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Ketubot 32

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Summary

This month’s shiurim are sponsored by Shoshana Shur for the refuah shleima of Meira Bat Zelda Zahava.

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Ketubot 32

וְקַיְימָא לַן דְּאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אָמַר עוּלָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה, כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת.

And since we maintain in general that one is not both flogged and liable to pay, if one receives lashes for having relations with his sister, why must he pay the fine as well? Ulla said: This is not difficult; here, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a young woman, for whom one pays a fine and is not flogged, whereas there, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a grown woman, for whom one does not pay a fine.

אֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת נָמֵי, הָא אִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם! בְּשׁוֹטָה. וְהָא אִיכָּא צַעֲרָא! בִּמְפוּתָּה.

The Gemara asks: In the case of one who has relations with his sister who is a grown woman, too, although he does not pay a fine, isn’t there compensation for humiliation and degradation? He should be exempt from lashes in that case as well. The Gemara answers: There, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is an imbecile, with regard to whom there is no humiliation or degradation beyond her status as an imbecile. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there payment for pain even in the rape of an imbecile? The Gemara responds: The halakha is with regard to a seduced woman, who is not entitled to payment for pain, as she engaged in relations willingly.

הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה, בִּיתוֹמָה וּמְפוּתָּה.

The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation that the mishna is referring to a seduced woman, the mishna can be understood even if you say it is referring to his sister who is a young woman. The reason that the seducer does not pay the fine is that the halakha is with regard to one who is an orphan and a seduced woman. Were her father alive, he would receive the payment. Because he died, the payment goes to her. Since she willingly participated in the relations, she relinquished her right to the payment, and the seducer is therefore liable to receive lashes.

אַלְמָא קָסָבַר עוּלָּא: כָּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְעוּלָּא הָא? גָּמַר מֵחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ: מָה חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

The Gemara observes: Apparently, Ulla maintains that in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, e.g., one who has forced relations with his sister who is a young woman, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: From where does Ulla derive this principle? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the halakha of one who injures another. Just as with regard to one who injures another where there is liability to both pay money for the injury and receive lashes for violating the prohibition “Lest he continues to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), the halakha there is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

מָה לְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ — שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בַּחֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים. וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא — שֶׁכֵּן הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין.

The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison between other cases and the case of one who injures another? One who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of one who injures another is particularly stringent, as he is liable to pay five types of indemnity: Injury, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, one could infer a fortiori: If in the stringent case of injuring another, one receives the more lenient punishment, all the more so would he receive the more lenient punishment in less stringent cases; nevertheless, one who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes. The reason is that there is also a lenient aspect with regard to injuring another, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court. The court administers lashes, injuring those convicted. The leniency is that its application is selective.

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מֵעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין: מָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

Rather, the Gemara states that Ulla derives this principle from the halakha of false, conspiring witnesses. Just as with regard to conspiring witnesses, where there is liability to both pay money, if they falsely testified to render one liable for payment, and receive lashes, for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13), and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

מָה לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין — שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן צְרִיכִים הַתְרָאָה. וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא — שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשׂוּ מַעֲשֶׂה!

The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the case of conspiring witnesses? Conspiring witnesses cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of conspiring witnesses is particularly stringent, as they do not require forewarning. As a rule, the courts administer punishment only to one who was forewarned not to perform the transgression. The fact that this is not a requirement in the case of conspiring witnesses indicates that it is a particularly stringent prohibition. Therefore, no proof can be cited from the case of conspiring witnesses to other cases with regard to monetary payment instead of lashes. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, the case of conspiring witnesses also has a lenient aspect, as they did not perform an action but merely spoke.

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מָה הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי. מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן — שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד חָמוּר, וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא — שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד הַקַּל.

Rather, Ulla derives the principle from both of them, the cases of one who injures another and of conspiring witnesses. The common denominator of both cases is that there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged; so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the common denominator of both cases, as they have an element of stringency that does not exist in other prohibitions in that one who injures another pays five types of indemnity, and conspiring witnesses are flogged without forewarning? And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, other cases cannot be derived from it, as they have an element of leniency that does not exist in other prohibitions. The prohibition in the case of one who injures another is selectively applied, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court, and the case of conspiring witnesses is lenient because they performed no action.

