Ketubot 54
כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה — לֵית לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: אִמַּהּ דַּעֲבַדָא אִיסּוּרָא — קַנְסוּהָ רַבָּנַן, אִיהִי, דְּלָא עֲבַדָא אִיסּוּרָא — לָא קַנְסוּהָ רַבָּנַן. תֵּיקוּ.
Once again the Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Since the Sages penalized the mother and declared that she does not have a marriage contract, the daughter does not have sustenance either, as her sustenance is guaranteed by her mother’s marriage contract. Or perhaps, with regard to her mother, who violated a prohibition, the Sages penalized her by depriving her of her marriage contract, whereas in the case of the daughter, who did not violate a prohibition, the Sages did not penalize her. Once again the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: בַּת אֲרוּסָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת? כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה — אִית לַהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן כְּתוּבָּה עַד שְׁעַת נִישּׂוּאִין — לֵית לַהּ, תֵּיקוּ.
Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of the daughter of a betrothed woman, i.e., a man betrothed a woman, fathered a daughter with her, and then died, does the daughter have the right to receive sustenance from his estate, or does she not have the right to receive sustenance? Since the mother has a marriage contract, as in this case the man wrote her a marriage contract after betrothing her, it may be argued that the daughter has the right to receive sustenance. Or perhaps, since the Sages did not enact any requirement for a man to provide his wife with a marriage contract until the time of marriage, the stipulations of the marriage contract do not apply until then, and therefore the daughter of this woman does not have the right to receive sustenance. Again, the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: בַּת אֲנוּסָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה מָנֶה.
Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a raped woman, i.e., a man raped a young woman, married her, had a child, and died, does she have the right to receive sustenance from her father’s estate or does she not have the right to receive sustenance from his estate? The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, do not raise this dilemma, as he said that a raped woman has a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, and therefore she is entitled to the stipulations of a marriage contract, one of which is that if she has a daughter with her husband, the daughter receives sustenance from the husband’s estate.
כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: יָצָא כֶּסֶף קְנָסָהּ בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, מַאי?
Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the money of her fine fulfilled his obligation to provide her with a marriage contract, i.e., since she has already received the fine in compensation for the rape, she is not entitled to further payment in the form of a marriage contract. According to this opinion, what is the halakha?
כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה, לֵית לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כְּתוּבָּה טַעְמָא מַאי — כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ, וְהָא — לָא מָצֵי מַפֵּיק לַהּ. תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara elaborates: It may be argued that since the mother does not have a marriage contract, the daughter does not have the right to receive sustenance from her father’s estate. Or perhaps one should consider the following: What is the reason that the marriage contract was enacted? So that his wife will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. And this one, his rape victim, he cannot divorce her by Torah law, as it is stated: “He may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). It was therefore unnecessary for the Sages to require that he provide the woman with a marriage contract. However, the reasons for the stipulations included in a marriage contract, e.g., that his daughter receives sustenance from his estate, still apply in this case. Consequently, the Sages stipulated that these provisions still be granted. Yet again the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
אַתְּ תְּהֵא יָתְבָא בְּבֵיתִי וְכוּ׳. תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״בְּבֵיתִי״ — וְלָא בְּבִיקְתִּי, אֲבָל מְזוֹנֵי אִית לַהּ. מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ מְזוֹנֵי נָמֵי לֵית לַהּ. וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי.
§ The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of a marriage contract is: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all your days as a widow. Rav Yosef taught: In my house, and not in my hovel [bikati]. If there is no room for her in his house, the heirs are not obligated to allow her to stay there. However, even in this case, she has the right to receive her sustenance from the heirs. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: She does not even have the right to receive her sustenance, as she is entitled to sustenance only when she lives in her husband’s house. If she resides elsewhere, for whatever reason, she does not receive this payment. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: תְּבָעוּהָ לְהִנָּשֵׂא וְנִתְפַּיְּיסָה — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. הָא לֹא נִתְפַּיְּיסָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת? אָמַר רַב עָנָן: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל: אָמְרָה ״מֵחֲמַת פְּלוֹנִי בַּעְלִי״ — יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, ״מֵחֲמַת בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁאֵינָן מְהוּגָּנִין לָהּ״ — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.
§ Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If a man proposed to marry a widow and she agreed, even if she has not yet married him, she no longer has the right to receive sustenance from the heirs of her previous husband. The Gemara comments: It may be inferred from here that if she had not agreed, even if the man had proposed marriage, she still has the right to receive sustenance. Rav Anan said: It was explained to me personally by Mar Shmuel that the halakha varies in different cases. If she said: I will not marry you due to so-and-so, my deceased husband, i.e., she still feels connected to him, she still has the right to receive sustenance from his estate. However, if she refused the offer because the men who approached her are people who are unsuitable for her, she does not have the right to continue to receive sustenance, as she has shown that in principle she is willing to remarry.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: זִינְּתָה — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: כִּיחֲלָה וּפִירְכְּסָה — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.
Rav Ḥisda said: If she engaged in licentious sexual relations she does not have the right to continue receiving sustenance from his estate, as she is not acting in a manner befitting a widow. Rav Yosef said: If she painted her eyes and dyed her hair she has clearly done so to attract men for the purposes of marriage, and therefore she does not have the right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate.
מַאן דְּאָמַר זִינְּתָה, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן כִּיחֲלָה וּפִירְכְּסָה. מַאן דְּאָמַר כִּיחֲלָה וּפִירְכְּסָה, אֲבָל זִינְּתָה אִית לַהּ, מַאי טַעְמָא — יֵצֶר אַנְסַהּ.
The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that a widow who engaged in licentious sexual relations loses her sustenance, all the more so if she painted her eyes and dyed her hair she loses her sustenance, as her intention to marry is evident. However, according to the one who says that if a widow painted her eyes and dyed her hair she forfeits her right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate, this ruling applies only to that particular situation. However, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she still has the right to receive sustenance from his estate. What is the reason? Her evil inclination forced her, i.e., she did not make a decision to remarry but merely succumbed to temptation.
וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּכֹל הָנֵי שְׁמַעְתָּתָא, אֶלָּא כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַתּוֹבַעַת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ בְּבֵית דִּין — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with all of these statements. Rather, the halakha is, in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who claims the payment specified in her marriage contract in court does not have the right to continue receiving sustenance, as she has thereby demonstrated her desire to sever her ties with her late husband.
וְלָא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: מָכְרָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וּמִשְׁכְּנָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, עָשְׂתָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי לְאַחֵר — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. הָנֵי — אִין, אֲבָל תּוֹבַעַת — לָא!
The Gemara asks: And does she not receive sustenance? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who sold her marriage contract, or used her marriage contract as collateral, or established her marriage contract as designated repayment [apoteiki] for a debt owed to another individual, she does not have the right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate? The Gemara infers from this baraita: In these cases, yes, she forfeits her right to continue to receive sustenance. However, in the case of a widow who claims her marriage contract, no, she does not lose the right to continue to receive sustenance.
הָנֵי, בֵּין בְּבֵית דִּין בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין. תּוֹבַעַת, בְּבֵית דִּין — אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין — לָא.
The Gemara answers that this argument is incorrect, and one should make the following inference instead: In these cases listed in the baraita, she forfeits her marriage contract whether she took the action in court or whether she did not do so in court. However, with regard to one who claims her marriage contract, if she issues this claim in court, yes, she loses the right to continue to receive her sustenance, but if her claim was not issued in court, no, she has not forfeited this right.
וְכָךְ הָיוּ אַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם וְכוּ׳. אִתְּמַר, רַב אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּאַנְשֵׁי יְהוּדָה, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּאַנְשֵׁי גָלִיל.
§ The mishna taught: And the residents of Jerusalem and of the Galilee would write the marriage contract in this manner, i.e., that if the woman is widowed, she may remain in her husband’s house and receive her sustenance from his property throughout her widowhood. Conversely, the residents of Judea would write that she may live in his house and be sustained from his estate until the heirs decide to give her the marriage contract. It was stated that the amora’im argued over this issue. Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of Judea, and Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of the Galilee and Jerusalem.
בָּבֶל וְכֹל פַּרְווֹדֶהָא נְהוּג כְּרַב, נְהַרְדְּעָא וְכֹל פַּרְווֹדֶהָא נְהוּג כִּשְׁמוּאֵל. הָהִיא בַּת מָחוֹזָא דַּהֲוָת נְסִיבָא לִנְהַרְדְּעָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, שַׁמְעַהּ לְקָלַהּ דְּבַת מָחוֹזָא הִיא.
The Gemara comments: Babylonia and all of its surrounding towns [parvadaha] act in accordance with the opinion of Rav; Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman of Meḥoza who was married to a man from Neharde’a. They came before Rav Naḥman to discuss her marriage contract. He heard from her voice that she was from Meḥoza, whose residents had a distinctive accent.
