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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
This week’s learning is sponsored by the Miller Rotenberg family in loving memory of their daughter Tanielle Miller on her 21st yahrzeit. “We honor and celebrate her memory by continuing the paths she forged, keeping her love of community, chesed, Israel, and learning, alive and vibrant.”
Ketubot 51
סוֹף סוֹף, כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִגְזוֹז כְּגָזוּז דָּמֵי! דִּצְרִיכָא לְדִיקְלָא קָאָמֵינָא.
Abaye asked him: Ultimately, anything that is about to be sheared is considered sheared, and therefore these dates should already be classified as movable property, from which her sustenance cannot be collected. Rav Yosef replied: I spoke of a case when the fruit is nearly fully ripe, but is still in need of the palm tree. Since they are attached to the ground, they may be used for the daughter’s sustenance.
הָהוּא יָתוֹם וִיתוֹמָה דַּאֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: הַעֲלוּ לַיָּתוֹם בִּשְׁבִיל יְתוֹמָה. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: וְהָא מָר הוּא דְּאָמַר מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי, בֵּין לִמְזוֹנֵי בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה וּבֵין לְפַרְנָסָה!
The Gemara relates: There were a certain minor orphan boy and orphan girl who came before Rava. Rava said to the trustees of the father’s estate: Increase the amount you give to the orphan boy, so that there should be enough for the orphan girl as well. The Sages said to Rava: But it was the Master who said that one may collect from land but not from movable property, whether for sustenance, whether for the marriage contract, or whether for the daughters’ livelihood. In this case only movable property was available.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִילּוּ רָצָה שִׁפְחָה לְשַׁמְּשׁוֹ, מִי לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ? כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי.
Rava said to them: If this orphan wanted a maidservant to serve him, would we not give him one? The court would use his father’s property to fund this acquisition. All the more so here, where there are two factors, as she is his sister and she will serve him as well. It is therefore appropriate to act in this manner, which is to the benefit of both the boy and the girl.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת, וְאֶחָד נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת — מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹן אִשָּׁה וּלְבָנוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת — מוֹצִיאִין לַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנִים, וְלַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנוֹת, וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנִים.
§ The Sages taught: With regard to both property that has a guarantee, i.e., real estate, and property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable objects, the court removes them from the orphan heirs for the sustenance of the wife and for the daughters. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to property that has a guarantee, the court removes it from the possession of the sons, who are the heirs, for the sake of the sustenance of the daughters. If the deceased had only daughters, and the adult daughters have taken possession of the estate, the court takes some of the property from the adult daughters in order to give an equal share to the young daughters. And likewise, one takes some of the property from the adult sons in order to give an equal share to the younger sons.
וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת בִּנְכָסִים מְרוּבִּין, אֲבָל לֹא לַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִין.
And in a case where the estate has a large amount of property, so that there is more than enough to provide sustenance for the daughters, the court takes from the daughters the property that is not needed to provide for their sustenance and gives it to the sons, who are the true heirs. However, in a case where the estate has a small amount of property, one does not take it from the daughters in order to give it to the sons.
נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת מוֹצִיאִין לַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנִים, וְלַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנוֹת, וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת. אֲבָל לֹא לַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנִים.
By contrast, with regard to property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable property, the court removes some of it from the possession of the adult sons, if they have taken it, in order to give a fair share to the young sons, and similarly, some property is taken from the adult daughters in order to give a fair share to the young daughters. And if there are both sons and daughters and the daughters have seized the movable property, it is taken from the daughters, who are not entitled to sustenance from movable property, and given to the sons, who are the heirs. However, they do not take any property from the sons in order to give it to the daughters.
אַף עַל גַּב דְּקַיְימָא לַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, הָכָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר. דְּאָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמְּטַלְטְלִי, בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה, בֵּין לִמְזוֹנֵי, בֵּין לְפַרְנָסָה.
The Gemara comments: Even though we maintain in general that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with his colleague, and therefore the halakha should follow his ruling rather than that of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, here the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As Rava said: The halakha is that a woman can collect her claim from land but not from movable property, whether for the marriage contract, for sustenance, or for her livelihood.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה — בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם, וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּתַב לָהּ שָׂדֶה שָׁוֶה מָנֶה תַּחַת מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְלֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״כֹּל נְכָסִים דְּאִית לִי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבְּתִיךְ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
MISHNA: If a husband did not write a marriage contract for his wife, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars upon divorce or the husband’s death, because it is a stipulation of the court that a wife is entitled to these amounts. If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars; and he cannot say that she should take only a mortgaged field for payment of her marriage contract, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum.
לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ: ״אִם תִּשְׁתְּבַאי, אֶפְרְקִינִּךְ וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״, וּבְכֹהֶנֶת: ״אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
Similarly, if he did not write for her in the marriage contract: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife, and in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, who is prohibited to return to her husband if she has intercourse with another man even if she is raped, if he did not write: I will return you to your native province, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as it is a stipulation of the court.
