Ketubot 53
חַזְיֵיהּ דְּלָא הֲוָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ — מִשּׁוּם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב יְהוּדָה: שִׁינָּנָא, לָא תִּיהְוֵי בְּעַבּוֹרֵי אַחְסָנְתָּא אֲפִילּוּ מִבְּרָא בִּישָׁא לִבְרָא טָבָא — דְּלָא יְדִיעָא מַאי זַרְעָא נָפֵיק מִינֵּיהּ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מִבְּרָא לִבְרַתָּא,
Rav Pappa saw that Yehuda bar Mareimar was not amenable to the idea of entering the house. He said to him: What is on your mind? Do you not wish to enter due to that which Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Shinnana, do not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance even from a bad son to a good son, as it is not known what seed will come from him? Perhaps the bad son will father worthy children. And all the more so, one should not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance from a son to a daughter.
הַאי נָמֵי תַּקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן הִיא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי: אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָנֵי מִילֵּי מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ. לְעַשּׂוֹיֵיהּ נָמֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַטּוּ מִי קָאָמֵינָא לָךְ דְּעוּל וְעַשְּׂיֵיהּ? עוּל וְלָא תְּעַשְּׂיֵיהּ קָאָמֵינָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַעֲלַאי דִּידִי הַיְינוּ עִשֻּׂיֵיהּ.
Rav Pappa continued: Are you worried that your arrival will pressure Abba of Sura to give his daughter a more substantial dowry? But this too is an ordinance of the Sages, that a father must provide a dowry for his daughter. This is as Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, as quoted above, that the Sages enacted this matter so that a man should take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: This applies only if the man gives of his own free will, but should one force him as well? Rav Pappa said to him: Did I say to you that you should enter and force him? I merely said that you should enter, but do not force him. He said to him: My very entrance is an act that will effectively force him, as he will increase her dowry in my honor.
אַכְפְּיֵיהּ וְעוֹל. אִישְׁתִּיק וִיתֵיב. סְבַר הָהוּא מִירְתָּח רָתַח. כַּתְבֵיהּ לְכֹל מַאי דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ. לְסוֹף אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי לָא מִישְׁתַּעֵי מָר? חַיֵּי דְּמָר, לָא שְׁבַיקִי מִידֵּי לְנַפְשַׁאי.
Eventually, Rav Pappa forced Yehuda bar Mareimar and he entered. He was silent, and sat without uttering a word. Abba of Sura thought that Yehuda bar Mareimar was angry with him for his failure to grant his daughter a suitable dowry. He therefore wrote down in the marriage contract all that he had as her dowry, to appease him. Ultimately, when he observed that Yehuda was still silent, Abba of Sura said to him: Even now the Master will not talk? By the Master’s life, I have left nothing for myself.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מִינַּאי דִּידִי — אֲפִילּוּ הַאי נָמֵי דִּכְתַבְתְּ לָא נִיחָא לִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אֶהְדַּר בִּי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁוּוֹיֵי נַפְשָׁךְ הַדְרָנָא — לָא קָאָמֵינָא.
Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: If you are acting for my sake, that which you wrote is also not amenable to me. Finally understanding his wishes, Abba of Sura said to Yehuda bar Mareimar: Now too, I will retract, as I acted in error. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: I did not speak so that you should turn yourself into the kind of person who retracts once he gives his word. You should uphold your agreement, but the agreement was not to my liking.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב יֵימַר סָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: מָכְרָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לְבַעְלָהּ, יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין אוֹ אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְתִבְּעֵי לָךְ מוֹחֶלֶת.
§ Rav Yeimar the Elder raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If a wife sold her marriage contract to her husband, i.e., she sold him the right not to have to pay her the marriage contract if they divorce or if she is widowed, does she have the marriage document concerning male children, or does she not have the marriage document concerning male children? Rava said to him: And you can raise the same dilemma with regard to a wife who forgoes her right to her marriage contract. Does she retain the marriage document concerning male children in this case?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא, מוֹכֶרֶת קָמִיבַּעְיָא לִי, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר זוּזֵי אַנְסוּהָ, דְּאָמֵינָא כְּמַאן דְּקָא מָחוּ לַהּ מְאָה עוּכְלֵי בְּעוּכְלָא, מוֹחֶלֶת מִיבַּעְיָא?!
Rav Yeimar said to him: Now, the halakha of one who sells her marriage contract is a dilemma for me. As, although there is room to say that the money forced her, and that I say that she is like one who is struck with a hundred strikes [ukelei] of a hammer [ukela], i.e., she needed liquid assets at the time and therefore she sold her marriage contract unwillingly, even so, I am still willing to entertain the possibility that she has sold the marriage document concerning male children. Then, with regard to one who forgoes her marriage contract, is it necessary to raise the dilemma?
