Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
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Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla veBaruch on his 18th yahrzeit on ח׳ אלול. “We continue to be inspired by his dedication to daily learning, from the Daf and beyond, to its surrounding philosophical, historical and legal nuances. We miss him greatly and can only strive to emulate his wise, kind and elegant ways.”
Chullin 86
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ דְּלָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל, אֲבָל ״צֵא טְרוֹף״ אֵימָא שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא.
The Gemara responds: Rav Dimi is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and tear loose, since it is obvious that this is not considered slaughter at all and one is not required to cover the blood. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, I would say that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Rav Dimi teaches us in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba (85a), that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered an act of slaughter, and one is therefore not required to cover the blood of this bird.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״צֵא נְחוֹר״, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר ״צֵא טְרוֹף״? וְכִי תֵּימָא קָסָבַר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים!
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, what is the reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and render the bird a tereifa? And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis?
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא טְרוֹף״, דִּשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ – אֵימָא: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּנְחִירָתוֹ זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךְ״.
The Gemara responds: Ravin is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, since an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered slaughter and one would not be required to cover the blood of the bird. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, I would say that the slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law to render it permitted for consumption, and consequently, the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Ravin teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law, as he himself derives from the verse: “As I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21).
וּמִי נְפַל לֵיהּ יָאנִיבָא בְּכִיתָּנֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רָבִין בַּר אַבָּא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר שְׁבָא: מִשֶּׁעָלוּ בְּנֵי הַגּוֹלָה פָּסְקוּ הַזִּיקִין וְהַזְּוָעוֹת וְהָרוּחוֹת וְהָרְעָמִים, וְלֹא הֶחְמִיץ יֵינָם, וְלֹא לָקָה פִּשְׁתָּנָם, וְנָתְנוּ חֲכָמִים עֵינֵיהֶם בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא וּבָנָיו.
§ The Gemara questions the very occurrence of the incident involving Rabbi Ḥiyya: And could moths have infested his flax? But doesn’t Ravin bar Abba say, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Sheva says: From when the people of the Exile ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael there ceased to be meteors, earthquakes, storm winds, and thunder; and their wine did not sour, and their flax was not stricken with an infestation of moths; and the Sages placed their eyes, i.e., attributed these phenomena, to the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, who ascended from Babylonia? If so, how was Rabbi Ḥiyya’s flax affected?
כִּי מַהְנְיָא זְכוּתַיְיהוּ – אַעָלְמָא, אַדִּידְהוּ – לָא, כִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם בַּת קוֹל יוֹצֵאת וְאוֹמֶרֶת: כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ נִיזּוֹן בִּשְׁבִיל חֲנִינָא בְּנִי, וַחֲנִינָא בְּנִי דַּי לוֹ בְּקַב חָרוּבִין מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת לְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת.
The Gemara responds: When their merit is effective, it is effective for the rest of the world but not for themselves. And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Each and every day a Divine Voice emerges and says: The entire world is sustained in the merit of Ḥanina ben Dosa, My son, and yet for Ḥanina, My son, a kav of carobs, i.e., a very small amount of inferior food, is sufficient to sustain him from one Shabbat eve to the next Shabbat eve. Similarly, the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons was effective for others but not for themselves.
מַתְנִי׳ חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָם – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת. בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת.
MISHNA: In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.
וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַתִּיר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים, וּמוֹדִים שֶׁאִם שָׁחַט – שֶׁאֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבָּנַן, מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא דִּפְלִיגִי?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is different about the first clause of the mishna that discusses the covering of the blood, where they do not disagree with the statement that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an animal without supervision one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood, which indicates the Rabbis hold that such an act of slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter; and what is different about the latter clause of the mishna that discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, where they disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal without supervision one is prohibited to subsequently slaughter its offspring, indicating they hold that such an act of slaughter is in fact considered an act of slaughter?
