Ketubot 58
קוּבְיוּסְטוּס — הִגִּיעוֹ. מַאי אִיכָּא — לִסְטִים מְזוּיָּין אוֹ מוּכְתָּב לַמַּלְכוּת, הָנְהוּ קָלָא אִית לְהוּ.
a gambler [kuvyustus], it has come to him, meaning that the seller has caught the buyer in a binding transaction, and he cannot annul the sale due to this kind of defect, as these characteristics are common in slaves. What is the halakha if it was discovered that the slave was an armed bandit or that the king had signed his death warrant, and there is a danger that the government will catch him and execute him? These are serious and uncommon defects that in principle could invalidate a sale. However, these defects generate publicity. In such unusual and severe circumstances, everyone is aware of them. Therefore, it is assumed that the buyer knew about them as well and nevertheless acquiesced to buy the slave. Consequently, there is no reason to revoke the sale of a slave.
מִכְּדִי, בֵּין לְמָר וּבֵין לְמָר לָא אָכְלָה, מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ קִבֵּל, מָסַר, וְהָלַךְ.
The Gemara asks: After all, according to this Sage, Ulla, and according to that Sage, Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda, she may not partake of teruma, so what is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in cases where he accepted, or he transferred or went. If the husband explicitly accepted her blemishes, there is no concern with regard to abrogation, but there is still a concern that she will give her family members teruma wine. Conversely, if the father transferred his daughter to the agents of the husband and entrusted her to their care, or if the father’s own agents went with the girl and the agents of the husband, there is no longer concern that she might give her family members teruma, as she is not with them, but there is still a concern about abrogation.
רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: נוֹתְנִין לָהּ הַכֹּל תְּרוּמָה וְכוּ׳. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבַת כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן, אֲבָל בְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֶחֱצָה חוּלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה.
§ The mishna states that there is a dispute with regard to how a priest must provide for the sustenance of his betrothed once the appointed time for the marriage arrives. Rabbi Tarfon says: He may give her everything from teruma. Rabbi Akiva says: He must give her half non-sacred food and half may be teruma. Abaye said: This dispute is referring to a daughter of a priest betrothed to a priest. But with regard to an Israelite woman who was betrothed to a priest, all agree that he must give her half non-sacred food and half may be teruma. A priest’s daughter is familiar with the halakhot of teruma and knows how to handle it when she is ritually impure, but when an Israelite woman is not yet familiar with these procedures, there is concern that she might defile the teruma. Consequently, she is given some non-sacred food to use as well.
וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַחְלוֹקֶת בַּאֲרוּסָה, אֲבָל בִּנְשׂוּאָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֶחֱצָה חוּלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה.
And Abaye also said that this dispute is referring only to a betrothed woman whose wedding date has arrived, but with regard to a married woman, all agree that her husband must give her half of her needs from non-sacred food and half may be teruma, as it is not appropriate for his wife to have to go to the trouble of selling teruma in order to obtain non-sacred food.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: נוֹתְנִין לָהּ הַכֹּל תְּרוּמָה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מֶחֱצָה חוּלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּבַת כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן, אֲבָל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֶחֱצָה חוּלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בַּאֲרוּסָה, אֲבָל בִּנְשׂוּאָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֶחֱצָה חוּלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה.
This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Tarfon says: He may give her everything from teruma, and Rabbi Akiva says: Half must be non-sacred food and half may be teruma. In what case is this statement said? With regard to a daughter of a priest betrothed to a priest. But with regard to an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, all agree that she gets half non-sacred food and half may be teruma. In what case is this statement said? With regard to a betrothed woman, but with regard to a married woman, all agree that he must give half non-sacred food and half may be teruma.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא אוֹמֵר: נוֹתְנִין לָהּ שְׁתֵּי יָדוֹת שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה, וְאַחַת שֶׁל חוּלִּין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לָהּ הַכֹּל תְּרוּמָה, וְהִיא מוֹכֶרֶת וְלוֹקַחַת בַּדָּמִים חוּלִּין. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּזְכְּרָה תְּרוּמָה — נוֹתְנִין לָהּ כִּפְלַיִם בְּחוּלִּין.
Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: He need not give half and half, but rather he may give her two parts teruma and one part non-sacred food. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may give her all of it in teruma, but as the value of teruma is lower than that of non-sacred food, the amount must suffice so that when she sells teruma during the days when she is ritually impure, she can buy a sufficient quantity of non-sacred food with the money. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Wherever teruma is mentioned, he must give her double the amount that she would receive of non-sacred food, so that she will not have difficulty locating buyers for her teruma. Teruma is less popular and its price is significantly lower, since its use is restricted. But if she receives a large amount of teruma, she will be able to sell it at an even lower price and locate a buyer more easily.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ טִירְחָא.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to effort. According to Rabbi Yehuda, she must make an effort to find buyers who will provide her with enough non-sacred food for her needs, and consequently, according to him the husband must provide an amount of teruma that is equal in value to the amount of non-sacred food to which she is entitled. In contrast, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds additional teruma to her allotment beyond this amount, so that she will not be forced to go to as much trouble to sell it.
הַיָּבָם אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל בִּתְרוּמָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהַאי קִנְיָן דְּאָחִיו הוּא.
§ The mishna states that a yavam does not enable the yevama to partake of teruma. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “The acquisition of his money” (Leviticus 22:11) may partake of teruma, but this woman is his brother’s acquisition and not his, since a yavam does not complete his marriage to the yevama until he consummates the marriage.
עָשְׂתָה שִׁשָּׁה חֳדָשִׁים בִּפְנֵי הַבַּעַל. הַשְׁתָּא בִּפְנֵי הַבַּעַל אָמְרַתְּ לָא, בִּפְנֵי הַיָּבָם מִיבַּעְיָא?! ״זוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר זוֹ״ קָתָנֵי.
§ The mishna said that if she completed six months from the time of the request for marriage under the aegis of the husband and another six months under the aegis of the yavam, she may not partake of teruma. It then says that this is also true if she completed most of the year under the aegis of the husband, and then it says that this is also true if she completed most of the time under the aegis of the yavam. The Gemara asks: Now that you say that if she completed most of the time under the aegis of the husband this does not enable her to partake of teruma, is it necessary to say that the same is true if she spent most of the time under the aegis of the yavam? The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that, meaning that the cases are organized from the less obvious to the more obvious.
זוֹ מִשְׁנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר עוּלָּא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה: מִשּׁוּם סִימְפּוֹן.
§ The mishna states that this ruling, that a woman betrothed to a priest may partake of teruma while she is still in her father’s house if the time for her wedding has arrived, is according to the initial version of the mishna. But that according to the final version, she may not partake of teruma until she has actually entered the wedding canopy. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this later ruling? Ulla said, and some say that Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said, that it is due to concern about abrogation, as the woman may have some blemish that will cause the annulment of the marriage, and it will then be clear that she consumed teruma unlawfully.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְעוּלָּא, קַמַּיְיתָא שֶׁמָּא יִמְזְגוּ לָהּ כּוֹס בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, וּבָתְרָיְיתָא מִשּׁוּם סִימְפּוֹן.
The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the opinion of Ulla, the first ruling that the Sages taught in the initial version of the mishna, namely that she may not partake of teruma in her father’s house immediately after betrothal, is because Ulla was concerned lest someone pour her a cup of teruma wine while she would be in her father’s house. And the latter ruling, that she may not partake of teruma until she actually enters the wedding canopy, even after the time for marriage arrives, is due to concern about abrogation. Consequently, there are two different reasons for the two different rulings.
אֶלָּא לְרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, קַמַּיְיתָא מִשּׁוּם סִימְפּוֹן וּבָתְרָיְיתָא מִשּׁוּם סִימְפּוֹן, מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?
However, according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, the first ruling was due to abrogation and the latter ruling was also due to abrogation. If so, what is the difference between the reasoning of the initial version of the mishna and the decision of the court that convened after them?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ בְּדִיקַת חוּץ. מָר סָבַר: בְּדִיקַת חוּץ — שְׁמָהּ בְּדִיקָה. וּמָר סָבַר: בְּדִיקַת חוּץ — לֹא שְׁמָהּ בְּדִיקָה.
