Ketubot 33
חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן בִּטַּלְתָּ ״לֹא יוֹסִיף פֶּן יוֹסִיף״! עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן בִּטַּלְתָּ ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״! אֶלָּא: עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין, אֶפְשָׁר לְקַיּוֹמַהּ בְּבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה. חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, אִיכָּא לְקַיּוֹמַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
The Gemara asks: Based on that reasoning, the same would hold true for one who injures another as well; if so, if he pays and is not lashed, you have rendered moot the prohibition “Forty he shall strike him; he shall not exceed, lest if he should exceed” (Deuteronomy 25:3). The same would hold true for conspiring witnesses as well; if so, you have rendered moot the verse interpreted as addressing the matter of conspiring witnesses: “And it shall be if the wicked man deserves to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Rather, with regard to conspiring witnesses, that verse can be fulfilled in the case of the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza. If witnesses testified that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza and were discovered to be conspiring witnesses, there is no payment and they are flogged. With regard to one who injures another as well, the verse can be fulfilled in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not cause damage amounting to the value of a peruta.
אֲחוֹתוֹ נָמֵי, אִיכָּא לְקַיּוֹמַהּ בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת! אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַאי ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְאַבָּיֵי. דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״. הַאי ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, with regard to one’s sister as well, the lashes can be fulfilled in the case of one who had forced relations with his sister who is a grown woman. Since there is no fine in that case, he is flogged and the verse is not moot. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that he does not agree with Ulla because this verse: “Because he tormented her” (Deuteronomy 22:29), is not available for a verbal analogy, as he requires it to derive in accordance with that which Abaye said, as Abaye said that the verse states: The fine of fifty dinar is payment “because he tormented her”; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.
וְעוּלָּא? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָתַן הָאִישׁ הַשּׁוֹכֵב עִמָּהּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה חֲמִשִּׁים כָּסֶף״, הֲנָאַת שְׁכִיבָה חֲמִשִּׁים, מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם.
The Gemara asks: And Ulla, who uses this verse to derive a verbal analogy, from where does he derive the halakha stated by Abaye? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the statement of Rava, who derives that halakha from the same verse, as Rava said that the verse states: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29). The superfluous phrase “who lay with her” teaches that it is for the pleasure of lying with her that he pays fifty shekels, i.e., fifty sela; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלְּמִי וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָאו בְּנֵי הַתְרָאָה נִינְהוּ. אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ אֵימַת? נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא — אָמְרִי: אִישְׁתְּלִין. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ בִּשְׁעַת מַעֲשֶׂה — פָּרְשִׁי וְלָא מַסְהֲדִי. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ לְבַסּוֹף — מַאי דַהֲוָה הֲוָה.
§ Rabbi Eliezer says: The reason that conspiring witnesses pay money but are not flogged is due to the fact that they are not subject to forewarning, and without forewarning there are no lashes. Rava said: Know that this is true, since there is no practical manner to forewarn them, as when would we forewarn them? Perhaps let us forewarn them initially, before they come to testify; in that case, the forewarning would be ineffective because they could say: We forgot the forewarning. Then let us forewarn them at the moment of the action, just before they testify; in that case they will leave and not testify at all, as concern for potential repercussions will intimidate them into silence. Or, let us forewarn them at the end after their testimony; in that case that which was, was, and forewarning at that point is pointless.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְנַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר? מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: וְנַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא וּנְרַמֵּז בְּהוּ רַמּוֹזֵי?
Abaye strongly objects to this: And let us warn them within an interval equivalent to the time of speaking, during the brief period after they completed their statements, at which time the testimony is not yet considered to have concluded. Since they can still retract or amend their testimony during that period, a warning delivered at that point would be timely and effective. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, also strongly objects to this: And let us forewarn them initially, before they testify, and gesture to them during the actual testimony, reminding them of the forewarning so they will be unable to claim that they forgot it.
הֲדַר אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרִי. אִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין צְרִיכִין הַתְרָאָה, כִּי לָא מַתְרִינַן בְּהוּ לָא קָטְלִינַן לְהוּ. מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִינְהוּ בָּעוּ קָטְלִי בְּלָא הַתְרָאָה, וְאִינְהוּ בָּעוּ הַתְרָאָה? הָא בָּעֵינַן ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״, וְלֵיכָּא.
