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Ketubot 34
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה — לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה. הָתִינַח עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, אֶלָּא שְׁחִיטַת שַׁבָּת — שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא! דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּשַׁבָּת וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ — שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה!
It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: The legal status of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not that of slaughter. Therefore, one is not liable for slaughter of the animal. The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to idolatry and the ox that is stoned, as their slaughter is ineffective in rendering the meat fit to be eaten; however, the slaughter on Shabbat is a proper act of slaughter, as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 14a): In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, his slaughter is valid and the meat may be eaten.
סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר. דְּתַנְיָא: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֹאכַל, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֹאכַל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֹאכַל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֹאכַל עוֹלָמִית. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֵאָכֵל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לוֹ, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֵאָכֵל עוֹלָמִית, לֹא לוֹ וְלֹא לַאֲחֵרִים.
The Gemara answers: The tanna of the baraita under discussion holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, as it is taught in a baraita:
With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat the food he cooked; if he did so intentionally, he may not eat it at all. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked unwittingly he may eat at the conclusion of Shabbat, as the Sages penalized even one who sinned unwittingly in that they prohibited him from deriving immediate benefit from the dish that he cooked; if he sinned intentionally, he may not eat from it ever.
Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he did so unwittingly, the food may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others but not by him; if he did so intentionally, it may not be eaten ever, neither by him nor by other Jews. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, food prepared by means of intentional desecration of Shabbat is unfit to be eaten. That is true with regard to cooking food on Shabbat and with regard to slaughtering an animal on Shabbat.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר? כִּדְדָרֵישׁ רַבִּי חִיָּיא אַפִּיתְחָא דְּבֵי נְשִׂיאָה: ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הִיא לָכֶם״, מָה קוֹדֶשׁ אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה — אַף מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת אֲסוּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה. אִי: מָה קוֹדֶשׁ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה — אַף מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לָכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא.
The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar? The Gemara explains: It is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught at the entrance to the house of the Nasi. It is written: “And you shall observe Shabbat, for it is sacred to you; he who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14); just as with regard to a sacred item consecrated to the Temple, eating it is prohibited, so too, with regard to food produced through action that desecrates Shabbat, eating it is prohibited. The Gemara asks: If so, perhaps the analogy should be extended to include the following: Just as with regard to a sacred item, deriving benefit from it is prohibited, so too, with regard to the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, deriving benefit from it should be prohibited. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “It is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it shall be yours in the sense that one may derive benefit from it.
יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מְחַלְּלֶיהָ מוֹת יוּמָת״, בְּמֵזִיד אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא בְּשׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara asks: Based on the analogy between actions that desecrate Shabbat and sacred items, one might have thought that even if the action was performed unwittingly it should be prohibited to eat its product, as is the case with regard to sacred items. Therefore, the verse states: “He who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it is with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat intentionally that I stated to you this analogy to sacred items, as the verse is clearly referring to one who is liable to receive the death penalty, and not with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat unwittingly, who is not executed.
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא, חַד אָמַר: מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְחַד אָמַר: דְּרַבָּנַן. מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — כְּדַאֲמַרַן, מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּרַבָּנַן — אָמַר קְרָא: ״קֹדֶשׁ הִיא״, הִיא קוֹדֶשׁ, וְאֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ קוֹדֶשׁ.
The Gemara comments: Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The product of an action that desecrates Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, and one said that it is prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to the one who said that it is prohibited by Torah law, it is as we said, that it is based on the verse interpreted by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And the one who said that it is prohibited by rabbinic law holds that the verse states: “It is sacred,” from which he infers: It is sacred, but the product of its actions is not sacred, and therefore, by Torah law it may be eaten.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּרַבָּנַן, מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן דְּפָטְרִי? כִּי קָא פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן אַשְּׁאָרָא.
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said it is prohibited by rabbinic law, what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis who exempt the thief from payment for the slaughter performed by his agent on Shabbat? By Torah law, the slaughter is valid. The Gemara answers: When the Rabbis exempt the thief from payment, it is with regard to the rest of the cases, i.e., one who slaughters for idolatry or an ox sentenced to stoning, not with regard to Shabbat.