נִשְׁבֵּית — חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. וְאִם אָמַר: הֲרֵי גִּיטָּהּ וּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, וְתִפְדֶּה אֶת עַצְמָהּ — אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי. לָקְתָה — חַיָּיב לְרַפְּאוֹתָהּ. אָמַר: ״הֲרֵי גִּיטָּהּ וּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, תְּרַפֵּא אֶת עַצְמָהּ״ — רַשַּׁאי.
If a woman was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. And if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her redeem herself, he is not permitted to do so, as he already obligated himself to redeem her when he wrote the marriage contract. If his wife was struck with illness, he is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. In this case, however, if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her heal herself, he is permitted to do so.
גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הַפּוֹחֵת לִבְתוּלָה מִמָּאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מִמָּנֶה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who is the author of the mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, who said: Anyone who decreases the sum guaranteed to a virgin in her marriage contract to less than two hundred dinars, or the sum guaranteed to a widow to less than one hundred dinars, and proceeds to live with his wife, this is licentious sexual intercourse. These sums are fixed by the Sages, and a husband is not permitted to pledge less than the established sum.
דְּאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָאָמַר: רָצָה, כּוֹתֵב לִבְתוּלָה שְׁטָר שֶׁל מָאתַיִם, וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ מָנֶה״. וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז״.
For if you say the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say that if the husband wants, he may write a document as a marriage contract for a virgin in which he pledges two hundred dinars, and she may immediately write: I have received from you one hundred dinars, thereby waiving her rights to half the sum, so that in practice she gets only one hundred dinars? And similarly, he may pledge one hundred dinars in the marriage contract of a widow, and she may write: I have received from you fifty dinars. This is not in accordance with the mishna, which indicates that he cannot give her less than the minimum amount even with her consent.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כָּתַב לָהּ שָׂדֶה שָׁוֶה מָנֶה תַּחַת מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְלֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״כֹּל נְכָסִים דְּאִית לִי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבְּתִיךְ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: אַחְרָיוּת טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But now say the latter clause of the mishna: If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum. In this clause, we come to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that omission of the guarantee from a document is presumed to be a scribal error, unless the document explicitly states that the property of the individual who wrote the document is not liened to guarantee the transaction.
דְּאִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָאָמַר: אַחְרָיוּת — לָאו טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא. דִּתְנַן: מָצָא שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב — אִם
For if this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t he say that omission of the guarantee from a document is not a scribal error, i.e., a lien can be placed on the property to guarantee the transaction only if the document explicitly states this to be the case. The Gemara cites the source of this dispute. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 12b): With regard to one who found promissory notes, if
יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — לֹא יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן.
they include a property guarantee he may not return them to the lender, as he does not know who lost them. It is possible that the debt has already been paid and the documents were returned to the borrower, and he lost them. He may not give them back to the lender even if the borrower admits that he still owes the money, as the court collects the debt from purchasers of the borrower’s property. There is a concern that the borrower has repaid the loan and he is saying that he did not yet repay it because he has conspired with the lender to convince the court to confiscate liened property that the borrower sold, and the lender and borrower will divide the proceeds.
אֵין בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה לֹא יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן.
If, however, the documents were of the kind that do not include a property guarantee he returns them, as in this case the court does not collect from purchasers of the borrower’s property. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that one, he may not return the promissory notes, as the court collects from purchasers of the borrower’s property regardless, as it is assumed that the omission of the property guarantee from a document is merely a scribal error.
רֵישָׁא רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה! וְכִי תֵּימָא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְשָׁאנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין כְּתוּבָּה לִשְׁטָרֵי. וּמִי שָׁאנֵי לֵיהּ?
If so, the first clause of the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And if you would say that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and there is a difference for Rabbi Meir between a marriage contract and other documents, i.e., the guarantee of a marriage contract applies even if it is omitted but the property guarantee in other contracts does not, is there really a difference for him between the two types of documents?
וְהָתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה גּוֹבִין מִן הַמְחוֹרָרִין, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: פֵּירוֹת, וּשְׁבַח פֵּירוֹת, וְהַמְקַבֵּל עָלָיו לָזוּן אֶת בֶּן אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבַת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְגֵט חוֹב שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת, וּכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אַחְרָיוּת.
Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Five claims may be collected only from free assets, and they are as follows: Produce, and enhancement to the produce. And likewise, in the case of one who accepts upon himself the duty to sustain his wife’s son or his wife’s daughter and then dies, they receive their support only from the estate’s free assets. And other claims that may be collected only from free assets are a document of debt that does not include the clause of property guarantee, and the marriage contract of a wife that does not include the clause of property guarantee.
מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר אַחְרָיוּת לָאו טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא — רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְקָתָנֵי כְּתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה.
