This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi for the continued health and good outcome for Talia Nechama bat Chana.
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Jonathan Loring in honor of his wife, Leah Ackner and their children Zev and Meira. “From the first day I met my wife in Hebrew class at JTS to watching her show kindness when we volunteered together to help those in need and even when I had to wait 9 years for a first date, my wife has always been an inspiration to me and everyone she meets. Thank you for these 20 years and B’Ezrat Hashem to many more! I love you wifesy.”
This month’s learning is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Pesha Etel bat Sarah
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi for the continued health and good outcome for Talia Nechama bat Chana.
Ketubot 52
מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, שֶׁאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִנְתּוּ״. רָבָא אָמַר: כֹּל שֶׁאִיסּוּר שְׁבִיָּיה גּוֹרֵם לָהּ — חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, אִיסּוּר דָּבָר אַחֵר גּוֹרֵם לָהּ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.
In the case of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, who are entitled to a marriage contract despite the fact that the relationship is forbidden and they must get divorced, he is not obligated to redeem her, as I do not apply to her the clause: And I will restore you to me as a wife, as she is forbidden to him. Rava said: In any case where the prohibition of her captivity, i.e., the fact that she was taken captive, causes her to be forbidden to her husband, as in the case of a priest’s wife who was taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. However, if another prohibition causes her to be forbidden to her husband, e.g., the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, he is not obligated to redeem her.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִשְׁבֵּית — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: פּוֹדָהּ, וְנוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, in which case he must divorce her, and she is then taken captive, Rabbi Eliezer says: He redeems her and gives her the payment for her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, as he may not take her back as his wife, due to his vow.
אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת סוֹמְכוֹס: כְּשֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ, כְּשֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, אוֹ בְּנִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ?
Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him?
וְאָמַר לִי: לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי, וְנִרְאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית. דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ — אָתֵי לְאִיעָרוֹמֵי.
And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it would appear that Rabbi Yehoshua does not obligate the husband to redeem her in a situation where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive. As, if you say that the same halakha applies in a case where she was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him, the husband might come to engage in trickery. If he wants to release himself from the duty to ransom his wife after she is captured, he can simply vow that she may not derive benefit from him, in which case he would be obligated to pay her only the marriage contract.
מַאי לָאו: בְּמַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן קָמִיפַּלְגִי, וְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְרָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?
The Gemara now analyzes the suggested comparison between the opinions cited in this baraita and the dispute between Abaye and Rava. What, is it not the case that the tanna’im disagree about a priest who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, may not derive benefit from him? And Abaye spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer when he said that the husband must redeem his wife even if she is forbidden to him due to something other than the fact that she was taken captive, and Rava spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
לָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדְרָה אִיהִי, וְקַיֵּים לַהּ הוּא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר: הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; with what are we dealing here? With a case where she vowed not to derive benefit from him, and her husband upheld it for her by neglecting to nullify her vow when he heard it. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he causes the vow to be in effect, and therefore he must redeem her and return her to her native province. And Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she is responsible for the vow, because she is the one who initially pronounced it.
אִי הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ — כְּתוּבָּה מַאי עֲבִידְתַּהּ?
The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, what is the payment of the marriage contract doing here? Why must he pay her marriage contract if it is her fault that they cannot remain married?
וְתוּ, אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת סוֹמְכוֹס: כְּשֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ, כְּשֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, אוֹ בְּשֶׁנִּשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ? וְאָמַר: לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי.
And furthermore, it was stated above that Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him? And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it is reasonable to assume that the case is where he took the vow and she was subsequently taken captive, as otherwise there is a concern that the husband will engage in trickery.
וְאִי דִּנְדַרָה אִיהִי, מָה לִי הִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, מָה לִי נִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ?
But if this is referring to a case where she was the one who vowed not to derive benefit from him, what is the difference to me whether he upheld her vow and she was subsequently taken captive, and what is the difference to me whether she was taken captive and he subsequently upheld her vow? Either way there is no reason to be concerned that he might engage in trickery, since she was the one who took the vow.
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם דְּאַדְּרַהּ אִיהוּ. וְאַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ, וְרָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. מַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן נָמֵי, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. דְּהַיְינוּ אַלְמָנָה [לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל].
Rather, this is actually referring to a case where he was the one who initially vowed that she may not derive benefit from him. And Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning, and Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning. Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning as follows: With regard to a widow who is married to a High Priest, everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her. If she was a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her. In the case of a priest who takes a vow prohibiting his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, from deriving benefit from him, likewise everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her, as this is the same as the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, as he can fulfill the requirement to restore her to her native province.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָזֵיל בָּתַר מֵעִיקָּרָא, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָזֵיל בָּתַר בַּסּוֹף.
When they disagree it is in the case of an Israelite who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of an Israelite, may not derive benefit from him. Rabbi Eliezer follows the status of the woman at the outset, i.e., when the marriage contract was written. Since at that time he could restore her to be his wife, the obligation he took upon himself to redeem her from captivity remains in effect, despite the fact that he can no longer do so due to the vow. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows the status of the woman at the end, and holds that since, in practice, the husband cannot take her back as a wife because of the vow, he is no longer obligated to ransom her.
רָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמַדִּיר, בֵּין אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן וּבֵין אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל.
Similarly, Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning: In the case of a widow married to a High Priest, and a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her, as the prohibition against her remaining married to him results from a cause other than her captivity. When they disagree it is with regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, whether she is the wife of a priest or the wife of an Israelite.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָזֵיל בָּתַר מֵעִיקָּרָא, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָזֵיל בָּתַר בַּסּוֹף.
Rabbi Eliezer follows her status at the outset and holds that since he obligated himself to ransom her when he wrote the marriage contract he must act accordingly. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows her status at the end, and holds that since he cannot fulfill his obligation to restore her as his wife due to a factor other than her captivity, he is entirely exempt from redeeming her.
נִשְׁבֵּית חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נִשְׁבֵּית בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלָהּ. הִכִּיר בָּהּ בַּעֲלָהּ — יוֹרְשִׁין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ בַּעֲלָהּ — אֵין יוֹרְשִׁין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.
§ The mishna taught that if she was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a wife who was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and afterward her husband died before he could redeem her, if her husband was aware of her captivity, the heirs are obligated to redeem her, but if her husband was not aware of her captivity, his heirs are not obligated to redeem her.
לֵוִי סָבַר לְמִיעְבַּד עוֹבָדָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב, הָכִי אָמַר חַבִּיבִי: לֵית הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא, אֶלָּא כִּי הָא דְּתַנְיָא: נִשְׁבֵּית לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ — אֵין הַיְּתוֹמִין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ נִשְׁבֵּית בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלָהּ — אֵין הַיְּתוֹמִין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. שֶׁאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לְאִינְתּוּ״.
The Gemara relates: Levi thought to act in accordance with this baraita. Rav said to him: My uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya, said as follows: The halakha is not in accordance with this baraita. Rather, it is in accordance with that which is taught in a different baraita: If she was taken captive after the death of her husband, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her. And moreover, even if she was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and he heard about it, and afterward her husband died, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her, as I cannot apply to her the clause in the marriage contract: And I will restore you to me as a wife. Since this stipulation cannot be fulfilled, the obligation to redeem her does not apply.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נִשְׁבֵּית, וְהָיוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ, פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹנָה — פּוֹדָהּ. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ: רָצָה פּוֹדָהּ, רָצָה אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר:
§ The Sages taught: If she was taken captive and they were seeking ransom from her husband of up to ten times her value, i.e., far more than the usual ransom for a captive of this kind, on the first occasion she is taken captive he must redeem her. From this point forward, i.e., if she was taken captive a second time, if he wants to, he redeems her, but if he does not want to redeem her, he does not have to redeem her, as the Sages obligated him to redeem her only once. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:
אֵין פּוֹדִין אֶת הַשְּׁבוּיִין יוֹתֵר עַל כְּדֵי דְמֵיהֶם, מִפְּנֵי תִּקּוּן הָעוֹלָם. הָא בִּכְדֵי דְמֵיהֶן פּוֹדִין, אַף עַל גַּב דְּפִרְקוֹנָהּ יוֹתֵר עַל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
One does not redeem captives at more than their value. This policy is for the betterment of the world, because if captives are ransomed at exorbitant prices, this will encourage their captors to kidnap more people. The Gemara notes: This implies that if the captors seek a ransom in accordance with their actual value one does redeem captives, even though this includes a case where a woman’s redemption is more than her marriage contract.
וּרְמִינְהִי: נִשְׁבֵּית, וְהָיוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹנָה — פּוֹדָהּ. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ: רָצָה פּוֹדָהּ, רָצָה אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה פִּרְקוֹנָהּ כְּנֶגֶד כְּתוּבָּתָהּ — פּוֹדָהּ, אִם לָאו אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ!
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different baraita, which states: If she was taken captive and the captors were seeking from her husband a ransom of up to ten times the value of her marriage contract, on the first occasion he must redeem her. From this point forward, if he wants to he redeems her, but if he does not want to redeem her, he does not have to redeem her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the price of her ransom was equal to her marriage contract he redeems her. If not, i.e., the price of her ransom was greater than the sum of money guaranteed to her in her marriage contract upon divorce or the death of her husband, he does not have to redeem her. He can suffice with paying her marriage contract.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל תְּרֵי קוּלֵּי אִית לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is of the opinion that there are two leniencies with regard to the halakhot of redemption. First, he maintains that one does not pay more than the general ransom given for such a captive, and second, a husband does not have to pay more than the sum of his wife’s marriage contract.
לָקְתָה חַיָּיב לְרַפְּאוֹתָהּ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין וּצְרִיכָה רְפוּאָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כִּמְזוֹנוֹת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: רְפוּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה (נִתְרַפֵּאת) [תִּתְרַפֵּא] — מִכְּתוּבָּתָהּ, שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כִּמְזוֹנוֹת.
