Ketubot 43

Ketubot 43

וּמוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס פָּטוּר. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי, כִּי קָא תָבַע — בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם קָא תָבַע.

And the principle is that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is exempt. Since the man would not have been liable to pay even if he had admitted his guilt, his denial of guilt is not considered a denial of monetary liability, and even if he swears falsely that he is not liable, he still does not become liable to bring an offering. And the Rabbis hold that when the father claims payment in court, it is the compensation for the humiliation and degradation that he claims. His main focus is not on the fine, and therefore the denial refers to a regular monetary claim.

בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִידֵּי דְּקִיץ, וְתָבַע מִידֵּי דְּלָא קִיץ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִידֵּי דְּכִי מוֹדֵי בֵּיהּ לָא מִיפְּטַר, וְתָבַע מִידֵּי דְּכִי מוֹדֵה בֵּיהּ מִיפְּטַר.

The Gemara asks: If this explanation is correct, with regard to what do the tanna’im disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds that a person does not leave aside something that is fixed, e.g., a fine, and claim something that is not fixed, e.g., the compensation for humiliation and degradation, which need to be assessed by the court. Consequently, a claim of rape is essentially a demand for the fine. And conversely, the Rabbis hold that a person does not leave aside something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is not exempt from payment, e.g., humiliation and degradation, and claim something that, if the defendant admits to it, he is exempt from payment. Consequently, they contend that the lawsuit is mainly focused on the compensation for the humiliation and degradation.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֲבִינָא מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בַּת הַנִּיזּוֹנֶת מִן הָאַחִין — מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לְמִי?

§ Rabbi Avina raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by her brothers, i.e., an orphan whose brothers provide her with her sustenance from their father’s estate, in accordance with the stipulation in the marriage contract between their parents that requires the father to pay for his daughter’s sustenance from his property, to whom do her earnings belong?

בִּמְקוֹם אָב קָיְימִי, מָה הָתָם — מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לָאָב, הָכָא נָמֵי — מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לָאַחִין, אוֹ דִלְמָא: לָא דָּמֵי לְאָב. הָתָם — מִדִּידֵיהּ מִיתַּזְנָא, הָכָא — לָאו מִדִּידְהוּ מִיתַּזְנָא.

Rabbi Avina explains the sides of the dilemma. One might say that the brothers stand in place of the father: Just as there, if their father is alive, her earnings go to the father, here too her earnings go to the brothers. Or perhaps this is not similar to the case of a living father. Why not? Because there, she is sustained from his own property, and therefore he is entitled to receive her earnings, whereas here, she is not sustained from their possessions but from the estate of their father, and consequently they should not receive her earnings.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים וּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ שֶׁלָּהֶן.

Rav Sheshet said to him: You already learned the answer to this dilemma from a mishna (Ketubot 81a): A widow is sustained from the property of the orphans, and her earnings are theirs. This indicates that although a widow receives her sustenance from the estate of her deceased husband, in accordance with the stipulations of the marriage contract, the orphans are nevertheless entitled to her earnings. The same reasoning should apply to an orphan sustained by her brothers.

מִי דָּמֵי? אַלְמְנָתוֹ, לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּהַרְוָוחָה. בִּתּוֹ, נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּהַרְווֹחָה.

The Gemara refutes this argument: Are the two situations comparable? In the case of his widow, the deceased is not necessarily amenable to her living in comfort. Consequently, she is entitled only to the minimum guaranteed to her in the marriage contract, while her earnings go to his heirs. Conversely, with regard to his daughter, he is amenable and is interested in her living in comfort, and therefore he allows her to retain her earnings so that she can have the extra money.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּבִתּוֹ עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ מֵאַלְמְנָתוֹ? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: עָשׂוּ אַלְמָנָה אֵצֶל הַבַּת כַּבַּת אֵצֶל אַחִין בִּנְכָסִין מוּעָטִין,

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the welfare of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow? But didn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Yosei said: The Sages established the halakha of a widow with regard to the daughter, who is also entitled to sustenance from the estate, like the halakha of a daughter with regard to the brothers in a case of a small estate that is insufficient for the livelihoods of both the girl and her brothers?

מָה הַבַּת אֵצֶל אַחִין — הַבַּת נִיזּוֹנֶת, וְהָאַחִין יִשְׁאֲלוּ עַל הַפְּתָחִים, אַף אַלְמָנָה אֵצֶל הַבַּת — אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת, וְהַבַּת תִּשְׁאַל עַל הַפְּתָחִים. לְעִנְיַן זִילוּתָא — אַלְמְנָתוֹ עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ. לְעִנְיַן הַרְוָוחָה — בִּתּוֹ עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ.

