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Today's Daf Yomi

March 27, 2015 | 讝壮 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Ketubot 53

讞讝讬讬讛 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 砖讬谞谞讗 诇讗 转讬讛讜讬 讘注讘讜专讬 讗讞住谞转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讘专讗 讘讬砖讗 诇讘专讗 讟讘讗 讚诇讗 讬讚讬注讗 诪讗讬 讝专注讗 谞驻讬拽 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 诪讘专讗 诇讘专转讗

Rav Pappa saw that Yehuda bar Mareimar was not amenable to the idea of entering the house. He said to him: What is on your mind? Do you not wish to enter due to that which Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Shinnana, do not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance even from a bad son to a good son, as it is not known what seed will come from him? Perhaps the bad son will father worthy children. And all the more so, one should not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance from a son to a daughter.

讛讗讬 谞诪讬 转拽谞转讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诪讚注转讬讛 诇注砖讜讬讬讛 谞诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讟讜 诪讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讚注讜诇 讜注砖讬讬讛 注讜诇 讜诇讗 转注砖讬讬讛 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注诇讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讬讬谞讜 注砖讬讬讛

Rav Pappa continued: Are you worried that your arrival will pressure Abba of Sura to give his daughter a more substantial dowry? But this too is an ordinance of the Sages, that a father must provide a dowry for his daughter. This is as Rabbi Yo岣nan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i, as quoted above, that the Sages enacted this matter so that a man should take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: This applies only if the man gives of his own free will, but should one force him as well? Rav Pappa said to him: Did I say to you that you should enter and force him? I merely said that you should enter, but do not force him. He said to him: My very entrance is an act that will effectively force him, as he will increase her dowry in my honor.

讗讻驻讬讬讛 讜注讜诇 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜讬转讬讘 住讘专 讛讛讜讗 诪讬专转讞 专转讞 讻转讘讬讛 诇讻诇 诪讗讬 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇住讜祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬砖转注讬 诪专 讞讬讬 讚诪专 诇讗 砖讘讬拽讬 诪讬讚讬 诇谞驻砖讗讬

Eventually, Rav Pappa forced Yehuda bar Mareimar and he entered. He was silent, and sat without uttering a word. Abba of Sura thought that Yehuda bar Mareimar was angry with him for his failure to grant his daughter a suitable dowry. He therefore wrote down in the marriage contract all that he had as her dowry, to appease him. Ultimately, when he observed that Yehuda was still silent, Abba of Sura said to him: Even now the Master will not talk? By the Master鈥檚 life, I have left nothing for myself.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讚讻转讘转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 讗讛讚专 讘讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讜讬讬讛 谞驻砖讱 讛讚专谞讗 诇讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗

Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: If you are acting for my sake, that which you wrote is also not amenable to me. Finally understanding his wishes, Abba of Sura said to Yehuda bar Mareimar: Now too, I will retract, as I acted in error. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: I did not speak so that you should turn yourself into the kind of person who retracts once he gives his word. You should uphold your agreement, but the agreement was not to my liking.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 住讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讻专讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜转讘注讬 诇讱 诪讜讞诇转

Rav Yeimar the Elder raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If a wife sold her marriage contract to her husband, i.e., she sold him the right not to have to pay her the marriage contract if they divorce or if she is widowed, does she have the marriage document concerning male children, or does she not have the marriage document concerning male children? Rava said to him: And you can raise the same dilemma with regard to a wife who forgoes her right to her marriage contract. Does she retain the marriage document concerning male children in this case?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 诪讜讻专转 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讝讜讝讬 讗谞住讜讛 讚讗诪讬谞讗 讻诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪讞讜 诇讛 诪讗讛 注讜讻诇讬 讘注讜讻诇讗 诪讜讞诇转 诪讬讘注讬讗

Rav Yeimar said to him: Now, the halakha of one who sells her marriage contract is a dilemma for me. As, although there is room to say that the money forced her, and that I say that she is like one who is struck with a hundred strikes [ukelei] of a hammer [ukela], i.e., she needed liquid assets at the time and therefore she sold her marriage contract unwillingly, even so, I am still willing to entertain the possibility that she has sold the marriage document concerning male children. Then, with regard to one who forgoes her marriage contract, is it necessary to raise the dilemma?