Abaye then said: That which I stated is not a significant matter. Instead, if it enters your mind that conspiring witnesses require forewarning, when we do not forewarn them we do not kill them. However, is there a matter in which they sought to kill the defendant without forewarning him, as their testimony was false, and in order to punish them they require forewarning? Don’t we require that their punishment reflect the verse “And you shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19)? And if they require forewarning that is not the case.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יִרְמְיָה: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה, דְּלָא מִ״כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם״ קָא מִיתְרַבֵּי — לִיבְעֵי הַתְרָאָה! אָמַר קְרָא: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״, מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם.
Rav Samma, son of Rav Yirmeya, strongly objects to this: However, if what you say is so, when witnesses falsely accuse a priest of being the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza, as they are not included in the verse “As he conspired” but rather they are punished for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” let them require forewarning. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that there must be a law equal for all of you. Since in standard cases of conspiring witnesses no forewarning is required, even in exceptional cases like testimony that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza, forewarning is not required.
רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי אָמַר: חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי, מֵהָכָא: ״וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ״. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּמַצּוּת שֶׁבְּמִיתָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה וְנָתַתָּ נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״.
§ Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The fact that in the case of one who injures another as well he pays money and is not flogged is derived not by means of a verbal analogy but from here: “If men quarrel and hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband” (Exodus 21:22). And Rabbi Elazar said: The verse is speaking of a quarrel that involves death, i.e., they sought to kill each other, as it is written: “And if any harm follow, then you shall give a soul for a soul” (Exodus 21:23).
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — אַמַּאי מִיקְּטִיל? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר, הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל. וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If they did not forewarn one not to kill the other, why is he killed if the death of his opponent ensues? Rather, obviously it is a case where they forewarned him, and the principle is that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter, murdering his counterpart, is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, injuring his counterpart. And although he is forewarned against injuring another, which violates a prohibition and is punishable by lashes, the Merciful One states: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22), indicating that one pays and is not flogged.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ, רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי דְּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל? דִּלְמָא לָא הָוֵי?! אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הָוֵי, מִמַּאי דְּמִיתָה חֲמוּרָה?
Rav Ashi strongly objects to this proof. First of all, with regard to your initial assumption, from where do you ascertain that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter? Perhaps he is not considered forewarned with regard to the lesser matter. Furthermore, even if you say that one is in fact forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes?
דִּלְמָא מַלְקוֹת חָמוּר? דְּאָמַר רַב: אִילְמָלֵי נַגְּדוּהּ לַחֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה — פְּלַחוּ לְצַלְמָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין הַכָּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה?
Perhaps the punishment of lashes is more severe, as Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah (see Daniel, chapter 3) instead of casting them into the fiery furnace, these three would have been induced to worship the graven image. Apparently, the punishment of lashes is more severe than death. Rav Samma, son of Rav Asi, said to Rav Ashi, and some say Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Ashi: And is there no difference to you between flogging that has a limit, e.g., forty lashes by Torah law, which is a less severe punishment, and flogging that does not have a limit, i.e., flogging administered to induce compliance, which is more severe?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד: הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי נֶפֶשׁ מַמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי דְּאָמַר מָמוֹן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
With regard to the basic proof from the case of the two men quarreling, Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod strongly objects to this. This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that the verse “And you shall give a soul for a soul” (Exodus 21:23) is referring to an actual life, and that if he caused the woman’s death he is executed. However, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that if he did not intend to injure the woman he is not liable to be executed and instead pays money as indemnity for causing her death, what can be said? According to that opinion, there was no forewarning for lashes at all, and the only liability is payment for injuring another.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, מֵהָכָא: ״אִם יָקוּם וְהִתְהַלֵּךְ בַּחוּץ עַל מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה״, וְכִי תַּעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁזֶּה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּשּׁוּק, וְזֶה נֶהֱרָג? אֶלָּא מְלַמֵּד שֶׁחוֹבְשִׁין אוֹתוֹ, וְאִי מָיֵת — קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ, וְאִי לָא מָיֵת — ״שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״.
Rather, Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod said in the name of Rava that the halakha that one pays and is not flogged is derived from here. With regard to one who struck another with a stone or his fist and did not kill him but caused him to be bedridden, it is written: “If he rises and walks outside with his staff, he who struck him is absolved” (Exodus 21:19). And could it enter your mind that this victim is walking in the marketplace and that aggressor is executed as a murderer? Rather, the verse teaches that one imprisons the aggressor while the injured party recuperates, and if he dies due to the blow he received, we kill him. And if he does not die and recovers, the aggressor’s punishment is based on the verse “His loss of livelihood he shall give, and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19).