אֶלָּא עוּלָּא ״תַּחַת״ ״תַּחַת״ גָּמַר. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִנָּהּ״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״. מָה הָתָם — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹנָא וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

Rather, Ulla derives the fact that one pays and is not flogged by means of a verbal analogy between the terms for and for. The verse states with regard to rape: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver, and to him she shall be as a wife, because [taḥat] he tormented her” (Deuteronomy 22:29), and it states there, with regard to injury: “An eye for [taḥat] an eye” (Exodus 21:24). Just as there, with regard to injury, one pays money and is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה: כָּאן שֶׁהִתְרוּ בּוֹ, כָּאן שֶׁלֹּא הִתְרוּ בּוֹ.

§ In proposing a different resolution to the apparent contradiction between the mishna here that rules that one pays a fine for raping his sister and the mishna in Makkot that rules that one is flogged in that case, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if you say that both mishnayot are referring to his sister who is a young woman, there it is referring to a case where the witnesses forewarned him, and therefore the rapist is flogged; here, it is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him. Since no lashes are administered without forewarning, the rapist pays the fine.

אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת וְאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — מִילְקָא לָקֵי, מָמוֹנָא לָא מְשַׁלֵּם. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ״, מִשּׁוּם רִשְׁעָה אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁתֵּי רִשְׁעָיוֹת. וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ ״אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ״.

The Gemara observes: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, and the witnesses forewarned him, he is flogged but does not pay money. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Yoḥanan derive this principle? The Gemara explains that he derives it from that which the verse states with regard to one sentenced to lashes in the court: “The judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before him, according to the measure of his wickedness” (Deuteronomy 25:2), from which it is inferred: For one act of wickedness, i.e., punishment, you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two acts of wickedness. And juxtaposed to this it states: “Forty he shall strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), indicating that the punishment that is administered when one is liable to receive two punishments is lashes and not payment.

וַהֲרֵי חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי! וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, אֲבָל אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — מִילְקָא לָקֵי, מָמוֹנָא לָא מְשַׁלֵּם, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה — לוֹקֶה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, אַמַּאי לוֹקֶה? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וְטַעְמָא — דְּלֵית בֵּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, הָא אִית בֵּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי!

The Gemara asks: And what of the case of one who injures another where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, in which case one pays money but is not flogged? And lest you say that this applies only when the witnesses did not forewarn him, but if they forewarned him before he struck his friend he is flogged but does not pay money, didn’t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one struck another with a blow that does not cause damage that amounts to the value of a peruta, he is flogged? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of that case? If it is a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him, why is he flogged? No lashes are administered without forewarning. Rather, obviously it is a case where they forewarned him, and the reason he is flogged is that there is not damage that amounts to the value of a peruta. The damages are not quantifiable. The Gemara infers: However, if there is damage that amounts to the value of a peruta, he pays money and is not flogged, even though he was forewarned.

כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין לְתַשְׁלוּמִין, הָכָא נָמֵי: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ לְתַשְׁלוּמִין. וְהֵיכָא אִיתְּמַר דְּרַבִּי אִילְעָא — אַהָא: מְעִידִין אָנוּ אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁחַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין — לוֹקִין וּמְשַׁלְּמִין, שֶׁלֹּא הַשֵּׁם הַמְּבִיאָן לִידֵי מַכּוֹת מְבִיאָן לִידֵי תַּשְׁלוּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.

The Gemara answers that the fact that conspiring witnesses pay money can be explained in accordance with that which Rabbi Ile’a said in a different context: The Torah explicitly amplified the case of conspiring witnesses to include liability for payment. The Torah employed language indicating that conspiring witnesses who testified falsely in order to render one liable for payment must pay the sum and are not flogged. Here, too, with regard to injury, the Torah explicitly amplified the case of one who injures another to include liability for payment. The Gemara asks: And where is this statement of Rabbi Ile’a stated? The Gemara answers that it is stated concerning this mishna (Makkot 4a). If witnesses said: We testify that so-and-so owes another two hundred dinar, and these witnesses were discovered to be conspiring witnesses; they are flogged and pay, as the source [shem] that brings them to liability to receive lashes does not bring them to liability for payment. Each liability has an independent source; the source for lashes is: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” (Exodus 20:13) while the source for payment is: “You shall do unto him as he conspired” (Deuteronomy 19:19). This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Anyone who pays is not flogged.