§ The mishna taught (51a) that if a woman was struck with illness, her husband is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a widow who is sustained from the property of the orphans and who requires medical treatment, her medical needs are like her sustenance, and the orphans must bear the costs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: With regard to treatment that has a fixed cost, she is healed from her marriage contract, i.e., the amount is subtracted from her marriage contract. If it is a treatment that does not have a fixed cost, it is considered like sustenance.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשׂוּ הַקָּזַת דָּם בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּרְפוּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה. קָרִיבֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֲוָה לְהוּ אִיתַּת אַבָּא דַּהֲוָת צְרִיכָה רְפוּאָה כֹּל יוֹמָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֵיזִילוּ קוּצוּ לֵיהּ מִידֵּי לְרוֹפֵא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages established that in Eretz Yisrael, bloodletting is considered like a treatment that does not have a fixed cost, and therefore the heirs must pay for that treatment. The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan had to take care of the wife of their father, who required treatment every day, and therefore her medical expenses were high. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan to ask him what to do. He said to them: Go and fix a lump sum with the doctor for his services. The treatment would then be considered as having a fixed cost, which is deducted from the marriage contract.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשִׂינוּ עַצְמֵינוּ כְּעוֹרְכֵי הַדַּיָּינִין. מֵעִיקָּרָא מַאי סְבַר, וּלְבַסּוֹף מַאי סְבַר? מֵעִיקָּרָא סְבַר: ״וּמִבְּשָׂרְךָ לֹא תִתְעַלָּם״, וּלְבַסּוֹף סְבַר: אָדָם חָשׁוּב שָׁאנֵי.
Later Rabbi Yoḥanan said in regret: We have made ourselves like legal advisors, who help people with their legal claims. The Gemara asks: At the outset, what did he hold and ultimately, what did he hold? The Gemara explains: At the outset he held that one should act in accordance with the verse “and that you do not hide yourself from your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7), which indicates that one must help his relatives. And ultimately he held that an important person is different. If a man of stature offers assistance to his family in a manner that causes a loss to another individual, it appears as though he were unfairly favoring his relatives.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״בְּנִין דִּכְרִין דְּיִהְווֹ לִיכִי מִינַּאי אִינּוּן יִרְתוּן כֶּסֶף כְּתוּבְּתִיךְ יָתֵר עַל חוּלָקְהוֹן דְּעִם אֲחוּהוֹן״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. ״בְּנָן נוּקְבָן דְּיִהְוֹין לִיכִי מִינַּאי יֶהֶוְיָן יָתְבָן בְּבֵיתִי וּמִיתַּזְנָן מִנִּכְסַי עַד דְּתִלַּקְחָן לְגוּבְרִין״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
MISHNA: If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. Likewise, if he omitted from the marriage contract the sentence: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.
״אַתְּ תְּהֵא יָתְבָא בְּבֵיתִי וּמִיתַּזְנָא מִנִּכְסַי כֹּל יְמֵי מֵיגַר אַלְמְנוּתִיךְ בְּבֵיתִי״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּךְ הָיוּ אַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם כּוֹתְבִין. אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין כְּאַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם. אַנְשֵׁי יְהוּדָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין: ״עַד שֶׁיִּרְצוּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁין לִיתֵּן לִךְ כְּתוּבְּתִיךְ״. לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצוּ יוֹרְשִׁין — נוֹתְנִין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וּפוֹטְרִין אוֹתָהּ.
Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live as a widow in my house, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court. The mishna comments: The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner, that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and the residents of the Galilee would write in this manner as well, like the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In contrast, the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her, and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי: מִפְּנֵי מָה הִתְקִינוּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין — כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקְפּוֹץ אָדָם וְיִכְתּוֹב לְבִתּוֹ כִּבְנוֹ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: For what reason did the Sages enact the marriage document concerning male children? It was enacted so that a man will be willing to take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. The marriage document concerning male children ensures that even if one’s daughter dies and her husband inherits her possessions, the dowry will eventually be inherited by her sons when her husband dies. Since the father of the bride knows that his grandchildren will inherit the dowry, he will give a larger dowry.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר בְּרָא לֵירוֹת בְּרַתָּא לָא תֵּירוֹת, וַאֲתוֹ רַבָּנַן וּמְתַקְּנִי דְּתֵירוֹת בְּרַתָּא?
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that justifies a situation where the Merciful One says that the son inherits and the daughter does not inherit, and yet the Sages came and enacted that the daughter should inherit? The practical effect of their decree is that daughters receive a significant portion of their father’s estate, just like sons.
הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״קְחוּ נָשִׁים וְהוֹלִידוּ בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת וּקְחוּ לִבְנֵיכֶם נָשִׁים וְאֶת בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם תְּנוּ לַאֲנָשִׁים״. בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּנִים — בִּידֵיהּ קָיְימִי. אֶלָּא בְּנָתֵיהּ, מִי קָיְימָן בִּידֵיהּ?
The Gemara answers: This also applies by Torah law, as it is written: “Take wives for yourselves and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands” (Jeremiah 29:6). This verse requires clarification. Granted, sons are in his hands, i.e., a father can select wives for them, but daughters, are they in his power that he can select husbands for them? It is not the manner of a woman or her family to court a man.
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּנַלְבְּשַׁהּ וְנִיכַסְּיַהּ וְנִיתֵּיב לַהּ מִידֵּי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּקָפְצִי עֲלַהּ וְאָתוּ נָסְבִי לַהּ. וְעַד כַּמָּה? אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: עַד לְעִישּׂוּר נִכְסֵי.