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — אַמַּאי מִיקְּטִיל! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר, מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״.
The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances? If the witnesses did not forewarn him, why is the offender killed if the victim dies? Rather, obviously it is a case where the witnesses forewarned him, and one who is forewarned for a severe matter, such as the potential death penalty, is also forewarned for the lesser matter of injuring another, for which he is liable to be flogged, and nevertheless the Merciful One states: “His loss of livelihood he shall give, and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.” Apparently, despite his liability to be flogged, he pays and is not flogged.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי דְּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל? דִּלְמָא לָא הָוֵי! וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הָוֵי, מִמַּאי דְּמִיתָה חֲמוּרָה? דִּלְמָא מַלְקוֹת חָמוּר? דְּאָמַר רַב: אִילְמָלֵי נַגְּדוּהּ לַחֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה, פְּלַחוּ לְצַלְמָא!
Rav Ashi strongly objects to this proof: First of all, with regard to your initial assumption, from where do you ascertain that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter? Perhaps he is not considered forewarned with regard to the lesser matter. Furthermore, even if you say that one is in fact forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes? Perhaps the punishment of lashes is more severe, as Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, instead of casting them into the fiery furnace, they would have been induced to worship the graven image. Apparently, the punishment of lashes is more severe than death.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין הַכָּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה?
Rav Samma, son of Rav Asi, said to Rav Ashi, and some say Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Ashi: And is there no difference to you between flogging that has a limit, e.g., forty lashes by Torah law, which is a less severe punishment, and flogging that does not have a limit, administered to induce compliance, which is more severe?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מָרִי: מִמַּאי דִּבְמֵזִיד, ״וְנִקָּה״ — מִקְּטָלָא? דִּלְמָא בְּשׁוֹגֵג, ״וְנִקָּה״ — מִגָּלוּת? קַשְׁיָא.
Rav Mari strongly objects to this proof that one pays and is not flogged: From where do you ascertain that this is referring to one who struck another intentionally, and that the verse “He who struck him shall be absolved” means that he shall be absolved of the death penalty? Perhaps the verse is referring to one who struck another unwittingly, and the verse means that he shall be absolved of exile? In that case, there would be no forewarning. Therefore, no proof may be cited from here that one who injures another pays and is not flogged. The Gemara concludes: This is difficult, and no proof may be cited from here.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ נָמֵי!
§ The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna here, which obligates one who rapes his sister to pay a fine, and the mishna in Makkot, which rules him liable to be flogged. Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One is flogged and pays. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, even if one raped his daughter he should also be obligated to pay the fine. However, the mishna lists only those who raped women for whom one is liable to be punished for violating a prohibition or liable to receive karet, not those for whom one is liable to receive court-imposed execution.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם — אִית לֵיהּ, מֵת וּמְשַׁלֵּם — לֵית לֵיהּ, וְלָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: גָּנַב וְטָבַח בְּשַׁבָּת, גָּנַב וְטָבַח לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, גָּנַב שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וּטְבָחוֹ — מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין!
And lest you say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that one is flogged and pays, but is not of the opinion that one dies by execution and pays; and isn’t he of the opinion that one who is executed pays? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, or stole it and slaughtered it for idolatry, or stole an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, from which one may derive no benefit and is therefore worthless, and slaughtered it, he pays the owner a payment of four or five times the principal, as he would in any case of stealing and slaughtering an animal? This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis exempt him from payment because he is liable to receive the death penalty for slaughtering on Shabbat or for idolatry. Apparently, Rabbi Meir maintains that one is obligated to pay even when he is liable to receive the death penalty.
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, רַבִּי אָבִין וְרַבִּי אִילְעָא וְכֹל חֲבוּרָתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי: בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.
The Gemara refutes this: Wasn’t it stated concerning this baraita that Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, that Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Ile’a and the entire group said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: That case is referring to one who slaughters by means of another? The thief himself did not slaughter the animal; rather, it was his agent. Consequently, the thief pays because the capital crime was committed by his agent. Therefore, this source is unrelated to Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to the question of whether one is executed and pays.
וְכִי זֶה חוֹטֵא וְזֶה מִתְחַיֵּיב? אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ״, מָה מְכִירָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, אַף טְבִיחָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.