רֵישָׁא, אִי אָמְרִינַן חַיָּיבִין לְכַסּוֹת, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן.
The Gemara responds: Actually, it is uncertain whether this slaughter is valid or not. With regard to the first clause, if we say one is obligated to cover the blood from an unsupervised slaughter, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter, and it is in fact forbidden to eat from their slaughter. Therefore, the Rabbis did not require the covering of the blood.
סֵיפָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן!
The Gemara challenges: If so, then with regard to the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the Rabbis say it is prohibited to slaughter the offspring of the mother after them, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter.
סֵיפָא, אָמְרִי: בִּשְׂרָא דְּלָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. רֵישָׁא נָמֵי, אָמְרִי: לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵירוֹ הוּא צָרִיךְ!
The Gemara rejects this: With regard to the latter clause, prohibiting the slaughter of the offspring will not cause people to conclude the unsupervised slaughter of the mother by disqualified people was valid. Rather, they will say: The reason the offspring is not slaughtered is because the owner does not need the meat. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the first clause as well, covering the blood will not lead one to conclude that the unsupervised slaughter was valid, as people will say: He is covering the blood because he needs to clean his courtyard of the blood. If so, let the Rabbis deem one obligated to cover the blood.
שָׁחַט בְּאַשְׁפָּה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara rejects this: But if a disqualified person slaughtered the animal in a garbage dump, what can be said to allow the covering of the blood? Obviously, people will not assume one covers the blood in order to clean a garbage dump. Similarly, if one comes to consult the court, what can be said? That is, if one sees from a distance that a disqualified person slaughtered an animal and the blood is uncovered, and he comes to consult the court with regard to the obligation to cover the blood, if the court tells him to cover the blood he might conclude that this is because the unsupervised slaughter was valid. Accordingly, since there are scenarios in which one might mistakenly conclude that the unsupervised slaughter of inept people is valid, the Rabbis concede that one is exempt from covering the blood of such an act of slaughter in all cases.
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, סֵיפָא נָמֵי, בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that the Rabbis are concerned for the aforementioned scenarios, then with regard to the latter clause as well, if one comes to consult the court with regard to the slaughter of the offspring, what can be said? That is, if one sees a disqualified person slaughter the mother, and he comes to ask the court whether he may slaughter the offspring on the same day, if the court prohibits him from slaughtering it he might conclude that this is because the slaughter of the mother was valid. Why, then, do the Rabbis prohibit one from slaughtering the offspring?
אֶלָּא, רַבָּנַן אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא פְּלִיגִי, וְנָטְרִי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר עַד דְּמַסֵּיק לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא, וַהֲדַר פְּלִיגִי עִילָּוֵיהּ.
The Gemara concludes: Rather, it must be that the Rabbis disagree concerning the entire matter, i.e., they disagree with regard to covering the blood as well, and hold that if a disqualified person slaughtered an animal while unsupervised, one must cover the blood; and the Rabbis waited for Rabbi Meir until he concluded his statement, and then they disagreed with him on both accounts.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן לְחוּמְרָא, אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara asks: If so, granted, the opinion of the Rabbis is understandable, as they consistently rule stringently. That is, although it is prohibited to consume the meat of an unsupervised slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the Rabbis require one to cover the blood and prohibit one to slaughter the offspring, due to concern that the person may have performed a valid slaughter. But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one is exempt from covering the blood and that one may slaughter the offspring on the same day, what is the reason he does not rule stringently due to uncertainty?
אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר עַל שְׁחִיטָתָן מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הוֹאִיל וְרוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מְקוּלְקָלִים.
Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable to receive lashes for eating from the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, due to violation of the prohibition against eating from an animal carcass. According to Rabbi Meir there is no uncertainty with regard to such slaughter, and it is not considered an act of slaughter at all. Consequently, one may become liable to receive lashes for its consumption. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ami says: Since the majority of actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and a minor are bungled, i.e., they are performed incompetently, it can be assumed that their slaughter was performed improperly as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פָּפָּא: מַאי אִירְיָא רוֹב? אֲפִילּוּ מִיעוּט נָמֵי, דְּהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר חָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא, סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה, וְאִתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא?
Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Why did Rabbi Ami specifically state that the reasoning of Rabbi Meir is based on the assumption that the majority of their actions are bungled? Even if only a minority of their actions are bungled and the majority are performed competently, Rabbi Meir would also maintain that the animal is considered a carcass, as Rabbi Meir is concerned for a minority when it can be combined with a presumptive status. If so, append the minority to the presumptive status of an animal prior to its slaughter, i.e., that it is prohibited for consumption, and the majority of competent acts of slaughter is thereby weakened.
דִּתְנַן: תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד הָעִיסָּה וּבָצֵק בְּיָדוֹ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁל תִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת,
The Gemara proves that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority: As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): In the case of a ritually impure child who is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure. This is because there is no proof the child touched it; he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle items. And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity since its impurity has not been definitively determined.
סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה וְאִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא.
One appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and consequently the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. Similarly, with regard to slaughter performed by inept people, why does Rabbi Ami state that the reason behind Rabbi Meir’s opinion is due to a majority? Let even a minority of bungled acts of slaughter join with the presumptive prohibited status of the animal to render this animal a carcass.
אִם אָמְרוּ סְפֵק טוּמְאָה לְטַהֵר, יֹאמְרוּ סְפֵק אִיסּוּר לְהַתִּיר?
The Gemara responds that the two cases are not comparable: If they said one may append the minority to the presumptive status with regard to a case of uncertain ritual impurity in order to render the dough pure, will they say that one may rely on a minority in the case of an uncertain prohibition in order to permit it? In other words, without the fact that a majority of the acts of slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are bungled, Rabbi Meir could neither deem one exempt from covering the blood nor allow one to slaughter the offspring immediately. Consequently, it is due only to the majority that Rabbi Meir deems one liable for violation of the prohibition against consuming an animal carcass when consuming meat from their slaughter.
הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְהוֹרָה רַבִּי כַּחֲכָמִים. הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּאַחֲרִיתָא?
§ With regard to the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara notes: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who held that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal, one may subsequently slaughter its offspring; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who held that it is prohibited to slaughter it. The Gemara asks: Which of these two rulings is the later, definitive ruling, and which ruling is the retracted one?
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא וְרַבִּי זֵירָא הֲווֹ קָיְימִי בְּשׁוּקָא דְּקֵיסָרִי, אַפִּתְחָא דְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. נְפַק רַבִּי אַמֵּי אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָאו אָמֵינָא לְכוּ בְּעִידָּן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא לָא תְּקִימוּ אַבָּרַאי, דִּילְמָא אִיכָּא אִינָשׁ דְּמִיצְטַרְכָא לֵיהּ שְׁמַעְתָּא וְאָתֵי לְאִיטְּרוֹדֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from an incident: Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea, at the entrance to the study hall. Rabbi Ami exited the study hall and found the two of them standing there. Rabbi Ami said to them: Have I not told you that at the time when the study hall is in session you should not stand outside, as perhaps there is a person inside the study hall who requires clarification of a halakha, and he will become bothered by it because you will not be inside to assist in offering the proper explanation?
רַבִּי זֵירָא עָל, רַבִּי אַבָּא לָא עָל. יָתְבִי וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ אַחְרִיתָא? אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: לָא שְׁבַקְתּוּן לִי דֶּאֱישַׁיְּילֵיהּ לְסָבָא, דִּילְמָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ מֵאֲבוּהּ, וַאֲבוּהּ מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא כֹּל תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין קָא מַהְדַּר תַּלְמוּדֵיהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
Rabbi Zeira entered the study hall, whereas Rabbi Abba did not enter. The students were sitting and raising a dilemma: Which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s two rulings is the later one? Rabbi Zeira said to them: You did not let me know that this is your dilemma while I was outside, which would have allowed me to ask the elder one, i.e., Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, since perhaps he heard the answer from his father, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. And perhaps his father heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba would review his studies in front of Rabbi Yoḥanan every thirty days.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּשָׁלַח רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לַגּוֹלָה: הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְהָא כְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי אוֹרִי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הָא דְּאַחֲרִיתָא? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Elazar sent a message to the Jews in exile, i.e., Babylonia: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Why did Rabbi Elazar disregard that ruling? The Gemara concludes: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from Rabbi Elazar’s message that this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, which is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, is the later one? The Gemara affirms: One may in fact conclude from here that this is so.