טוֹבֵחַ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁחַט בֵּיהּ פּוּרְתָּא — אִיתְּסַר לֵיהּ, אִידַּךְ כִּי קָא טָבַח, לָאו דְּמָרֵיהּ קָא טָבַח! אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאוֹמֵר בִּגְמַר זְבִיחָה הוּא עוֹבְדָהּ.
The Gemara asks the following question with regard to Rabbi Meir’s opinion that one who slaughters for idolatry is liable to pay the owner for the animal. Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, it is prohibited for him to derive benefit from the animal because it is an animal sacrificed to idolatry; and when he slaughters the rest, it is not the animal that belongs to its owner that he is slaughtering. Since it is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal, it has no value and there is no ownership. Rava said: It is referring to one who says, prior to the slaughter, that he is worshipping the idol only at the completion of the slaughter, and therefore the prohibition takes effect only then.
שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, לָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא דְּקָטָבַח! אָמַר רַבָּה: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁמְּסָרוֹ לְשׁוֹמֵר, וְהִזִּיק בְּבֵית שׁוֹמֵר, וְנִגְמַר דִּינוֹ בְּבֵית שׁוֹמֵר, וּגְנָבוֹ גַּנָּב מִבֵּית שׁוֹמֵר.
The Gemara asks the following question with regard to Rabbi Meir’s opinion that one who slaughters the ox that is stoned is liable to pay for the slaughter. Why is he liable? It is not the owner’s ox that he is slaughtering, since once the ox is sentenced to be stoned it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the owners entrusted the ox to a bailee and the ox injured another person while in the bailee’s house, and it was sentenced to be stoned while in the bailee’s house, and the thief then stole it from the bailee’s house and slaughtered it.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב דְּאָמַר: אַף מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ הֶחְזִירוֹ שׁוֹמֵר לִבְעָלָיו — מוּחְזָר. וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן — כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי.
And this solution is based on the fact that Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov and holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who said: Even after the ox was sentenced to be stoned, if the bailee returned it to its owners, it is returned. Despite the fact that the ox is now worthless, as no benefit may be derived from it, since the bailee returned an ox that is physically intact the owner has no claim against him. And Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that the legal status of an object that effects monetary loss is like that of money. Even in the case of an object that is worthless, if its elimination causes monetary loss because it must be replaced, it is considered to have value. In this case, although the ox has no value in and of itself, slaughtering the animal prevents the bailee from returning it intact to the owner, requiring him to pay the owner the value of the ox before it was sentenced to be stoned. Consequently, the thief must reimburse the bailee, as the ox has value for the bailee.
רַבָּה אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ,
Rabba said: Actually, contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation of the baraita, it is referring to one who slaughters the animal himself,
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם אִית לֵיהּ, מֵת וּמְשַׁלֵּם לֵית לֵיהּ. וְשָׁאנֵי הָנֵי, דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל — מְשַׁלֵּם. וְאַזְדָּא רַבָּה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: הָיָה גְּדִי גָּנוּב לוֹ, וּטְבָחוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת. גָּנַב וְטָבַח בְּשַׁבָּת — פָּטוּר, שֶׁאִם אֵין גְּנֵיבָה, אֵין טְבִיחָה וְאֵין מְכִירָה.
and Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that one is flogged and pays, but is not of the opinion that one dies by execution and pays. And these halakhot are different, as it is a novel element that the Torah innovated with regard to the halakhic category of fines; although he is killed, he pays. And Rabba followed his line of reasoning stated elsewhere, as Rabba said: If one had a stolen kid in his possession that he had stolen previously, and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay five times the principal for slaughtering the kid, as he was already liable for stealing before he came to violate the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Although he slaughtered the goat on Shabbat, a capital crime, he is liable for the payment because it is a fine. However, if he stole the goat and slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from the payment of five times the principal as, if there is no payment for theft, due to his liability to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, and his obligation to repay the theft is not a fine, there is no liability for slaughter and there is no liability for sale.
וְאָמַר רַבָּה: הָיָה גְּדִי גָּנוּב לוֹ וּטְבָחוֹ בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר מַחְתֶּרֶת. גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת — פָּטוּר, שֶׁאִם אֵין גְּנֵיבָה, אֵין טְבִיחָה וְאֵין מְכִירָה.