The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation: And does this agent sin and that thief is liable to pay four and five times the principal? This violates the principle: There is no agent for matters of transgression. The Gemara explains that this is a halakha unique to this case. Rava said that the Merciful One states: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep and slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37). Based on the juxtaposition of slaughter and sale, Rava continues: Just as sale is performed by means of another, as there is no sale without a buyer, so too, one is liable to be punished for slaughter by means of another. Although there is no agent for transgression, here there is a Torah decree that one is liable by means of another.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״אוֹ״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ. דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה תָּנָא: ״תַּחַת״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.
The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different source for the halakha that one is liable for slaughter by means of an agent. It is written: “And slaughter it or sell it”; the term “or” comes to include an agent. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Ḥizkiyya taught a different proof from the same verse: “He shall pay…for an ox…for a sheep”; the term “for” comes to include an agent.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר זוּטְרָא: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִילּוּ עֲבַד אִיהוּ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, וְעָבֵיד שְׁלִיחַ וּמִחַיַּיב? אִיהוּ, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מִיחַיַּיב, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ.
Mar Zutra strongly objects to this halakha. Is there any matter with regard to which if one performs it himself, he is not liable, and yet if his agent performs it he is liable? Had he slaughtered the animal himself on Shabbat he would have been exempt from payment. How, then, is he liable if he does so by means of an agent? The Gemara answers: He is exempt not due to the fact that he is not liable for the slaughter; rather, he is exempt due to the fact that he receives the greater of the two punishments, the death penalty, for his desecration of Shabbat. He is liable for both the slaughter and the desecration of Shabbat. In practice, he receives the more severe punishment. However, when he appoints an agent, there is no liability for the desecration of Shabbat, and therefore he must pay for the slaughter.
אִי בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן דְּפָטְרִי? מַאן חֲכָמִים —
The Gemara returns to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation of the baraita. If the baraita is referring to the case of one who slaughtered by means of another, what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt him from payment? As the thief did not perform a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, why is he exempt from payment for slaughtering the animal? The Gemara answers: Who are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir in this case?
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Ketubot 33
חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן בִּטַּלְתָּ ״לֹא יוֹסִיף פֶּן יוֹסִיף״! עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן בִּטַּלְתָּ ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״! אֶלָּא: עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין, אֶפְשָׁר לְקַיּוֹמַהּ בְּבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה. חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, אִיכָּא לְקַיּוֹמַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
The Gemara asks: Based on that reasoning, the same would hold true for one who injures another as well; if so, if he pays and is not lashed, you have rendered moot the prohibition “Forty he shall strike him; he shall not exceed, lest if he should exceed” (Deuteronomy 25:3). The same would hold true for conspiring witnesses as well; if so, you have rendered moot the verse interpreted as addressing the matter of conspiring witnesses: “And it shall be if the wicked man deserves to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Rather, with regard to conspiring witnesses, that verse can be fulfilled in the case of the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza. If witnesses testified that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza and were discovered to be conspiring witnesses, there is no payment and they are flogged. With regard to one who injures another as well, the verse can be fulfilled in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not cause damage amounting to the value of a peruta.
אֲחוֹתוֹ נָמֵי, אִיכָּא לְקַיּוֹמַהּ בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת! אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַאי ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְאַבָּיֵי. דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״. הַאי ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִינָּהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, with regard to one’s sister as well, the lashes can be fulfilled in the case of one who had forced relations with his sister who is a grown woman. Since there is no fine in that case, he is flogged and the verse is not moot. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that he does not agree with Ulla because this verse: “Because he tormented her” (Deuteronomy 22:29), is not available for a verbal analogy, as he requires it to derive in accordance with that which Abaye said, as Abaye said that the verse states: The fine of fifty dinar is payment “because he tormented her”; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.
וְעוּלָּא? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָתַן הָאִישׁ הַשּׁוֹכֵב עִמָּהּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה חֲמִשִּׁים כָּסֶף״, הֲנָאַת שְׁכִיבָה חֲמִשִּׁים, מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם.