Rabbi Abba explains: Just as in the case of a daughter with regard to the brothers, the halakha is that the daughter is sustained from the father’s estate, and if the brothers have nothing to eat they must go and beg for charity at people’s doors, so too, in the case of a widow with regard to the daughter, the widow is sustained and the daughters beg for charity at people’s doors. This indicates that a man is more concerned for his widow than his daughter. The Gemara explains: The two cases are not comparable. With regard to degradation, one’s widow is preferable to him, i.e., if one of them must be forced to go around requesting handouts, a man would rather it be his daughter than his widow. By contrast, with regard to comfort, the comfort of his daughter is more preferable to him than that of his widow.

מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ וּמְצִיאָתָהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא גָּבְתָה — מֵת הָאָב הֲרֵי הֵן שֶׁל אַחִין. טַעְמָא דִּבְחַיֵּי הָאָב, הָא לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב — לְעַצְמָהּ. מַאי לָאו בְּנִיזּוֹנֶת? לָא, בְּשֶׁאֵינָהּ נִיזּוֹנֶת.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rav Sheshet’s conclusion that the orphan girl’s earnings belong to the brothers, from the mishna: With regard to her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them, if the father died, they belong to her brothers. Rav Yosef infers: The reason for this halakha is that she acquired her earnings in her father’s lifetime, which indicates that the money she earns after the father’s death belongs to her. What, is it not referring even to a daughter who is sustained from his estate? The Gemara refutes this claim: No, it deals with a daughter who is not sustained from his property but who sustains herself through her own earnings.

אִי בְּשֶׁאֵינָהּ נִיזּוֹנֶת, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״. הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּעֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי, דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״עִמָּךְ״.

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is speaking of one who is not sustained from his estate, what is the purpose of stating this? It is obvious that this is the halakha, as even according to the one who said that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not feed you, i.e., a master is not legally obligated to provide sustenance to his slave, this applies only to a Canaanite slave, with regard to whom it is not written in the Torah: “With you,” and therefore his master is not obligated to feed him.

אֲבָל עֶבֶד עִבְרִי דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ ״עִמָּךְ״ — לֹא. כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן בִּתּוֹ!

However, in the case of a Hebrew slave, as it is written with regard to him: “With you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), which indicates that he is entitled to live with his master as an equal, the master may not compel the slave to serve him unless he feeds him. All the more so concerning his daughter, it cannot be the case that this young woman has to work and give her wages to the brothers if they are not obligated to sustain her at the same time.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְהַעֲדָפָה. אָמַר רָבָא: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה כְּרַב יוֹסֵף לָא יָדַע דְּאִיכָּא הַעֲדָפָה, וְקָמוֹתֵיב תְּיוּבְתָּא?

Rabba bar Ulla said: It is necessary only for the surplus. The mishna is not implying that the brothers can take her earnings produced after the father’s death and not sustain her, leaving her with nothing. Rather, the question concerns a young woman whose earnings provide her with more than she needs for her sustenance, leaving her with a surplus. It is this surplus that belongs to her, and not to her brothers. Rava said in response to Rabba bar Ulla’s explanation: Is it possible that a man as great as Rav Yosef does not know that there is an explanation according to which the implied case of the mishna is referring to the surplus, and in his ignorance he raises a refutation against Rav Sheshet? This certainly cannot be the case.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רַב יוֹסֵף מַתְנִיתִין גּוּפָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ. דְּקָתָנֵי: מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ וּמְצִיאָתָהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא גָּבְתָה. מְצִיאָתָהּ מִמַּאן גָּבְיָא?

Rather, Rava said: The mishna itself poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, and this difficulty led Rav Yosef to his conclusion. This is as the mishna teaches: Her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them. Rava analyzes this statement: With regard to items that she has found, from whom does she collect them? The concept of collecting is inappropriate in this case.

אֶלָּא לָאו, הָכִי קָאָמַר: מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ כִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, מָה מְצִיאָתָהּ בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב — לָאָב, לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב — לְעַצְמָהּ, אַף מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ נָמֵי: בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב — לָאָב, לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב — לְעַצְמָהּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, is it not the case that this is what the mishna said: Her earnings are like items she has found: Just as items she has found in her father’s lifetime belong to her father, and after the father’s death they belong to her, so too, the same rule applies to her earnings as well: In the father’s lifetime, they go to the father, and after the father’s death they belong to her, even when she is sustained from the inheritance. The Gemara concludes: We can learn from this inference that the mishna deals with her earnings themselves, not their surplus, in contrast to the interpretation of Rav Sheshet.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בַּת הַנִּיזּוֹנֶת מִן הָאַחִין, מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לְעַצְמָהּ. אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי טַעְמָא — דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִתְנַחַלְתֶּם אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם אַחֲרֵיכֶם״. ״אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם״, וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם לִבְנֵיכֶם. מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ זְכוּת בִּתּוֹ לִבְנוֹ.