Rather, the verse teaches us this, that the father should dress her and cover her and give her something, i.e., property, so that men will take the initiative with her and come to marry her. When the verse instructs fathers to marry off their daughters, it means that they must make efforts to ensure this outcome, including bestowing a dowry. The Gemara asks: And up to how much must a father give his daughters? Abaye and Rava both say: Up to one-tenth of one’s property should be handed over to his daughter for her dowry.
וְאֵימָא: דְּאָב לֵירוֹת, דְּבַעַל לָא לֵירוֹת! אִם כֵּן, אָב נָמֵי מִימְּנַע וְלָא כָּתֵב.
The Gemara asks: But if this is the reason for the institution of the marriage document concerning male children, say that it is only the portion the bride’s father gave as a dowry that her sons should inherit, but the money the husband guarantees to pay his wife, they should not inherit. The Gemara answers: If so, the bride’s father will also refrain from writing a large dowry. If his daughter’s sons will not inherit the husband’s portion of the marriage contract, her father will be reluctant to give generously himself.
וְאֵימָא: הֵיכָא דִּכְתַב אָב — לִכְתּוֹב בַּעַל, הֵיכָא דְּלָא כְּתַב אָב — לָא לִכְתּוֹב בַּעַל! לָא פְּלוּג רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara continues to ask: But if the concern is that the father will not give, say that in a case where the father wrote a large dowry for his daughter, let the husband also write the stipulation in the marriage document concerning male children, and when the father did not write a large dowry, let the husband not write this stipulation. The Gemara replies: The Sages did not distinguish between these cases. Although the main purpose of their enactment was to encourage fathers to provide their daughters with generous dowries, the Sages applied their decree equally to all women, even when the father failed to do so.
בַּת בֵּין הַבָּנִים נָמֵי תֵּירוֹת? כְּנַחֲלָה שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara poses another question: If the aim is to ensure that the money of the marriage contract will remain with the woman’s descendants, in a case when one has a daughter from one woman among his sons from another woman, the daughter should likewise inherit her mother’s dowry. Why do only male children inherit their mother’s dowry? The Gemara responds: The Sages established this enactment as similar to the halakha of inheritance: Just as a regular inheritance belongs to sons and not daughters, the same applies to the marriage document concerning male children.
בַּת בֵּין הַבָּנוֹת תֵּירוֹת! לָא פְּלוּג רַבָּנַן. וְתִיגְבֵּי מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי? כִּכְתוּבָּה שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara continues to inquire: Why shouldn’t one at least say that a daughter among daughters should inherit? If he had a daughter from this wife, and his other children are also daughters, in which case all the daughters divide the inheritance, the daughters of each wife should receive the portion her maternal grandfather gave to her mother. The Gemara again answers: The Sages did not distinguish between these cases when establishing their decree. The Gemara further asks: And let the marriage document concerning male children be collected even from movable property, if that is all the father possesses. The Gemara replies: The Sages established this enactment as similar to a regular marriage contract, which can be collected only from land.
תִּטְרוֹף מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי! ״יִרְתוּן״ תְּנַן. וְאֵימָא אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיכָּא מוֹתַר דִּינָר! בְּמָקוֹם דְּקָא מִיעַקְרָא נַחֲלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara poses yet another question: Let it be collected even from liened property, i.e., property the father sold after he wrote the marriage contract. The Gemara answers that we learned in the mishna: Will inherit, and one’s heirs do not inherit property that he has sold. The Gemara asks: But if this is the reason for this enactment, say that it should apply even though there is no more than a dinar beyond the value of the marriage contract that the father left over in his estate. The Sages stated that if no property is left for the inheritance, all the sons share the inheritance equally, in accordance with Torah law. The Gemara answers: In a case where their decree would entirely uproot the halakha of inheritance by Torah law, the Sages did not enact the marriage document concerning male children.
רַב פָּפָּא אִיעֲסַק לֵיהּ לִבְרֵיהּ בֵּי אַבָּא סוּרָאָה. אָזֵיל לְמִיכְתַּב לַהּ כְּתוּבְּתַהּ. שְׁמַע יְהוּדָה בַּר מָרִימָר, נְפַק אֲתָא אִיתְחֲזִי לֵיהּ. כִּי מְטוֹ לְפִיתְחָא, הֲוָה קָא מִפְּטַר מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נֵיעוּל מָר בַּהֲדַאי!
The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa, having arranged for his son to marry into the family of Abba of Sura, went to supervise the writing of the bride’s marriage contract. Yehuda bar Mareimar heard that Rav Pappa was coming, and came out to present himself before him, in honor of his arrival. When they came to the entrance of Abba of Sura’s house, Yehuda bar Mareimar took his leave of him, as he did not wish to enter. Rav Pappa said to him: Let the Master enter inside with me.
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תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
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I am grateful for the structure of the Daf Yomi. When I am freer to learn to my heart’s content, I learn other passages in addition. But even in times of difficulty, I always know that I can rely on the structure and social support of Daf Yomi learners all over the world.