The Gemara reasons: Whom have you heard say that omission of the property guarantee from a document is not a scribal error? Rabbi Meir, and yet the baraita teaches that the same applies to the marriage contract of a wife. This proves that according to Rabbi Meir, there is no difference between a marriage contract and other documents.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: הָתָם כָּתְבָה לֵיהּ ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״, הָכָא לָא כָּתְבָה לֵיהּ ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and if you wish, say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and there, in the other mishna (54b), the case is where she wrote to him: I have received it, thereby waiving her right to part of the marriage contract. In contrast, here, she did not write to him: I have received it, and therefore she collects the entire sum from him even if he did not write a marriage contract.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר: מַאי ״חַיָּיב״ דְּקָתָנֵי — מִן הַמְחוֹרָרִין.
Conversely, if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. According to this interpretation, what is the meaning of the phrase: He is obligated, which is taught in the latter clause of the mishna with regard to the case where the marriage contract did not specify that the husband’s property will serve as a guarantee of his obligations toward his wife? It means that the wife’s claims may be collected only from the husband’s free assets, i.e., she does not have a lien on his property.
לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה — אֲסוּרָה לְבַעְלָהּ. חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹפָהּ בְּרָצוֹן.
§ The mishna taught that if the husband did not write for her that he would redeem her from captivity and restore her to him, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as this is a stipulation of the court. Shmuel’s father said: The wife of an Israelite who was raped is forbidden to her husband, as we are concerned that perhaps her ordeal started as rape and ended willingly, i.e., during the act she may have acquiesced, and a married woman who willingly had relations with another man is forbidden to her husband.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב לַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״אִם תִּשְׁתְּבַאי, אֶפְרְקִינִּךְ וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״! אִישְׁתִּיק.
Rav raised an objection to the opinion of Shmuel’s father from the mishna, which states that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract reads: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife. This indicates that despite the possibility that she might have been raped during captivity, she remains permitted to her husband if he is not a priest, and there is no concern that she might have ultimately agreed to the act. Shmuel’s father was silent and did not respond.
קָרֵי רַב עֲלֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״שָׂרִים עָצְרוּ בְמִלִּים וְכַף יָשִׂימוּ לְפִיהֶם״. מַאי אִית לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר? בִּשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ.
Rav recited the following verse about Shmuel’s father: “The princes refrained from talking and laid a hand upon their mouths” (Job 29:9). The Gemara comments: The application of this verse to Shmuel’s father indicates that he refrained from responding despite the fact that an answer was available. But what is there for him to say in reply? The Gemara answers: He could have said that in the case of a captive woman they were lenient. Since it is uncertain whether she was in fact raped during her captivity, the Sages were lenient. However, it is possible that they were more stringent in the case of a woman who was definitely raped.
וְלַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, אוֹנֶס דְּשַׁרְיַהּ רַחֲמָנָא הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּקָאָמְרִי עֵדִים בְּצוֹוַחַת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף.
The Gemara further asks: According to Shmuel’s father, how can you find a case of rape where the Merciful One permits the victim to remain married to her husband? It is always possible that she might have ultimately acquiesced. The Gemara answers: For example, where witnesses say that she screamed continuously from beginning to end.
וּפְלִיגָא דְּרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל שֶׁתְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹף [בְּרָצוֹן, אֲפִילּוּ] הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: הַנִּיחוּ לוֹ, שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא (לֹא) נִזְקַק לָהּ הִיא שׂוֹכַרְתּוֹ, מוּתֶּרֶת. מַאי טַעְמָא — יֵצֶר אַלְבְּשַׁהּ.
The Gemara comments: And Shmuel’s father disagrees with the opinion of Rava. As Rava said: With regard to any case that starts as rape and ends willingly, even if she ultimately says: Leave him, and she further states that if he had not forcibly initiated intercourse with her, she would have hired him for intercourse, she is nevertheless permitted to her husband. What is the reason for this? The evil inclination took hold of her during the act, and therefore she is still considered to have engaged in intercourse against her will.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״, אֲסוּרָה. הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ כֹּל שֶׁתְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹפָהּ בְּרָצוֹן.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: The verse states with regard to a sota: “And a man lies with her…and she was not taken” (Numbers 5:13). This is referring to a woman who had intercourse but was not taken forcefully, i.e., raped, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred from this that if she was taken forcefully, she is permitted to him. And the word “she” teaches that you have a case of another woman, where even though she was not taken forcefully she is permitted. And which case is this? This is any case that starts as rape and ends willingly. Although at the conclusion of the act she was not taken forcefully, she is nevertheless permitted to her husband, as stated by Rava.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״ — אֲסוּרָה, הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְפָּשָׂה — אֲסוּרָה, וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן.
A different inference from the same verse is taught in another baraita: “And she was not taken”; in this case, the woman is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred that if she was taken forcefully, she is permitted to her husband. And you have another case where, even though she was taken forcefully, she is forbidden to her husband. And which case is this? This is the case of the wife of a priest, who is forbidden to her husband even if she is the victim of a rape.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״ — אֲסוּרָה, הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפָּשָׂה, מוּתֶּרֶת. וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ שֶׁקִּידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשֵׁי טָעוּת, שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ בְּנָהּ מוּרְכָּב עַל כְּתֵיפָהּ — מְמָאֶנֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת לָהּ.