And Rabba said: If one had a stolen kid in his possession that he had stolen previously, and he slaughtered it in the course of an act of burglary, he is liable to pay four or five times the principal, as he was already liable for theft before he came to violate the prohibition against burglary. However, if he stole and slaughtered an animal in the course of an act of burglary, he is exempt. Because the owner of the house is permitted to kill the burglar, the status of the burglar is tantamount to one liable to receive the death penalty. As, if there is no payment for theft, there is no liability for slaughter and there is no liability for sale. Rabba’s statements indicate that one pays the fines for slaughter or sale even if he is liable to receive the death penalty.
וּצְרִיכָא. דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שַׁבָּת — מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיסּוּרָהּ אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם. אֲבָל מַחְתֶּרֶת, דְּאִיסּוּר שָׁעָה הוּא — אֵימָא לָא. וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מַחְתֶּרֶת — מִשּׁוּם דְּמַחְתַּרְתּוֹ זוֹ הִיא הַתְרָאָתוֹ. אֲבָל שַׁבָּת, דְּבָעֲיָא הַתְרָאָה — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for Rabba to state this halakha with regard to both Shabbat and burglary; as, if he had taught us that one is exempt from payment only with regard to Shabbat, it is because Shabbat is severe since punishment for violation of its prohibition is an eternal prohibition, as whenever witnesses testify that one desecrated Shabbat, he can be executed. However, in the case of burglary, as punishment for violating its prohibition is transitory, e.g., it is permitted for the homeowner to kill the burglar only as long as the burglar remains on his property, say that he is not exempt from payment. And if he taught us the exemption only with regard to burglary, that would be because his burglary is his forewarning. Because he certainly intends to kill the homeowner, it is permitted for the homeowner to kill him without forewarning. In that respect, burglary is a severe prohibition and exempts one from payment. However, Shabbat, which requires forewarning, is a less severe prohibition, and in that case, say that one is not exempt from payment. Therefore, it was necessary for Rabba to state the exemption in both cases.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָיְתָה פָּרָה גְּנוּבָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת. הָיְתָה פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת — פָּטוּר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: רַב פָּפָּא, פָּרָה אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן?!
Rav Pappa said: If one had a stolen cow in his possession that he had stolen previously and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay four or five times the principal as he was already liable for theft before he came to violate the prohibition of Shabbat. If a cow was lent to him and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from paying the fine. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Is Rav Pappa coming to teach us the case of a cow? In other words, what did Rav Pappa add that was not already clear from Rabba’s statement? The same principle applies with regard to both a kid and a cow. If one was liable to pay for the theft when he stole the animal, he is liable to pay the fine for slaughter as well, even if he is liable to receive the death penalty.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַב פָּפָּא, שְׁאוּלָה אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִשְּׁעַת מְשִׁיכָה הוּא דְּאִתְחַיַּיב לֵיהּ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ, הָכָא נָמֵי: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁאֵלָה אִתְחַיַּיב בְּאוּנְסֶיהָ. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said to him: Rav Pappa is coming to teach us the halakha with regard to a borrowed cow, as it could enter your mind to say that since Rav Pappa said: It is from the moment of pulling the animal into his domain that the borrower is obligated to provide the animal’s sustenance, then here too, from the moment of borrowing he is liable to pay for its unavoidable accidents. From that point, the animal is legally in his possession and therefore, even if he slaughtered the animal on Shabbat he should be liable. Therefore, he teaches us that one assumes liability for unavoidable accidents only when they actually occur, and if that is on Shabbat, he is exempt.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה — מִשְׁתַּמְּשִׁין בָּהּ כׇּל יְמֵי שְׁאֵלָתָהּ, מֵתָה — אֵין חַיָּיבִין בְּאוֹנְסָהּ. כִּסְבוּרִין שֶׁל אֲבִיהֶם הִיא וּטְבָחוּהָ וַאֲכָלוּהָ — מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי בָשָׂר בְּזוֹל. הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם.
Rava said: If their father died and left them a borrowed cow, they may use it for the entire duration of the period for which it was borrowed. The right to use a borrowed article continues even after the borrower himself dies. However, if the cow died, they are not liable to pay for its unavoidable accident, as they did not borrow the animal themselves. Similarly, if they thought the cow was their father’s and they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay only a reduced assessment of the price of the meat. They are required to pay only for the benefit they received, not the damage they caused the owner. However, if their father left them property as a guarantee for return of the borrowed item, i.e., there was a lien on the father’s property during his lifetime, they are obligated to pay the entire sum of the damage.
אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא, וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא. מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַסֵּיפָא — וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא. וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא, אֲבָל אַרֵישָׁא לָא — וְהַיְינוּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא.
The Gemara comments: Some teach this statement, that if the father left property as a guarantee his heirs are liable to pay the entire damage, with regard to the first clause of this halakha, and some teach it with regard to the latter clause. The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause, when the animal died, all the more so would he teach this halakha with regard to the latter clause, as since they slaughtered the animal they must pay full damages. And this approach differs with the opinion of Rav Pappa, who said that a borrower is liable for accidents only when the incident occurs. And according to the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause, this halakha applies only when they slaughtered and ate it; however, with regard to the first clause, when it died, they would not be liable, as the tanna too maintains that liability for unavoidable accidents begins only when the incident occurs, not from when the cow was borrowed. And this is consistent with the ruling of Rav Pappa.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא אָמַר כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּקָא מוֹקֵים לָהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? אָמַר לָךְ: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
Several possible solutions were proposed to resolve the apparent contradiction between the mishna here that says that one who rapes his sister pays a fine and the mishna in Makkot that says that he is flogged. The Gemara comments: Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who explains the mishna as referring to a case where he was not forewarned, did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who explains that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as he establishes the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, a preferable option, as that aligns the unattributed mishna with the halakha. However, what is the reason that Reish Lakish didn’t state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: Since if they forewarned him he is exempt from payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is exempt as well.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ. דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין וְדָבָר אַחֵר — רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב — דְּהָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר — כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow their standard lines of reasoning in this regard, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to pay; since he sinned unwittingly he did not receive the severe punishment. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt. The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan said he is liable; since they did not forewarn him, he sinned unwittingly. Reish Lakish said he is exempt; since if they forewarned him he is exempt from payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is exempt as well.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״,
Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following verse, which describes a case where two people fought and during their struggle they hurt a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband” (Exodus 21:22).
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Jerusalem, Israel
Ketubot 34
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה — לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה. הָתִינַח עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, אֶלָּא שְׁחִיטַת שַׁבָּת — שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא! דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּשַׁבָּת וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ — שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה!
It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: The legal status of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not that of slaughter. Therefore, one is not liable for slaughter of the animal. The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to idolatry and the ox that is stoned, as their slaughter is ineffective in rendering the meat fit to be eaten; however, the slaughter on Shabbat is a proper act of slaughter, as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 14a): In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, his slaughter is valid and the meat may be eaten.
סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר. דְּתַנְיָא: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֹאכַל, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֹאכַל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֹאכַל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֹאכַל עוֹלָמִית. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג — יֵאָכֵל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לוֹ, בְּמֵזִיד — לֹא יֵאָכֵל עוֹלָמִית, לֹא לוֹ וְלֹא לַאֲחֵרִים.
The Gemara answers: The tanna of the baraita under discussion holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, as it is taught in a baraita:
With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat the food he cooked; if he did so intentionally, he may not eat it at all. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked unwittingly he may eat at the conclusion of Shabbat, as the Sages penalized even one who sinned unwittingly in that they prohibited him from deriving immediate benefit from the dish that he cooked; if he sinned intentionally, he may not eat from it ever.
Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he did so unwittingly, the food may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others but not by him; if he did so intentionally, it may not be eaten ever, neither by him nor by other Jews. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, food prepared by means of intentional desecration of Shabbat is unfit to be eaten. That is true with regard to cooking food on Shabbat and with regard to slaughtering an animal on Shabbat.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר? כִּדְדָרֵישׁ רַבִּי חִיָּיא אַפִּיתְחָא דְּבֵי נְשִׂיאָה: ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הִיא לָכֶם״, מָה קוֹדֶשׁ אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה — אַף מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת אֲסוּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה. אִי: מָה קוֹדֶשׁ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה — אַף מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לָכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא.
