Chullin 86

לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא צא נחור דלאו שחיטה היא כלל אבל צא טרוף אימא שחיטה שאינה ראויה שמה שחיטה וליבעי כסוי קא משמע לן כדרבי חייא בר אבא

The Gemara responds: Rav Dimi is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and tear loose, since it is obvious that this is not considered slaughter at all and one is not required to cover the blood. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, I would say that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Rav Dimi teaches us in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba (85a), that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered an act of slaughter, and one is therefore not required to cover the blood of this bird.

ולמאן דאמר צא נחור מאי טעמא לא אמר צא טרוף וכי תימא קסבר שחיטה שאינה ראויה שמה שחיטה והא אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן ראה רבי דבריו של רבי שמעון בכסוי הדם ושנאו בלשון חכמים

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, what is the reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and render the bird a tereifa? And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis?

לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא צא טרוף דשחיטה שאינה ראויה לא שמה שחיטה אבל צא נחור אימא אין שחיטה לעוף מן התורה ונחירתו זו היא שחיטתו וליבעי כסוי קא משמע לן כאשר צויתך

The Gemara responds: Ravin is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, since an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered slaughter and one would not be required to cover the blood of the bird. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, I would say that the slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law to render it permitted for consumption, and consequently, the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Ravin teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law, as he himself derives from the verse: “As I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21).

ומי נפל ליה יאניבא בכיתניה והאמר רבין בר אבא ואמרי לה אמר רבי אבין בר שבא משעלו בני הגולה פסקו הזיקין והזועות והרוחות והרעמים ולא החמיץ יינם ולא לקה פשתנם ונתנו חכמים עיניהם ברבי חייא ובניו

§ The Gemara questions the very occurrence of the incident involving Rabbi Ḥiyya: And could moths have infested his flax? But doesn’t Ravin bar Abba say, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Sheva says: From when the people of the Exile ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael there ceased to be meteors, earthquakes, storm winds, and thunder; and their wine did not sour, and their flax was not stricken with an infestation of moths; and the Sages placed their eyes, i.e., attributed these phenomena, to the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, who ascended from Babylonia? If so, how was Rabbi Ḥiyya’s flax affected?

כי מהניא זכותייהו אעלמא אדידהו לא כדרב יהודה אמר רב דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב בכל יום ויום בת קול יוצאת ואומרת כל העולם כולו ניזון בשביל חנינא בני וחנינא בני די לו בקב חרובין מערב שבת לערב שבת

The Gemara responds: When their merit is effective, it is effective for the rest of the world but not for themselves. And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Each and every day a Divine Voice emerges and says: The entire world is sustained in the merit of Ḥanina ben Dosa, My son, and yet for Ḥanina, My son, a kav of carobs, i.e., a very small amount of inferior food, is sufficient to sustain him from one Shabbat eve to the next Shabbat eve. Similarly, the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons was effective for others but not for themselves.

מתני׳ חרש שוטה וקטן ששחטו ואחרים רואין אותם חייב לכסות בינן לבין עצמן פטור מלכסות

MISHNA: In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.

וכן לענין אותו ואת בנו ששחטו ואחרים רואין אותן אסור לשחוט אחריהם בינן לבין עצמן רבי מאיר מתיר לשחוט אחריהן וחכמים אוסרים ומודים שאם שחט שאינו סופג את הארבעים

And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.

גמ׳ ורבנן מאי שנא רישא דלא פליגי ומאי שנא סיפא דפליגי

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is different about the first clause of the mishna that discusses the covering of the blood, where they do not disagree with the statement that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an animal without supervision one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood, which indicates the Rabbis hold that such an act of slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter; and what is different about the latter clause of the mishna that discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, where they disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal without supervision one is prohibited to subsequently slaughter its offspring, indicating they hold that such an act of slaughter is in fact considered an act of slaughter?

רישא אי אמרינן חייבין לכסות אמרי שחיטה מעלייתא היא ואתי למיכל משחיטתן

The Gemara responds: Actually, it is uncertain whether this slaughter is valid or not. With regard to the first clause, if we say one is obligated to cover the blood from an unsupervised slaughter, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter, and it is in fact forbidden to eat from their slaughter. Therefore, the Rabbis did not require the covering of the blood.