Rav Yehuda said another exposition of this same verse that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: “And she was not taken”; in this case she is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred that if she was taken forcefully she is permitted to her husband. And there is a case of another woman where, even though she was not taken forcefully, she nevertheless remains permitted. And which case is this? This is referring to one whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as, even if her son from this marriage is riding on her shoulders she may refuse to remain with her husband and go off as pleases her. Since she was not really married to begin with, an act of intercourse with another man does not render her forbidden to the man with whom she performed a mistaken betrothal.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָנֵי נְשֵׁי דִּגְנַבוּ גַּנָּבֵי — שַׁרְיָין לְגוּבְרַיְיהוּ. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב יְהוּדָה: וְהָא קָא מַמְטְיָאן לְהוּ נַהֲמָא! מֵחֲמַת יִרְאָה. וְהָא קָא מְשַׁלְּחָן לְהוּ גִּירֵי! מֵחֲמַת יִרְאָה. וַדַּאי, שַׁבְקִינְהוּ וְאָזְלָן מִנַּפְשַׁיְיהוּ — אֲסִירָן.
Rav Yehuda said: Those women stolen by kidnappers are permitted to their husbands, as, even if they had intercourse with their captors it is considered rape. The Rabbis said to Rav Yehuda: But while they are captives they bring their kidnappers bread. This indicates that they are not acting under duress. He replied: They do so due to fear. The Rabbis further inquired: But they send them arrows. Rav Yehuda again replied: This too is due to fear. However, I certainly agree that if the kidnappers leave them alone, and they go back to them of their own accord, they are forbidden to their husbands, as it is clear that they are no longer acting out of fear.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁבוּיֵי מַלְכוּת — הֲרֵי הֵן כִּשְׁבוּיִין. גְּנוּבֵי לִיסְטוּת — אֵינָן כִּשְׁבוּיִין. וְהָתַנְיָא אִיפְּכָא!
The Sages taught: With regard to women captured by the monarchy for the purpose of having intercourse with the king, they are considered to be like captives, i.e., they are assumed to have been raped but not to have consented to intercourse. However, those stolen by bandits are not considered to be like captives, as there is a concern that they might have consented to their captors, thinking that they will marry them. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the reverse is the case, i.e., women taken by the monarchy are not classified as captives, whereas this status does apply to those abducted by bandits?
מַלְכוּת אַמַּלְכוּת לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּמַלְכוּת אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ, הָא בְּמַלְכוּת בֶּן נֶצַּר.
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the ruling of one baraita with regard to those captured by the monarchy and the ruling of the other baraita with regard to those captured by the monarchy is not difficult: This first baraita is referring to the monarchy of Ahasuerus, i.e., a powerful king, as the woman is aware that he is merely using her to satisfy his lust and will certainly not marry her, whereas that other baraita is dealing with the monarchy of ben Netzer, a man who established for himself a minor kingdom through robbery and small-scale conquests. It is possible for a woman to suppose that a king like ben Netzer will eventually marry her.
לִיסְטוּת אַלִּיסְטוּת לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּבֶן נֶצַּר, הָא בְּלִיסְטִים דְּעָלְמָא. וּבֶן נֶצַּר, הָתָם קָרֵי לֵיהּ מֶלֶךְ, וְהָכָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ לִסְטִים! אִין, גַּבֵּי אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ — לִסְטִים הוּא, גַּבֵּי לִסְטִים דְּעָלְמָא — מֶלֶךְ הוּא.
Similarly, the apparent contradiction between the ruling of one baraita with regard to those kidnapped by bandits and the ruling of the other baraita with regard to those kidnapped by bandits is not difficult: This first baraita is referring to the banditry of ben Netzer, as she might agree to his advances, hoping to become the wife of a king. Conversely, that other baraita is dealing with regular bandits [listim], as it can be assumed that the woman did not acquiesce to having intercourse, as, even if he wanted to marry her she would not agree. The Gemara asks: And this ben Netzer, how can it be that there he is called a king and here he is called a bandit? The Gemara answers: Yes, when considered alongside Ahasuerus he is merely a bandit, but when considered alongside a regular bandit he is deemed a king.
וּבְכֹהֶנֶת אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל — חַיָּיב לִפְדוֹתָהּ, שֶׁאֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וּבְכֹהֶנֶת אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ״,
§ The mishna taught: And in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, even if her husband did not write: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and return you to your native province, he is obligated to do so. Abaye said: In the case of a widow who was married to a High Priest, although the marriage is prohibited by Torah law, if she is taken captive he is obligated to redeem her, as I apply to her the clause: And in the case of a priestess: I will return you to your native province. Her husband can, and therefore must, fulfill this clause just as he could if he had married a woman who is permitted to him.
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Ketubot 51: Rape Is Rape (Or: Where Shmuel’s Father Goes Wrong)
08.26.2022 | כ״ט באב תשפ״ב
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Ketubot 51
סוֹף סוֹף, כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִגְזוֹז כְּגָזוּז דָּמֵי! דִּצְרִיכָא לְדִיקְלָא קָאָמֵינָא.