וְנֵימָא: כׇּל הַלּוֹקֶה אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם! אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין לְתַשְׁלוּמִין. הֵיכָן רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה? מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״, ״יָד בְּיָד״ לְמָה לִי? דָּבָר הַנִּיתָּן מִיָּד לְיָד, וּמַאי נִיהוּ — מָמוֹן.

And with regard to that mishna, the Gemara asks: Let us say, on the contrary, that anyone who is flogged does not pay. Rabbi Ile’a said: The Torah explicitly amplified the case of conspiring witnesses for payment, not lashes. The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah amplify the case of conspiring witnesses? The Gemara explains: Now, since it states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19); why do I require the Torah to state in his punishment: “A hand for a hand” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? This indicates that the punishment that takes precedence is one in which there is an item that is given from hand to hand, and what is that item? It is money.

חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״, ״כֵּן יִנָּתֵן בּוֹ״, לְמָה לִי? דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נְתִינָה, וּמַאי נִיהוּ — מָמוֹן.

The same can be said with regard to one who injures another. Now, since it states: “And a man who places a blemish upon his counterpart, as he has done so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19), why do I require the Torah to state: “As one who places a blemish upon a man, so shall be placed [yinnaten] upon him” (Leviticus 24:20)? This teaches that this is referring to an item that involves giving [netina], and what is that item? It is money.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּעוּלָּא? אִם כֵּן, בִּטַּלְתָּ ״עֶרְוַת אֲחוֹתְךָ… לֹא תְגַלֶּה״.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason that he did not say the same halakha as Ulla, that where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged? The Gemara answers: If so, if that were the case, you have rendered moot the prohibition “The nakedness of your sister…you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:9) in that contrary to the standard prohibitions, no lashes would be administered for its violation.

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Laura Shechter

Lexington, MA, United States

Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba

Marsha Wasserman
Marsha Wasserman

Jerusalem, Israel

I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!

Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Debbie Engelen-Eigles

Minnesota, United States

I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .

Martha Tarazi
Martha Tarazi

Panama, Panama

The first month I learned Daf Yomi by myself in secret, because I wasn’t sure how my husband would react, but after the siyyum on Masechet Brachot I discovered Hadran and now sometimes my husband listens to the daf with me. He and I also learn mishnayot together and are constantly finding connections between the different masechtot.

Laura Warshawsky
Laura Warshawsky

Silver Spring, Maryland, United States

A Gemara shiur previous to the Hadran Siyum, was the impetus to attend it.It was highly inspirational and I was smitten. The message for me was התלמוד בידינו. I had decided along with my Chahsmonaim group to to do the daf and take it one daf at time- without any expectations at all. There has been a wealth of information, insights and halachik ideas. It is truly exercise of the mind, heart & Soul

Phyllis Hecht.jpeg
Phyllis Hecht

Hashmonaim, Israel

3 years ago, I joined Rabbanit Michelle to organize the unprecedented Siyum HaShas event in Jerusalem for thousands of women. The whole experience was so inspiring that I decided then to start learning the daf and see how I would go…. and I’m still at it. I often listen to the Daf on my bike in mornings, surrounded by both the external & the internal beauty of Eretz Yisrael & Am Yisrael!

Lisa Kolodny
Lisa Kolodny

Raanana, Israel

I am grateful for the structure of the Daf Yomi. When I am freer to learn to my heart’s content, I learn other passages in addition. But even in times of difficulty, I always know that I can rely on the structure and social support of Daf Yomi learners all over the world.

I am also grateful for this forum. It is very helpful to learn with a group of enthusiastic and committed women.

Janice Block-2
Janice Block

Beit Shemesh, Israel

With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!

Sharon Mink
Sharon Mink

Haifa, Israel

I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Wendy Rozov
Wendy Rozov

Phoenix, AZ, United States

Ive been learning Gmara since 5th grade and always loved it. Have always wanted to do Daf Yomi and now with Michelle Farber’s online classes it made it much easier to do! Really enjoying the experience thank you!!