讗诪专 专讘讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讗讞专讬诐 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讗谞住讜讛 诪讜讞诇转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞讬诇转讗

Rava said: It is obvious to me that if a wife sells her marriage contract to others, not to her husband but to someone else who is willing to pay at the present time for the chance to collect the money stated in her marriage contract if she is later divorced or widowed, she still has the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? The money forced her to sell, and she did not mean to renounce all her rights. It is likewise clear to me that one who forgoes the right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not have the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? She has forgiven it all and has no intention of claiming anything from her husband.

讘注讬 专讘讗 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讻诪讜讻专转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讚诪讬 讗讜 讻诪讜讞诇转 诇讘注诇讛 讚诪讬 讘转专 讚讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟讗 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘讛 诇讘注诇讛 讻诪讜讻专转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讚诪讬

However, Rava raised a dilemma about the following case: With regard to one who sells her marriage contract to her husband, is she considered like one who sells to others, i.e., she has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, or is she considered like one who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband, i.e., she has forfeited everything? After he raised the dilemma he subsequently resolved it: One who sells her marriage contract to her husband is considered like one who sells to others, as she is assumed to have done so due to financial constraints.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 诪转讛 讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讬讜专砖讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚转讛

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection: We learned in a mishna (Yevamot 87b) that if a woman鈥檚 husband went overseas, and after hearing the testimony of one witness that he was dead the woman married again, and then her first husband returned, both husbands must divorce her, and she does not receive payment of her marriage contract from either man. That mishna proceeds to state that if she died, neither the heirs of this one, the first husband, nor the heirs of that one, the second husband, inherit the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. And we discussed the following question: With regard to a marriage contract, what is its purpose? In other words, the mishna just said that she is not entitled to a marriage contract, so how can it even be suggested that the heirs might inherit it?

讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 讬爪专 讗谞住讛

And Rav Pappa said: This is referring to the marriage document concerning male children. Not only does she forfeit her marriage contract, but she also loses the right to the marriage document concerning male children, as her sons do not inherit from her at all. Rav Idi bar Avin explains his objection. But if, according to the above statement, a wife who sells her marriage contract has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, why does the mishna in Yevamot state that none of the woman鈥檚 heirs inherit the proceeds of her marriage contract? Here too, in that mishna, let us say that her desire to marry another man forced her to marry her second husband. Why should she forfeit the marriage document concerning male children?

讛转诐 拽谞住讗 讛讜讗 讚拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: There it is a penalty with which the Sages penalized her. In other words, the reason is not that she automatically forfeits the marriage document concerning male children, along with the marriage contract itself. Rather, her loss of the marriage document concerning male children is one of several penalties the Sages imposed upon her for remarrying on the basis of the testimony of a single witness without conducting her own thorough investigation into her husband鈥檚 fate. Therefore, one cannot learn from that halakha with regard to the issue at hand.

讬转讬讘 专讘讬谉 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讜讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讜讞诇转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚拽讗诪专转 诇讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 诪砖讬讘 专注讛 转讞转 讟讜讘讛 诇讗 转诪讜砖 专注讛 诪讘讬转讜

Ravin bar 岣nina sat before Rav 岣sda, and he sat and said the following halakha in the name of Rabbi Elazar: One who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not receive her sustenance from him. Rav 岣sda said to him: Had you not said this halakha to me in the name of a great man, I would have said to you that this is an injustice, in accordance with the verse 鈥渨ho rewards evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house鈥 (Proverbs 17:13). After she relinquishes to her husband her right to her marriage contract, which was a favor to her husband, she loses her sustenance as well.

讬转讬讘 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜注讜诇讗 讜讗讘讬诪讬 讘专 专讘 驻驻讬 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗诪讬 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讗转讗 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讻讬讘讗 讗专讜住转讜 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 拽讘专 讗讜 讛讘 诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讞讬讬讗 转谞讬谞讗 讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 诇讗 讗讜谞谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 诇讗 讗讜谞谞转 讜诇讗 诪讬讟诪讗讛 诇讜 诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 诪转 讛讜讗 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛

The Gemara relates: Rav Na岣an was sitting, and Ulla and Avimei bar Rav Pappi were sitting as well, and Rav 岣yya bar Ami was sitting with them, when a certain man came before them whose betrothed wife had died. They said to him: Go and bury her, or give her heirs the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. Rav 岣yya said to them, in surprise at their response: But we learned that with regard to one鈥檚 betrothed wife he neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest, and similarly, she neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for him. If she died he does not inherit from her, and if he died she collects payment of her marriage contract.