אֲמַר לְהוּ: בָּבֶל וְכׇל פַּרְווֹדֶהָא נְהוּג כְּרַב. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: וְהָא לִנְהַרְדְּעָא נְסִיבָא! אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי הָכִי, נְהַרְדְּעָא וְכׇל פַּרְווֹדֶהָא נְהוּג כִּשְׁמוּאֵל. וְעַד הֵיכָא נְהַרְדְּעָא — עַד הֵיכָא דְּסָגֵי קַבָּא דִנְהַרְדְּעָא.
Rav Naḥman said to them: Babylonia and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Rav. They said to him: But she is marrying a resident of Neharde’a. He said to them: If so, Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara asks: And until where is the boundary of Neharde’a? Up to any place where the kav measurement of Neharde’a is used. The entire area that utilizes the system of Neharde’a measurements is considered part of its surroundings for the purposes of this halakha.
אִיתְּמַר. אַלְמָנָה, רַב אָמַר: שָׁמִין מַה שֶּׁעָלֶיהָ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵין שָׁמִין מַה שֶּׁעָלֶיהָ. אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין: וְחִילּוּפָהּ בְּלָקִיט.
§ It was stated that the amora’im also argued about the halakha of a widow. Rav said: When she receives the payment of her marriage contract, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her and deducts their value from the payment she receives. And Shmuel said that the court does not appraise the clothes that are upon her. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said: And the reverse is the case with regard to a hired worker. With regard to a hired laborer who lived with his employer and the latter bought clothes for him, Rav and Shmuel disagreed as to whether these garments are appraised and their value deducted from the worker’s salary when he leaves his employer’s service. However, in this case Rav claims that his clothes are not appraised, whereas Shmuel maintains that they are appraised.
רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי: וְכֵן בְּלָקִיט. וּמַנַּח בַּהּ סִימָנָא: ״יַתְמָא וְאַרְמַלְתָּא שְׁלַח וּפוֹק״.
Conversely, Rav Kahana would teach: And likewise with regard to a hired worker, their respective opinions are the same in this case as well. Rav rules that one appraises the garments, while Shmuel claims that one does not. And he would apply a mnemonic device for Rav’s opinion: An orphan and a widow, disrobe and remove them. In other words, Rav maintains that both a widow and a hired worker, dubbed an orphan due to his typical poverty, should disrobe, as it were, when the court evaluates the payment to which they are entitled.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אַף עַל גַּב דִּתְנַן בְּמַתְנִיתִין כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב. דִּתְנַן: אֶחָד הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו, וְאֶחָד הַמַּעֲרִיךְ אֶת עַצְמוֹ — אֵין לוֹ לֹא בִּכְסוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא בִּכְסוּת בָּנָיו, וְלֹא בְּצֶבַע שֶׁצָּבַע לִשְׁמָן, וְלֹא בְּסַנְדָּלִים חֲדָשִׁים שֶׁלָּקַח לִשְׁמָן.
Rav Naḥman said: Even though we learned in a mishna in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. As we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 24a): With regard to both one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasurer has the right to take neither his wife’s clothing, nor his children’s clothing, nor new dyed clothing that he dyed specially for them, even if they have yet to wear them, nor new sandals that he bought for them. This mishna is apparently in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel that a woman’s garments are not considered her husband’s property.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: וְכִי מֵאַחַר דִּתְנַן מַתְנִיתִין כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, אַמַּאי הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִכְאוֹרָה כִּשְׁמוּאֵל רְהִיטָא, כִּי מְעַיְּינַתְּ בָּהּ — הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Once we have learned a mishna in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, why is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rav? He said to him: It would seem [likhora] that this mishna agrees with the opinion of Shmuel when it is skimmed through and read superficially. However, when you examine it you will see that the halakha is in fact in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
מַאי טַעְמָא? כִּי אַקְנִי לַהּ, אַדַּעְתָּא לְמֵיקַם קַמֵּיהּ. אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִשְׁקַל וּלְמִיפַּק — לָא אַקְנִי לַהּ.