Lisa Lawrence
Lisa Lawrence

Neve Daniel, Israel

I started learning at the beginning of this Daf Yomi cycle because I heard a lot about the previous cycle coming to an end and thought it would be a good thing to start doing. My husband had already bought several of the Koren Talmud Bavli books and they were just sitting on the shelf, not being used, so here was an opportunity to start using them and find out exactly what was in them. Loving it!

Caroline Levison
Caroline Levison

Borehamwood, United Kingdom

I have joined the community of daf yomi learners at the start of this cycle. I have studied in different ways – by reading the page, translating the page, attending a local shiur and listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcasts, depending on circumstances and where I was at the time. The reactions have been positive throughout – with no exception!

Silke Goldberg
Silke Goldberg

Guildford, United Kingdom

Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.

Lisa S. Malik
Lisa S. Malik

Wynnewood, United States

When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!

Wendy Dickstein
Wendy Dickstein

Jerusalem, Israel

I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .

Martha Tarazi
Martha Tarazi

Panama, Panama

I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Wendy Rozov
Wendy Rozov

Phoenix, AZ, United States

Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!

Judith Weil
Judith Weil

Raanana, Israel

I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.

Adina Hagege
Adina Hagege

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

My family recently made Aliyah, because we believe the next chapter in the story of the Jewish people is being written here, and we want to be a part of it. Daf Yomi, on the other hand, connects me BACK, to those who wrote earlier chapters thousands of years ago. So, I feel like I’m living in the middle of this epic story. I’m learning how it all began, and looking ahead to see where it goes!
Tina Lamm
Tina Lamm

Jerusalem, Israel

Ketubot 32

וְקַיְימָא לַן דְּאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אָמַר עוּלָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה, כָּאן בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת.

And since we maintain in general that one is not both flogged and liable to pay, if one receives lashes for having relations with his sister, why must he pay the fine as well? Ulla said: This is not difficult; here, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a young woman, for whom one pays a fine and is not flogged, whereas there, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is a grown woman, for whom one does not pay a fine.

אֲחוֹתוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת נָמֵי, הָא אִיכָּא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם! בְּשׁוֹטָה. וְהָא אִיכָּא צַעֲרָא! בִּמְפוּתָּה.

The Gemara asks: In the case of one who has relations with his sister who is a grown woman, too, although he does not pay a fine, isn’t there compensation for humiliation and degradation? He should be exempt from lashes in that case as well. The Gemara answers: There, the halakha in the mishna is with regard to his sister who is an imbecile, with regard to whom there is no humiliation or degradation beyond her status as an imbecile. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there payment for pain even in the rape of an imbecile? The Gemara responds: The halakha is with regard to a seduced woman, who is not entitled to payment for pain, as she engaged in relations willingly.

הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה, בִּיתוֹמָה וּמְפוּתָּה.

The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation that the mishna is referring to a seduced woman, the mishna can be understood even if you say it is referring to his sister who is a young woman. The reason that the seducer does not pay the fine is that the halakha is with regard to one who is an orphan and a seduced woman. Were her father alive, he would receive the payment. Because he died, the payment goes to her. Since she willingly participated in the relations, she relinquished her right to the payment, and the seducer is therefore liable to receive lashes.

אַלְמָא קָסָבַר עוּלָּא: כָּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְעוּלָּא הָא? גָּמַר מֵחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ: מָה חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

The Gemara observes: Apparently, Ulla maintains that in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, e.g., one who has forced relations with his sister who is a young woman, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: From where does Ulla derive this principle? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the halakha of one who injures another. Just as with regard to one who injures another where there is liability to both pay money for the injury and receive lashes for violating the prohibition “Lest he continues to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), the halakha there is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

מָה לְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ — שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בַּחֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים. וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא — שֶׁכֵּן הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין.

The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison between other cases and the case of one who injures another? One who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of one who injures another is particularly stringent, as he is liable to pay five types of indemnity: Injury, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, one could infer a fortiori: If in the stringent case of injuring another, one receives the more lenient punishment, all the more so would he receive the more lenient punishment in less stringent cases; nevertheless, one who injures another cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes. The reason is that there is also a lenient aspect with regard to injuring another, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court. The court administers lashes, injuring those convicted. The leniency is that its application is selective.