Abaye asked him: Ultimately, anything that is about to be sheared is considered sheared, and therefore these dates should already be classified as movable property, from which her sustenance cannot be collected. Rav Yosef replied: I spoke of a case when the fruit is nearly fully ripe, but is still in need of the palm tree. Since they are attached to the ground, they may be used for the daughter’s sustenance.
הָהוּא יָתוֹם וִיתוֹמָה דַּאֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: הַעֲלוּ לַיָּתוֹם בִּשְׁבִיל יְתוֹמָה. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: וְהָא מָר הוּא דְּאָמַר מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמִּטַּלְטְלִי, בֵּין לִמְזוֹנֵי בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה וּבֵין לְפַרְנָסָה!
The Gemara relates: There were a certain minor orphan boy and orphan girl who came before Rava. Rava said to the trustees of the father’s estate: Increase the amount you give to the orphan boy, so that there should be enough for the orphan girl as well. The Sages said to Rava: But it was the Master who said that one may collect from land but not from movable property, whether for sustenance, whether for the marriage contract, or whether for the daughters’ livelihood. In this case only movable property was available.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִילּוּ רָצָה שִׁפְחָה לְשַׁמְּשׁוֹ, מִי לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ? כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי.
Rava said to them: If this orphan wanted a maidservant to serve him, would we not give him one? The court would use his father’s property to fund this acquisition. All the more so here, where there are two factors, as she is his sister and she will serve him as well. It is therefore appropriate to act in this manner, which is to the benefit of both the boy and the girl.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת, וְאֶחָד נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת — מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹן אִשָּׁה וּלְבָנוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת — מוֹצִיאִין לַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנִים, וְלַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנוֹת, וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנִים.
§ The Sages taught: With regard to both property that has a guarantee, i.e., real estate, and property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable objects, the court removes them from the orphan heirs for the sustenance of the wife and for the daughters. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to property that has a guarantee, the court removes it from the possession of the sons, who are the heirs, for the sake of the sustenance of the daughters. If the deceased had only daughters, and the adult daughters have taken possession of the estate, the court takes some of the property from the adult daughters in order to give an equal share to the young daughters. And likewise, one takes some of the property from the adult sons in order to give an equal share to the younger sons.
וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת בִּנְכָסִים מְרוּבִּין, אֲבָל לֹא לַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִין.
And in a case where the estate has a large amount of property, so that there is more than enough to provide sustenance for the daughters, the court takes from the daughters the property that is not needed to provide for their sustenance and gives it to the sons, who are the true heirs. However, in a case where the estate has a small amount of property, one does not take it from the daughters in order to give it to the sons.
נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת מוֹצִיאִין לַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנִים, וְלַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנוֹת, וְלַבָּנִים מִן הַבָּנוֹת. אֲבָל לֹא לַבָּנוֹת מִן הַבָּנִים.
By contrast, with regard to property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable property, the court removes some of it from the possession of the adult sons, if they have taken it, in order to give a fair share to the young sons, and similarly, some property is taken from the adult daughters in order to give a fair share to the young daughters. And if there are both sons and daughters and the daughters have seized the movable property, it is taken from the daughters, who are not entitled to sustenance from movable property, and given to the sons, who are the heirs. However, they do not take any property from the sons in order to give it to the daughters.
אַף עַל גַּב דְּקַיְימָא לַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, הָכָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר. דְּאָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: מִמְּקַרְקְעֵי וְלָא מִמְּטַלְטְלִי, בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה, בֵּין לִמְזוֹנֵי, בֵּין לְפַרְנָסָה.
The Gemara comments: Even though we maintain in general that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with his colleague, and therefore the halakha should follow his ruling rather than that of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, here the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As Rava said: The halakha is that a woman can collect her claim from land but not from movable property, whether for the marriage contract, for sustenance, or for her livelihood.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה — בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם, וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. כָּתַב לָהּ שָׂדֶה שָׁוֶה מָנֶה תַּחַת מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְלֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״כֹּל נְכָסִים דְּאִית לִי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבְּתִיךְ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
MISHNA: If a husband did not write a marriage contract for his wife, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars upon divorce or the husband’s death, because it is a stipulation of the court that a wife is entitled to these amounts. If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars; and he cannot say that she should take only a mortgaged field for payment of her marriage contract, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum.
לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ: ״אִם תִּשְׁתְּבַאי, אֶפְרְקִינִּךְ וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״, וּבְכֹהֶנֶת: ״אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.
Similarly, if he did not write for her in the marriage contract: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife, and in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, who is prohibited to return to her husband if she has intercourse with another man even if she is raped, if he did not write: I will return you to your native province, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as it is a stipulation of the court.