What is the reason for this? When he bought her these clothes he did so with the intention that she should stand before him and wear them when she is with him. He did not buy them for her with the intention that she should take them and leave him. The reason for the mishna’s ruling is in fact that the husband acquires the clothes on behalf of his wife, but this applies only if she is living with him. Consequently, if she is living with him, the treasurer has no right to them. However, if she leaves him, she has no right to them, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
כַּלְּתָא דְּבֵי בַּר אֶלְיָשִׁיב הֲוָה קָא תָּבְעָה כְּתוּבְּתַהּ מִיַּתְמֵי. הֲוָה קָא מַמְטְיָא לְהוּ לְבֵי דִינָא, אָמְרִי: זִילָא לַן מִילְּתָא דְּתֵיזְלִי הָכִי. אֲזַלָא לְבֵישְׁתִּינְהוּ וְאִיכַּסִּתִינְהוּ לְכוּלֵּיהּ מָנָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבִינָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב, דְּאָמַר: אַלְמָנָה שָׁמִין מַה שֶּׁעָלֶיהָ.
§ The Gemara relates: The daughter-in-law of the house of the son of Elyashiv was claiming payment of her marriage contract from the orphans, and she was in the process of bringing them to the court. The orphans said to her: It is demeaning for us that you should go dressed in this manner, in house clothes. We would rather you come in more suitable attire. She went and dressed and covered herself with all of her clothes. They came before Ravina, who said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who said that with regard to a widow, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her. Therefore, the court takes everything she is wearing into account in the calculation of her marriage contract payment.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״נְדוּנְיָא לִבְרַת״. זַל נְדוּנְיָא. אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: פּוּרְנָא לְיַתְמֵי.
The Gemara relates another incident: A certain person said to his heirs, in his will: Give a dowry to my daughter. There was an established custom for the amount of money spent on a dowry, including clothing and jewelry. In the meantime, the cost of a dowry depreciated, i.e., all these items could be acquired with less money. The question arose concerning the difference between the amount the father wished to give her when he wrote the will and the sum they paid in practice. Rav Idi bar Avin said: The profit [purna], i.e., this difference in price, goes to the male orphans, not to the daughter.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ:
The Gemara cites a related incident: A certain person said to his heirs, in his will:
״אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי מִן חַמְרָא לִבְרַת״. אִיַּיקַּר חַמְרָא. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: רַוְוחָא לְיַתְמֵי.
Four hundred dinars of this wine you should give to my daughter, and the wine subsequently appreciated in value, so that some money remained. Rav Yosef said: The gain goes to the male orphans, i.e., they are entitled to the leftover sum.
קָרִיבֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֲוָה לְהוּ אִיתַּת אַבָּא דַּהֲוָה קָמַפְסְדָה מְזוֹנֵי. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֵיזִילוּ וֶאֱמַרוּ לֵיהּ לַאֲבוּכוֹן דִּנְיַיחֵד לַהּ אַרְעָא לִמְזוֹנַהּ.
The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan had a wife of their father who would diminish his resources by spending wastefully on her sustenance. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan to ask his advice. He said to them: Go and say to your father that he should set aside a certain portion of land for her sustenance. If she agrees to accept this land for her sustenance she has thereby relinquished her claim to the rest of the estate.
אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁרִיבָּה לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: וְהָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא אָמַר הָכִי! אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ הַבוּ לַהּ. וְאִי לָא, מַפֵּיקְנָא לְכוּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מֵאוּנַּיְיכוּ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לְהוּ: מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה? שֶׁכְּנֶגְדִּי חָלוּק עָלַי.
After their father died, they came before Reish Lakish for his ruling, and he said to them: All the more so, he has increased the sources of sustenance available to her. In other words, they are still obligated to support her from their father’s estate according to the lifestyle she is accustomed to living, and if they do not, she may use the field to supplement what they give her. They said to him: But Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say so. He said to them: Go and give her all she requires, and if not, I will remove for you Rabbi Yoḥanan from your ears, i.e., I will treat you so harshly that you will forget Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling. They approached Rabbi Yoḥanan to complain, but he said to them: What can I do? I cannot impose my opinion, as a man equal to me disagrees with me.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אָמַר ״לִמְזוֹנוֹת״ — רִיבָּה לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. אָמַר ״בִּמְזוֹנוֹת״ — קָצַץ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.