讟注诪讗 讚诪转 讛讜讗 讛讗 诪转讛 讛讬讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 诇讻砖转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬

Rav 岣yya infers the following from this statement: The reason for this halakha is that he died, from which it may be inferred that if she died she does not have a marriage contract, nor any of the stipulations of a marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that her marriage contract is canceled upon her death? Rav Hoshaya said: The reason is that I do not read with regard to her the condition stated in the marriage contract: When you marry another he may take what is written for you, as she cannot marry another.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗专讜住讛 砖诪转讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讘讬讬 讝讬诇讜 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara relates another incident: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Reish Lakish said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a marriage contract. Abaye said to the scholars who recited this halakha in Ravin鈥檚 name: Go, and say to Ravin:

砖拽讬诇讗 讟讬讘讜转讱 砖讚讬讗 讗讞讬讝专讬 讻讘专 转专讙诪讗 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 诇砖诪注转讬讛 讘讘讘诇

Your good is taken and cast on thorns, i.e., we do not owe you a debt of gratitude for informing us of this statement, as Rav Hoshaya himself already interpreted and ruled this halakha of yours in Babylonia.

讘谞谉 谞讜拽讘谉 讚讬讛讜讬讬谉 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讜讻讜壮 专讘 转谞讬 注讚 讚转诇拽讞谉 诇讙讜讘专讬谉 讜诇讜讬 转谞讬 注讚 讚转讘讙专谉 诇专讘 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘讙专 讜诇讜讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬谞住讬讘

搂 The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract is the clause: Any female children you will have from me will be sustained from my property. The Gemara notes that Rav would teach that the daughters are entitled to sustenance until they are taken as wives by men, and Levi would teach that they are entitled to sustenance until they become grown women. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav, are daughters entitled to sustenance even though they have become grown women, if they are still unmarried? Yet how can this be correct? After all, adult daughters are no longer under their father鈥檚 jurisdiction even in his lifetime. And can Levi possibly maintain that even though they are married they still receive sustenance from their father鈥檚 estate until they become grown women?

讗诇讗 讘讙专 讜诇讗 讗讬谞住讬讘 讗讬谞住讬讘 讜诇讗 讘讙专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讗专讜住讛 讜诇讗 讘讙专 讜讻谉 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讘诪转谞讬转讬讛 注讚 讚转讘讙专谉 讜讬诪讟讬 讝诪谞讬讛讜谉 讚讗讬谞住讘谉 转专转讬 讗诇讗 讗讜 转讘讙专谉 讗讜 讬诪讟讬 讝诪谞讬讛讜谉 诇讗讬转谞住讘讗

Rather, in a case where they became grown women and were not married, or were married and had not become grown women, everyone agrees that they are not entitled to sustenance. When they disagree it is with regard to a daughter who was betrothed and had not become a grown woman. Levi maintains that as she is still unmarried she remains under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction. And Levi likewise taught the following version of this stipulation in his baraita: Until they become grown women and the time arrives for their marriage. The Gemara asks: Are these two conditions both necessary? She leaves her father鈥檚 domain when one of these conditions is fulfilled. Rather, Levi means that they can continue to receive sustenance either until they become grown women or their time arrives for marriage.

讻转谞讗讬 注讚 诪转讬 讛讘转 谞讝讜谞讬转 注讚 砖转讗专住 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专讜 注讚 砖转讘讙专 转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 注讚 讚讬讛讜讜讬讬谉 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讜讬讛 讚讗讬专讜住讬谉 讗讜 讛讜讬讛 讚谞讬砖讜讗讬谉 转讬拽讜

The Gemara observes: The dispute between Rav and Levi is like a dispute between tanna鈥檌m. As we have learned: Until when is a daughter sustained from her father鈥檚 property? Until she is betrothed. In the name of Rabbi Elazar they said: Until she becomes a grown woman. Rav Yosef taught the version: Until they become married. The meaning of the expression: Until they become married, is unclear, and therefore a dilemma was raised before the scholars: Does this refer to becoming betrothed or to becoming married? No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讬 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪讬谞讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪住讘专讗 诇讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬专住讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚转讬转讝讬诇

