Ketubot 68

בטלי כסף או בטלי זהב אמר היינו דאמר רבי אלעזר בואו ונחזיק טובה לרמאין שאלמלא הן היינו חוטאין בכל יום שנאמר וקרא עליך אל ה׳ והיה בך חטא

Silver, i.e., white, tablecloths [telei] or gold, i.e., colored, tablecloths? Clearly, then, they are not entitled to charity. Rabbi Ḥanina said: This is what Rabbi Elazar said: Come and let us appreciate the swindlers who ask for charity that they do not need, because were it not for them, who command our attention and receive our charity, we would be sinning every day in failing to properly support the truly poor, as it is stated: “Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and your eye be evil against your needy brother, and you will not give him; and he cry to the Lord against you, and it be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 15:9). Because the swindlers take our money in the name of charity, we have an excuse of sorts for failing to fully meet the needs of the truly poor.

ותני רבי חייא בר רב מדיפתי רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר כל המעלים עיניו מן הצדקה כאילו עובד עבודה זרה כתיב הכא השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל וגו׳ וכתיב התם יצאו אנשים בני בליעל מה להלן עבודה זרה אף כאן עבודה זרה

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: With regard to anyone who averts his eyes from the obligation to give charity, it is as if he engages in idol worship. It is written here concerning charity: “Beware that there be not a base [beliya’al] thought in your heart…and you will not give him” (Deuteronomy 15:9), and it is written there concerning idolatry: “Certain base [beliya’al] fellows have gone out” (Deuteronomy 13:14). Just as there, in the latter verse, the word “base [beliya’al]” is referring to idol worship, so too here, this expression indicates a sin on the scale of idol worship.

תנו רבנן המסמא את עינו והמצבה את בטנו והמקפח את שוקו אינו נפטר מן העולם עד שיבא לידי כך המקבל צדקה ואין צריך לכך סופו אינו נפטר מן העולם עד שיבא לידי כך

The Gemara cites a baraita relating to swindlers who collect charity. The Sages taught: One who falsely blinds his eye, and one who bloats his stomach as if he were sick, and one who falsely crushes [mekape’aḥ] his leg, in order to benefit dishonestly from charity, will not depart from the world before he comes to this same plight, and he will truly suffer from the ailment that he feigned. More generally, one who receives charity and does not need it, his end will be that he will not depart from the world before he comes to this state of actually needing charity.

תנן התם אין מחייבין אותו למכור את ביתו ואת כלי תשמישו ולא והתניא היה משתמש בכלי זהב ישתמש בכלי כסף בכלי כסף ישתמש בכלי נחושת

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Pe’a 8:8): Who is entitled to receive charity? Whoever has less than two hundred dinars. However, the administrators of the charities do not require him to sell his house and his accessories to reach the threshold of two hundred dinars. For the purposes of charity, his wealth is calculated based on cash alone. The Gemara asks: And do we not insist that he sell property? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If he was accustomed to use gold wares, he should now use silver wares. If he was accustomed to use silver wares, he should now use copper wares. This indicates that he is required to sell at least some of his possessions.

אמר רב זביד לא קשיא הא במטה ושולחן הא בכוסות וקערות מאי שנא כוסות וקערות דלא דאמר מאיסי לי מטה ושולחן נמי אמר לא מקבל עילואי אמר רבא בריה דרבה במחרישה דכספא

Rav Zevid said: This is not difficult. This source, which requires him to sell wares and lower his standard of living, speaks of a bed and a table, and that source, which does not require him to sell his accessories, speaks of his cups and plates. The Gemara asks: What is different about cups and plates, that he is not required to sell them? It is because he says: The cheaper ones are disgusting to me, and I cannot eat with them. The Gemara asks further: If so, with regard to a bed and a table he may also say: I do not accept these lesser wares upon myself, as they are uncomfortable for me. What is the difference between the furnishings and the dishes? Rava, son of Rabba, said: There is no difference; he need not sell furnishings either. The baraita requiring him to sell his property speaks of a silver comb on his table or another comparable novelty or decorative item. Such articles must be sold, but necessities, even luxurious or high quality ones, need not be sold.