Rabbi Abbahu said: This matter was explained to me personally by Rabbi Yoḥanan. All depends on the husband’s description of the land. If he said that he is giving her land for her sustenance, he has thereby increased the sources of sustenance available to her. He will continue to provide her sustenance, but if that amount is insufficient he has also set aside an area of land specifically for that purpose. However, if he said to her that he is designating the land as her sustenance, he has thereby fixed this plot of land as the only source of sustenance available to her, and she can take no more.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ נַעֲרָה
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, אִם רָצָה לְהוֹסִיף אֲפִילּוּ מֵאָה מָנֶה — יוֹסִיף. נִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, בֵּין מִן הָאֵרוּסִין בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — גּוֹבָה אֶת הַכֹּל. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — גּוֹבָה אֶת הַכֹּל, מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב לָהּ אֶלָּא עַל מְנָת לְכוֹנְסָהּ.
MISHNA: Although they said as a principle that a virgin collects two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and that a widow collects one hundred dinars, if the husband wishes to add even an additional ten thousand dinars, he may add it. If she is then widowed or divorced, whether from betrothal or whether from marriage, she collects the entire amount, including the additional sum. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If she is widowed or divorced from marriage, she collects the total amount, but if she is widowed or divorced from betrothal, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. This is because he wrote the additional amount for her in the marriage contract only in order to marry her.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם רָצָה כּוֹתֵב לִבְתוּלָה שְׁטָר שֶׁל מָאתַיִם, וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ מָנֶה״, וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה וְהִיא כּוֹתֶבֶת ״הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי מִמְּךָ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַפּוֹחֵת לִבְתוּלָה מִמָּאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מִמָּנֶה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
Rabbi Yehuda says a related halakha with regard to the marriage contract: If he wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred dinars as is fitting for her, and she may then write a receipt stating: I received one hundred dinars from you. Even though she has not actually received the money, the receipt serves as a means for her to waive half of the amount due to her for her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the financial commitment in the marriage contract is a right due to the wife, which she may waive if she chooses to do so. And similarly, for a widow he may write one hundred dinars in the contract and she may write a receipt stating: I received from you fifty dinars. However, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to do this, as anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to less than than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marital relationship amounts to licentious sexual relations because it is as if he did not write any marriage contract at all.
גְּמָ׳ פְּשִׁיטָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: קִיצּוּתָא עֲבַדוּ רַבָּנַן שֶׁלֹּא לְבַיֵּישׁ אֶת מִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
GEMARA: The mishna states that if he wishes to add to the obligation in the marriage contract, he may do so. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if he wishes to add he may do so? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that the Sages instituted a fixed ceiling on the amount one may designate in the marriage contract, in order not to embarrass one who does not have sufficient funds, the mishna therefore teaches us that the Sages were not specific about this. If he wishes to add to the amount, he may do so.
אִם רָצָה לְהוֹסִיף כּוּ׳. ״רָצָה לִכְתּוֹב לָהּ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״רָצָה לְהוֹסִיף״. מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַיְבוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַיְבוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: תְּנַאי כְּתוּבָּה כִּכְתוּבָּה דָּמֵי.
§ The mishna states that if he wishes to add even ten thousand dinars to the marriage contract, he may do so. The Gemara comments: It does not teach: He wishes to write for her, rather: He wishes to add. This language indicates that the additional sum he wrote is added to the marriage contract itself, as opposed to being an independent obligation. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Aivu, who said what Rabbi Yannai said, as Rabbi Aivu said that Rabbi Yannai said: The stipulation in the marriage contract as well as additional amounts he chooses to add to the contract are comparable to the marriage contract itself.
נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ: לְמוֹכֶרֶת; וּלְמוֹחֶלֶת; לְמוֹרֶדֶת;
This principle produces a practical difference with regard to many issues. It is relevant to one who sells her marriage contract, indicating that such a sale includes the additional sum of the marriage contract; and to one who waives her marriage contract to her husband or his heirs, teaching that the additional sum is included in this relinquishing of rights to payment of the contract; and to a rebellious woman, from whom the court deducts a specific amount from her marriage contract each week until there is nothing left. These deductions come from the additional sum as well.
וּלְפוֹגֶמֶת; לְתוֹבַעַת; וּלְעוֹבֶרֶת עַל דָּת;
And this principle also results in a practical difference to one who vitiates her marriage contract, as one who states that she received part of the payment for her marriage contract does not receive the remainder without taking an oath, and the additional sum is included in this halakha; to one who demands payment for her marriage contract, as the Sages ruled that from the time she begins to demand the payment she waives her right to further sustenance, and this applies with regard to one who demands the additional sum as well; and to one who violates the precepts of halakha or of Jewish custom, who may be divorced without receiving payment for her marriage contract, including the additional sum.