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מֵעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין: מָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

Rather, the Gemara states that Ulla derives this principle from the halakha of false, conspiring witnesses. Just as with regard to conspiring witnesses, where there is liability to both pay money, if they falsely testified to render one liable for payment, and receive lashes, for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13), and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

מָה לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין — שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן צְרִיכִים הַתְרָאָה. וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא — שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשׂוּ מַעֲשֶׂה!

The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the case of conspiring witnesses? Conspiring witnesses cannot serve as a paradigm for cases of liability for both money and lashes because the case of conspiring witnesses is particularly stringent, as they do not require forewarning. As a rule, the courts administer punishment only to one who was forewarned not to perform the transgression. The fact that this is not a requirement in the case of conspiring witnesses indicates that it is a particularly stringent prohibition. Therefore, no proof can be cited from the case of conspiring witnesses to other cases with regard to monetary payment instead of lashes. And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, the case of conspiring witnesses also has a lenient aspect, as they did not perform an action but merely spoke.

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מָה הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי. מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן — שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד חָמוּר, וְאִי מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא הוּא — שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד הַקַּל.

Rather, Ulla derives the principle from both of them, the cases of one who injures another and of conspiring witnesses. The common denominator of both cases is that there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes and the halakha is that one pays money but is not flogged; so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged. The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the comparison of other cases to the common denominator of both cases, as they have an element of stringency that does not exist in other prohibitions in that one who injures another pays five types of indemnity, and conspiring witnesses are flogged without forewarning? And if payment of money is a more lenient form of punishment than lashes, other cases cannot be derived from it, as they have an element of leniency that does not exist in other prohibitions. The prohibition in the case of one who injures another is selectively applied, as it is permitted, in departure from its norm, in court, and the case of conspiring witnesses is lenient because they performed no action.

אֶלָּא עוּלָּא ״תַּחַת״ ״תַּחַת״ גָּמַר. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִנָּהּ״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״. מָה הָתָם — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי; אַף כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹנָא וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי.

Rather, Ulla derives the fact that one pays and is not flogged by means of a verbal analogy between the terms for and for. The verse states with regard to rape: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver, and to him she shall be as a wife, because [taḥat] he tormented her” (Deuteronomy 22:29), and it states there, with regard to injury: “An eye for [taḥat] an eye” (Exodus 21:24). Just as there, with regard to injury, one pays money and is not flogged, so too, in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אֲחוֹתוֹ נַעֲרָה: כָּאן שֶׁהִתְרוּ בּוֹ, כָּאן שֶׁלֹּא הִתְרוּ בּוֹ.

§ In proposing a different resolution to the apparent contradiction between the mishna here that rules that one pays a fine for raping his sister and the mishna in Makkot that rules that one is flogged in that case, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if you say that both mishnayot are referring to his sister who is a young woman, there it is referring to a case where the witnesses forewarned him, and therefore the rapist is flogged; here, it is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him. Since no lashes are administered without forewarning, the rapist pays the fine.

אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת וְאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — מִילְקָא לָקֵי, מָמוֹנָא לָא מְשַׁלֵּם. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ״, מִשּׁוּם רִשְׁעָה אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁתֵּי רִשְׁעָיוֹת. וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ ״אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ״.

The Gemara observes: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that in any case where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, and the witnesses forewarned him, he is flogged but does not pay money. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Yoḥanan derive this principle? The Gemara explains that he derives it from that which the verse states with regard to one sentenced to lashes in the court: “The judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before him, according to the measure of his wickedness” (Deuteronomy 25:2), from which it is inferred: For one act of wickedness, i.e., punishment, you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two acts of wickedness. And juxtaposed to this it states: “Forty he shall strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), indicating that the punishment that is administered when one is liable to receive two punishments is lashes and not payment.

וַהֲרֵי חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, דְּאִיכָּא מָמוֹן וּמַלְקוֹת — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי! וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, אֲבָל אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — מִילְקָא לָקֵי, מָמוֹנָא לָא מְשַׁלֵּם, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה — לוֹקֶה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, אַמַּאי לוֹקֶה? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ, וְטַעְמָא — דְּלֵית בֵּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, הָא אִית בֵּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה — מָמוֹנָא מְשַׁלֵּם, מִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי!