I am also grateful for this forum. It is very helpful to learn with a group of enthusiastic and committed women.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I’ve been wanting to do Daf Yomi for years, but always wanted to start at the beginning and not in the middle of things. When the opportunity came in 2020, I decided: “this is now the time!” I’ve been posting my journey daily on social media, tracking my progress (#DafYomi); now it’s fully integrated into my daily routines. I’ve also inspired my partner to join, too!
Teaneck, United States
It has been a pleasure keeping pace with this wonderful and scholarly group of women.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Ketubot 52
מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, שֶׁאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִנְתּוּ״. רָבָא אָמַר: כֹּל שֶׁאִיסּוּר שְׁבִיָּיה גּוֹרֵם לָהּ — חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, אִיסּוּר דָּבָר אַחֵר גּוֹרֵם לָהּ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.
In the case of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, who are entitled to a marriage contract despite the fact that the relationship is forbidden and they must get divorced, he is not obligated to redeem her, as I do not apply to her the clause: And I will restore you to me as a wife, as she is forbidden to him. Rava said: In any case where the prohibition of her captivity, i.e., the fact that she was taken captive, causes her to be forbidden to her husband, as in the case of a priest’s wife who was taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. However, if another prohibition causes her to be forbidden to her husband, e.g., the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, he is not obligated to redeem her.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְנִשְׁבֵּית — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: פּוֹדָהּ, וְנוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, in which case he must divorce her, and she is then taken captive, Rabbi Eliezer says: He redeems her and gives her the payment for her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, as he may not take her back as his wife, due to his vow.
אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת סוֹמְכוֹס: כְּשֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ, כְּשֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, אוֹ בְּנִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ?
Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him?
וְאָמַר לִי: לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי, וְנִרְאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית. דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ נִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ — אָתֵי לְאִיעָרוֹמֵי.
And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it would appear that Rabbi Yehoshua does not obligate the husband to redeem her in a situation where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive. As, if you say that the same halakha applies in a case where she was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him, the husband might come to engage in trickery. If he wants to release himself from the duty to ransom his wife after she is captured, he can simply vow that she may not derive benefit from him, in which case he would be obligated to pay her only the marriage contract.
מַאי לָאו: בְּמַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן קָמִיפַּלְגִי, וְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְרָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?
The Gemara now analyzes the suggested comparison between the opinions cited in this baraita and the dispute between Abaye and Rava. What, is it not the case that the tanna’im disagree about a priest who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, may not derive benefit from him? And Abaye spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer when he said that the husband must redeem his wife even if she is forbidden to him due to something other than the fact that she was taken captive, and Rava spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
לָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדְרָה אִיהִי, וְקַיֵּים לַהּ הוּא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר: הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; with what are we dealing here? With a case where she vowed not to derive benefit from him, and her husband upheld it for her by neglecting to nullify her vow when he heard it. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he causes the vow to be in effect, and therefore he must redeem her and return her to her native province. And Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she is responsible for the vow, because she is the one who initially pronounced it.
אִי הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ — כְּתוּבָּה מַאי עֲבִידְתַּהּ?
The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, what is the payment of the marriage contract doing here? Why must he pay her marriage contract if it is her fault that they cannot remain married?
וְתוּ, אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת סוֹמְכוֹס: כְּשֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְאֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ, כְּשֶׁהִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, אוֹ בְּשֶׁנִּשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ? וְאָמַר: לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי.
And furthermore, it was stated above that Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him? And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it is reasonable to assume that the case is where he took the vow and she was subsequently taken captive, as otherwise there is a concern that the husband will engage in trickery.
וְאִי דִּנְדַרָה אִיהִי, מָה לִי הִדִּירָהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִשְׁבֵּית, מָה לִי נִשְׁבֵּית וּלְבַסּוֹף הִדִּירָהּ?
But if this is referring to a case where she was the one who vowed not to derive benefit from him, what is the difference to me whether he upheld her vow and she was subsequently taken captive, and what is the difference to me whether she was taken captive and he subsequently upheld her vow? Either way there is no reason to be concerned that he might engage in trickery, since she was the one who took the vow.
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם דְּאַדְּרַהּ אִיהוּ. וְאַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ, וְרָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. מַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן נָמֵי, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. דְּהַיְינוּ אַלְמָנָה [לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל].
Rather, this is actually referring to a case where he was the one who initially vowed that she may not derive benefit from him. And Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning, and Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning. Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning as follows: With regard to a widow who is married to a High Priest, everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her. If she was a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her. In the case of a priest who takes a vow prohibiting his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, from deriving benefit from him, likewise everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her, as this is the same as the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, as he can fulfill the requirement to restore her to her native province.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמַדִּיר אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָזֵיל בָּתַר מֵעִיקָּרָא, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָזֵיל בָּתַר בַּסּוֹף.
When they disagree it is in the case of an Israelite who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of an Israelite, may not derive benefit from him. Rabbi Eliezer follows the status of the woman at the outset, i.e., when the marriage contract was written. Since at that time he could restore her to be his wife, the obligation he took upon himself to redeem her from captivity remains in effect, despite the fact that he can no longer do so due to the vow. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows the status of the woman at the end, and holds that since, in practice, the husband cannot take her back as a wife because of the vow, he is no longer obligated to ransom her.
רָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּמַדִּיר, בֵּין אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן וּבֵין אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל.
Similarly, Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning: In the case of a widow married to a High Priest, and a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her, as the prohibition against her remaining married to him results from a cause other than her captivity. When they disagree it is with regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, whether she is the wife of a priest or the wife of an Israelite.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָזֵיל בָּתַר מֵעִיקָּרָא, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָזֵיל בָּתַר בַּסּוֹף.
Rabbi Eliezer follows her status at the outset and holds that since he obligated himself to ransom her when he wrote the marriage contract he must act accordingly. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows her status at the end, and holds that since he cannot fulfill his obligation to restore her as his wife due to a factor other than her captivity, he is entirely exempt from redeeming her.
נִשְׁבֵּית חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נִשְׁבֵּית בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלָהּ. הִכִּיר בָּהּ בַּעֲלָהּ — יוֹרְשִׁין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. לֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ בַּעֲלָהּ — אֵין יוֹרְשִׁין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.
§ The mishna taught that if she was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a wife who was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and afterward her husband died before he could redeem her, if her husband was aware of her captivity, the heirs are obligated to redeem her, but if her husband was not aware of her captivity, his heirs are not obligated to redeem her.
לֵוִי סָבַר לְמִיעְבַּד עוֹבָדָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב, הָכִי אָמַר חַבִּיבִי: לֵית הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא, אֶלָּא כִּי הָא דְּתַנְיָא: נִשְׁבֵּית לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ — אֵין הַיְּתוֹמִין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ נִשְׁבֵּית בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלָהּ — אֵין הַיְּתוֹמִין חַיָּיבִין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. שֶׁאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לְאִינְתּוּ״.
The Gemara relates: Levi thought to act in accordance with this baraita. Rav said to him: My uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya, said as follows: The halakha is not in accordance with this baraita. Rather, it is in accordance with that which is taught in a different baraita: If she was taken captive after the death of her husband, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her. And moreover, even if she was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and he heard about it, and afterward her husband died, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her, as I cannot apply to her the clause in the marriage contract: And I will restore you to me as a wife. Since this stipulation cannot be fulfilled, the obligation to redeem her does not apply.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נִשְׁבֵּית, וְהָיוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ, פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹנָה — פּוֹדָהּ. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ: רָצָה פּוֹדָהּ, רָצָה אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר:
§ The Sages taught: If she was taken captive and they were seeking ransom from her husband of up to ten times her value, i.e., far more than the usual ransom for a captive of this kind, on the first occasion she is taken captive he must redeem her. From this point forward, i.e., if she was taken captive a second time, if he wants to, he redeems her, but if he does not want to redeem her, he does not have to redeem her, as the Sages obligated him to redeem her only once. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:
אֵין פּוֹדִין אֶת הַשְּׁבוּיִין יוֹתֵר עַל כְּדֵי דְמֵיהֶם, מִפְּנֵי תִּקּוּן הָעוֹלָם. הָא בִּכְדֵי דְמֵיהֶן פּוֹדִין, אַף עַל גַּב דְּפִרְקוֹנָהּ יוֹתֵר עַל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
One does not redeem captives at more than their value. This policy is for the betterment of the world, because if captives are ransomed at exorbitant prices, this will encourage their captors to kidnap more people. The Gemara notes: This implies that if the captors seek a ransom in accordance with their actual value one does redeem captives, even though this includes a case where a woman’s redemption is more than her marriage contract.
וּרְמִינְהִי: נִשְׁבֵּית, וְהָיוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹנָה — פּוֹדָהּ. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ: רָצָה פּוֹדָהּ, רָצָה אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה פִּרְקוֹנָהּ כְּנֶגֶד כְּתוּבָּתָהּ — פּוֹדָהּ, אִם לָאו אֵינוֹ פּוֹדָהּ!
And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different baraita, which states: If she was taken captive and the captors were seeking from her husband a ransom of up to ten times the value of her marriage contract, on the first occasion he must redeem her. From this point forward, if he wants to he redeems her, but if he does not want to redeem her, he does not have to redeem her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the price of her ransom was equal to her marriage contract he redeems her. If not, i.e., the price of her ransom was greater than the sum of money guaranteed to her in her marriage contract upon divorce or the death of her husband, he does not have to redeem her. He can suffice with paying her marriage contract.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל תְּרֵי קוּלֵּי אִית לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is of the opinion that there are two leniencies with regard to the halakhot of redemption. First, he maintains that one does not pay more than the general ransom given for such a captive, and second, a husband does not have to pay more than the sum of his wife’s marriage contract.
לָקְתָה חַיָּיב לְרַפְּאוֹתָהּ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין וּצְרִיכָה רְפוּאָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כִּמְזוֹנוֹת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: רְפוּאָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ קִצְבָה (נִתְרַפֵּאת) [תִּתְרַפֵּא] — מִכְּתוּבָּתָהּ, שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כִּמְזוֹנוֹת.