The Gemara asks: And Ulla, who uses this verse to derive a verbal analogy, from where does he derive the halakha stated by Abaye? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the statement of Rava, who derives that halakha from the same verse, as Rava said that the verse states: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29). The superfluous phrase “who lay with her” teaches that it is for the pleasure of lying with her that he pays fifty shekels, i.e., fifty sela; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלְּמִי וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָאו בְּנֵי הַתְרָאָה נִינְהוּ. אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ אֵימַת? נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא — אָמְרִי: אִישְׁתְּלִין. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ בִּשְׁעַת מַעֲשֶׂה — פָּרְשִׁי וְלָא מַסְהֲדִי. נַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ לְבַסּוֹף — מַאי דַהֲוָה הֲוָה.
§ Rabbi Eliezer says: The reason that conspiring witnesses pay money but are not flogged is due to the fact that they are not subject to forewarning, and without forewarning there are no lashes. Rava said: Know that this is true, since there is no practical manner to forewarn them, as when would we forewarn them? Perhaps let us forewarn them initially, before they come to testify; in that case, the forewarning would be ineffective because they could say: We forgot the forewarning. Then let us forewarn them at the moment of the action, just before they testify; in that case they will leave and not testify at all, as concern for potential repercussions will intimidate them into silence. Or, let us forewarn them at the end after their testimony; in that case that which was, was, and forewarning at that point is pointless.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְנַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר? מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: וְנַיתְרֵי בְּהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא וּנְרַמֵּז בְּהוּ רַמּוֹזֵי?
Abaye strongly objects to this: And let us warn them within an interval equivalent to the time of speaking, during the brief period after they completed their statements, at which time the testimony is not yet considered to have concluded. Since they can still retract or amend their testimony during that period, a warning delivered at that point would be timely and effective. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, also strongly objects to this: And let us forewarn them initially, before they testify, and gesture to them during the actual testimony, reminding them of the forewarning so they will be unable to claim that they forgot it.
הֲדַר אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרִי. אִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין צְרִיכִין הַתְרָאָה, כִּי לָא מַתְרִינַן בְּהוּ לָא קָטְלִינַן לְהוּ. מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִינְהוּ בָּעוּ קָטְלִי בְּלָא הַתְרָאָה, וְאִינְהוּ בָּעוּ הַתְרָאָה? הָא בָּעֵינַן ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״, וְלֵיכָּא.
Abaye then said: That which I stated is not a significant matter. Instead, if it enters your mind that conspiring witnesses require forewarning, when we do not forewarn them we do not kill them. However, is there a matter in which they sought to kill the defendant without forewarning him, as their testimony was false, and in order to punish them they require forewarning? Don’t we require that their punishment reflect the verse “And you shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19)? And if they require forewarning that is not the case.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יִרְמְיָה: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה, דְּלָא מִ״כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם״ קָא מִיתְרַבֵּי — לִיבְעֵי הַתְרָאָה! אָמַר קְרָא: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״, מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם.
Rav Samma, son of Rav Yirmeya, strongly objects to this: However, if what you say is so, when witnesses falsely accuse a priest of being the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza, as they are not included in the verse “As he conspired” but rather they are punished for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” let them require forewarning. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that there must be a law equal for all of you. Since in standard cases of conspiring witnesses no forewarning is required, even in exceptional cases like testimony that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza, forewarning is not required.
רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי אָמַר: חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי, מֵהָכָא: ״וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ״. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּמַצּוּת שֶׁבְּמִיתָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה וְנָתַתָּ נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״.
§ Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The fact that in the case of one who injures another as well he pays money and is not flogged is derived not by means of a verbal analogy but from here: “If men quarrel and hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband” (Exodus 21:22). And Rabbi Elazar said: The verse is speaking of a quarrel that involves death, i.e., they sought to kill each other, as it is written: “And if any harm follow, then you shall give a soul for a soul” (Exodus 21:23).
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — אַמַּאי מִיקְּטִיל? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר, הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל. וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If they did not forewarn one not to kill the other, why is he killed if the death of his opponent ensues? Rather, obviously it is a case where they forewarned him, and the principle is that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter, murdering his counterpart, is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, injuring his counterpart. And although he is forewarned against injuring another, which violates a prohibition and is punishable by lashes, the Merciful One states: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22), indicating that one pays and is not flogged.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ, רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי דְּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל? דִּלְמָא לָא הָוֵי?! אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הָוֵי, מִמַּאי דְּמִיתָה חֲמוּרָה?
Rav Ashi strongly objects to this proof. First of all, with regard to your initial assumption, from where do you ascertain that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter? Perhaps he is not considered forewarned with regard to the lesser matter. Furthermore, even if you say that one is in fact forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes?