Rav 岣sda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard anything from Rav Yehuda with regard to whether a betrothed orphan has sustenance from the brothers鈥 inheritance of their father鈥檚 estate, or whether she does not have sustenance? Rav Yosef said to him: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I can conclude that she does not have sustenance from the inheritance. The reason is that since her husband has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to request her sustenance from the inheritance, when he himself can provide for her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪住讘专讗 讗讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讙讜讛 诇讗 砖讚讬 讝讜讝讬 讘讻讚讬

Rav 岣sda said to Rav Yosef: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should have sustenance from the brothers. The reason is that since her husband is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 诪住讘专讗 讗讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讙讜讛 诇讗 砖讚讬 讝讜讝讬 讘讻讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪住讘专讗 诇讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬专住讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚转讬转讝讬诇

And some say a different version of this discussion. Rav Yosef said to Rav 岣sda: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I would say that she does have sustenance from the brothers: Since he is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing. In response, Rav 岣sda said to him: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should not have sustenance from the inheritance: Since he has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to ask the brothers for food, and he would rather provide for her himself.

住讬诪谉 讚讙讘专讬 砖拽 讝专祝 诪讗谞讛 讜讬讘诪讛 砖谞讬讛 讗专讜住讛 讜讗谞住讛

搂 The Gemara states a mnemonic device for the men, i.e., the Sages, who appear in the following discussion: Shin, kuf, zayin, reish, peh. This refers to Rav Sheshet, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rava, and Rav Pappa. The dilemmas themselves are listed in the following mnemonic: She refused, and a yevama, a secondary forbidden relationship, a betrothed woman, and woman who was raped.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 诪诪讗谞转 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

The Gemara analyzes these cases one by one: The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who refused, i.e., a minor orphan girl who was married off by her brothers or mother and then refused her husband, thereby nullifying the marriage, does she have sustenance from her father鈥檚 inheritance or does she not have sustenance? Is she considered to have been married, and therefore her right to sustenance has lapsed, or does her refusal nullify the marriage to the extent that it is as though she were never married at all, and therefore she is still entitled to sustenance?

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜讙专讜砖讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬谞讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in the following baraita: In the case of a widow in her father鈥檚 house, or a divorc茅e in her father鈥檚 house, or a widow awaiting her yavam in her father鈥檚 house, she has sustenance. Rabbi Yehuda says: If she is still in her father鈥檚 house she has sustenance; if she is not in her father鈥檚 house she does not have sustenance.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讬谞讜 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪诪讗谞转 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗讬转 诇讛 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诇讬转 诇讛

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is to all appearances the same as that of the first tanna. What is their dispute? Rather, is it not the case that there is a practical difference between them concerning a girl who refused her husband, as the first tanna maintains that she has sustenance, as her marriage has been annulled and it is as though it never occurred, and Rabbi Yehuda maintains that she does not have sustenance, as she permanently forfeited this right when she left her father鈥檚 house in marriage.

讘注讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘转 讬讘诪讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a yevama, i.e., a woman who married her yavam in levirate marriage and gave birth to a daughter before he passed away, does she have sustenance from the property of the yavam, i.e., the girl鈥檚 father, or does she not have sustenance?

讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诪专 讻转讜讘转讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 诇讬转 诇讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬 诇讬转 诇讛 诪专讗砖讜谉 转拽讬谞讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖谞讬 讗讬转 诇讛 转讬拽讜

The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Since the Master said that the payment of the marriage contract of a yevama is taken from the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam, her daughter should therefore not have rights to sustenance from the property of the yavam. Her sustenance is a stipulation of the marriage contract, which does not apply to the yavam. Or perhaps, since if she does not have enough to cover the amount of her marriage contract from the property of the first husband, the Sages enacted for her a marriage contract from the second one, i.e., the yavam. Therefore, her daughter should have sustenance from his property. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘转 砖谞讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship, i.e., a girl born to a man and women forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, whose mother is penalized by being deprived of a marriage contract, does her daughter have sustenance or does she not have sustenance?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Ketubot 53

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 53

讞讝讬讬讛 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诪讜讗诇 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 砖讬谞谞讗 诇讗 转讬讛讜讬 讘注讘讜专讬 讗讞住谞转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讘专讗 讘讬砖讗 诇讘专讗 讟讘讗 讚诇讗 讬讚讬注讗 诪讗讬 讝专注讗 谞驻讬拽 诪讬谞讬讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 诪讘专讗 诇讘专转讗

Rav Pappa saw that Yehuda bar Mareimar was not amenable to the idea of entering the house. He said to him: What is on your mind? Do you not wish to enter due to that which Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Shinnana, do not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance even from a bad son to a good son, as it is not known what seed will come from him? Perhaps the bad son will father worthy children. And all the more so, one should not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance from a son to a daughter.