רב פפא אמר לא קשיא כאן קודם שיבא לידי גיבוי כאן לאחר שיבא לידי גיבוי:

The Gemara offers an alternative resolution to the contradiction concerning the requirement to sell property. Rav Pappa said: This is not difficult. Here, the source that does not require him to sell property describes circumstances before he comes to the point of collecting charity. There, the source that requires him to sell property addresses a case that may arise after he comes to the point of collecting charity. If he has more than two hundred dinars and nevertheless collects charity, the court will reclaim from him the charity he has collected. In the event that he does not have enough cash to pay, he is required to sell his property of any type and downgrade to lesser items.

מתני׳ יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה מדעתה וכתבו לה במאה או בחמשים זוז יכולה היא משתגדיל להוציא מידן מה שראוי להנתן לה

MISHNA: With regard to a minor orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off, even with her consent to a small dowry, she retains her rights to a proper dowry. And thus, if they wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from her mother, or brothers, or their respective estates the sum of money that is fit to be given to her as a dowry, which is one-tenth of the family’s estate. Even if she agreed to forgo part of this sum as a minor, she may collect it as an adult.

רבי יהודה אומר אם השיא את הבת הראשונה ינתן לשניה כדרך שנתן לראשונה וחכמים אומרים פעמים שאדם עני והעשיר או עשיר והעני אלא שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה:

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter before he died, a dowry should be given to the second daughter in the same manner that he gave one to the first daughter. And the Rabbis say: There is no ready standard, since sometimes a person is poor and then becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and then becomes poor, so a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum.

גמ׳ אמר שמואל לפרנסה שמין באב מתיבי הבנות ניזונות ומתפרנסות מנכסי אביהן כיצד אין אומרים אילו אביה קיים כך וכך היה נותן לה אלא שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה מאי לאו פרנסת הבעל אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לא בפרנסת עצמה

GEMARA: Shmuel said: With respect to her support in the form of the dowry, the court evaluates what she should be given based on the circumstances of the father and gives her the amount that he would have given. The Gemara raises an objection: We have learned: The daughters are sustained and supported from the property of their father. How so? We do not speculate on the basis of his social standing and his previous experience and say: If her father were still alive, he would give her such and such amount. Rather, the court appraises the total worth of the property and gives her a portion of it, without a subjective estimate based on the father. The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What, is it not that the word support is referring to support for the husband, which is the dowry? The Gemara responds: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, it is referring to her own support and the food she receives. That allowance is calculated without considering the father’s practices, but the question of the dowry is still unresolved.

הא ניזונות ומתפרנסות קתני מאי לאו אחת פרנסת הבעל ואחת פרנסת עצמה לא אידי ואידי בפרנסת עצמה ולא קשיא הא באכילה ובשתיה והא בלבושא וכיסויא

The Gemara asks: But the cited source teaches: They are sustained and supported, which indicates two separate allowances. What, is it not that one term is referring to support for the husband in the form of the dowry and one term is referring to her own support? The Gemara answers: No, this one and that one both refer to her own support for her personal needs. And the use of two terms is not difficult, because this term, sustained, is referring to allowance for eating and drinking, and that term, supported, is referring to clothing and other covering.

תנן וחכמים אומרים פעמים שאדם עני והעשיר או עשיר והעני אלא שמין הנכסים ונותנין לה מאי עני ומאי עשיר אי נימא עני עני בנכסים עשיר עשיר בנכסים מכלל דתנא קמא סבר אפילו עשיר והעני כדמעיקרא יהבינן לה הא לית ליה

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: Sometimes a person is poor and becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and becomes poor, and a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum. The Gemara analyzes this opinion: What is meant by the term poor, and what is meant by the term wealthy? If we say that poor is referring to one who is poor in property, and wealthy is referring to one who is wealthy in property, if so, by inference it seems that the first tanna holds that even if the father was wealthy and then became poor, we give the second daughter a dowry that is like the dowry that he provided originally to the first daughter. But how could we assign such a sum when he does not have enough in the estate?