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף.
MISHNA: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חַיָּה – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע חַיָּה, בֵּין מְרוּבָּה וּבֵין מוּעֶטֶת; עוֹף – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע עוֹף, בֵּין מְרוּבֶּה וּבֵין מוּעָט; מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). “Undomesticated animal” is inclusive, i.e., any number of animals is included in the term undomesticated animal, whether many or few. Likewise, “bird” is inclusive, i.e., any amount is included in the term bird, whether many or few. From here the Rabbis stated: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״חַיָּה אוֹ עוֹף״.
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird, as it is stated: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). The term “or” indicates that each type must be attended to separately.
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״, מַאי קָא מְהַדְּרִי לֵיהּ? הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק.
The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the next verse states: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof.” The Gemara asks: What are the Rabbis responding to Rabbi Yehuda with this statement? The Gemara explains: This is what the Rabbis are saying to him: This term “or” that interposes between an undomesticated animal and a bird is needed to separate them, in order to indicate that the obligation to cover the blood applies after slaughtering either an undomesticated animal or a bird. If not for the term “or” one might have thought the obligation to cover the blood takes effect only after slaughtering both an undomesticated animal and a bird. Accordingly, one cannot derive from this term that the blood of an undomesticated animal and a bird must be covered separately.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לְחַלֵּק – מִ״דָּמוֹ״ נָפְקָא, וְרַבָּנַן: ״דָּמוֹ״ טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״.
And Rabbi Yehuda responds to this: The source for separating the obligations with regard to an undomesticated animal and a bird is derived from the verse: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13). The verse makes reference to the blood of only one animal, indicating that the obligation applies after slaughtering either a bird or an undomesticated animal. And the Rabbis respond that “its blood” also indicates many, as the term: Blood, can refer to any amount of blood. This is demonstrated by that which is written: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof” (Leviticus 17:14).
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְעִנְיַן בְּרָכָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְבָרֵךְ אֶלָּא בְּרָכָה אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִתַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב?
§ Rabbi Ḥanina says: Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that one first covers the blood of an undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to the matter of the blessing over their slaughter, i.e., that one recites only one blessing. The Gemara questions this assertion: Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from the incident that occurred with the students of Rav?
דְּרַב בְּרוֹנָא וְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל תַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב הֲווֹ יָתְבִי בִּסְעוֹדְתָּא, קָאֵי עֲלַיְיהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ. הֲדוּר אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִישְׁתֵּי. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא: הָכִי אָמַר רַב, כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר ״הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ״ אִיתְּסַר לֵיהּ לְמִשְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא. הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיטַּפַּל לֵיהּ לְכִסּוּי אִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ לִבְרָכָה.
As it occurred that Rav Beruna and Rav Ḥananel, the students of Rav, were sitting together at a meal, and Rav Yeiva the Elder stood over them to serve them. They said to him: Give us a cup of wine over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals. They then changed their mind and said to him: Give us a cup of wine to drink. Rav Yeiva the Elder said to them that this is what Rav said: Once someone at a meal says: Give me a cup over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals, it is prohibited for him to drink any more wine, since he has expressed his desire to conclude his meal. If he now wishes to drink more wine, he must recite a blessing before drinking it. Ravina asks: Here too, since he is required to cover the blood of the undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, there is an interruption between the acts of slaughter, and he has therefore become obligated to recite a new blessing before slaughtering the bird.
