Ketubot 71
מַעֲשֶׂה דְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן.
the incident of Beit Ḥoron, where an individual had vowed to prohibit his father from deriving benefit from him, and then in order to allow his father to come to the celebration of his son’s wedding, he gave all of his property to someone else as a gift. The recipient of the property was concerned that the vow would be transgressed by the father, so he consecrated the son’s property and declared that if he was not empowered to do so, then the original transfer of property as a gift would not be valid. Consequently, in the present case, the Sages are unconcerned by the artifice performed, while Rabbi Yosei is concerned with such artifice and therefore prohibits it.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל חֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד וְכוּ׳. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: כֹּהֶנֶת אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן. רָבָא אָמַר: חֹדֶשׁ מָלֵא וְחֹדֶשׁ חָסֵר אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
§ It was taught in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara is puzzled by Rabbi Yehuda’s statement with regard to an Israelite: This is the same as the opinion of the first tanna. Abaye said: Concerning an Israelite, Rabbi Yehuda in fact does not disagree with the first tanna, but he comes to teach us that the halakha is different for the wife of a priest. Rava said: The practical difference between them is a full thirty-day month and a deficient month with twenty-nine days: The first tanna requires exactly thirty days, while Rabbi Yehuda requires one month, whether it is a full month or a deficient one.
אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּמְפָרֵשׁ, אֲבָל בִּסְתָם — יוֹצִיא לְאַלְתַּר וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְתָם לֹא יוֹצִיא, שֶׁמָּא יִמְצָא פֶּתַח לְנִדְרוֹ.
Rav said: With regard to the thirty-day time frame, where the Sages established that a husband supports his wife through a trustee, they taught this only with regard to a case where he specifies a limited time during which the vow will be in effect. But if he vows without specification of an end point, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even if he vowed without specification, he should not divorce her immediately, as perhaps he will discover an opening enabling the dissolution of his vow.
וְהָא אִיפְּלִגוּ בַּיהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִתַּשְׁמִישׁ הַמִּטָּה, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת. — וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: שַׁבָּת אַחַת. וְאָמַר רַב: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּמְפָרֵשׁ, אֲבָל בִּסְתָם — יוֹצִיא לְאַלְתַּר וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְתָם נָמֵי לֹא יוֹצִיא, שֶׁמָּא יִמְצָא פֶּתַח לְנִדְרוֹ.
The Gemara asks: But they have already disagreed about this issue one time with regard to a similar situation, as we learned in a mishna (61b): With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from engaging in marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two weeks, he may maintain her as a wife, and Beit Hillel say the limit is one week. And with regard to this dispute, Rav said: The dispute is in a case where he specifies, but in the case of an unspecified vow, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even in the case of an unspecified vow he also should not divorce her immediately, as perhaps he will discover an opening enabling the dissolution of his vow. If so, why does this dispute need to be repeated?
צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָהִיא: בְּהָהִיא קָאָמַר רַב — מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָס, אֲבָל בְּהָא, דְּאֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָס — אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל. וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָא: בְּהָא קָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל — מִשּׁוּם דְּאֶפְשָׁר בְּפַרְנָס, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא, אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לְרַב — צְרִיכָא.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state it twice, as, if it was stated only in that case, i.e., that of a vow rendering it prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, then one may have said that in that case Rav says he must divorce her immediately, because it is impossible to compensate for the vow through a trustee. But in this case, where the vow rendered it prohibited for her to benefit from his property, for which it is possible to compensate through a trustee, we would say that he concedes to Shmuel that he should not divorce her immediately. And conversely, if it were stated in this case, i.e., that of a vow concerning sustenance, then one may have said in this case that Shmuel says he should not divorce her because it is possible to compensate for the vow through a trustee, but in that case, where he vows to prohibit her from engaging in marital relations with him, one would say he concedes to Rav that he must divorce her immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to record the dispute twice.
תְּנַן: הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּטְעוֹם אֶחָד מִכׇּל הַפֵּירוֹת — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב: כָּאן בִּסְתָם, כָּאן בִּמְפָרֵשׁ. אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל קַשְׁיָא!