נִשְׁבֵּית — חַיָּיב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. וְאִם אָמַר: הֲרֵי גִּיטָּהּ וּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, וְתִפְדֶּה אֶת עַצְמָהּ — אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי. לָקְתָה — חַיָּיב לְרַפְּאוֹתָהּ. אָמַר: ״הֲרֵי גִּיטָּהּ וּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, תְּרַפֵּא אֶת עַצְמָהּ״ — רַשַּׁאי.
If a woman was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. And if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her redeem herself, he is not permitted to do so, as he already obligated himself to redeem her when he wrote the marriage contract. If his wife was struck with illness, he is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. In this case, however, if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her heal herself, he is permitted to do so.
גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הַפּוֹחֵת לִבְתוּלָה מִמָּאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מִמָּנֶה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who is the author of the mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, who said: Anyone who decreases the sum guaranteed to a virgin in her marriage contract to less than two hundred dinars, or the sum guaranteed to a widow to less than one hundred dinars, and proceeds to live with his wife, this is licentious sexual intercourse. These sums are fixed by the Sages, and a husband is not permitted to pledge less than the established sum.
דְּאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָאָמַר: רָצָה, כּוֹתֵב לִבְתוּלָה שְׁטָר שֶׁל מָאתַיִם, וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ מָנֶה״. וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז״.
For if you say the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say that if the husband wants, he may write a document as a marriage contract for a virgin in which he pledges two hundred dinars, and she may immediately write: I have received from you one hundred dinars, thereby waiving her rights to half the sum, so that in practice she gets only one hundred dinars? And similarly, he may pledge one hundred dinars in the marriage contract of a widow, and she may write: I have received from you fifty dinars. This is not in accordance with the mishna, which indicates that he cannot give her less than the minimum amount even with her consent.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כָּתַב לָהּ שָׂדֶה שָׁוֶה מָנֶה תַּחַת מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְלֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״כֹּל נְכָסִים דְּאִית לִי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבְּתִיךְ״ — חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין. אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: אַחְרָיוּת טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But now say the latter clause of the mishna: If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum. In this clause, we come to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that omission of the guarantee from a document is presumed to be a scribal error, unless the document explicitly states that the property of the individual who wrote the document is not liened to guarantee the transaction.
דְּאִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָאָמַר: אַחְרָיוּת — לָאו טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא. דִּתְנַן: מָצָא שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב — אִם
For if this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t he say that omission of the guarantee from a document is not a scribal error, i.e., a lien can be placed on the property to guarantee the transaction only if the document explicitly states this to be the case. The Gemara cites the source of this dispute. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 12b): With regard to one who found promissory notes, if
יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — לֹא יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן.
they include a property guarantee he may not return them to the lender, as he does not know who lost them. It is possible that the debt has already been paid and the documents were returned to the borrower, and he lost them. He may not give them back to the lender even if the borrower admits that he still owes the money, as the court collects the debt from purchasers of the borrower’s property. There is a concern that the borrower has repaid the loan and he is saying that he did not yet repay it because he has conspired with the lender to convince the court to confiscate liened property that the borrower sold, and the lender and borrower will divide the proceeds.
אֵין בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים — יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה לֹא יַחֲזִיר, שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן.
If, however, the documents were of the kind that do not include a property guarantee he returns them, as in this case the court does not collect from purchasers of the borrower’s property. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that one, he may not return the promissory notes, as the court collects from purchasers of the borrower’s property regardless, as it is assumed that the omission of the property guarantee from a document is merely a scribal error.
רֵישָׁא רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה! וְכִי תֵּימָא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְשָׁאנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין כְּתוּבָּה לִשְׁטָרֵי. וּמִי שָׁאנֵי לֵיהּ?
If so, the first clause of the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And if you would say that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and there is a difference for Rabbi Meir between a marriage contract and other documents, i.e., the guarantee of a marriage contract applies even if it is omitted but the property guarantee in other contracts does not, is there really a difference for him between the two types of documents?
וְהָתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה גּוֹבִין מִן הַמְחוֹרָרִין, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: פֵּירוֹת, וּשְׁבַח פֵּירוֹת, וְהַמְקַבֵּל עָלָיו לָזוּן אֶת בֶּן אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבַת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְגֵט חוֹב שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת, וּכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אַחְרָיוּת.
Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Five claims may be collected only from free assets, and they are as follows: Produce, and enhancement to the produce. And likewise, in the case of one who accepts upon himself the duty to sustain his wife’s son or his wife’s daughter and then dies, they receive their support only from the estate’s free assets. And other claims that may be collected only from free assets are a document of debt that does not include the clause of property guarantee, and the marriage contract of a wife that does not include the clause of property guarantee.
מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר אַחְרָיוּת לָאו טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא — רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְקָתָנֵי כְּתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה.
The Gemara reasons: Whom have you heard say that omission of the property guarantee from a document is not a scribal error? Rabbi Meir, and yet the baraita teaches that the same applies to the marriage contract of a wife. This proves that according to Rabbi Meir, there is no difference between a marriage contract and other documents.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: הָתָם כָּתְבָה לֵיהּ ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״, הָכָא לָא כָּתְבָה לֵיהּ ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and if you wish, say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and there, in the other mishna (54b), the case is where she wrote to him: I have received it, thereby waiving her right to part of the marriage contract. In contrast, here, she did not write to him: I have received it, and therefore she collects the entire sum from him even if he did not write a marriage contract.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר: מַאי ״חַיָּיב״ דְּקָתָנֵי — מִן הַמְחוֹרָרִין.