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תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
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Chullin 86
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ דְּלָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל, אֲבָל ״צֵא טְרוֹף״ אֵימָא שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא.
The Gemara responds: Rav Dimi is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and tear loose, since it is obvious that this is not considered slaughter at all and one is not required to cover the blood. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, I would say that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Rav Dimi teaches us in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba (85a), that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered an act of slaughter, and one is therefore not required to cover the blood of this bird.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״צֵא נְחוֹר״, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר ״צֵא טְרוֹף״? וְכִי תֵּימָא קָסָבַר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים!
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, what is the reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and render the bird a tereifa? And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis?
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא טְרוֹף״, דִּשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ – אֵימָא: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּנְחִירָתוֹ זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךְ״.
The Gemara responds: Ravin is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, since an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered slaughter and one would not be required to cover the blood of the bird. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, I would say that the slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law to render it permitted for consumption, and consequently, the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Ravin teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law, as he himself derives from the verse: “As I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21).
וּמִי נְפַל לֵיהּ יָאנִיבָא בְּכִיתָּנֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רָבִין בַּר אַבָּא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר שְׁבָא: מִשֶּׁעָלוּ בְּנֵי הַגּוֹלָה פָּסְקוּ הַזִּיקִין וְהַזְּוָעוֹת וְהָרוּחוֹת וְהָרְעָמִים, וְלֹא הֶחְמִיץ יֵינָם, וְלֹא לָקָה פִּשְׁתָּנָם, וְנָתְנוּ חֲכָמִים עֵינֵיהֶם בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא וּבָנָיו.
§ The Gemara questions the very occurrence of the incident involving Rabbi Ḥiyya: And could moths have infested his flax? But doesn’t Ravin bar Abba say, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Sheva says: From when the people of the Exile ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael there ceased to be meteors, earthquakes, storm winds, and thunder; and their wine did not sour, and their flax was not stricken with an infestation of moths; and the Sages placed their eyes, i.e., attributed these phenomena, to the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, who ascended from Babylonia? If so, how was Rabbi Ḥiyya’s flax affected?
כִּי מַהְנְיָא זְכוּתַיְיהוּ – אַעָלְמָא, אַדִּידְהוּ – לָא, כִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם בַּת קוֹל יוֹצֵאת וְאוֹמֶרֶת: כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ נִיזּוֹן בִּשְׁבִיל חֲנִינָא בְּנִי, וַחֲנִינָא בְּנִי דַּי לוֹ בְּקַב חָרוּבִין מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת לְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת.
The Gemara responds: When their merit is effective, it is effective for the rest of the world but not for themselves. And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Each and every day a Divine Voice emerges and says: The entire world is sustained in the merit of Ḥanina ben Dosa, My son, and yet for Ḥanina, My son, a kav of carobs, i.e., a very small amount of inferior food, is sufficient to sustain him from one Shabbat eve to the next Shabbat eve. Similarly, the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons was effective for others but not for themselves.
מַתְנִי׳ חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָם – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת. בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת.
MISHNA: In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.
וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַתִּיר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים, וּמוֹדִים שֶׁאִם שָׁחַט – שֶׁאֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבָּנַן, מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא דִּפְלִיגִי?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is different about the first clause of the mishna that discusses the covering of the blood, where they do not disagree with the statement that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an animal without supervision one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood, which indicates the Rabbis hold that such an act of slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter; and what is different about the latter clause of the mishna that discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, where they disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal without supervision one is prohibited to subsequently slaughter its offspring, indicating they hold that such an act of slaughter is in fact considered an act of slaughter?
רֵישָׁא, אִי אָמְרִינַן חַיָּיבִין לְכַסּוֹת, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן.