סיפא נמי כיון דקאמרי רבנן אסור לשחוט אחריהם אמרי שחיטה מעלייתא היא ואתי למיכל משחיטתן

The Gemara challenges: If so, then with regard to the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the Rabbis say it is prohibited to slaughter the offspring of the mother after them, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter.

סיפא אמרי בשרא דלא קא מיבעיא ליה רישא נמי אמרי לנקר חצירו הוא צריך

The Gemara rejects this: With regard to the latter clause, prohibiting the slaughter of the offspring will not cause people to conclude the unsupervised slaughter of the mother by disqualified people was valid. Rather, they will say: The reason the offspring is not slaughtered is because the owner does not need the meat. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the first clause as well, covering the blood will not lead one to conclude that the unsupervised slaughter was valid, as people will say: He is covering the blood because he needs to clean his courtyard of the blood. If so, let the Rabbis deem one obligated to cover the blood.

שחט באשפה מאי איכא למימר בא לימלך מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara rejects this: But if a disqualified person slaughtered the animal in a garbage dump, what can be said to allow the covering of the blood? Obviously, people will not assume one covers the blood in order to clean a garbage dump. Similarly, if one comes to consult the court, what can be said? That is, if one sees from a distance that a disqualified person slaughtered an animal and the blood is uncovered, and he comes to consult the court with regard to the obligation to cover the blood, if the court tells him to cover the blood he might conclude that this is because the unsupervised slaughter was valid. Accordingly, since there are scenarios in which one might mistakenly conclude that the unsupervised slaughter of inept people is valid, the Rabbis concede that one is exempt from covering the blood of such an act of slaughter in all cases.

וליטעמיך סיפא נמי בא לימלך מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that the Rabbis are concerned for the aforementioned scenarios, then with regard to the latter clause as well, if one comes to consult the court with regard to the slaughter of the offspring, what can be said? That is, if one sees a disqualified person slaughter the mother, and he comes to ask the court whether he may slaughter the offspring on the same day, if the court prohibits him from slaughtering it he might conclude that this is because the slaughter of the mother was valid. Why, then, do the Rabbis prohibit one from slaughtering the offspring?

אלא רבנן אכולה מילתא פליגי ונטרי ליה לרבי מאיר עד דמסיק לה למילתא והדר פליגי עילויה

The Gemara concludes: Rather, it must be that the Rabbis disagree concerning the entire matter, i.e., they disagree with regard to covering the blood as well, and hold that if a disqualified person slaughtered an animal while unsupervised, one must cover the blood; and the Rabbis waited for Rabbi Meir until he concluded his statement, and then they disagreed with him on both accounts.

בשלמא רבנן לחומרא אלא רבי מאיר מאי טעמא

The Gemara asks: If so, granted, the opinion of the Rabbis is understandable, as they consistently rule stringently. That is, although it is prohibited to consume the meat of an unsupervised slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the Rabbis require one to cover the blood and prohibit one to slaughter the offspring, due to concern that the person may have performed a valid slaughter. But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one is exempt from covering the blood and that one may slaughter the offspring on the same day, what is the reason he does not rule stringently due to uncertainty?

אמר רבי יעקב אמר רבי יוחנן מחייב היה רבי מאיר על שחיטתן משום נבלה מאי טעמא אמר רבי אמי הואיל ורוב מעשיהן מקולקלים

Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable to receive lashes for eating from the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, due to violation of the prohibition against eating from an animal carcass. According to Rabbi Meir there is no uncertainty with regard to such slaughter, and it is not considered an act of slaughter at all. Consequently, one may become liable to receive lashes for its consumption. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ami says: Since the majority of actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and a minor are bungled, i.e., they are performed incompetently, it can be assumed that their slaughter was performed improperly as well.