The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar? The Gemara explains: It is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught at the entrance to the house of the Nasi. It is written: “And you shall observe Shabbat, for it is sacred to you; he who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14); just as with regard to a sacred item consecrated to the Temple, eating it is prohibited, so too, with regard to food produced through action that desecrates Shabbat, eating it is prohibited. The Gemara asks: If so, perhaps the analogy should be extended to include the following: Just as with regard to a sacred item, deriving benefit from it is prohibited, so too, with regard to the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, deriving benefit from it should be prohibited. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “It is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it shall be yours in the sense that one may derive benefit from it.
יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מְחַלְּלֶיהָ מוֹת יוּמָת״, בְּמֵזִיד אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא בְּשׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara asks: Based on the analogy between actions that desecrate Shabbat and sacred items, one might have thought that even if the action was performed unwittingly it should be prohibited to eat its product, as is the case with regard to sacred items. Therefore, the verse states: “He who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it is with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat intentionally that I stated to you this analogy to sacred items, as the verse is clearly referring to one who is liable to receive the death penalty, and not with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat unwittingly, who is not executed.
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא, חַד אָמַר: מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְחַד אָמַר: דְּרַבָּנַן. מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — כְּדַאֲמַרַן, מַאן דְּאָמַר דְּרַבָּנַן — אָמַר קְרָא: ״קֹדֶשׁ הִיא״, הִיא קוֹדֶשׁ, וְאֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ קוֹדֶשׁ.
The Gemara comments: Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The product of an action that desecrates Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, and one said that it is prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to the one who said that it is prohibited by Torah law, it is as we said, that it is based on the verse interpreted by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And the one who said that it is prohibited by rabbinic law holds that the verse states: “It is sacred,” from which he infers: It is sacred, but the product of its actions is not sacred, and therefore, by Torah law it may be eaten.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּרַבָּנַן, מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן דְּפָטְרִי? כִּי קָא פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן אַשְּׁאָרָא.
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said it is prohibited by rabbinic law, what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis who exempt the thief from payment for the slaughter performed by his agent on Shabbat? By Torah law, the slaughter is valid. The Gemara answers: When the Rabbis exempt the thief from payment, it is with regard to the rest of the cases, i.e., one who slaughters for idolatry or an ox sentenced to stoning, not with regard to Shabbat.
טוֹבֵחַ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁחַט בֵּיהּ פּוּרְתָּא — אִיתְּסַר לֵיהּ, אִידַּךְ כִּי קָא טָבַח, לָאו דְּמָרֵיהּ קָא טָבַח! אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאוֹמֵר בִּגְמַר זְבִיחָה הוּא עוֹבְדָהּ.
The Gemara asks the following question with regard to Rabbi Meir’s opinion that one who slaughters for idolatry is liable to pay the owner for the animal. Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, it is prohibited for him to derive benefit from the animal because it is an animal sacrificed to idolatry; and when he slaughters the rest, it is not the animal that belongs to its owner that he is slaughtering. Since it is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal, it has no value and there is no ownership. Rava said: It is referring to one who says, prior to the slaughter, that he is worshipping the idol only at the completion of the slaughter, and therefore the prohibition takes effect only then.
שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, לָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא דְּקָטָבַח! אָמַר רַבָּה: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁמְּסָרוֹ לְשׁוֹמֵר, וְהִזִּיק בְּבֵית שׁוֹמֵר, וְנִגְמַר דִּינוֹ בְּבֵית שׁוֹמֵר, וּגְנָבוֹ גַּנָּב מִבֵּית שׁוֹמֵר.
The Gemara asks the following question with regard to Rabbi Meir’s opinion that one who slaughters the ox that is stoned is liable to pay for the slaughter. Why is he liable? It is not the owner’s ox that he is slaughtering, since once the ox is sentenced to be stoned it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the owners entrusted the ox to a bailee and the ox injured another person while in the bailee’s house, and it was sentenced to be stoned while in the bailee’s house, and the thief then stole it from the bailee’s house and slaughtered it.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב דְּאָמַר: אַף מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ הֶחְזִירוֹ שׁוֹמֵר לִבְעָלָיו — מוּחְזָר. וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן — כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי.