We learned in the continuation of the mishna: One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Granted that according to Rav, there is no contradiction between the two clauses of the mishna. It can be said that here it is referring to an unspecified vow, so he must divorce her immediately, and there, in the first clause, it is referring to a case where he specifies a time limit. But according to Shmuel, it is difficult.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדְרָה הִיא, וְקִיֵּים לָהּ אִיהוּ. וְקָסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where she vowed to prohibit herself from tasting the produce, and he ratified it for her and did not dissolve the vow. Since she made the vow, she certainly will not search for a way to dissolve it. Therefore, he must divorce her immediately. And Rabbi Meir, who is presumed to be the author of an unattributed opinion in a mishna, holds that when he ratifies her vow, he is putting his finger between her teeth, causing her to bite him, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect. If so, it is his responsibility, and he therefore must give her the payment of her marriage contract when he divorces her.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ? וְהָתַנְיָא: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּדְרָה בְּנָזִיר, וְשָׁמַע בַּעְלָהּ וְלֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמְרִים: הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ, לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל לְהָפֵר — יָפֵר. וְאִם אָמַר אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּאִשָּׁה נַדְרָנִית — תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir hold that in this case he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A woman who vowed, prohibiting herself from benefiting from items that are prohibited to a nazirite, and her husband heard and did not nullify it, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: She already put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Therefore, if the husband wishes to nullify this vow, he may nullify it. And if he said: I do not want a vowing wife, she can be divorced without the payment of the marriage contract.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמְרִים: הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ, לְפִיכָךְ אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל לְהָפֵר — יָפֵר. וְאִם אָמַר: אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּאִשָּׁה נַדְרָנִית — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה! אֵיפוֹךְ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמְרִים: הוּא נוֹתֵן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמְרִים: הִיא נָתְנָה.
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: By deciding not to nullify the vow, he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect, and therefore if the husband wishes to nullify the vow, he may nullify it. And if he said: I do not want a vowing wife, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: He is putting his finger between her teeth. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: She put her finger between her own teeth.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא נָתְנָה? וְהָתְנַן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּעֲנִיּוּת שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן קִצְבָה!
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that she put her finger between her own teeth? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, and Rabbi Yosei says: For poor women, when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract? According to the final explanation given by Shmuel, the mishna is referring to a case where the wife vowed and the husband ratified it, indicating that Rabbi Yosei also agrees that it is the husband’s responsibility, and therefore he must give her the payment of her marriage contract.
אֵימָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמְרִים: הוּא נוֹתֵן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמְרִים: הִיא נָתְנָה. וְסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא נָתְנָה? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹם אֶחָד — יְקַיֵּים!
The Gemara answers: Say that the text of the baraita should read as follows: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei say: He is putting his finger between her teeth; Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar say: She put her finger between her own teeth. This way, there is no contradiction between statements attributed to either Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara asks further: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that she put her finger between her own teeth? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: For an Israelite, if the vow is in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if the vow is in effect for two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of the marriage contract? According to the explanation that the mishna is referring to a case where she vowed and he ratified it, it would appear that Rabbi Yehuda also agrees that he is putting his finger between her teeth.
אֵימָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמְרִים: הוּא נוֹתֵן, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הִיא נָתְנָה. וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר זוּגֵי זוּגֵי קָתָנֵי, אֵימָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמְרִים: הִיא נָתְנָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמְרִים: הוּא נוֹתֵן. וְהָא סְתָמָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara answers: Say the text of the dispute should read as follows: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei say he is putting his finger between her teeth, and Rabbi Elazar says she put her finger between her own teeth. And if you say the opinions of the tanna’im listed in the baraita are taught in pairs, and therefore it cannot be that three of them share the same opinion, say: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar say she put her finger between her own teeth, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei say he is putting his finger between her teeth. And this particular unattributed opinion is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּעֲנִיּוּת שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן קִצְבָה, אַלְמָא בַּעַל מָצֵי מֵיפַר? וּרְמִינְהוּ: אֵלּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר: דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִינּוּי נֶפֶשׁ, ״אִם אֶרְחַץ״, ״אִם לֹא אֶרְחַץ״. ״אִם אֶתְקַשֵּׁט״, ״אִם לֹא אֶתְקַשֵּׁט״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אֵין אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי עִינּוּי נֶפֶשׁ, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן נִדְרֵי עִינּוּי נֶפֶשׁ: ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל בָּשָׂר״, וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן״, וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אֶתְקַשֵּׁט
Since the mishna has been explained as a case where the wife vowed and her husband ratified it, the Gemara asks about a different issue: And does Rabbi Yosei hold, for poor women, that when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow he must divorce her? This means that apparently, a husband can nullify a wife’s vow not to adorn herself. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different mishna (Nedarim 79a): These are the cases of a wife’s vow that the husband may nullify: Cases of vows that involve affliction, such as when the woman says: If I bathe, I forbid myself to benefit from it; or if she says: If I do not bathe, i.e., she vows not to bathe at all; or she vows: If I adorn myself; or vows: If I do not adorn myself, all of which cause her to suffer. Rabbi Yosei said: These are not vows of affliction, which the husband may nullify, but rather, these, i.e., the following, are vows of affliction: Such as when she vows that I will not eat meat, or that I will not drink wine, or even that I will not adorn myself
בְּבִגְדֵי צִבְעוֹנִין״! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ.
with colored garments, as not wearing colored garments can cause shame to her as well as to her husband. But vows that affect her alone are not considered vows of affliction. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where she vowed not to adorn herself with regard to matters that are between him and her, meaning that she vowed not to use a substance that removes her pubic hair. This is considered a matter between him and her, since the hair could interfere with sexual intercourse.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? דְּאִתְּמַר: דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ, רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר, רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר: אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר, שֶׁלֹּא מָצִינוּ שׁוּעָל שֶׁמֵּת בַּעֲפַר פִּיר.
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said the husband can nullify his wife’s vow if it relates to matters that are between him and her, i.e., that disrupt normal, intimate relations between them. But according to the one who said the husband cannot nullify such vows, what can be said? The amora’im had a dispute concerning this question, as it is stated: With regard to vows related to matters that are between him and her, such as the example above, Rav Huna said that the husband can nullify his wife’s vow, while Rav Adda bar Ahava said the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, since it does not interfere with sexual intercourse between them. Rav Adda bar Ahava explains his opinion with an analogy: Since we have not found a fox that died in the dirt of a hole where it lives, so too here, although she grows her pubic hair, he will not be harmed by it, since he is familiar with her body.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן דִּתְלָ[תַ]נְהוּ לְקִישּׁוּטֶיהָ בְּתַשְׁמִישׁ הַמִּטָּה, דְּאָמְרָה: ״יֵאָסֵר הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישְׁךָ עָלַי אִם אֶתְקַשֵּׁט״, כִּדְאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא.
Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a case where through her vow she made sexual intercourse contingent upon her adornment, as she said: The pleasure of intercourse with you is forbidden to me if I adorn myself, as Rav Kahana said that such language qualifies as matters between him and her, and a husband can nullify such a vow.
דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: ״הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישִׁי עָלֶיךָ״ — כּוֹפָהּ וּמְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ. ״הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישְׁךָ עָלַי״ — יָפֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מַאֲכִילִין לָאָדָם דָּבָר הָאָסוּר לוֹ.
As Rav Kahana said: If the woman says to her husband: The pleasure of intercourse with me is forbidden to you, he may nevertheless compel her through legal and financial measures to fulfill her marital obligations and have sexual intercourse with him, since she does not have the power to render herself forbidden to him by a vow, due to her prior marital obligations. But if she says: The pleasure of intercourse with you is forbidden to me, this vow is valid but he may nullify it. Although she is obligated by the terms of the marriage to cohabit with him, she does not directly contravene her obligation but rather prohibits herself from deriving pleasure from sexual intercourse. Therefore, her husband may not compel her to engage in intercourse in violation of her vow, since one cannot feed a person an object which is forbidden to him. Instead, he may nullify it if he wishes.