讛讗讬 谞诪讬 转拽谞转讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诪讚注转讬讛 诇注砖讜讬讬讛 谞诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讟讜 诪讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 讚注讜诇 讜注砖讬讬讛 注讜诇 讜诇讗 转注砖讬讬讛 拽讗诪讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注诇讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讛讬讬谞讜 注砖讬讬讛

Rav Pappa continued: Are you worried that your arrival will pressure Abba of Sura to give his daughter a more substantial dowry? But this too is an ordinance of the Sages, that a father must provide a dowry for his daughter. This is as Rabbi Yo岣nan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i, as quoted above, that the Sages enacted this matter so that a man should take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: This applies only if the man gives of his own free will, but should one force him as well? Rav Pappa said to him: Did I say to you that you should enter and force him? I merely said that you should enter, but do not force him. He said to him: My very entrance is an act that will effectively force him, as he will increase her dowry in my honor.

讗讻驻讬讬讛 讜注讜诇 讗讬砖转讬拽 讜讬转讬讘 住讘专 讛讛讜讗 诪讬专转讞 专转讞 讻转讘讬讛 诇讻诇 诪讗讬 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇住讜祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬砖转注讬 诪专 讞讬讬 讚诪专 诇讗 砖讘讬拽讬 诪讬讚讬 诇谞驻砖讗讬

Eventually, Rav Pappa forced Yehuda bar Mareimar and he entered. He was silent, and sat without uttering a word. Abba of Sura thought that Yehuda bar Mareimar was angry with him for his failure to grant his daughter a suitable dowry. He therefore wrote down in the marriage contract all that he had as her dowry, to appease him. Ultimately, when he observed that Yehuda was still silent, Abba of Sura said to him: Even now the Master will not talk? By the Master鈥檚 life, I have left nothing for myself.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讚讻转讘转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 讗讛讚专 讘讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讜讬讬讛 谞驻砖讱 讛讚专谞讗 诇讗 拽讗诪讬谞讗

Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: If you are acting for my sake, that which you wrote is also not amenable to me. Finally understanding his wishes, Abba of Sura said to Yehuda bar Mareimar: Now too, I will retract, as I acted in error. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: I did not speak so that you should turn yourself into the kind of person who retracts once he gives his word. You should uphold your agreement, but the agreement was not to my liking.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 住讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讻专讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讜转讘注讬 诇讱 诪讜讞诇转

Rav Yeimar the Elder raised a dilemma before Rav Na岣an: If a wife sold her marriage contract to her husband, i.e., she sold him the right not to have to pay her the marriage contract if they divorce or if she is widowed, does she have the marriage document concerning male children, or does she not have the marriage document concerning male children? Rava said to him: And you can raise the same dilemma with regard to a wife who forgoes her right to her marriage contract. Does she retain the marriage document concerning male children in this case?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖转讗 诪讜讻专转 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讝讜讝讬 讗谞住讜讛 讚讗诪讬谞讗 讻诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪讞讜 诇讛 诪讗讛 注讜讻诇讬 讘注讜讻诇讗 诪讜讞诇转 诪讬讘注讬讗

Rav Yeimar said to him: Now, the halakha of one who sells her marriage contract is a dilemma for me. As, although there is room to say that the money forced her, and that I say that she is like one who is struck with a hundred strikes [ukelei] of a hammer [ukela], i.e., she needed liquid assets at the time and therefore she sold her marriage contract unwillingly, even so, I am still willing to entertain the possibility that she has sold the marriage document concerning male children. Then, with regard to one who forgoes her marriage contract, is it necessary to raise the dilemma?

讗诪专 专讘讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讗讞专讬诐 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讗谞住讜讛 诪讜讞诇转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞讬诇转讗

Rava said: It is obvious to me that if a wife sells her marriage contract to others, not to her husband but to someone else who is willing to pay at the present time for the chance to collect the money stated in her marriage contract if she is later divorced or widowed, she still has the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? The money forced her to sell, and she did not mean to renounce all her rights. It is likewise clear to me that one who forgoes the right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not have the marriage document concerning male children. What is the reason? She has forgiven it all and has no intention of claiming anything from her husband.