This halakha was also stated by amora’im, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: In the case of a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings nevertheless belong to her. Rav Kahana said: What is the reason for this? As it is written with regard to slaves: “And you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you” (Leviticus 25:46), from which it is inferred: It is them, slaves alone, that you bequeath to your sons, and you do not bequeath your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son. All the rights a man possesses over his daughter are personal rights, which are not transferable by inheritance.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה: וְאֵימָא בְּפִיתּוּי הַבַּת וּקְנָסוֹת וַחֲבָלוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. וְכֵן תָּנָא רַב חֲנִינָא: בְּפִתּוּי הַבַּת וּקְנָסוֹת וַחֲבָלוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר!

Rabba strongly objects to this explanation that the verse is referring to a man’s rights to his daughter’s earnings: But one can say that the verse is speaking of the fine that a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines paid to him if she is raped, and compensation due to him for injuries that she suffered, and the verse indicates that these rights are not bequeathed to his heirs. And Rav Ḥanina likewise explicitly taught that the verse is speaking of payments a father is paid in the case of the seduction of his daughter, and the fines due to him if she is raped, and compensation for injuries she has suffered.

חֲבָלוֹת, צַעֲרָא דְגוּפָא נִינְהוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא:

The Gemara questions this interpretation: With regard to injuries, they are the result of her bodily pain, and the guiding principle is that any compensation for a daughter’s physical pain does not belong to her father, who merely keeps it in trust for her. If so, the category of injuries should not have been included in this list. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

שֶׁפְּצָעָהּ בְּפָנֶיהָ. אָמַר רַב זֵירָא אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה אָמַר רַב: בַּת הַנִּיזּוֹנֶת מִן הָאַחִין מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לְעַצְמָהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִתְנַחַלְתֶּם אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם אַחֲרֵיכֶם״. ״אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם״, וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם לִבְנֵיכֶם. מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ זְכוּת בִּתּוֹ לִבְנוֹ.

We are dealing with a case when he injured her in her face, and therefore he must also pay for the loss of her value, a sum that belongs to her father. Rav Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said, and some say Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings belong to her, as it is written: “And you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you” (Leviticus 25:46), which indicates: It is them, slaves, that you bequeath to your sons, and not your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אֲבִימִי בַּר פַּפֵּי: שָׁקוּד אַמְרַהּ. שָׁקוּד מַנּוּ? שְׁמוּאֵל, הָא רַב אַמְרַהּ! אֵימָא: אַף שָׁקוּד אַמְרַהּ. אָמַר מָר בַּר אַמֵּימָר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב, וְהִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב.

Avimi bar Pappi said to Rabbi Zeira: Shakud said this halakha. The Gemara asks: Who is Shakud? This is a nickname for Shmuel. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rav say it? The Gemara answers: One should say that Avimi bar Pappi meant that even Shakud said it, i.e., Shmuel also agreed with this ruling. Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: The Sages of Neharde’a say as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, that brothers who are sustaining their sister are entitled to her earnings. Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that her earnings belong to her. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְאָרֵס אֶת בִּתּוֹ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, אֵירְסָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ. הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלָּהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אִם מִשֶּׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ, אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ.

MISHNA: One who betroths his minor daughter to a man, and the man subsequently divorces her, and her father then betroths her to another, and she is widowed, the payment specified in her marriage contract, even from her second husband, is his, i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father married her off and her husband divorced her, and her father then married her to another man and she was widowed, even the payment specified in her marriage contract from her first marriage is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. They said to him: If it was after he married her off, even the first time, her father no longer has authority over her.

גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּהִשִּׂיאָהּ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה, אֲבָל נִתְאַרְמְלָה תְּרֵי זִמְנֵי — תּוּ לָא חַזְיָא לְאִינְּסוֹבֵי. וְאַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא סָתֵים לַן תַּנָּא כְּרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר: בִּתְרֵי זִמְנֵי הָוְיָא חֲזָקָה.

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the language of the mishna: The reason is that he married her off, and the husband divorced her, and he married her off to another man, and she was widowed. However, if she was widowed twice she is no longer fit to be married, due to the concern that she is the cause of her husbands’ early demise. The Gemara comments: And the tanna incidentally teaches an unattributed opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that presumption is established by two occasions. Consequently, she is already considered a danger after two husbands have passed away, as opposed to the opinion that three incidents are required to establish a presumption.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הוֹאִיל וּמִשְּׁעַת אֵירוּסִין זָכָה בָּהֶן הָאָב.

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains that Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the father is entitled to the payments of the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when the first husband obligated himself to pay her marriage contract, as the girl was under her father’s authority at the time, the father receives the money. Although the money is actually paid only after the girl was married and divorced, at which time she is under her own jurisdiction, her father acquired his right to the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when she was under his authority.