The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to superficial investigation, i.e., the investigation that could have been conducted on his behalf by his female relatives, which could have been only a superficial investigation. One Sage holds that superficial investigation is considered a valid investigation, and therefore once he requested to marry her and the marriage date arrived, there is no concern of a later abrogation, and one Sage holds that superficial investigation is not considered a valid investigation, and consequently there is still concern that when he consummates the marriage he will find some blemish on her and abrogate the marriage.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּקְדִּישׁ מַעֲשֵׂה יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ — הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת. הַמּוֹתָר, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֶקְדֵּשׁ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין.
MISHNA: If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, meaning anything she produces, such as thread that she spins from wool, which, according to the Sages’ ordinance, belongs to her husband, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. However, there is a dispute with regard to the surplus, meaning any earnings she produces in excess of the amount she is required to produce for her husband. Rabbi Meir says: The surplus is consecrated property, and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says: The surplus is also non-sacred.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה לוֹמַר לְבַעְלָהּ ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״. קָסָבַר: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן מְזוֹנֵי — עִיקָּר, וּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה. וְכִי אָמְרָה ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״ — הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדָהּ.
GEMARA: Rav Huna said that Rav said: A woman may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. He holds that when the Sages instituted the various obligations and rights of a husband and wife, the husband’s obligation to provide for the wife’s sustenance was the primary one, and they then decreed that her earnings belong to him in return, due to concern about animosity. If he would be obligated to provide for her sustenance but she would be allowed to work and keep her earnings, he would resent her. Since her right to sustenance is the primary one, if she says: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, she has permission to do so. As the arrangement was established for her benefit, she may cancel it if it is not suitable for her.
מֵיתִיבִי: תִּקְּנוּ מְזוֹנוֹת תַּחַת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ! אֵימָא: תִּקְּנוּ מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ תַּחַת מְזוֹנוֹת.
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: They instituted the husband’s responsibility for her sustenance in exchange for his right to her earnings. This indicates that the primary enactment is the husband’s right to his wife’s earnings, and the ordinance that requires him to provide her with sustenance comes as a result. According to this, the wife would not be allowed to waive the arrangement, contrary to Rav Huna’s statement. The Gemara responds: Emend the text of the baraita and say instead: They instituted her earnings in exchange for the husband’s responsibility for her sustenance.
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ מַעֲשֵׂה יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ — הֲרֵי הִיא עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת. מַאי לָאו, בְּנִיזּוֹנֶת? לָא, בְּשֶׁאֵינָהּ נִיזּוֹנֶת.
The Gemara raises an objection: Let us say that the mishna supports Rav Huna’s opinion, as it is taught: If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings. What, is it not discussing a woman who is sustained by her husband, meaning that he is willing to sustain her, although she relinquishes her right to sustenance in accordance with Rav Huna’s principle? Therefore, her earnings do not belong to him to consecrate. The Gemara answers: No, it is discussing a woman who is not sustained by her husband, as he does not have sufficient funds to sustain her. Consequently, there is no proof with regard to Rav Huna’s statement.
אִי בְּשֶׁאֵינָהּ נִיזּוֹנֶת, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״ — הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּעֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי, דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״עִמָּךְ״, אֲבָל עֶבֶד עִבְרִי, דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ ״עִמָּךְ״ — לָא, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן אִשְׁתּוֹ!
The Gemara asks: If it is discussing a woman who is not sustained, what is the purpose of stating that he may not consecrate her earnings? Even according to the one who says that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you, this applies only to a Canaanite slave, about whom it is not written: “With you.” But with regard to a Hebrew slave about whom it is written: “It is good for him with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), this does not apply, and the master must sustain him just as he sustains the members of his own household. And this is true all the more so with regard to his wife, as there is a specific obligation of sustenance. Consequently, if he does not do so, he certainly has no right to her earnings.
סֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ: מוֹתָר, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֶקְדֵּשׁ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין.
The Gemara answers: This halakha did not need to be stated, but the latter clause was necessary, as it contains a novelty with regard to the surplus: Rabbi Meir says that the surplus is consecrated property, and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says it is non-sacred.
וּפְלִיגָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לָא תֵּימָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם. אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְכוּפָּהּ לְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ — נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַיִךְ לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶם״.