וְלֹא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט וְלֹא תֵּאָסֵר! אִם כֵּן קָרוּ לַהּ ״מְנֻוֶּולֶת״.
The Gemara asks: And even if she creates this contingency by vowing that the pleasure of sexual intercourse will be forbidden to her if she adorns herself, let her not adorn herself and she will not be forbidden. Since the prohibition against intercourse created through her vow may never go into effect, the husband should not be able to nullify the vow, because a vow against adornment alone is not subject to the husband’s nullification. The Gemara answers: If so, they will call her repulsive when she does not adorn herself, and she cannot endure the embarrassment of such a situation. Therefore, it is assumed that she will eventually adorn herself at some point.
וְתִתְקַשֵּׁט וְתֵאָסֵר, אִי לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת, אִי לְבֵית הִלֵּל שַׁבָּת אַחַת! הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּאַדְּרַהּ אִיהוּ, דְּסָבְרָה: מִירְתָּח רָתַח עִילָּוַאי וְהַשְׁתָּא מוֹתֵיב דַּעְתֵּיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּנְדַרָה אִיהִי וְשָׁתֵיק לַהּ, סָבְרָה מִדְּאִישְׁתִּיק — מִיסְנָא הוּא דְּסָנֵי לִי.
The Gemara asks: And let her adorn herself and be prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse, and he can still maintain her. As was stated concerning one who prohibits himself from cohabiting with his wife, if according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, he may maintain her for two weeks; if according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, for one week. Why then did they require him to divorce her immediately? The Gemara answers: This applies only where he took a vow to render intercourse with her prohibited, as she thinks: He vowed because he is angry with me, but now he will calm down and dissolve the vow. But here, as the mishna is explained as a case where she vows and he is silent and does not nullify it, she thinks: Since he is silent, this means he despises me, and consequently she desires a divorce.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּעֲנִיּוּת שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן קִצְבָה. וְכַמָּה קִצְבָה? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים. רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי: רֶגֶל, שֶׁכֵּן בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִתְקַשְּׁטוֹת בָּרֶגֶל.
§ The mishna states that Rabbi Yosei says: For poor women, he must divorce her when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow to remain in effect. The Gemara asks: And how long is this set amount of time? He is allowed to maintain her as a wife if he did set a time, but certainly there is a limit. This halakha would not apply in a case of a long period of time. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Twelve months. Rabba bar bar Ḥanna said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ten years. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: A pilgrim Festival, meaning until the next one of the three Festivals, since Jewish women adorn themselves on the pilgrim Festival. If his vow remains in effect beyond the Festival, it is considered as if he did not set a time limit, and he must divorce her.
וּבַעֲשִׁירוּת שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שֶׁכֵּן אִשָּׁה חֲשׁוּבָה נֶהֱנֵית מֵרֵיחַ קִשּׁוּטֶיהָ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם.
And for wealthy women, Rabbi Yosei said the limit is thirty days. The Gemara asks: What is different about thirty days specifically? Abaye said: Because an important and wealthy woman enjoys the scent of her adornments that she put on previously for up to thirty days, and after that time she feels that she is repulsive.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא עִמָּהּ בָּעִיר — חוֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד יְקַיֵּים, שְׁנַיִם יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. וּבִזְמַן שֶׁהוּא בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת — רֶגֶל אֶחָד יְקַיֵּים, שְׁלֹשָׁה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.
MISHNA: With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife not to go to her father’s house, when her father is with her in the same city, if the vow is to be in effect up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife. If the vow is for two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And when her father is in a different city, if the vow is to be in effect until at most one pilgrim Festival, i.e., until the next pilgrim Festival, he may maintain her as his wife. Although the wife often visits her parents during the Festival, she is capable of refraining one time. For three Festivals, however, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵךְ לְבֵית הָאֵבֶל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹעֵל בְּפָנֶיהָ. וְאִם הָיָה טוֹעֵן מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר — רַשַּׁאי.