And this solution is based on the fact that Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov and holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who said: Even after the ox was sentenced to be stoned, if the bailee returned it to its owners, it is returned. Despite the fact that the ox is now worthless, as no benefit may be derived from it, since the bailee returned an ox that is physically intact the owner has no claim against him. And Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that the legal status of an object that effects monetary loss is like that of money. Even in the case of an object that is worthless, if its elimination causes monetary loss because it must be replaced, it is considered to have value. In this case, although the ox has no value in and of itself, slaughtering the animal prevents the bailee from returning it intact to the owner, requiring him to pay the owner the value of the ox before it was sentenced to be stoned. Consequently, the thief must reimburse the bailee, as the ox has value for the bailee.
רַבָּה אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ,
Rabba said: Actually, contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation of the baraita, it is referring to one who slaughters the animal himself,
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם אִית לֵיהּ, מֵת וּמְשַׁלֵּם לֵית לֵיהּ. וְשָׁאנֵי הָנֵי, דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל — מְשַׁלֵּם. וְאַזְדָּא רַבָּה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: הָיָה גְּדִי גָּנוּב לוֹ, וּטְבָחוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת. גָּנַב וְטָבַח בְּשַׁבָּת — פָּטוּר, שֶׁאִם אֵין גְּנֵיבָה, אֵין טְבִיחָה וְאֵין מְכִירָה.
and Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that one is flogged and pays, but is not of the opinion that one dies by execution and pays. And these halakhot are different, as it is a novel element that the Torah innovated with regard to the halakhic category of fines; although he is killed, he pays. And Rabba followed his line of reasoning stated elsewhere, as Rabba said: If one had a stolen kid in his possession that he had stolen previously, and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay five times the principal for slaughtering the kid, as he was already liable for stealing before he came to violate the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Although he slaughtered the goat on Shabbat, a capital crime, he is liable for the payment because it is a fine. However, if he stole the goat and slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from the payment of five times the principal as, if there is no payment for theft, due to his liability to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, and his obligation to repay the theft is not a fine, there is no liability for slaughter and there is no liability for sale.
וְאָמַר רַבָּה: הָיָה גְּדִי גָּנוּב לוֹ וּטְבָחוֹ בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר מַחְתֶּרֶת. גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת — פָּטוּר, שֶׁאִם אֵין גְּנֵיבָה, אֵין טְבִיחָה וְאֵין מְכִירָה.
And Rabba said: If one had a stolen kid in his possession that he had stolen previously, and he slaughtered it in the course of an act of burglary, he is liable to pay four or five times the principal, as he was already liable for theft before he came to violate the prohibition against burglary. However, if he stole and slaughtered an animal in the course of an act of burglary, he is exempt. Because the owner of the house is permitted to kill the burglar, the status of the burglar is tantamount to one liable to receive the death penalty. As, if there is no payment for theft, there is no liability for slaughter and there is no liability for sale. Rabba’s statements indicate that one pays the fines for slaughter or sale even if he is liable to receive the death penalty.
וּצְרִיכָא. דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שַׁבָּת — מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיסּוּרָהּ אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם. אֲבָל מַחְתֶּרֶת, דְּאִיסּוּר שָׁעָה הוּא — אֵימָא לָא. וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מַחְתֶּרֶת — מִשּׁוּם דְּמַחְתַּרְתּוֹ זוֹ הִיא הַתְרָאָתוֹ. אֲבָל שַׁבָּת, דְּבָעֲיָא הַתְרָאָה — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for Rabba to state this halakha with regard to both Shabbat and burglary; as, if he had taught us that one is exempt from payment only with regard to Shabbat, it is because Shabbat is severe since punishment for violation of its prohibition is an eternal prohibition, as whenever witnesses testify that one desecrated Shabbat, he can be executed. However, in the case of burglary, as punishment for violating its prohibition is transitory, e.g., it is permitted for the homeowner to kill the burglar only as long as the burglar remains on his property, say that he is not exempt from payment. And if he taught us the exemption only with regard to burglary, that would be because his burglary is his forewarning. Because he certainly intends to kill the homeowner, it is permitted for the homeowner to kill him without forewarning. In that respect, burglary is a severe prohibition and exempts one from payment. However, Shabbat, which requires forewarning, is a less severe prohibition, and in that case, say that one is not exempt from payment. Therefore, it was necessary for Rabba to state the exemption in both cases.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָיְתָה פָּרָה גְּנוּבָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת. הָיְתָה פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת — פָּטוּר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: רַב פָּפָּא, פָּרָה אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן?!