מֵתִיב רָבָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב. וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בִּמְאָרֵס אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה וּבָגְרָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשֵּׂאת, שֶׁאֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ. אַמַּאי? הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וּמִשְּׁעַת אֵירוּסִין זָכָה בָּהֶן הָאָב.

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to her father. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of one who betroths his daughter when she is a minor, and she matures and subsequently marries, that her father no longer has authority over her once she becomes an adult, and he does not retain his rights to her marriage contract. According to the above explanation, why does Rabbi Yehuda agree in that case? Here too, let him say: Since the father is entitled to the payment of her marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, he receives the payment even if she married after she reached majority.

אֶלָּא, אִי אִתְּמַר, הָכִי אִתְּמַר: רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הוֹאִיל וּבִרְשׁוּתוֹ נִכְתָּבִין.

Rather, if this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the amounts of the marriage contract are written under his authority, as the marriage contract is drafted right before the marriage, at which point the girl was still under her father’s jurisdiction, he is therefore entitled to the money. This explains why the ruling is different if she reached majority before her marriage. In this case, the marriage contract was written when she was no longer under her father’s jurisdiction, and therefore her father is not entitled to the payment of her marriage contract.

וּמִיגְבָּא, מֵאֵימַת גָּבְיָא?

And now that it has been established that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the rights to a marriage contract are determined based upon the time of marriage and not the time of betrothal, despite the fact that its sum is fixed at that time, the Gemara asks: From when does the husband’s property become liened to ensure collection of his wife’s marriage contract? Does the monetary claim take effect at the time of betrothal, so that there is a lien on any property he owned at that time, or is there a lien only on property that the husband owned at the time of marriage?

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מָנֶה מָאתַיִם מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, וְתוֹסֶפֶת מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין. וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין.

Rav Huna said: With regard to the one hundred dinars for a non-virgin and the two hundred for a virgin, the basic sums of a marriage contract instituted by the Sages, she has a lien on her husband’s property from the time of the betrothal, as she acquired this amount when she was betrothed, but with regard to the addition, i.e., additional sums of money stipulated by the husband himself, the wife’s lien on his property takes effect only from the time of the marriage. And Rav Asi said: The lien for both this and that take effect only from the time of their marriage.

וּמִי אָמַר רַב הוּנָא הָכִי? וְהָאִתְּמַר: הוֹצִיאָה עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי כְּתוּבּוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל מָאתַיִם, וְאַחַת שֶׁל שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת. וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בָּאתָה לִגְבּוֹת מָאתַיִם — גּוֹבָה מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת — גּוֹבָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי.

The Gemara asks: And did Rav Huna actually say this, that a woman has a lien on her husband’s property from the time of betrothal with regard to payment of the one hundred or two hundred dinars that constitute the main sum of her marriage contract? But wasn’t it stated that amora’im discussed the case of a woman who produced against her husband, upon their divorce, two marriage contracts, written at different times, one of two hundred dinars and the other one of three hundred? And Rav Huna said: Since she can claim only one marriage contract, if she came to collect the first sum of two hundred dinars, she can collect that amount even from property her husband sold after the first point in time, when this marriage contract was written, and if she wishes to collect the one worth three hundred dinars, she can collect from property her husband sold after the second point in time.

וְאִם אִיתָא, תִּיגְבֵּי מָאתַיִם מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, וּמֵאָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי.

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rav Huna maintains that the lien for the basic sum and the addition can be ascribed to different dates, let her collect two hundred dinars from property sold after the first point in time, as she was already entitled to the basic sum of her marriage contract from that day, and she can collect the additional one hundred dinars from property sold after the second point in time.

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, תִּיגְבֵּי חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת כּוּלָּם? מָאתַיִם מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, תְּלָת מְאָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי!

The Gemara refutes this argument: And even according to your reasoning, let her collect the entire five hundred dinars, the sum of both marriage contracts. She should be able to collect two hundred from property sold after the first point in time and three hundred from property sold after the second stipulated time.

אֶלָּא חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת מַאי טַעְמָא לָא גָּבְיָא? כֵּיוָן דְּלָא כָּתַב לָהּ: ״צְבֵיתִי וְאוֹסֵיפִית לָךְ תְּלָת מְאָה אַמָּאתַיִם״. הָכִי קָאָמַר לַהּ: אִי מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן גָּבְיַאתְּ — גְּבַאי מָאתַיִם, אִי מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי גָּבְיַאתְּ — גְּבַאי תְּלָת מְאָה

Rather, what is the reason that she may not collect the entire sum of five hundred dinars? Since he did not write to her in the second marriage contract: I chose to add to the payment of your marriage contract, and therefore I am writing a contract for three hundred dinars in addition to the first two hundred dinars, it is apparent that this is what he meant to say to her by writing a second marriage contract: If you collect from property sold after the first point in time, you may collect two hundred dinars; if you collect from property sold after the second point in time, you may collect three hundred dinars.