אלא לאו עני עני בדעת עשיר עשיר בדעת וקתני שמין את הנכסים ונותנין לה אלמא לא אזלינן בתר אומדנא ותיובתא דשמואל הוא דאמר כרבי יהודה דתנן רבי יהודה אומר אם השיא בת הראשונה ינתן לשניה כדרך שנתן לראשונה

Rather, is it not that poor means poor in mindset, i.e., he spends his money thriftily as though he were poor, and that wealthy means wealthy in mindset, i.e., he spends money liberally as though he were wealthy? And nevertheless the mishna teaches that even if the father changes his approach to spending, the court appraises the property and gives the dowry to her. Apparently, then, we do not follow the assessment of the father’s intentions but rather give a fixed sum, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara dismisses the refutation: Shmuel has said his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter, a dowry should be given to the second in the same manner that he gave to the first. According to this opinion, the court does assess the father’s tendencies in determining the dowry for the second daughter.

ונימא הלכה כרבי יהודה אי אמר הלכה כרבי יהודה הוה אמינא דוקא השיאה דגלי דעתיה אבל לא השיאה לא קא משמע לן טעמא דרבי יהודה דאזלינן בתר אומדנא לא שנא השיאה ולא שנא לא השיאה

The Gemara asks: And let Shmuel say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why did he not do so? The Gemara responds: If he had said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would have said that this is specifically when he marries off the first daughter, as he revealed his mind concerning the proper sum of a dowry, but if he did not marry her off before he died, then the court does not assess his disposition to determine the proper amount. Since, however, Shmuel did not merely say that he accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he teaches us that the reason behind Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that we follow the assessment of what the father would have done. It is no different if he married a daughter off, and it is no different if he did not marry one off.

והאי דקתני השיאה להודיעך כחן דרבנן דאף על גב דהשיאה וגלי דעתיה לא אזלינן בתר אומדנא

And that which the mishna teaches in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: He married off the first daughter, this is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the dissenting opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that although the father married the first daughter off and revealed his mind with respect to dowries, we still do not follow an assessment of how much the father would have given to the second daughter.

אמר ליה רבא לרב חסדא דרשינן משמך הלכה כרבי יהודה אמר ליה יהא רעוא כל כי הני מילי מעלייתא תדרשו משמאי

Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: We teach in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this matter. He said to him: May it be God’s will that you will teach in my name all proper statements such as this. Rav Ḥisda agreed with the quote attributed to him.

ומי אמר רבא הכי והתניא רבי אומר בת הניזונת מן האחין נוטלת עישור נכסים ואמר רבא הלכתא כרבי לא קשיא הא דאמידניה הא דלא אמידניה

The Gemara asks: And did Rava actually say this, that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. And Rava said with regard to that baraita: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Evidently, Rava rejects Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion concerning approximating the father’s intent. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. In this instance, Rava adopts Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion because we assessed the father and understood his mindset. In that instance, Rava rules that she should be given one-tenth because we did not assess the father and his mindset could not be determined.

הכי נמי מסתברא דאמר רב אדא בר אהבה מעשה ונתן לה רבי אחד משנים עשר בנכסים קשיין אהדדי אלא לאו שמע מינה הא דאמידניה הא דלא אמידניה שמע מינה

The Gemara notes: So too, it is reasonable, as Rav Adda bar Ahava said: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave an orphan one-twelfth of her late father’s property for her dowry. Ostensibly, these amoraic statements are difficult, as they contradict each other. Which portion of the estate did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi determine should be given for a dowry, one-tenth or one-twelfth? Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the discrepancy that the respective circumstances were different? In this ruling, in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave one-twelfth, it was because we assessed the father, and we knew that to be his intention. In that ruling, he ruled that she should receive the standard one-tenth because we didn’t assess the father and could not determine his intentions. The Gemara accepts the proof: Conclude from this that the matter does depend on the ability to properly assess the father’s intent.

גופא אמר רבי בת הניזונת מן האחין נוטלת עישור נכסים אמרו לו לרבי לדבריך מי שיש לו עשר בנות ובן אין לו לבן במקום בנות כלום

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. They said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: According to your opinion, in the case of one who has ten daughters and a son, the son does not have anything where there are daughters, as each daughter receives one-tenth of the estate. What becomes of the son’s biblically mandated inheritance?