אָמַר רָבָא, פְּשִׁיטָא לִי: מוֹכֶרֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לַאֲחֵרִים — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא — זוּזֵי אַנְסוּהָ. מוֹחֶלֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לְבַעְלָהּ — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, מַאי טַעְמָא — אַחוֹלֵי אַחֵילְתַּהּ.
Rava said: It is obvious to me that if a wife sells her marriage contract to others, not to her husband but to someone else who is willing to pay at the present time for the chance to collect the money stated in her marriage contract if she is later divorced or widowed, she still has the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? The money forced her to sell, and she did not mean to renounce all her rights. It is likewise clear to me that one who forgoes the right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not have the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? She has forgiven it all and has no intention of claiming anything from her husband.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: מוֹכֶרֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לְבַעְלָהּ, כְּמוֹכֶרֶת לַאֲחֵרִים דָּמֵי, אוֹ כְּמוֹחֶלֶת לְבַעְלָהּ דָּמֵי? בָּתַר דְּבַעְיַאּ הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: מוֹכֶרֶת כְּתוּבָּה לְבַעְלָהּ, כְּמוֹכֶרֶת לַאֲחֵרִים דָּמֵי.
However, Rava raised a dilemma about the following case: With regard to one who sells her marriage contract to her husband, is she considered like one who sells to others, i.e., she has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, or is she considered like one who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband, i.e., she has forfeited everything? After he raised the dilemma he subsequently resolved it: One who sells her marriage contract to her husband is considered like one who sells to others, as she is assumed to have done so due to financial constraints.
מֵתִיב רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: מֵתָה — אֵין יוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה וְאֵין יוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה יוֹרְשִׁין כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מַאי עֲבִידְתַּהּ?!
Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection: We learned in a mishna (Yevamot 87b) that if a woman’s husband went overseas, and after hearing the testimony of one witness that he was dead the woman married again, and then her first husband returned, both husbands must divorce her, and she does not receive payment of her marriage contract from either man. That mishna proceeds to state that if she died, neither the heirs of this one, the first husband, nor the heirs of that one, the second husband, inherit the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. And we discussed the following question: With regard to a marriage contract, what is its purpose? In other words, the mishna just said that she is not entitled to a marriage contract, so how can it even be suggested that the heirs might inherit it?
וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין. וְאַמַּאי? הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא יֵצֶר אַנְסַהּ!
And Rav Pappa said: This is referring to the marriage document concerning male children. Not only does she forfeit her marriage contract, but she also loses the right to the marriage document concerning male children, as her sons do not inherit from her at all. Rav Idi bar Avin explains his objection. But if, according to the above statement, a wife who sells her marriage contract has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, why does the mishna in Yevamot state that none of the woman’s heirs inherit the proceeds of her marriage contract? Here too, in that mishna, let us say that her desire to marry another man forced her to marry her second husband. Why should she forfeit the marriage document concerning male children?
הָתָם, קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקַנְסוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara answers: There it is a penalty with which the Sages penalized her. In other words, the reason is not that she automatically forfeits the marriage document concerning male children, along with the marriage contract itself. Rather, her loss of the marriage document concerning male children is one of several penalties the Sages imposed upon her for remarrying on the basis of the testimony of a single witness without conducting her own thorough investigation into her husband’s fate. Therefore, one cannot learn from that halakha with regard to the issue at hand.
יָתֵיב רָבִין בַּר חֲנִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מוֹחֶלֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לְבַעְלָהּ — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דְּקָאָמְרַתְּ לִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּא, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לָךְ: ״מֵשִׁיב רָעָה תַּחַת טוֹבָה לֹא תָמוּשׁ רָעָה מִבֵּיתוֹ״?!
Ravin bar Ḥanina sat before Rav Ḥisda, and he sat and said the following halakha in the name of Rabbi Elazar: One who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not receive her sustenance from him. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Had you not said this halakha to me in the name of a great man, I would have said to you that this is an injustice, in accordance with the verse “who rewards evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house” (Proverbs 17:13). After she relinquishes to her husband her right to her marriage contract, which was a favor to her husband, she loses her sustenance as well.