The Gemara asks: And what of the case of one who injures another where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, in which case one pays money but is not flogged? And lest you say that this applies only when the witnesses did not forewarn him, but if they forewarned him before he struck his friend he is flogged but does not pay money, didn’t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one struck another with a blow that does not cause damage that amounts to the value of a peruta, he is flogged? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of that case? If it is a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him, why is he flogged? No lashes are administered without forewarning. Rather, obviously it is a case where they forewarned him, and the reason he is flogged is that there is not damage that amounts to the value of a peruta. The damages are not quantifiable. The Gemara infers: However, if there is damage that amounts to the value of a peruta, he pays money and is not flogged, even though he was forewarned.

כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין לְתַשְׁלוּמִין, הָכָא נָמֵי: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ לְתַשְׁלוּמִין. וְהֵיכָא אִיתְּמַר דְּרַבִּי אִילְעָא — אַהָא: מְעִידִין אָנוּ אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁחַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין — לוֹקִין וּמְשַׁלְּמִין, שֶׁלֹּא הַשֵּׁם הַמְּבִיאָן לִידֵי מַכּוֹת מְבִיאָן לִידֵי תַּשְׁלוּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.

The Gemara answers that the fact that conspiring witnesses pay money can be explained in accordance with that which Rabbi Ile’a said in a different context: The Torah explicitly amplified the case of conspiring witnesses to include liability for payment. The Torah employed language indicating that conspiring witnesses who testified falsely in order to render one liable for payment must pay the sum and are not flogged. Here, too, with regard to injury, the Torah explicitly amplified the case of one who injures another to include liability for payment. The Gemara asks: And where is this statement of Rabbi Ile’a stated? The Gemara answers that it is stated concerning this mishna (Makkot 4a). If witnesses said: We testify that so-and-so owes another two hundred dinar, and these witnesses were discovered to be conspiring witnesses; they are flogged and pay, as the source [shem] that brings them to liability to receive lashes does not bring them to liability for payment. Each liability has an independent source; the source for lashes is: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” (Exodus 20:13) while the source for payment is: “You shall do unto him as he conspired” (Deuteronomy 19:19). This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Anyone who pays is not flogged.

וְנֵימָא: כׇּל הַלּוֹקֶה אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם! אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין לְתַשְׁלוּמִין. הֵיכָן רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה? מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״, ״יָד בְּיָד״ לְמָה לִי? דָּבָר הַנִּיתָּן מִיָּד לְיָד, וּמַאי נִיהוּ — מָמוֹן.

And with regard to that mishna, the Gemara asks: Let us say, on the contrary, that anyone who is flogged does not pay. Rabbi Ile’a said: The Torah explicitly amplified the case of conspiring witnesses for payment, not lashes. The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah amplify the case of conspiring witnesses? The Gemara explains: Now, since it states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19); why do I require the Torah to state in his punishment: “A hand for a hand” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? This indicates that the punishment that takes precedence is one in which there is an item that is given from hand to hand, and what is that item? It is money.

חוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי, מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״, ״כֵּן יִנָּתֵן בּוֹ״, לְמָה לִי? דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נְתִינָה, וּמַאי נִיהוּ — מָמוֹן.

The same can be said with regard to one who injures another. Now, since it states: “And a man who places a blemish upon his counterpart, as he has done so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19), why do I require the Torah to state: “As one who places a blemish upon a man, so shall be placed [yinnaten] upon him” (Leviticus 24:20)? This teaches that this is referring to an item that involves giving [netina], and what is that item? It is money.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּעוּלָּא? אִם כֵּן, בִּטַּלְתָּ ״עֶרְוַת אֲחוֹתְךָ… לֹא תְגַלֶּה״.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason that he did not say the same halakha as Ulla, that where there is liability to both pay money and receive lashes, one pays money but is not flogged? The Gemara answers: If so, if that were the case, you have rendered moot the prohibition “The nakedness of your sister…you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:9) in that contrary to the standard prohibitions, no lashes would be administered for its violation.

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