Rav Pappa said: If one had a stolen cow in his possession that he had stolen previously and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay four or five times the principal as he was already liable for theft before he came to violate the prohibition of Shabbat. If a cow was lent to him and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from paying the fine. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Is Rav Pappa coming to teach us the case of a cow? In other words, what did Rav Pappa add that was not already clear from Rabba’s statement? The same principle applies with regard to both a kid and a cow. If one was liable to pay for the theft when he stole the animal, he is liable to pay the fine for slaughter as well, even if he is liable to receive the death penalty.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַב פָּפָּא, שְׁאוּלָה אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִשְּׁעַת מְשִׁיכָה הוּא דְּאִתְחַיַּיב לֵיהּ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ, הָכָא נָמֵי: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁאֵלָה אִתְחַיַּיב בְּאוּנְסֶיהָ. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said to him: Rav Pappa is coming to teach us the halakha with regard to a borrowed cow, as it could enter your mind to say that since Rav Pappa said: It is from the moment of pulling the animal into his domain that the borrower is obligated to provide the animal’s sustenance, then here too, from the moment of borrowing he is liable to pay for its unavoidable accidents. From that point, the animal is legally in his possession and therefore, even if he slaughtered the animal on Shabbat he should be liable. Therefore, he teaches us that one assumes liability for unavoidable accidents only when they actually occur, and if that is on Shabbat, he is exempt.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה — מִשְׁתַּמְּשִׁין בָּהּ כׇּל יְמֵי שְׁאֵלָתָהּ, מֵתָה — אֵין חַיָּיבִין בְּאוֹנְסָהּ. כִּסְבוּרִין שֶׁל אֲבִיהֶם הִיא וּטְבָחוּהָ וַאֲכָלוּהָ — מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי בָשָׂר בְּזוֹל. הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם.
Rava said: If their father died and left them a borrowed cow, they may use it for the entire duration of the period for which it was borrowed. The right to use a borrowed article continues even after the borrower himself dies. However, if the cow died, they are not liable to pay for its unavoidable accident, as they did not borrow the animal themselves. Similarly, if they thought the cow was their father’s and they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay only a reduced assessment of the price of the meat. They are required to pay only for the benefit they received, not the damage they caused the owner. However, if their father left them property as a guarantee for return of the borrowed item, i.e., there was a lien on the father’s property during his lifetime, they are obligated to pay the entire sum of the damage.
אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא, וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא. מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַסֵּיפָא — וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא. וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא, אֲבָל אַרֵישָׁא לָא — וְהַיְינוּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא.
The Gemara comments: Some teach this statement, that if the father left property as a guarantee his heirs are liable to pay the entire damage, with regard to the first clause of this halakha, and some teach it with regard to the latter clause. The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause, when the animal died, all the more so would he teach this halakha with regard to the latter clause, as since they slaughtered the animal they must pay full damages. And this approach differs with the opinion of Rav Pappa, who said that a borrower is liable for accidents only when the incident occurs. And according to the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause, this halakha applies only when they slaughtered and ate it; however, with regard to the first clause, when it died, they would not be liable, as the tanna too maintains that liability for unavoidable accidents begins only when the incident occurs, not from when the cow was borrowed. And this is consistent with the ruling of Rav Pappa.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא אָמַר כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּקָא מוֹקֵים לָהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? אָמַר לָךְ: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
Several possible solutions were proposed to resolve the apparent contradiction between the mishna here that says that one who rapes his sister pays a fine and the mishna in Makkot that says that he is flogged. The Gemara comments: Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who explains the mishna as referring to a case where he was not forewarned, did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who explains that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as he establishes the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, a preferable option, as that aligns the unattributed mishna with the halakha. However, what is the reason that Reish Lakish didn’t state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: Since if they forewarned him he is exempt from payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is exempt as well.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ. דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין וְדָבָר אַחֵר — רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פָּטוּר. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב — דְּהָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר — כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ — נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow their standard lines of reasoning in this regard, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to pay; since he sinned unwittingly he did not receive the severe punishment. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt. The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan said he is liable; since they did not forewarn him, he sinned unwittingly. Reish Lakish said he is exempt; since if they forewarned him he is exempt from payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is exempt as well.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ״,
Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following verse, which describes a case where two people fought and during their struggle they hurt a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband” (Exodus 21:22).