§ The mishna taught (51a) that if a woman was struck with illness, her husband is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a widow who is sustained from the property of the orphans and who requires medical treatment, her medical needs are like her sustenance, and the orphans must bear the costs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: With regard to treatment that has a fixed cost, she is healed from her marriage contract, i.e., the amount is subtracted from her marriage contract. If it is a treatment that does not have a fixed cost, it is considered like sustenance.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשׂוּ הַקָּזַת דָּם בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּרְפוּאָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קִצְבָה. קָרִיבֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֲוָה לְהוּ אִיתַּת אַבָּא דַּהֲוָת צְרִיכָה רְפוּאָה כֹּל יוֹמָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֵיזִילוּ קוּצוּ לֵיהּ מִידֵּי לְרוֹפֵא.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages established that in Eretz Yisrael, bloodletting is considered like a treatment that does not have a fixed cost, and therefore the heirs must pay for that treatment. The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan had to take care of the wife of their father, who required treatment every day, and therefore her medical expenses were high. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan to ask him what to do. He said to them: Go and fix a lump sum with the doctor for his services. The treatment would then be considered as having a fixed cost, which is deducted from the marriage contract.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשִׂינוּ עַצְמֵינוּ כְּעוֹרְכֵי הַדַּיָּינִין. מֵעִיקָּרָא מַאי סְבַר, וּלְבַסּוֹף מַאי סְבַר? מֵעִיקָּרָא סְבַר: ״וּמִבְּשָׂרְךָ לֹא תִתְעַלָּם״, וּלְבַסּוֹף סְבַר: אָדָם חָשׁוּב שָׁאנֵי.
Later Rabbi Yoḥanan said in regret: We have made ourselves like legal advisors, who help people with their legal claims. The Gemara asks: At the outset, what did he hold and ultimately, what did he hold? The Gemara explains: At the outset he held that one should act in accordance with the verse “and that you do not hide yourself from your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7), which indicates that one must help his relatives. And ultimately he held that an important person is different. If a man of stature offers assistance to his family in a manner that causes a loss to another individual, it appears as though he were unfairly favoring his relatives.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״בְּנִין דִּכְרִין דְּיִהְווֹ לִיכִי מִינַּאי אִינּוּן יִרְתוּן כֶּסֶף כְּתוּבְּתִיךְ יָתֵר עַל חוּלָקְהוֹן דְּעִם אֲחוּהוֹן״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. ״בְּנָן נוּקְבָן דְּיִהְוֹין לִיכִי מִינַּאי יֶהֶוְיָן יָתְבָן בְּבֵיתִי וּמִיתַּזְנָן מִנִּכְסַי עַד דְּתִלַּקְחָן לְגוּבְרִין״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
MISHNA: If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. Likewise, if he omitted from the marriage contract the sentence: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.
״אַתְּ תְּהֵא יָתְבָא בְּבֵיתִי וּמִיתַּזְנָא מִנִּכְסַי כֹּל יְמֵי מֵיגַר אַלְמְנוּתִיךְ בְּבֵיתִי״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּךְ הָיוּ אַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם כּוֹתְבִין. אַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין כְּאַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם. אַנְשֵׁי יְהוּדָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין: ״עַד שֶׁיִּרְצוּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁין לִיתֵּן לִךְ כְּתוּבְּתִיךְ״. לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצוּ יוֹרְשִׁין — נוֹתְנִין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וּפוֹטְרִין אוֹתָהּ.
Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live as a widow in my house, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court. The mishna comments: The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner, that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and the residents of the Galilee would write in this manner as well, like the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In contrast, the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her, and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי: מִפְּנֵי מָה הִתְקִינוּ כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין — כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקְפּוֹץ אָדָם וְיִכְתּוֹב לְבִתּוֹ כִּבְנוֹ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: For what reason did the Sages enact the marriage document concerning male children? It was enacted so that a man will be willing to take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. The marriage document concerning male children ensures that even if one’s daughter dies and her husband inherits her possessions, the dowry will eventually be inherited by her sons when her husband dies. Since the father of the bride knows that his grandchildren will inherit the dowry, he will give a larger dowry.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר בְּרָא לֵירוֹת בְּרַתָּא לָא תֵּירוֹת, וַאֲתוֹ רַבָּנַן וּמְתַקְּנִי דְּתֵירוֹת בְּרַתָּא?
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that justifies a situation where the Merciful One says that the son inherits and the daughter does not inherit, and yet the Sages came and enacted that the daughter should inherit? The practical effect of their decree is that daughters receive a significant portion of their father’s estate, just like sons.
הָא נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״קְחוּ נָשִׁים וְהוֹלִידוּ בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת וּקְחוּ לִבְנֵיכֶם נָשִׁים וְאֶת בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם תְּנוּ לַאֲנָשִׁים״. בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּנִים — בִּידֵיהּ קָיְימִי. אֶלָּא בְּנָתֵיהּ, מִי קָיְימָן בִּידֵיהּ?
The Gemara answers: This also applies by Torah law, as it is written: “Take wives for yourselves and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands” (Jeremiah 29:6). This verse requires clarification. Granted, sons are in his hands, i.e., a father can select wives for them, but daughters, are they in his power that he can select husbands for them? It is not the manner of a woman or her family to court a man.