Additionally, one who vows and obligates his wife not to go to a house of mourning to console the mourners, or to a house of feasting for a wedding, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Why is this so? Because it is as if he were locking a door in front of her. And if he claimed he did so due to something else, meaning he is concerned about inappropriate conduct there, he is permitted to do so.
אָמַר לָהּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֹּאמְרִי לִפְלוֹנִי מַה שֶּׁאָמַרְתָּ לִי״, אוֹ: ״מַה שֶּׁאָמַרְתִּי לָךְ״, אוֹ שֶׁתְּהֵא מְמַלְּאָה וּמְעָרָה לָאַשְׁפָּה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.
If he said to her: The vow will be void on condition that you tell so-and-so what you told me, or what I told you, or on condition that she fill something up and pour it into the refuse, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara will explain all of these cases thoroughly.
גְּמָ׳ הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ רֶגֶל אֶחָד יְקַיֵּים. הָא שְׁנַיִם — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שְׁלֹשָׁה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. הָא שְׁנַיִם — יְקַיֵּים.
GEMARA: Concerning the first clause in the mishna, the Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult: You said on one hand that if the vow will be in effect for one pilgrim Festival he may maintain her as his wife, from which it may be deduced that if he forbade her from going to her father’s house for two Festivals, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But say the latter clause: For three Festivals he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, from which it may be deduced that if the vow will be in effect for two Festivals, he may maintain her as his wife. Thus, the inferences from the first and latter clauses are contradictory.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: סֵיפָא אֲתָאן לְכֹהֶנֶת, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא. רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּרְדוּפָה, כָּאן בְּשֶׁאֵינָהּ רְדוּפָה.
Abaye said: In the latter clause, we have come to a case concerning the wife of a priest, with regard to whom more time is allowed before a divorce is required, since her husband may not remarry her afterward. And this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who distinguished in the previous mishna between the wives of an Israelite and those of a priest. Rabba bar Ulla said: It is not difficult, and can be explained in a different way: Here, in the first clause, it is referring to a woman who is eager and enthusiastic to return regularly to her father’s home, and if her husband prohibits her from doing so for more than one Festival it will cause her significant distress; while there, in the latter clause, it is referring to a woman who is not eager. Consequently, he must divorce her only if the vow will last for three Festivals.
״אָז הָיִיתִי בְעֵינָיו כְּמוֹצְאֵת שָׁלוֹם״, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּכַלָּה שֶׁנִּמְצֵאת שְׁלֵמָה בְּבֵית חָמִיהָ, וּרְדוּפָה לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַגִּיד שִׁבְחָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ.
Once the Gemara has mentioned the idea of a woman who is eager to return to her father’s house, it discusses another context where a similar idea is mentioned. Concerning the verse “Then I was in his eyes as one that found peace” (Song of Songs 8:10), Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The meaning is: Like a bride who is considered perfect in her father-in-law’s house, and is eager to go and relate her praise in her father’s house, to tell how many complimentary things were said about her by her husband’s family.
״וְהָיָה בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא נְאוּם ה׳ תִּקְרְאִי אִישִׁי וְלֹא תִקְרְאִי לִי עוֹד בַּעְלִי״, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּכַלָּה בְּבֵית חָמִיהָ, וְלֹא כְּכַלָּה בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ.
Similarly, concerning the verse “And it shall be on that day, says the Lord, that you will call Me: My Husband [Ishi], and you will no longer call Me: My Master [Ba’ali]” (Hosea 2:18), Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The meaning is: Like a bride in her father-in-law’s house after she has already lived with her husband, whom she is consequently not ashamed to call her marriage partner, and not like a betrothed bride still in her father’s house, who simply refers to her groom as: My master.
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה
§ The mishna states: One who vows and obligates his wife not to go to a house of mourning or to a house of feasting for a wedding, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract, because it is as if he were locking a door in front of her. The Gemara asks: Granted, when he forbids her from going to a house of feasting,