אמר ליה רב פפא לרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע ואמרי לה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרב פפא מאי איריא רוב אפילו מיעוט נמי דהא רבי מאיר חייש למיעוטא סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואתרע ליה רובא

Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Why did Rabbi Ami specifically state that the reasoning of Rabbi Meir is based on the assumption that the majority of their actions are bungled? Even if only a minority of their actions are bungled and the majority are performed competently, Rabbi Meir would also maintain that the animal is considered a carcass, as Rabbi Meir is concerned for a minority when it can be combined with a presumptive status. If so, append the minority to the presumptive status of an animal prior to its slaughter, i.e., that it is prohibited for consumption, and the majority of competent acts of slaughter is thereby weakened.

דתנן תינוק שנמצא בצד העיסה ובצק בידו רבי מאיר מטהר וחכמים מטמאין מפני שדרכו של תינוק לטפח ואמרינן מאי טעמא דרבי מאיר קסבר רוב תינוקות מטפחין ומיעוט אין מטפחין ועיסה זו בחזקת טהרה עומדת

The Gemara proves that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority: As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): In the case of a ritually impure child who is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure. This is because there is no proof the child touched it; he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle items. And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity since its impurity has not been definitively determined.

סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא

One appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and consequently the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. Similarly, with regard to slaughter performed by inept people, why does Rabbi Ami state that the reason behind Rabbi Meir’s opinion is due to a majority? Let even a minority of bungled acts of slaughter join with the presumptive prohibited status of the animal to render this animal a carcass.

אם אמרו ספק טומאה לטהר יאמרו ספק איסור להתיר

The Gemara responds that the two cases are not comparable: If they said one may append the minority to the presumptive status with regard to a case of uncertain ritual impurity in order to render the dough pure, will they say that one may rely on a minority in the case of an uncertain prohibition in order to permit it? In other words, without the fact that a majority of the acts of slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are bungled, Rabbi Meir could neither deem one exempt from covering the blood nor allow one to slaughter the offspring immediately. Consequently, it is due only to the majority that Rabbi Meir deems one liable for violation of the prohibition against consuming an animal carcass when consuming meat from their slaughter.

הורה רבי כרבי מאיר והורה רבי כחכמים הי מינייהו דאחריתא

§ With regard to the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara notes: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who held that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal, one may subsequently slaughter its offspring; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who held that it is prohibited to slaughter it. The Gemara asks: Which of these two rulings is the later, definitive ruling, and which ruling is the retracted one?

תא שמע דרבי אבא בריה דרבי חייא בר אבא ורבי זירא הוו קיימי בשוקא דקיסרי אפתחא דבי מדרשא נפק רבי אמי אשכחינהו אמר להו לאו אמינא לכו בעידן בי מדרשא לא תקימו אבראי דילמא איכא אינש דמיצטרכא ליה שמעתא ואתי לאיטרודי

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from an incident: Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea, at the entrance to the study hall. Rabbi Ami exited the study hall and found the two of them standing there. Rabbi Ami said to them: Have I not told you that at the time when the study hall is in session you should not stand outside, as perhaps there is a person inside the study hall who requires clarification of a halakha, and he will become bothered by it because you will not be inside to assist in offering the proper explanation?

רבי זירא על רבי אבא לא על יתבי וקא מיבעיא להו הי מינייהו אחריתא אמר להו רבי זירא לא שבקתון לי דאישייליה לסבא דילמא שמיע ליה מאבוה ואבוה מיניה דרבי יוחנן דרבי חייא בר אבא כל תלתין יומין קא מהדר תלמודיה קמיה דרבי יוחנן

Rabbi Zeira entered the study hall, whereas Rabbi Abba did not enter. The students were sitting and raising a dilemma: Which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s two rulings is the later one? Rabbi Zeira said to them: You did not let me know that this is your dilemma while I was outside, which would have allowed me to ask the elder one, i.e., Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, since perhaps he heard the answer from his father, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. And perhaps his father heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba would review his studies in front of Rabbi Yoḥanan every thirty days.

מאי הוי עלה תא שמע דשלח רבי אלעזר לגולה הורה רבי כרבי מאיר והא כרבנן נמי אורי אלא לאו שמע מינה הא דאחריתא שמע מינה

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Elazar sent a message to the Jews in exile, i.e., Babylonia: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Why did Rabbi Elazar disregard that ruling? The Gemara concludes: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from Rabbi Elazar’s message that this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, which is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, is the later one? The Gemara affirms: One may in fact conclude from here that this is so.