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּנַלְבְּשַׁהּ וְנִיכַסְּיַהּ וְנִיתֵּיב לַהּ מִידֵּי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּקָפְצִי עֲלַהּ וְאָתוּ נָסְבִי לַהּ. וְעַד כַּמָּה? אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: עַד לְעִישּׂוּר נִכְסֵי.
Rather, the verse teaches us this, that the father should dress her and cover her and give her something, i.e., property, so that men will take the initiative with her and come to marry her. When the verse instructs fathers to marry off their daughters, it means that they must make efforts to ensure this outcome, including bestowing a dowry. The Gemara asks: And up to how much must a father give his daughters? Abaye and Rava both say: Up to one-tenth of one’s property should be handed over to his daughter for her dowry.
וְאֵימָא: דְּאָב לֵירוֹת, דְּבַעַל לָא לֵירוֹת! אִם כֵּן, אָב נָמֵי מִימְּנַע וְלָא כָּתֵב.
The Gemara asks: But if this is the reason for the institution of the marriage document concerning male children, say that it is only the portion the bride’s father gave as a dowry that her sons should inherit, but the money the husband guarantees to pay his wife, they should not inherit. The Gemara answers: If so, the bride’s father will also refrain from writing a large dowry. If his daughter’s sons will not inherit the husband’s portion of the marriage contract, her father will be reluctant to give generously himself.
וְאֵימָא: הֵיכָא דִּכְתַב אָב — לִכְתּוֹב בַּעַל, הֵיכָא דְּלָא כְּתַב אָב — לָא לִכְתּוֹב בַּעַל! לָא פְּלוּג רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara continues to ask: But if the concern is that the father will not give, say that in a case where the father wrote a large dowry for his daughter, let the husband also write the stipulation in the marriage document concerning male children, and when the father did not write a large dowry, let the husband not write this stipulation. The Gemara replies: The Sages did not distinguish between these cases. Although the main purpose of their enactment was to encourage fathers to provide their daughters with generous dowries, the Sages applied their decree equally to all women, even when the father failed to do so.
בַּת בֵּין הַבָּנִים נָמֵי תֵּירוֹת? כְּנַחֲלָה שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara poses another question: If the aim is to ensure that the money of the marriage contract will remain with the woman’s descendants, in a case when one has a daughter from one woman among his sons from another woman, the daughter should likewise inherit her mother’s dowry. Why do only male children inherit their mother’s dowry? The Gemara responds: The Sages established this enactment as similar to the halakha of inheritance: Just as a regular inheritance belongs to sons and not daughters, the same applies to the marriage document concerning male children.
בַּת בֵּין הַבָּנוֹת תֵּירוֹת! לָא פְּלוּג רַבָּנַן. וְתִיגְבֵּי מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי? כִּכְתוּבָּה שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara continues to inquire: Why shouldn’t one at least say that a daughter among daughters should inherit? If he had a daughter from this wife, and his other children are also daughters, in which case all the daughters divide the inheritance, the daughters of each wife should receive the portion her maternal grandfather gave to her mother. The Gemara again answers: The Sages did not distinguish between these cases when establishing their decree. The Gemara further asks: And let the marriage document concerning male children be collected even from movable property, if that is all the father possesses. The Gemara replies: The Sages established this enactment as similar to a regular marriage contract, which can be collected only from land.
תִּטְרוֹף מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי! ״יִרְתוּן״ תְּנַן. וְאֵימָא אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיכָּא מוֹתַר דִּינָר! בְּמָקוֹם דְּקָא מִיעַקְרָא נַחֲלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara poses yet another question: Let it be collected even from liened property, i.e., property the father sold after he wrote the marriage contract. The Gemara answers that we learned in the mishna: Will inherit, and one’s heirs do not inherit property that he has sold. The Gemara asks: But if this is the reason for this enactment, say that it should apply even though there is no more than a dinar beyond the value of the marriage contract that the father left over in his estate. The Sages stated that if no property is left for the inheritance, all the sons share the inheritance equally, in accordance with Torah law. The Gemara answers: In a case where their decree would entirely uproot the halakha of inheritance by Torah law, the Sages did not enact the marriage document concerning male children.
רַב פָּפָּא אִיעֲסַק לֵיהּ לִבְרֵיהּ בֵּי אַבָּא סוּרָאָה. אָזֵיל לְמִיכְתַּב לַהּ כְּתוּבְּתַהּ. שְׁמַע יְהוּדָה בַּר מָרִימָר, נְפַק אֲתָא אִיתְחֲזִי לֵיהּ. כִּי מְטוֹ לְפִיתְחָא, הֲוָה קָא מִפְּטַר מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נֵיעוּל מָר בַּהֲדַאי!
The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa, having arranged for his son to marry into the family of Abba of Sura, went to supervise the writing of the bride’s marriage contract. Yehuda bar Mareimar heard that Rav Pappa was coming, and came out to present himself before him, in honor of his arrival. When they came to the entrance of Abba of Sura’s house, Yehuda bar Mareimar took his leave of him, as he did not wish to enter. Rav Pappa said to him: Let the Master enter inside with me.