אמר להן כך אני אומר ראשונה נוטלת עישור נכסים שניה במה ששיירה ושלישית במה ששיירה וחוזרות וחולקות בשוה

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: This is what I say: The first daughter to marry takes one-tenth of the estate; the second takes one-tenth of what the first left, rather than one-tenth of the original estate; and the third takes one-tenth of what the second left; and then they later redistribute the portions equally, so that each daughter receives the same amount. In this way, the son retains a portion of the inheritance.

כל חדא וחדא דנפשה שקלה הכי קאמר אם באו כולם להנשא כאחת חולקות בשוה

The Gemara asks: Why should they divide the portions equally? Since each and every daughter, in turn, takes her own dowry, each one receives that which she rightfully deserves. It is unreasonable to demand of them to redivide the dowries later. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said, i.e., meant: If they all come to be married at the same time, then they divide the portions equally. If, however, they marry at different times, then each daughter receives the appropriate percentage of the estate at the time of her marriage.

מסייע ליה לרב מתנה דאמר רב מתנה אם באו להנשא כולם כאחת נוטלות עישור אחד עישור אחד סלקא דעתך אלא נוטלות עישור כאחד

This conclusion supports the opinion of Rav Mattana, as Rav Mattana said: If they all come to be married at one time, they take one-tenth. The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter your mind that all the daughters should share just one-tenth of the property? Rather, Rav Mattana means that they each take one-tenth in one uniform measure, as in normal circumstances each one successively takes one-tenth of whatever property remains. However, because all the weddings take place within a short time span, the dowries are redistributed immediately after the weddings, so that they are all of equal value.

תנו רבנן הבנות בין בגרו עד שלא נישאו ובין נישאו עד שלא בגרו איבדו מזונותיהן ולא איבדו פרנסתן דברי רבי רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אף איבדו פרנסתן כיצד הן עושות שוכרות להן בעלים ומוציאין להן פרנסתן

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the daughters, whether they matured before they were married or were married before they matured, they lost their sustenance. Sustenance is provided from the inheritance only for single daughters who have not yet matured. However, they did not lose their support, i.e., their allotted provisions for a dowry, upon maturing. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: They lost even their support. If they matured before marrying, they lost their chance to collect their dowries from the estate. What do they do to avoid losing the dowries? They have no alternative other than to marry before maturing. They hire themselves husbands, i.e., they take pains to be sure that they are married, and then they appropriate their support, i.e., dowries, for themselves.

אמר רב נחמן אמר לי הונא הלכתא כרבי איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן יתומה שהשיאתה אמה או אחיה מדעתה וכתבו לה במאה או בחמשים זוז יכולה היא משתגדיל להוציא מידם מה שראוי להנתן לה טעמא דקטנה הא גדולה ויתרה

Rav Naḥman said: Rav Huna told me that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and orphans may collect their dowries from the estate even when they marry after maturing. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna: With regard to an orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off with her consent and wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from them that which is fit to be given to her for her dowry. The Gemara infers: The reason that she may collect the balance of the dowry is that she married as a minor girl, but if she married as an adult woman, evidently she forgoes the balance. This would appear to follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says that her rights to inherit the dowry are terminated when she matures, against the statement of Rav Naḥman.

לא קשיא הא דמחאי הא דלא מחאי

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi distinguishes between two instances of mature brides. In this case, because she protests, she may still collect the rest of her dowry. In that case, because she does not protest, she implicitly waives the balance of the dowry.

הכי נמי מסתברא דאם כן קשיא דרבי אדרבי דתניא רבי אומר בת הניזונת מן האחין נוטלת עישור נכסים ניזונת אין שאינה ניזונת לא

The Gemara notes: This, too, stands to reason, since if indeed Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi fails to differentiate between when she does and does not protest, it is difficult: One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: An orphan daughter who is sustained by the brothers takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. The Gemara infers: If she is sustained when she is a minor, then yes, she receives inheritance for a dowry; if she is not sustained because she has reached majority, then no, she does not receive a dowry from the estate. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches that once she matures, she may not take one-tenth of the estate, which directly contradicts the first statement cited in his name.