דִּלְמָא מַלְקוֹת חָמוּר? דְּאָמַר רַב: אִילְמָלֵי נַגְּדוּהּ לַחֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה — פְּלַחוּ לְצַלְמָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין הַכָּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה?
Perhaps the punishment of lashes is more severe, as Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah (see Daniel, chapter 3) instead of casting them into the fiery furnace, these three would have been induced to worship the graven image. Apparently, the punishment of lashes is more severe than death. Rav Samma, son of Rav Asi, said to Rav Ashi, and some say Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Ashi: And is there no difference to you between flogging that has a limit, e.g., forty lashes by Torah law, which is a less severe punishment, and flogging that does not have a limit, i.e., flogging administered to induce compliance, which is more severe?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד: הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי נֶפֶשׁ מַמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי דְּאָמַר מָמוֹן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
With regard to the basic proof from the case of the two men quarreling, Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod strongly objects to this. This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that the verse “And you shall give a soul for a soul” (Exodus 21:23) is referring to an actual life, and that if he caused the woman’s death he is executed. However, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that if he did not intend to injure the woman he is not liable to be executed and instead pays money as indemnity for causing her death, what can be said? According to that opinion, there was no forewarning for lashes at all, and the only liability is payment for injuring another.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, מֵהָכָא: ״אִם יָקוּם וְהִתְהַלֵּךְ בַּחוּץ עַל מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה״, וְכִי תַּעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁזֶּה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּשּׁוּק, וְזֶה נֶהֱרָג? אֶלָּא מְלַמֵּד שֶׁחוֹבְשִׁין אוֹתוֹ, וְאִי מָיֵת — קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ, וְאִי לָא מָיֵת — ״שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״.
Rather, Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod said in the name of Rava that the halakha that one pays and is not flogged is derived from here. With regard to one who struck another with a stone or his fist and did not kill him but caused him to be bedridden, it is written: “If he rises and walks outside with his staff, he who struck him is absolved” (Exodus 21:19). And could it enter your mind that this victim is walking in the marketplace and that aggressor is executed as a murderer? Rather, the verse teaches that one imprisons the aggressor while the injured party recuperates, and if he dies due to the blow he received, we kill him. And if he does not die and recovers, the aggressor’s punishment is based on the verse “His loss of livelihood he shall give, and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19).
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — אַמַּאי מִיקְּטִיל! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר, מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״.
The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances? If the witnesses did not forewarn him, why is the offender killed if the victim dies? Rather, obviously it is a case where the witnesses forewarned him, and one who is forewarned for a severe matter, such as the potential death penalty, is also forewarned for the lesser matter of injuring another, for which he is liable to be flogged, and nevertheless the Merciful One states: “His loss of livelihood he shall give, and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.” Apparently, despite his liability to be flogged, he pays and is not flogged.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי דְּמוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר חָמוּר הָוֵי מוּתְרֶה לְדָבָר הַקַּל? דִּלְמָא לָא הָוֵי! וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הָוֵי, מִמַּאי דְּמִיתָה חֲמוּרָה? דִּלְמָא מַלְקוֹת חָמוּר? דְּאָמַר רַב: אִילְמָלֵי נַגְּדוּהּ לַחֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה, פְּלַחוּ לְצַלְמָא!
Rav Ashi strongly objects to this proof: First of all, with regard to your initial assumption, from where do you ascertain that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter? Perhaps he is not considered forewarned with regard to the lesser matter. Furthermore, even if you say that one is in fact forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes? Perhaps the punishment of lashes is more severe, as Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, instead of casting them into the fiery furnace, they would have been induced to worship the graven image. Apparently, the punishment of lashes is more severe than death.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב סַמָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין הַכָּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה לְהַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה?
Rav Samma, son of Rav Asi, said to Rav Ashi, and some say Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Ashi: And is there no difference to you between flogging that has a limit, e.g., forty lashes by Torah law, which is a less severe punishment, and flogging that does not have a limit, administered to induce compliance, which is more severe?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מָרִי: מִמַּאי דִּבְמֵזִיד, ״וְנִקָּה״ — מִקְּטָלָא? דִּלְמָא בְּשׁוֹגֵג, ״וְנִקָּה״ — מִגָּלוּת? קַשְׁיָא.