Conversely, if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. According to this interpretation, what is the meaning of the phrase: He is obligated, which is taught in the latter clause of the mishna with regard to the case where the marriage contract did not specify that the husband’s property will serve as a guarantee of his obligations toward his wife? It means that the wife’s claims may be collected only from the husband’s free assets, i.e., she does not have a lien on his property.
לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה — אֲסוּרָה לְבַעְלָהּ. חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹפָהּ בְּרָצוֹן.
§ The mishna taught that if the husband did not write for her that he would redeem her from captivity and restore her to him, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as this is a stipulation of the court. Shmuel’s father said: The wife of an Israelite who was raped is forbidden to her husband, as we are concerned that perhaps her ordeal started as rape and ended willingly, i.e., during the act she may have acquiesced, and a married woman who willingly had relations with another man is forbidden to her husband.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב לַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״אִם תִּשְׁתְּבַאי, אֶפְרְקִינִּךְ וְאוֹתְבִינִּךְ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״! אִישְׁתִּיק.
Rav raised an objection to the opinion of Shmuel’s father from the mishna, which states that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract reads: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife. This indicates that despite the possibility that she might have been raped during captivity, she remains permitted to her husband if he is not a priest, and there is no concern that she might have ultimately agreed to the act. Shmuel’s father was silent and did not respond.
קָרֵי רַב עֲלֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: ״שָׂרִים עָצְרוּ בְמִלִּים וְכַף יָשִׂימוּ לְפִיהֶם״. מַאי אִית לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר? בִּשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ.
Rav recited the following verse about Shmuel’s father: “The princes refrained from talking and laid a hand upon their mouths” (Job 29:9). The Gemara comments: The application of this verse to Shmuel’s father indicates that he refrained from responding despite the fact that an answer was available. But what is there for him to say in reply? The Gemara answers: He could have said that in the case of a captive woman they were lenient. Since it is uncertain whether she was in fact raped during her captivity, the Sages were lenient. However, it is possible that they were more stringent in the case of a woman who was definitely raped.
וְלַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, אוֹנֶס דְּשַׁרְיַהּ רַחֲמָנָא הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּקָאָמְרִי עֵדִים בְּצוֹוַחַת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף.
The Gemara further asks: According to Shmuel’s father, how can you find a case of rape where the Merciful One permits the victim to remain married to her husband? It is always possible that she might have ultimately acquiesced. The Gemara answers: For example, where witnesses say that she screamed continuously from beginning to end.
וּפְלִיגָא דְּרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל שֶׁתְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹף [בְּרָצוֹן, אֲפִילּוּ] הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: הַנִּיחוּ לוֹ, שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא (לֹא) נִזְקַק לָהּ הִיא שׂוֹכַרְתּוֹ, מוּתֶּרֶת. מַאי טַעְמָא — יֵצֶר אַלְבְּשַׁהּ.
The Gemara comments: And Shmuel’s father disagrees with the opinion of Rava. As Rava said: With regard to any case that starts as rape and ends willingly, even if she ultimately says: Leave him, and she further states that if he had not forcibly initiated intercourse with her, she would have hired him for intercourse, she is nevertheless permitted to her husband. What is the reason for this? The evil inclination took hold of her during the act, and therefore she is still considered to have engaged in intercourse against her will.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״, אֲסוּרָה. הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ כֹּל שֶׁתְּחִלָּתָהּ בְּאוֹנֶס וְסוֹפָהּ בְּרָצוֹן.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: The verse states with regard to a sota: “And a man lies with her…and she was not taken” (Numbers 5:13). This is referring to a woman who had intercourse but was not taken forcefully, i.e., raped, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred from this that if she was taken forcefully, she is permitted to him. And the word “she” teaches that you have a case of another woman, where even though she was not taken forcefully she is permitted. And which case is this? This is any case that starts as rape and ends willingly. Although at the conclusion of the act she was not taken forcefully, she is nevertheless permitted to her husband, as stated by Rava.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״ — אֲסוּרָה, הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְפָּשָׂה — אֲסוּרָה, וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן.
A different inference from the same verse is taught in another baraita: “And she was not taken”; in this case, the woman is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred that if she was taken forcefully, she is permitted to her husband. And you have another case where, even though she was taken forcefully, she is forbidden to her husband. And which case is this? This is the case of the wife of a priest, who is forbidden to her husband even if she is the victim of a rape.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְהִיא לֹא נִתְפָּשָׂה״ — אֲסוּרָה, הָא נִתְפָּשָׂה — מוּתֶּרֶת. וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אַחֶרֶת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפָּשָׂה, מוּתֶּרֶת. וְאֵיזוֹ — זוֹ שֶׁקִּידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשֵׁי טָעוּת, שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ בְּנָהּ מוּרְכָּב עַל כְּתֵיפָהּ — מְמָאֶנֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת לָהּ.