The Gemara responds: Actually, it is uncertain whether this slaughter is valid or not. With regard to the first clause, if we say one is obligated to cover the blood from an unsupervised slaughter, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter, and it is in fact forbidden to eat from their slaughter. Therefore, the Rabbis did not require the covering of the blood.
סֵיפָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן!
The Gemara challenges: If so, then with regard to the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the Rabbis say it is prohibited to slaughter the offspring of the mother after them, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter.
סֵיפָא, אָמְרִי: בִּשְׂרָא דְּלָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. רֵישָׁא נָמֵי, אָמְרִי: לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵירוֹ הוּא צָרִיךְ!
The Gemara rejects this: With regard to the latter clause, prohibiting the slaughter of the offspring will not cause people to conclude the unsupervised slaughter of the mother by disqualified people was valid. Rather, they will say: The reason the offspring is not slaughtered is because the owner does not need the meat. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the first clause as well, covering the blood will not lead one to conclude that the unsupervised slaughter was valid, as people will say: He is covering the blood because he needs to clean his courtyard of the blood. If so, let the Rabbis deem one obligated to cover the blood.
שָׁחַט בְּאַשְׁפָּה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara rejects this: But if a disqualified person slaughtered the animal in a garbage dump, what can be said to allow the covering of the blood? Obviously, people will not assume one covers the blood in order to clean a garbage dump. Similarly, if one comes to consult the court, what can be said? That is, if one sees from a distance that a disqualified person slaughtered an animal and the blood is uncovered, and he comes to consult the court with regard to the obligation to cover the blood, if the court tells him to cover the blood he might conclude that this is because the unsupervised slaughter was valid. Accordingly, since there are scenarios in which one might mistakenly conclude that the unsupervised slaughter of inept people is valid, the Rabbis concede that one is exempt from covering the blood of such an act of slaughter in all cases.
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, סֵיפָא נָמֵי, בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that the Rabbis are concerned for the aforementioned scenarios, then with regard to the latter clause as well, if one comes to consult the court with regard to the slaughter of the offspring, what can be said? That is, if one sees a disqualified person slaughter the mother, and he comes to ask the court whether he may slaughter the offspring on the same day, if the court prohibits him from slaughtering it he might conclude that this is because the slaughter of the mother was valid. Why, then, do the Rabbis prohibit one from slaughtering the offspring?
אֶלָּא, רַבָּנַן אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא פְּלִיגִי, וְנָטְרִי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר עַד דְּמַסֵּיק לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא, וַהֲדַר פְּלִיגִי עִילָּוֵיהּ.
The Gemara concludes: Rather, it must be that the Rabbis disagree concerning the entire matter, i.e., they disagree with regard to covering the blood as well, and hold that if a disqualified person slaughtered an animal while unsupervised, one must cover the blood; and the Rabbis waited for Rabbi Meir until he concluded his statement, and then they disagreed with him on both accounts.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן לְחוּמְרָא, אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – מַאי טַעְמָא?
The Gemara asks: If so, granted, the opinion of the Rabbis is understandable, as they consistently rule stringently. That is, although it is prohibited to consume the meat of an unsupervised slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the Rabbis require one to cover the blood and prohibit one to slaughter the offspring, due to concern that the person may have performed a valid slaughter. But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one is exempt from covering the blood and that one may slaughter the offspring on the same day, what is the reason he does not rule stringently due to uncertainty?
אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר עַל שְׁחִיטָתָן מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הוֹאִיל וְרוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מְקוּלְקָלִים.
Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable to receive lashes for eating from the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, due to violation of the prohibition against eating from an animal carcass. According to Rabbi Meir there is no uncertainty with regard to such slaughter, and it is not considered an act of slaughter at all. Consequently, one may become liable to receive lashes for its consumption. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ami says: Since the majority of actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and a minor are bungled, i.e., they are performed incompetently, it can be assumed that their slaughter was performed improperly as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פָּפָּא: מַאי אִירְיָא רוֹב? אֲפִילּוּ מִיעוּט נָמֵי, דְּהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר חָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא, סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה, וְאִתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא?
Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Why did Rabbi Ami specifically state that the reasoning of Rabbi Meir is based on the assumption that the majority of their actions are bungled? Even if only a minority of their actions are bungled and the majority are performed competently, Rabbi Meir would also maintain that the animal is considered a carcass, as Rabbi Meir is concerned for a minority when it can be combined with a presumptive status. If so, append the minority to the presumptive status of an animal prior to its slaughter, i.e., that it is prohibited for consumption, and the majority of competent acts of slaughter is thereby weakened.
דִּתְנַן: תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד הָעִיסָּה וּבָצֵק בְּיָדוֹ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁל תִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת,
The Gemara proves that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority: As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): In the case of a ritually impure child who is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure. This is because there is no proof the child touched it; he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle items. And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity since its impurity has not been definitively determined.
סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה וְאִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא.
One appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and consequently the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. Similarly, with regard to slaughter performed by inept people, why does Rabbi Ami state that the reason behind Rabbi Meir’s opinion is due to a majority? Let even a minority of bungled acts of slaughter join with the presumptive prohibited status of the animal to render this animal a carcass.
אִם אָמְרוּ סְפֵק טוּמְאָה לְטַהֵר, יֹאמְרוּ סְפֵק אִיסּוּר לְהַתִּיר?
The Gemara responds that the two cases are not comparable: If they said one may append the minority to the presumptive status with regard to a case of uncertain ritual impurity in order to render the dough pure, will they say that one may rely on a minority in the case of an uncertain prohibition in order to permit it? In other words, without the fact that a majority of the acts of slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are bungled, Rabbi Meir could neither deem one exempt from covering the blood nor allow one to slaughter the offspring immediately. Consequently, it is due only to the majority that Rabbi Meir deems one liable for violation of the prohibition against consuming an animal carcass when consuming meat from their slaughter.
הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְהוֹרָה רַבִּי כַּחֲכָמִים. הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּאַחֲרִיתָא?
§ With regard to the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara notes: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who held that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal, one may subsequently slaughter its offspring; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who held that it is prohibited to slaughter it. The Gemara asks: Which of these two rulings is the later, definitive ruling, and which ruling is the retracted one?
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא וְרַבִּי זֵירָא הֲווֹ קָיְימִי בְּשׁוּקָא דְּקֵיסָרִי, אַפִּתְחָא דְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. נְפַק רַבִּי אַמֵּי אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָאו אָמֵינָא לְכוּ בְּעִידָּן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא לָא תְּקִימוּ אַבָּרַאי, דִּילְמָא אִיכָּא אִינָשׁ דְּמִיצְטַרְכָא לֵיהּ שְׁמַעְתָּא וְאָתֵי לְאִיטְּרוֹדֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from an incident: Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea, at the entrance to the study hall. Rabbi Ami exited the study hall and found the two of them standing there. Rabbi Ami said to them: Have I not told you that at the time when the study hall is in session you should not stand outside, as perhaps there is a person inside the study hall who requires clarification of a halakha, and he will become bothered by it because you will not be inside to assist in offering the proper explanation?
רַבִּי זֵירָא עָל, רַבִּי אַבָּא לָא עָל. יָתְבִי וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ אַחְרִיתָא? אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: לָא שְׁבַקְתּוּן לִי דֶּאֱישַׁיְּילֵיהּ לְסָבָא, דִּילְמָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ מֵאֲבוּהּ, וַאֲבוּהּ מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא כֹּל תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין קָא מַהְדַּר תַּלְמוּדֵיהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
Rabbi Zeira entered the study hall, whereas Rabbi Abba did not enter. The students were sitting and raising a dilemma: Which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s two rulings is the later one? Rabbi Zeira said to them: You did not let me know that this is your dilemma while I was outside, which would have allowed me to ask the elder one, i.e., Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, since perhaps he heard the answer from his father, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. And perhaps his father heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba would review his studies in front of Rabbi Yoḥanan every thirty days.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּשָׁלַח רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לַגּוֹלָה: הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְהָא כְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי אוֹרִי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הָא דְּאַחֲרִיתָא? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Elazar sent a message to the Jews in exile, i.e., Babylonia: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Why did Rabbi Elazar disregard that ruling? The Gemara concludes: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from Rabbi Elazar’s message that this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, which is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, is the later one? The Gemara affirms: One may in fact conclude from here that this is so.