The Gemara comments: This opinion of Rav Huna disputes that of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: Do not say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is that since he maintains that a person may consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, the consecration can take effect even on her future earnings. Rather, say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is that since he can compel her to produce her earnings for him, it is as if he had a certain legal claim to the products of her hands, i.e., her earnings. Consequently, he is considered as if he had said to her: Your hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and the consecration can therefore take effect on something that already exists. Since Reish Lakish said that he may compel her to produce earnings for him, the implication is that she may not say: I will not be sustained and I will not work.
וְהָא לָא אֲמַר לַהּ הָכִי! כֵּיוָן דְּשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר: אֵין אָדָם מוֹצִיא דְּבָרָיו לְבַטָּלָה — נַעֲשֶׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַיִךְ לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶם״.
With regard to Reish Lakish’s statement, the Gemara asks: But he did not say this to her; rather, he said that he was consecrating her earnings. The Gemara answers: Since we heard that Rabbi Meir said: A person does not say things for naught, and according to this principle, when one says something that has no halakhic meaning, it is interpreted as if he had said something that does have halakhic relevance, he is considered as if he had said to her: Your hands are consecrated to the One Who made them.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֵין אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם? וְהָתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, אוֹ: ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, אוֹ ״שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, אוֹ: ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Meir hold that a person may not consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world? Isn’t it taught in a baraita that if a gentile says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; or if she was a gentile and he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after you convert; or if he was a slave and said to her: After I am emancipated; or if she was a maidservant and he said to her: After you are emancipated; or if she was married and he said to her: After your husband dies; or if he was married to her sister and he said: After your sister dies, as at that point the betrothal could take effect; or if she was a widow waiting for her yavam and he said to her: After your yavam performs ḥalitza with you, Rabbi Meir says: If any of these cases occurred, she is betrothed. Apparently Rabbi Meir maintains that betrothal can take effect even on something that has not yet come into being.
מֵהַהִיא — אִין, מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara answers: Actually, from that baraita, one can learn that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion, but Reish Lakish merely wanted to say that no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as it is possible to explain Rabbi Meir’s words in another way, based on the principle that a person does not say things for naught.
הַמּוֹתָר, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר הֶקְדֵּשׁ. אֵימַת קָדוֹשׁ? רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַויְיהוּ: מוֹתָר לְאַחַר מִיתָה קָדוֹשׁ. רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר: מוֹתָר מֵחַיִּים קָדוֹשׁ.
§ The mishna states that with regard to the surplus, Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated property. The Gemara asks: According to this opinion, when does the surplus amount become consecrated? Rav and Shmuel both said: The surplus is consecrated only after the woman’s death. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The surplus is consecrated while she is still alive.
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב פָּפָּא: בְּמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וּמַעֲלֶה לָהּ מָעָה כֶּסֶף לִצְרָכֶיהָ — מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר מִיתָה קָדוֹשׁ?
Rav Pappa discussed it, as he was perplexed by this dispute: With regard to what do they argue? If we say that the husband provides for her sustenance and additionally provides her with a silver ma’a coin every week for the rest of her needs, as he is obligated to do (see 64b), then what is the reason for the opinion of the one who said it is consecrated only after her death? As the husband has fulfilled all of his obligations and is consequently the owner of his wife’s earnings, he should be capable of consecrating them.
וְאֶלָּא כְּשֶׁאֵין מַעֲלֶה לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וְלֹא מַעֲלֶה לָהּ מָעָה כֶּסֶף לִצְרָכֶיהָ — מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מֵחַיִּים קָדוֹשׁ?
And if we rather say that he does not provide for her sustenance and does not provide her with a silver ma’a for her needs, and she must consequently support herself entirely, then what is the reason for the opinion of the one who said that it is consecrated in her lifetime? It is possible that at some point she will not find sufficient employment, and since her husband does not provide for her sustenance or her other needs, she will need the money for herself and there will not be any surplus at all.
לְעוֹלָם בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וְאֵינוֹ מַעֲלֶה לָהּ מָעָה כֶּסֶף לִצְרָכֶיהָ. רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל סָבְרִי: תִּקְּנוּ
The Gemara answers: Actually, one must explain that they are discussing a situation where he provides for her sustenance, but does not provide her with a silver ma’a for her needs, and this is their dispute: Rav and Shmuel maintain that the main enactment was that they established