יָתֵיב רַב נַחְמָן וְעוּלָּא וַאֲבִימִי בַּר רַב פַּפֵּי, וְיָתֵיב רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי גַּבַּיְיהוּ. אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דִּשְׁכִיבָא אֲרוּסָתוֹ, אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: זִיל קְבַר, אוֹ הַב לָהּ כְּתוּבְּתַהּ. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב חִיָּיא, תְּנֵינָא: אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה — לֹא אוֹנֵן וְלֹא מִיטַּמֵּא לַהּ, וְכֵן הִיא — לֹא אוֹנֶנֶת וְלֹא מִיטַּמְּאָה לוֹ. מֵתָה — אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ, מֵת הוּא — גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
The Gemara relates: Rav Naḥman was sitting, and Ulla and Avimei bar Rav Pappi were sitting as well, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami was sitting with them, when a certain man came before them whose betrothed wife had died. They said to him: Go and bury her, or give her heirs the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. Rav Ḥiyya said to them, in surprise at their response: But we learned that with regard to one’s betrothed wife he neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest, and similarly, she neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for him. If she died he does not inherit from her, and if he died she collects payment of her marriage contract.
טַעְמָא דְּמֵת הוּא, הָא מֵתָה הִיא — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: שֶׁאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״לִכְשֶׁתִּנָּשְׂאִי לְאַחֵר תִּטְּלִי מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב לִיכִי״.
Rav Ḥiyya infers the following from this statement: The reason for this halakha is that he died, from which it may be inferred that if she died she does not have a marriage contract, nor any of the stipulations of a marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that her marriage contract is canceled upon her death? Rav Hoshaya said: The reason is that I do not read with regard to her the condition stated in the marriage contract: When you marry another he may take what is written for you, as she cannot marry another.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אֲרוּסָה שֶׁמֵּתָה — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי, זִילוּ אִמְרוּ לֵיהּ:
The Gemara relates another incident: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Reish Lakish said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a marriage contract. Abaye said to the scholars who recited this halakha in Ravin’s name: Go, and say to Ravin:
שְׁקִילָא טֵיבוּתָךְ שַׁדְיָא אַחִיזְרֵי, כְּבָר תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא לִשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ בְּבָבֶל.
Your good is taken and cast on thorns, i.e., we do not owe you a debt of gratitude for informing us of this statement, as Rav Hoshaya himself already interpreted and ruled this halakha of yours in Babylonia.
בְּנָן נוּקְבָן דְּיִהְוְיָין לִיכִי מִינַּאי וְכוּ׳. רַב תָּנֵי: ״עַד דְּתִלַּקְחָן לְגוּבְרִין״, וְלֵוִי תָּנֵי: ״עַד דְּתִבְגְּרָן״. לְרַב, אַף עַל גַּב דִּבְגַר?! וְלֵוִי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִינְּסִיב?!
§ The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract is the clause: Any female children you will have from me will be sustained from my property. The Gemara notes that Rav would teach that the daughters are entitled to sustenance until they are taken as wives by men, and Levi would teach that they are entitled to sustenance until they become grown women. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav, are daughters entitled to sustenance even though they have become grown women, if they are still unmarried? Yet how can this be correct? After all, adult daughters are no longer under their father’s jurisdiction even in his lifetime. And can Levi possibly maintain that even though they are married they still receive sustenance from their father’s estate until they become grown women?
אֶלָּא: בְּגַר וְלָא אִינְּסִיב, אִינְּסִיב וְלָא בְּגַר — דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בַּאֲרוּסָה וְלָא בְּגַר. וְכֵן תָּנֵי לֵוִי בְּמַתְנִיתֵיהּ: ״עַד דְּתִבְגְּרָן וְיִמְטֵי זִמְנֵיהוֹן דְּאִינַּסְבָן״. תַּרְתֵּי? אֶלָּא: אוֹ תִּבְגְּרָן אוֹ יִמְטֵי זִמְנֵיהוֹן לְאִיתְנַסְבָא.
Rather, in a case where they became grown women and were not married, or were married and had not become grown women, everyone agrees that they are not entitled to sustenance. When they disagree it is with regard to a daughter who was betrothed and had not become a grown woman. Levi maintains that as she is still unmarried she remains under her father’s jurisdiction. And Levi likewise taught the following version of this stipulation in his baraita: Until they become grown women and the time arrives for their marriage. The Gemara asks: Are these two conditions both necessary? She leaves her father’s domain when one of these conditions is fulfilled. Rather, Levi means that they can continue to receive sustenance either until they become grown women or their time arrives for marriage.