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף.
MISHNA: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חַיָּה – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע חַיָּה, בֵּין מְרוּבָּה וּבֵין מוּעֶטֶת; עוֹף – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע עוֹף, בֵּין מְרוּבֶּה וּבֵין מוּעָט; מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). “Undomesticated animal” is inclusive, i.e., any number of animals is included in the term undomesticated animal, whether many or few. Likewise, “bird” is inclusive, i.e., any amount is included in the term bird, whether many or few. From here the Rabbis stated: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״חַיָּה אוֹ עוֹף״.
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird, as it is stated: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). The term “or” indicates that each type must be attended to separately.
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״, מַאי קָא מְהַדְּרִי לֵיהּ? הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק.
The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the next verse states: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof.” The Gemara asks: What are the Rabbis responding to Rabbi Yehuda with this statement? The Gemara explains: This is what the Rabbis are saying to him: This term “or” that interposes between an undomesticated animal and a bird is needed to separate them, in order to indicate that the obligation to cover the blood applies after slaughtering either an undomesticated animal or a bird. If not for the term “or” one might have thought the obligation to cover the blood takes effect only after slaughtering both an undomesticated animal and a bird. Accordingly, one cannot derive from this term that the blood of an undomesticated animal and a bird must be covered separately.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לְחַלֵּק – מִ״דָּמוֹ״ נָפְקָא, וְרַבָּנַן: ״דָּמוֹ״ טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״.
And Rabbi Yehuda responds to this: The source for separating the obligations with regard to an undomesticated animal and a bird is derived from the verse: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13). The verse makes reference to the blood of only one animal, indicating that the obligation applies after slaughtering either a bird or an undomesticated animal. And the Rabbis respond that “its blood” also indicates many, as the term: Blood, can refer to any amount of blood. This is demonstrated by that which is written: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof” (Leviticus 17:14).
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְעִנְיַן בְּרָכָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְבָרֵךְ אֶלָּא בְּרָכָה אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִתַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב?
§ Rabbi Ḥanina says: Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that one first covers the blood of an undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to the matter of the blessing over their slaughter, i.e., that one recites only one blessing. The Gemara questions this assertion: Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from the incident that occurred with the students of Rav?
דְּרַב בְּרוֹנָא וְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל תַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב הֲווֹ יָתְבִי בִּסְעוֹדְתָּא, קָאֵי עֲלַיְיהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ. הֲדוּר אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִישְׁתֵּי. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא: הָכִי אָמַר רַב, כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר ״הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ״ אִיתְּסַר לֵיהּ לְמִשְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא. הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיטַּפַּל לֵיהּ לְכִסּוּי אִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ לִבְרָכָה.
As it occurred that Rav Beruna and Rav Ḥananel, the students of Rav, were sitting together at a meal, and Rav Yeiva the Elder stood over them to serve them. They said to him: Give us a cup of wine over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals. They then changed their mind and said to him: Give us a cup of wine to drink. Rav Yeiva the Elder said to them that this is what Rav said: Once someone at a meal says: Give me a cup over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals, it is prohibited for him to drink any more wine, since he has expressed his desire to conclude his meal. If he now wishes to drink more wine, he must recite a blessing before drinking it. Ravina asks: Here too, since he is required to cover the blood of the undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, there is an interruption between the acts of slaughter, and he has therefore become obligated to recite a new blessing before slaughtering the bird.