Rav Mari strongly objects to this proof that one pays and is not flogged: From where do you ascertain that this is referring to one who struck another intentionally, and that the verse “He who struck him shall be absolved” means that he shall be absolved of the death penalty? Perhaps the verse is referring to one who struck another unwittingly, and the verse means that he shall be absolved of exile? In that case, there would be no forewarning. Therefore, no proof may be cited from here that one who injures another pays and is not flogged. The Gemara concludes: This is difficult, and no proof may be cited from here.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ נָמֵי!
§ The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna here, which obligates one who rapes his sister to pay a fine, and the mishna in Makkot, which rules him liable to be flogged. Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One is flogged and pays. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, even if one raped his daughter he should also be obligated to pay the fine. However, the mishna lists only those who raped women for whom one is liable to be punished for violating a prohibition or liable to receive karet, not those for whom one is liable to receive court-imposed execution.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם — אִית לֵיהּ, מֵת וּמְשַׁלֵּם — לֵית לֵיהּ, וְלָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: גָּנַב וְטָבַח בְּשַׁבָּת, גָּנַב וְטָבַח לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, גָּנַב שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וּטְבָחוֹ — מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין!
And lest you say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that one is flogged and pays, but is not of the opinion that one dies by execution and pays; and isn’t he of the opinion that one who is executed pays? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, or stole it and slaughtered it for idolatry, or stole an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, from which one may derive no benefit and is therefore worthless, and slaughtered it, he pays the owner a payment of four or five times the principal, as he would in any case of stealing and slaughtering an animal? This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis exempt him from payment because he is liable to receive the death penalty for slaughtering on Shabbat or for idolatry. Apparently, Rabbi Meir maintains that one is obligated to pay even when he is liable to receive the death penalty.
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, רַבִּי אָבִין וְרַבִּי אִילְעָא וְכֹל חֲבוּרָתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי: בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.
The Gemara refutes this: Wasn’t it stated concerning this baraita that Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, that Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Ile’a and the entire group said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: That case is referring to one who slaughters by means of another? The thief himself did not slaughter the animal; rather, it was his agent. Consequently, the thief pays because the capital crime was committed by his agent. Therefore, this source is unrelated to Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to the question of whether one is executed and pays.
וְכִי זֶה חוֹטֵא וְזֶה מִתְחַיֵּיב? אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ״, מָה מְכִירָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, אַף טְבִיחָה עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.
The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation: And does this agent sin and that thief is liable to pay four and five times the principal? This violates the principle: There is no agent for matters of transgression. The Gemara explains that this is a halakha unique to this case. Rava said that the Merciful One states: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep and slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37). Based on the juxtaposition of slaughter and sale, Rava continues: Just as sale is performed by means of another, as there is no sale without a buyer, so too, one is liable to be punished for slaughter by means of another. Although there is no agent for transgression, here there is a Torah decree that one is liable by means of another.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״אוֹ״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ. דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה תָּנָא: ״תַּחַת״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.
The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different source for the halakha that one is liable for slaughter by means of an agent. It is written: “And slaughter it or sell it”; the term “or” comes to include an agent. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Ḥizkiyya taught a different proof from the same verse: “He shall pay…for an ox…for a sheep”; the term “for” comes to include an agent.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר זוּטְרָא: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִילּוּ עֲבַד אִיהוּ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, וְעָבֵיד שְׁלִיחַ וּמִחַיַּיב? אִיהוּ, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מִיחַיַּיב, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ.
Mar Zutra strongly objects to this halakha. Is there any matter with regard to which if one performs it himself, he is not liable, and yet if his agent performs it he is liable? Had he slaughtered the animal himself on Shabbat he would have been exempt from payment. How, then, is he liable if he does so by means of an agent? The Gemara answers: He is exempt not due to the fact that he is not liable for the slaughter; rather, he is exempt due to the fact that he receives the greater of the two punishments, the death penalty, for his desecration of Shabbat. He is liable for both the slaughter and the desecration of Shabbat. In practice, he receives the more severe punishment. However, when he appoints an agent, there is no liability for the desecration of Shabbat, and therefore he must pay for the slaughter.
אִי בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן דְּפָטְרִי? מַאן חֲכָמִים —
The Gemara returns to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation of the baraita. If the baraita is referring to the case of one who slaughtered by means of another, what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt him from payment? As the thief did not perform a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, why is he exempt from payment for slaughtering the animal? The Gemara answers: Who are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir in this case?