כְּתַנָּאֵי: עַד מָתַי הַבַּת נִזּוֹנֶית — עַד שֶׁתֵּאָרֵס, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמְרוּ: עַד שֶׁתִּבְגַּר. תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״עַד דִּיהֶוְויָין״. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֲוָיָה דְאֵירוּסִין, אוֹ הֲוָיָה דְנִישּׂוּאִין? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara observes: The dispute between Rav and Levi is like a dispute between tanna’im. As we have learned: Until when is a daughter sustained from her father’s property? Until she is betrothed. In the name of Rabbi Elazar they said: Until she becomes a grown woman. Rav Yosef taught the version: Until they become married. The meaning of the expression: Until they become married, is unclear, and therefore a dilemma was raised before the scholars: Does this refer to becoming betrothed or to becoming married? No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מִי שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, אֲרוּסָה יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשְׁמָע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, אֶלָּא מִסְּבָרָא לֵית לַהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאֵירְסַהּ, לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיתְּזִיל.
Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard anything from Rav Yehuda with regard to whether a betrothed orphan has sustenance from the brothers’ inheritance of their father’s estate, or whether she does not have sustenance? Rav Yosef said to him: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I can conclude that she does not have sustenance from the inheritance. The reason is that since her husband has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to request her sustenance from the inheritance, when he himself can provide for her.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם מִשְׁמָע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ, מִסְּבָרָא אִית לַהּ. כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוַּהּ, לָא שָׁדֵי זוּזֵי בִּכְדִי.
Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should have sustenance from the brothers. The reason is that since her husband is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשְׁמָע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, מִסְּבָרָא אִית לַהּ — כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוַּהּ, לָא שָׁדֵי זוּזֵי בִּכְדִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מִשְׁמָע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ, מִסְּבָרָא לֵית לַהּ. כֵּיוָן דְּאֵירְסַהּ, לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיתְּזִיל.
And some say a different version of this discussion. Rav Yosef said to Rav Ḥisda: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I would say that she does have sustenance from the brothers: Since he is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing. In response, Rav Ḥisda said to him: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should not have sustenance from the inheritance: Since he has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to ask the brothers for food, and he would rather provide for her himself.
סִימָן דְּגַבְרֵי: שַׁק זְרַף. מֵאֲנָה, וִיבָמָה, שְׁנִיָּה, אֲרוּסָה, וַאֲנֻסָה.
§ The Gemara states a mnemonic device for the men, i.e., the Sages, who appear in the following discussion: Shin, kuf, zayin, reish, peh. This refers to Rav Sheshet, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rava, and Rav Pappa. The dilemmas themselves are listed in the following mnemonic: She refused, and a yevama, a secondary forbidden relationship, a betrothed woman, and a woman who was raped.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְמָאֶנֶת, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?
The Gemara analyzes these cases one by one: The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who refused, i.e., a minor orphan girl who was married off by her brothers or mother and then refused her husband, thereby nullifying the marriage, does she have sustenance from her father’s inheritance or does she not have sustenance? Is she considered to have been married, and therefore her right to sustenance has lapsed, or does her refusal nullify the marriage to the extent that it is as though she were never married at all, and therefore she is still entitled to sustenance?
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: אַלְמָנָה בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, וּגְרוּשָׁה בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, וְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ — יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עוֹדָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ — יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אֵינָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.
Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in the following baraita: In the case of a widow in her father’s house, or a divorcée in her father’s house, or a widow awaiting her yavam in her father’s house, she has sustenance. Rabbi Yehuda says: If she is still in her father’s house she has sustenance; if she is not in her father’s house she does not have sustenance.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא?! אֶלָּא לָאו, מְמָאֶנֶת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר אִית לַהּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר לֵית לַהּ.
Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is to all appearances the same as that of the first tanna. What is their dispute? Rather, is it not the case that there is a practical difference between them concerning a girl who refused her husband, as the first tanna maintains that she has sustenance, as her marriage has been annulled and it is as though it never occurred, and Rabbi Yehuda maintains that she does not have sustenance, as she permanently forfeited this right when she left her father’s house in marriage.
בָּעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בַּת יְבָמָהּ, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?
Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a yevama, i.e., a woman who married her yavam in levirate marriage and gave birth to a daughter before he passed away, does she have sustenance from the property of the yavam, i.e., the girl’s father, or does she not have sustenance?
כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן, לֵית לַהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאִי לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן, תַּקִּינוּ לַהּ רַבָּנַן מִשֵּׁנִי, אִית לַהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Since the Master said that the payment of the marriage contract of a yevama is taken from the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam, her daughter should therefore not have rights to sustenance from the property of the yavam. Her sustenance is a stipulation of the marriage contract, which does not apply to the yavam. Or perhaps, since if she does not have enough to cover the amount of her marriage contract from the property of the first husband, the Sages enacted for her a marriage contract from the second one, i.e., the yavam. Therefore, her daughter should have sustenance from his property. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בַּת שְׁנִיָּה, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?
Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship, i.e., a girl born to a man and women forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, whose mother is penalized by being deprived of a marriage contract, does her daughter have sustenance or does she not have sustenance?