讘注讬 专讘讗 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讻诪讜讻专转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讚诪讬 讗讜 讻诪讜讞诇转 诇讘注诇讛 讚诪讬 讘转专 讚讘注讬讗 讛讚专 驻砖讟讗 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘讛 诇讘注诇讛 讻诪讜讻专转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讚诪讬

However, Rava raised a dilemma about the following case: With regard to one who sells her marriage contract to her husband, is she considered like one who sells to others, i.e., she has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, or is she considered like one who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband, i.e., she has forfeited everything? After he raised the dilemma he subsequently resolved it: One who sells her marriage contract to her husband is considered like one who sells to others, as she is assumed to have done so due to financial constraints.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 诪转讛 讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讜讗讬谉 讬讜专砖讬谉 砖诇 讝讛 讬讜专砖讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚转讛

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection: We learned in a mishna (Yevamot 87b) that if a woman鈥檚 husband went overseas, and after hearing the testimony of one witness that he was dead the woman married again, and then her first husband returned, both husbands must divorce her, and she does not receive payment of her marriage contract from either man. That mishna proceeds to state that if she died, neither the heirs of this one, the first husband, nor the heirs of that one, the second husband, inherit the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. And we discussed the following question: With regard to a marriage contract, what is its purpose? In other words, the mishna just said that she is not entitled to a marriage contract, so how can it even be suggested that the heirs might inherit it?

讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 讬爪专 讗谞住讛

And Rav Pappa said: This is referring to the marriage document concerning male children. Not only does she forfeit her marriage contract, but she also loses the right to the marriage document concerning male children, as her sons do not inherit from her at all. Rav Idi bar Avin explains his objection. But if, according to the above statement, a wife who sells her marriage contract has not relinquished the marriage document concerning male children, why does the mishna in Yevamot state that none of the woman鈥檚 heirs inherit the proceeds of her marriage contract? Here too, in that mishna, let us say that her desire to marry another man forced her to marry her second husband. Why should she forfeit the marriage document concerning male children?

讛转诐 拽谞住讗 讛讜讗 讚拽谞住讜讛 专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: There it is a penalty with which the Sages penalized her. In other words, the reason is not that she automatically forfeits the marriage document concerning male children, along with the marriage contract itself. Rather, her loss of the marriage document concerning male children is one of several penalties the Sages imposed upon her for remarrying on the basis of the testimony of a single witness without conducting her own thorough investigation into her husband鈥檚 fate. Therefore, one cannot learn from that halakha with regard to the issue at hand.

讬转讬讘 专讘讬谉 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讜讬转讬讘 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讜讞诇转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚拽讗诪专转 诇讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱 诪砖讬讘 专注讛 转讞转 讟讜讘讛 诇讗 转诪讜砖 专注讛 诪讘讬转讜

Ravin bar 岣nina sat before Rav 岣sda, and he sat and said the following halakha in the name of Rabbi Elazar: One who forgoes her right to collect her marriage contract from her husband does not receive her sustenance from him. Rav 岣sda said to him: Had you not said this halakha to me in the name of a great man, I would have said to you that this is an injustice, in accordance with the verse 鈥渨ho rewards evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house鈥 (Proverbs 17:13). After she relinquishes to her husband her right to her marriage contract, which was a favor to her husband, she loses her sustenance as well.

讬转讬讘 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜注讜诇讗 讜讗讘讬诪讬 讘专 专讘 驻驻讬 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗诪讬 讙讘讬讬讛讜 讗转讗 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讻讬讘讗 讗专讜住转讜 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 拽讘专 讗讜 讛讘 诇讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讞讬讬讗 转谞讬谞讗 讗砖转讜 讗专讜住讛 诇讗 讗讜谞谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 诇讗 讗讜谞谞转 讜诇讗 诪讬讟诪讗讛 诇讜 诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 诪转 讛讜讗 讙讜讘讛 讻转讜讘转讛

The Gemara relates: Rav Na岣an was sitting, and Ulla and Avimei bar Rav Pappi were sitting as well, and Rav 岣yya bar Ami was sitting with them, when a certain man came before them whose betrothed wife had died. They said to him: Go and bury her, or give her heirs the sum stipulated in her marriage contract. Rav 岣yya said to them, in surprise at their response: But we learned that with regard to one鈥檚 betrothed wife he neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest, and similarly, she neither assumes the status of an acute mourner nor becomes ritually impure for him. If she died he does not inherit from her, and if he died she collects payment of her marriage contract.