אלא לאו שמע מינה הא דמחאי הא דלא מחאי שמע מינה

The Gemara proposes a resolution to the contradiction: Rather, is it not correct to conclude from this that this ruling applies when she protests and that ruling applies when she does not protest? The Gemara confirms: Conclude from this that this is the resolution. If she matures before marrying, she collects the full dowry only if she insists upon it.

אמר ליה רבינא לרבא אמר לן רב אדא בר אהבה משמך בגרה אינה צריכה למחות נישאת אינה צריכה למחות בגרה ונישאת צריכה למחות

Ravina said to Rava: Rav Adda bar Ahava said to us in your name: If she matured, she does not need to actively protest in order to receive her one-tenth of the estate. Similarly, if she became married, she does not need to protest. If she both matured and became married, then she needs to protest in order to receive her one-tenth.

מי אמר רבא הכי והא איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן יתומה ושני ליה הא דמחי הא דלא מחי לא קשיא הא דקא מיתזנא מינייהו הא דלא קא מיתזנא מינייהו

The Gemara asks: Did Rava actually say this? But Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman earlier concerning an orphan who was married, and Rav Naḥman answered him that this ruling applies when she protested, and that other ruling applies when she did not protest. Evidently, then, she forfeits her share if she does not protest. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This ruling applies when she is sustained by them even after marriage, and consequently she is embarrassed to protest. In this case, silence does not indicate that she forgoes the dowry. That ruling, insisting that she voice a claim, applies when she is not sustained by them, and she has no reason not to protest.

אמר רב הונא אמר רבי פרנסה אינה כתנאי כתובה מאי אינה כתנאי כתובה אי נימא דאילו פרנסה טרפא ממשעבדי ותנאי כתובה לא טרפא ממשעבדי מאי קא משמע לן הא מעשים בכל יום מוציאין לפרנסה ואין מוציאין למזונות

§ Rav Huna said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Support is not treated like a stipulation in the marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Is not like a stipulation in the marriage contract? If we say that he is teaching: Whereas, with regard to support, she may seize her debt even from liened property that has been sold, and with regard to a stipulation in the marriage contract, she may not seize her debt from liened property that has been sold, what is he teaching us? But incidents that occur daily are proof enough that the court does appropriate money from liened property for paying support but does not appropriate for sustenance. He does not need to teach us that distinction.

ואלא דאילו פרנסה גביא נמי ממטלטלי ותנאי כתובה ממקרקעי גביא ממטלטלי לא גביא

But rather, there may be another explanation of Rav Huna’s statement: Whereas with regard to support, she may also collect it from movable property of the estate, with regard to a stipulation in the marriage contract, she may collect for it only from real estate, but from movable property she may not collect for it.

לרבי אידי ואידי מיגבא גביא דתניא אחד נכסים שיש להן אחריות ואחד נכסים שאין להן אחריות מוציאין למזון האשה ולבנות דברי רבי

The Gemara objects that this explanation is untenable: According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, from both this and that type of property, she may certainly collect for it, as it is taught in a baraita: Whether with respect to property that has a guarantee behind it, assuring that the seller will compensate the buyer if the property is repossessed, i.e., real estate, or whether with respect to property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable objects, the court appropriates the funds necessary for the sustenance of the wife and the daughters. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Since sustenance is a stipulation in the marriage contract, this approach does not explain how a stipulation is unlike support.

אלא מאי פרנסה אינה כתנאי כתובה לכדתניא האומר אל יזונו בנותיו מנכסיו אין שומעין לו אל יתפרנסו בנותיו מנכסיו שומעין לו שהפרנסה אינה כתנאי כתובה

Rather, what is the meaning of the statement: Support is not treated like a stipulation in the marriage contract? This statement has implications with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says in his will that his daughters should not be sustained from his estate, one does not listen to him, as it is not his prerogative to abrogate this obligation. But if he says that his daughters should not be supported from his estate, one does listen to him, as the legal status of the dowry is not like that of a stipulation in the marriage contract. The responsibility to provide support is an ordinance that falls upon the father or his inheritors, and they may choose to reject the responsibility.