Rav Yehuda said another exposition of this same verse that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: “And she was not taken”; in this case she is forbidden to her husband. It may be inferred that if she was taken forcefully she is permitted to her husband. And there is a case of another woman where, even though she was not taken forcefully, she nevertheless remains permitted. And which case is this? This is referring to one whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as, even if her son from this marriage is riding on her shoulders she may refuse to remain with her husband and go off as pleases her. Since she was not really married to begin with, an act of intercourse with another man does not render her forbidden to the man with whom she performed a mistaken betrothal.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָנֵי נְשֵׁי דִּגְנַבוּ גַּנָּבֵי — שַׁרְיָין לְגוּבְרַיְיהוּ. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב יְהוּדָה: וְהָא קָא מַמְטְיָאן לְהוּ נַהֲמָא! מֵחֲמַת יִרְאָה. וְהָא קָא מְשַׁלְּחָן לְהוּ גִּירֵי! מֵחֲמַת יִרְאָה. וַדַּאי, שַׁבְקִינְהוּ וְאָזְלָן מִנַּפְשַׁיְיהוּ — אֲסִירָן.
Rav Yehuda said: Those women stolen by kidnappers are permitted to their husbands, as, even if they had intercourse with their captors it is considered rape. The Rabbis said to Rav Yehuda: But while they are captives they bring their kidnappers bread. This indicates that they are not acting under duress. He replied: They do so due to fear. The Rabbis further inquired: But they send them arrows. Rav Yehuda again replied: This too is due to fear. However, I certainly agree that if the kidnappers leave them alone, and they go back to them of their own accord, they are forbidden to their husbands, as it is clear that they are no longer acting out of fear.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁבוּיֵי מַלְכוּת — הֲרֵי הֵן כִּשְׁבוּיִין. גְּנוּבֵי לִיסְטוּת — אֵינָן כִּשְׁבוּיִין. וְהָתַנְיָא אִיפְּכָא!
The Sages taught: With regard to women captured by the monarchy for the purpose of having intercourse with the king, they are considered to be like captives, i.e., they are assumed to have been raped but not to have consented to intercourse. However, those stolen by bandits are not considered to be like captives, as there is a concern that they might have consented to their captors, thinking that they will marry them. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that the reverse is the case, i.e., women taken by the monarchy are not classified as captives, whereas this status does apply to those abducted by bandits?
מַלְכוּת אַמַּלְכוּת לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּמַלְכוּת אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ, הָא בְּמַלְכוּת בֶּן נֶצַּר.
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the ruling of one baraita with regard to those captured by the monarchy and the ruling of the other baraita with regard to those captured by the monarchy is not difficult: This first baraita is referring to the monarchy of Ahasuerus, i.e., a powerful king, as the woman is aware that he is merely using her to satisfy his lust and will certainly not marry her, whereas that other baraita is dealing with the monarchy of ben Netzer, a man who established for himself a minor kingdom through robbery and small-scale conquests. It is possible for a woman to suppose that a king like ben Netzer will eventually marry her.
לִיסְטוּת אַלִּיסְטוּת לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּבֶן נֶצַּר, הָא בְּלִיסְטִים דְּעָלְמָא. וּבֶן נֶצַּר, הָתָם קָרֵי לֵיהּ מֶלֶךְ, וְהָכָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ לִסְטִים! אִין, גַּבֵּי אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ — לִסְטִים הוּא, גַּבֵּי לִסְטִים דְּעָלְמָא — מֶלֶךְ הוּא.
Similarly, the apparent contradiction between the ruling of one baraita with regard to those kidnapped by bandits and the ruling of the other baraita with regard to those kidnapped by bandits is not difficult: This first baraita is referring to the banditry of ben Netzer, as she might agree to his advances, hoping to become the wife of a king. Conversely, that other baraita is dealing with regular bandits [listim], as it can be assumed that the woman did not acquiesce to having intercourse, as, even if he wanted to marry her she would not agree. The Gemara asks: And this ben Netzer, how can it be that there he is called a king and here he is called a bandit? The Gemara answers: Yes, when considered alongside Ahasuerus he is merely a bandit, but when considered alongside a regular bandit he is deemed a king.
וּבְכֹהֶנֶת אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל — חַיָּיב לִפְדוֹתָהּ, שֶׁאֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״וּבְכֹהֶנֶת אַהְדְּרִינִּךְ לִמְדִינְתִּךָ״,
§ The mishna taught: And in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, even if her husband did not write: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and return you to your native province, he is obligated to do so. Abaye said: In the case of a widow who was married to a High Priest, although the marriage is prohibited by Torah law, if she is taken captive he is obligated to redeem her, as I apply to her the clause: And in the case of a priestess: I will return you to your native province. Her husband can, and therefore must, fulfill this clause just as he could if he had married a woman who is permitted to him.
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