讟注诪讗 讚诪转 讛讜讗 讛讗 诪转讛 讛讬讗 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 砖讗讬谉 讗谞讬 拽讜专讗 讘讛 诇讻砖转谞砖讗讬 诇讗讞专 转讟诇讬 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 诇讬讻讬

Rav 岣yya infers the following from this statement: The reason for this halakha is that he died, from which it may be inferred that if she died she does not have a marriage contract, nor any of the stipulations of a marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that her marriage contract is canceled upon her death? Rav Hoshaya said: The reason is that I do not read with regard to her the condition stated in the marriage contract: When you marry another he may take what is written for you, as she cannot marry another.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗专讜住讛 砖诪转讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讘讬讬 讝讬诇讜 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara relates another incident: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Reish Lakish said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a marriage contract. Abaye said to the scholars who recited this halakha in Ravin鈥檚 name: Go, and say to Ravin:

砖拽讬诇讗 讟讬讘讜转讱 砖讚讬讗 讗讞讬讝专讬 讻讘专 转专讙诪讗 专讘 讛讜砖注讬讗 诇砖诪注转讬讛 讘讘讘诇

Your good is taken and cast on thorns, i.e., we do not owe you a debt of gratitude for informing us of this statement, as Rav Hoshaya himself already interpreted and ruled this halakha of yours in Babylonia.

讘谞谉 谞讜拽讘谉 讚讬讛讜讬讬谉 诇讬讻讬 诪讬谞讗讬 讜讻讜壮 专讘 转谞讬 注讚 讚转诇拽讞谉 诇讙讜讘专讬谉 讜诇讜讬 转谞讬 注讚 讚转讘讙专谉 诇专讘 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘讙专 讜诇讜讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬谞住讬讘

搂 The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract is the clause: Any female children you will have from me will be sustained from my property. The Gemara notes that Rav would teach that the daughters are entitled to sustenance until they are taken as wives by men, and Levi would teach that they are entitled to sustenance until they become grown women. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav, are daughters entitled to sustenance even though they have become grown women, if they are still unmarried? Yet how can this be correct? After all, adult daughters are no longer under their father鈥檚 jurisdiction even in his lifetime. And can Levi possibly maintain that even though they are married they still receive sustenance from their father鈥檚 estate until they become grown women?

讗诇讗 讘讙专 讜诇讗 讗讬谞住讬讘 讗讬谞住讬讘 讜诇讗 讘讙专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讗专讜住讛 讜诇讗 讘讙专 讜讻谉 转谞讬 诇讜讬 讘诪转谞讬转讬讛 注讚 讚转讘讙专谉 讜讬诪讟讬 讝诪谞讬讛讜谉 讚讗讬谞住讘谉 转专转讬 讗诇讗 讗讜 转讘讙专谉 讗讜 讬诪讟讬 讝诪谞讬讛讜谉 诇讗讬转谞住讘讗

Rather, in a case where they became grown women and were not married, or were married and had not become grown women, everyone agrees that they are not entitled to sustenance. When they disagree it is with regard to a daughter who was betrothed and had not become a grown woman. Levi maintains that as she is still unmarried she remains under her father鈥檚 jurisdiction. And Levi likewise taught the following version of this stipulation in his baraita: Until they become grown women and the time arrives for their marriage. The Gemara asks: Are these two conditions both necessary? She leaves her father鈥檚 domain when one of these conditions is fulfilled. Rather, Levi means that they can continue to receive sustenance either until they become grown women or their time arrives for marriage.

讻转谞讗讬 注讚 诪转讬 讛讘转 谞讝讜谞讬转 注讚 砖转讗专住 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讗诪专讜 注讚 砖转讘讙专 转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 注讚 讚讬讛讜讜讬讬谉 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛讜讬讛 讚讗讬专讜住讬谉 讗讜 讛讜讬讛 讚谞讬砖讜讗讬谉 转讬拽讜

The Gemara observes: The dispute between Rav and Levi is like a dispute between tanna鈥檌m. As we have learned: Until when is a daughter sustained from her father鈥檚 property? Until she is betrothed. In the name of Rabbi Elazar they said: Until she becomes a grown woman. Rav Yosef taught the version: Until they become married. The meaning of the expression: Until they become married, is unclear, and therefore a dilemma was raised before the scholars: Does this refer to becoming betrothed or to becoming married? No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讬 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪讬谞讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪住讘专讗 诇讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬专住讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚转讬转讝讬诇