מתני׳ שחט מאה חיות במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן מאה עופות במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן חיה ועוף במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן רבי יהודה אומר שחט חיה יכסנה ואחר כך ישחוט את העוף

MISHNA: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן חיה כל משמע חיה בין מרובה ובין מועטת עוף כל משמע עוף בין מרובה ובין מועט מכאן אמרו שחט מאה חיות במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן מאה עופות במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן חיה ועוף במקום אחד כסוי אחד לכולן

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). “Undomesticated animal” is inclusive, i.e., any number of animals is included in the term undomesticated animal, whether many or few. Likewise, “bird” is inclusive, i.e., any amount is included in the term bird, whether many or few. From here the Rabbis stated: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient.

רבי יהודה אומר שחט חיה יכסנה ואחר כך ישחוט את העוף שנאמר חיה או עוף

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird, as it is stated: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). The term “or” indicates that each type must be attended to separately.

אמרו לו הרי הוא אומר כי נפש כל בשר דמו בנפשו הוא מאי קא מהדרי ליה הכי קאמרי ליה רבנן האי או מיבעי ליה לחלק

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the next verse states: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof.” The Gemara asks: What are the Rabbis responding to Rabbi Yehuda with this statement? The Gemara explains: This is what the Rabbis are saying to him: This term “or” that interposes between an undomesticated animal and a bird is needed to separate them, in order to indicate that the obligation to cover the blood applies after slaughtering either an undomesticated animal or a bird. If not for the term “or” one might have thought the obligation to cover the blood takes effect only after slaughtering both an undomesticated animal and a bird. Accordingly, one cannot derive from this term that the blood of an undomesticated animal and a bird must be covered separately.

ורבי יהודה לחלק מדמו נפקא ורבנן דמו טובא משמע דכתיב כי נפש כל בשר דמו בנפשו הוא

And Rabbi Yehuda responds to this: The source for separating the obligations with regard to an undomesticated animal and a bird is derived from the verse: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13). The verse makes reference to the blood of only one animal, indicating that the obligation applies after slaughtering either a bird or an undomesticated animal. And the Rabbis respond that “its blood” also indicates many, as the term: Blood, can refer to any amount of blood. This is demonstrated by that which is written: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof” (Leviticus 17:14).

אמר רבי חנינא מודה היה רבי יהודה לענין ברכה שאינו מברך אלא ברכה אחת אמר ליה רבינא לרב אחא בריה דרבא ואמרי לה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי מאי שנא מתלמידי דרב

§ Rabbi Ḥanina says: Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that one first covers the blood of an undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to the matter of the blessing over their slaughter, i.e., that one recites only one blessing. The Gemara questions this assertion: Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from the incident that occurred with the students of Rav?

דרב ברונא ורב חננאל תלמידי דרב הוו יתבי בסעודתא קאי עלייהו רב ייבא סבא אמרו ליה הב ליבריך הדור אמרו ליה הב לישתי אמר להו רב ייבא סבא הכי אמר רב כיון דאמר הב ליבריך איתסר ליה למשתי חמרא הכא נמי כיון דאיטפל ליה לכסוי איחייב ליה לברכה

As it occurred that Rav Beruna and Rav Ḥananel, the students of Rav, were sitting together at a meal, and Rav Yeiva the Elder stood over them to serve them. They said to him: Give us a cup of wine over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals. They then changed their mind and said to him: Give us a cup of wine to drink. Rav Yeiva the Elder said to them that this is what Rav said: Once someone at a meal says: Give me a cup over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals, it is prohibited for him to drink any more wine, since he has expressed his desire to conclude his meal. If he now wishes to drink more wine, he must recite a blessing before drinking it. Ravina asks: Here too, since he is required to cover the blood of the undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, there is an interruption between the acts of slaughter, and he has therefore become obligated to recite a new blessing before slaughtering the bird.