Rav 岣sda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard anything from Rav Yehuda with regard to whether a betrothed orphan has sustenance from the brothers鈥 inheritance of their father鈥檚 estate, or whether she does not have sustenance? Rav Yosef said to him: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I can conclude that she does not have sustenance from the inheritance. The reason is that since her husband has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to request her sustenance from the inheritance, when he himself can provide for her.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪住讘专讗 讗讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讙讜讛 诇讗 砖讚讬 讝讜讝讬 讘讻讚讬

Rav 岣sda said to Rav Yosef: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should have sustenance from the brothers. The reason is that since her husband is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 诪住讘专讗 讗讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讙讜讛 诇讗 砖讚讬 讝讜讝讬 讘讻讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖诪注 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讱 诪住讘专讗 诇讬转 诇讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬专住讛 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚转讬转讝讬诇

And some say a different version of this discussion. Rav Yosef said to Rav 岣sda: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I would say that she does have sustenance from the brothers: Since he is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing. In response, Rav 岣sda said to him: If you have not heard this halakha, by logical reasoning she should not have sustenance from the inheritance: Since he has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to ask the brothers for food, and he would rather provide for her himself.

住讬诪谉 讚讙讘专讬 砖拽 讝专祝 诪讗谞讛 讜讬讘诪讛 砖谞讬讛 讗专讜住讛 讜讗谞住讛

搂 The Gemara states a mnemonic device for the men, i.e., the Sages, who appear in the following discussion: Shin, kuf, zayin, reish, peh. This refers to Rav Sheshet, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rava, and Rav Pappa. The dilemmas themselves are listed in the following mnemonic: She refused, and a yevama, a secondary forbidden relationship, a betrothed woman, and woman who was raped.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘 砖砖转 诪诪讗谞转 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

The Gemara analyzes these cases one by one: The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who refused, i.e., a minor orphan girl who was married off by her brothers or mother and then refused her husband, thereby nullifying the marriage, does she have sustenance from her father鈥檚 inheritance or does she not have sustenance? Is she considered to have been married, and therefore her right to sustenance has lapsed, or does her refusal nullify the marriage to the extent that it is as though she were never married at all, and therefore she is still entitled to sustenance?

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 砖砖转 转谞讬转讜讛 讗诇诪谞讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜讙专讜砖讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬谞讛 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in the following baraita: In the case of a widow in her father鈥檚 house, or a divorc茅e in her father鈥檚 house, or a widow awaiting her yavam in her father鈥檚 house, she has sustenance. Rabbi Yehuda says: If she is still in her father鈥檚 house she has sustenance; if she is not in her father鈥檚 house she does not have sustenance.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讬谞讜 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪诪讗谞转 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗讬转 诇讛 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 诇讬转 诇讛

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is to all appearances the same as that of the first tanna. What is their dispute? Rather, is it not the case that there is a practical difference between them concerning a girl who refused her husband, as the first tanna maintains that she has sustenance, as her marriage has been annulled and it is as though it never occurred, and Rabbi Yehuda maintains that she does not have sustenance, as she permanently forfeited this right when she left her father鈥檚 house in marriage.

讘注讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘转 讬讘诪讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a yevama, i.e., a woman who married her yavam in levirate marriage and gave birth to a daughter before he passed away, does she have sustenance from the property of the yavam, i.e., the girl鈥檚 father, or does she not have sustenance?

讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诪专 讻转讜讘转讛 注诇 谞讻住讬 讘注诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 诇讬转 诇讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬 诇讬转 诇讛 诪专讗砖讜谉 转拽讬谞讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 诪砖谞讬 讗讬转 诇讛 转讬拽讜

The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Since the Master said that the payment of the marriage contract of a yevama is taken from the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam, her daughter should therefore not have rights to sustenance from the property of the yavam. Her sustenance is a stipulation of the marriage contract, which does not apply to the yavam. Or perhaps, since if she does not have enough to cover the amount of her marriage contract from the property of the first husband, the Sages enacted for her a marriage contract from the second one, i.e., the yavam. Therefore, her daughter should have sustenance from his property. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘转 砖谞讬讛 讬砖 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讜转

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship, i.e., a girl born to a man and women forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, whose mother is penalized by being deprived of a marriage contract, does her daughter have sustenance or does she not have sustenance?

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