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September 18, 2022 | ื›ืดื‘ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืคืดื‘

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 74

After explaining Raba and Abaye’s different explanations of Rav and Shmuel’s debate regarding the case of a man who betrothed a woman with a stipulation that she not have any vows upon her and then married her without making the stipulation, Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion is brought as well – the woman does not need a get as the marriage is not valid. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s position from a Tosefta Yevamot 12:10 and Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation on it regarding the definition of a mistaken chalitza that is effective. The contradiction is resolved. Rabbi Elazar differs from Abaye and Raba and holds that both Rav and Shmuel agree that the marriage is valid in this case as well as in a few other similar cases. However, it is quoted in the name of Rabbi Ami that only in one of those cases it is valid, but in the others, including the case of a conditional betrothal, the marriage is invalid. Ulla ruled that a get is required and a dissenting opinion is brought. If a woman was betrothed upon condition that she not have vows or not have blemishes and she in fact does but goes to a chacham to annul her vows or goes to a doctor to fix her blemishes, is the marriage valid? Is there a reason to distinguish between vows and blemishes? There are contradictory sources regarding the case of the vows. The Gemara resolves the contradiction as there is a tannatic debate regarding the vows and brings a Mishna in Gittin 55b to prove it.

ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืืžืจื• ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ื•ืœื ืžืชื™ื™ื‘ืžืช ื•ื”ื ื”ื›ื ื“ื›ื˜ืขื•ืช ืืฉื” ืื—ืช ื“ืžื™ ื•ืคืœื™ื’ื™


In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said that even in this case she performs แธฅalitza, but she may not enter into levirate marriage. This dispute seems to hinge on whether, when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her as an adult, he did so for the purpose of betrothal, or whether he relied upon the invalid betrothal performed when she was a minor. But here, this should be considered similar to an error concerning one woman, and yet they disagree.


ื”ืชื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืื“ื ื™ื•ื“ืข ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื’ืžืจ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืœืฉื ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ื™ื•ื“ืข ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื›ื™ ืงื ื‘ืขืœ ืื“ืขืชื ื“ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื™ื ืงื ื‘ืขืœ


The Gemara refutes this claim: This is not the nature of the disagreement. Rather, there too they disagree over a possible halakhic error: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a person knows that the betrothal of a minor girl is nothing, and consequently, after she reaches adulthood, he decides to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal. Therefore, if the husband dies she may enter into levirate marriage. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that a person does not know that the betrothal of a minor girl is nothing, and therefore when he engages in sexual intercourse with her after she reaches adulthood, he does so on the basis of the initial betrothal, which is not effective according to Torah law, and therefore she cannot enter into levirate marriage.


ืืชืžืจ ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ [ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ] ืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ืื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืื™ืงื ื‘ืจ ืื—ืชื™ื” ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื•ื˜ืขืช ื›ืฉื™ืจื” ืื™ื–ื• ื”ื™ื ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื•ื˜ืขืช ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืฉืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ืœื” ื•ื‘ื›ืš ืืชื” ื›ื•ื ืกื”


It was also stated in accordance with Rabbaโ€™s opinion, that there is no dispute with regard to an error concerning one woman: Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: One who betrothed a woman conditionally and engaged in sexual intercourse without specifying that he is voiding the condition, all agree that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rav Ika, son of Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akovโ€™s sister, raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita that states: A mistaken แธฅalitza is valid. The amoraโ€™im asked: What is meant by the term: A mistaken แธฅalitza? Reish Lakish said: Any situation when someone says to a man whose married brother died childless [yavam] not well versed in halakha: Perform แธฅalitza with her and by doing so you will thereby marry her. Although he did not intend to release their bond with this แธฅalitza, it is nevertheless effective.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืื ื™ ืฉื•ื ื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืœื ื ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื” ื”ื™ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื” ื”ื™ื ื•ืœื ื ืชื›ื•ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ื•ืืช ืืžืจืช ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ืฉืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ืœื” ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืชืชืŸ ืœืš ืžืืชื™ื ื–ื•ื–


Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: I teach with regard to the halakhot of แธฅalitza: Whether he intended to release her through แธฅalitza and she did not intend it, or whether she intended this outcome and he did not intend it, her แธฅalitza is invalid; it will always be invalid until they both intend the appropriate outcome. And you say that in that case, when he intended to marry her and not to release her, that her แธฅalitza is valid? Rather, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said that in fact, in such a case, the แธฅalitza would be invalid, and the term: A mistaken แธฅalitza, concerns any situation where someone says to the yavam: Perform แธฅalitza with her on condition that she gives you two hundred dinars as payment, and afterward she refuses to give him the money.


ืืœืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืขื‘ื“ ืžืขืฉื” ืื—ื•ืœื™ ืื—ืœื™ื” ืœืชื ืื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื‘ืขืœ ืื—ื•ืœื™ ืื—ืœื™ื” ืœืชื ืื™ื”


The Gemara returns to our issue: Apparently, it can be seen from here that since he performed an action, the halakha views this as though he explicitly waived his condition, for although he stipulated a condition, once he actually performs แธฅalitza the condition is ignored. If so, here too, with regard to a conditional betrothal, since he engaged in sexual intercourse, he has waived his condition, which contradicts Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akovโ€™s view.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ ืฉืคื™ืจ ืงื ืืžืจืช ืžื›ื“ื™ ื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ืžื”ื™ื›ื ื’ืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืชื ืื™ ื‘ื ื™ ื’ื“ ื•ื‘ื ื™ ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ


He said to him: Student of the academy, have you spoken well? The reason why the แธฅalitza is valid is not because he waived his condition, but rather because the condition was invalid to begin with. After all, from where do we learn through tradition all the laws of conditions? From the conditions made with the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben. Moses made a condition with the tribes of Gad and Reuben: If they would go with the rest of the nation to fight in the battles for the land of Canaan on the western side of the Jordan, they would receive their inheritance on the eastern side, as they requested (see Numbers, chapter 32).


ืชื ืื” ื“ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื™ื” ืชื ืื” ื“ืœื ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ืœื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื”


The Gemara derives the halakhot of contractual conditions from that incident, and these include the rule that a condition that can be fulfilled by means of an agent, as was done there, when Moses transferred responsibility for implementing the condition to Joshua and the Elders, and such a condition is a valid condition. Whereas a condition that cannot be fulfilled by means of an agent as was done there is not a valid condition. Accordingly, since แธฅalitza cannot be performed by means of an agent, the condition is of no effect and the แธฅalitza is valid. There is therefore no proof from here that a husband who performs an action waives his condition.


ื•ื”ื ื‘ื™ืื” ื“ืœื ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ื•ืงื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื”


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But sexual intercourse is something that cannot be fulfilled by means of an agent as was done there, in the case of the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben, and yet it is considered a valid condition. If a man says that he is engaging in intercourse with a woman for the purpose of betrothal on condition that a certain stipulation be fulfilled, if that condition is broken the betrothal is invalid.


ื”ืชื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ืชืงื•ืฉ ื”ื•ื™ื•ืช ืœื”ื“ื“ื™


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of betrothal, there is a special reason for this law, because the different ways of becoming betrothed are juxtaposed to each other. The Torah describes betrothal with the term becoming, as in the expression: โ€œAnd she becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2). Betrothal can be performed through the transference of money or an item of value, through a document, or through sexual intercourse. All three forms are juxtaposed with one another. Conditions can be stipulated for betrothal performed via transference of money or through a document, since these methods of betrothal can be fulfilled through an agent. Therefore, a condition may also be stipulated for betrothal through sexual intercourse, although that cannot be fulfilled through an agent.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืขื•ืœื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืžืœื•ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ื‘ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜


Rav Ulla bar Abba said that Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: In the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan by forgiving a debt she owes him, which does not effect betrothal, and subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her; or one who betroths a woman conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her; or one who betroths a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, in all of these cases, all agree that she requires a bill of divorce from him. Although the initial betrothal was invalid, they are betrothed due to the subsequent sexual intercourse.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžื ื—ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ื‘ื”ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ื˜ืขื™ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืš ื˜ืขื™


Rav Yosef bar Abba said that Rabbi Menaแธฅem said that Rabbi Ami said: In the case of one who betroths a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta and subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce from him. This is because it is in this matter that he does not err. He knows that betrothal must be performed with an item worth at least a peruta, and he therefore must have engaged in intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal. But with regard to those other cases, i.e., a loan or a condition, he does err. He engages in intercourse based upon his initial betrothal, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืขื•ืœื ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ื–ื” ื”ื™ื” ืžืขืฉื” ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื” ื›ื— ื‘ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœื”ื•ืฆื™ืื” ื‘ืœื ื’ื˜


Rav Kahana said in the name of Ulla: In the case of one who betroths a woman conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce from him, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara relates: This was an incident that actually occurred. A man betrothed a woman conditionally and then engaged in sexual intercourse with her without specification, and the Sages did not have the power to allow her to leave her husband without a bill of divorce, since they could not definitively rule that the betrothal was invalid. Therefore, they forced him to give her a bill of divorce.


ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืžื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื•ื”ื™ื ืœื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื”ื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ื•ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืื—ืจืช ืฉืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ื•ืื™ื–ื• ื–ื• ืฉืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ื” ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื˜ืขื•ืช ืฉืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ื ื” ืžื•ืจื›ื‘ ืขืœ ื›ืชื™ืคื”


The Gemara comments: This statement comes to exclude the opinion of this tanna, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse states with regard to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]: โ€œAnd she was not seizedโ€ (Numbers 5:13), i.e., she was not raped. That is, she is forbidden to her husband since she willingly committed adultery with another man. Consequently, a woman who in fact was seized is permitted to her husband. And you have another woman who, although she was not seized but rather engaged in sexual intercourse willingly, is nevertheless permitted to her husband and is not considered a sota. And who is this? This is referring to one whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as even if her son from this marriage is riding on her shoulders,


ืžืžืื ืช ื•ื”ื•ืœื›ืช ืœื”


she may refuse her husband and go on her way. According to this opinion, the marriage did not take effect at all, despite the fact that they engaged in sexual intercourse, because the betrothal involved an error.


ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ืืฆืœ ื—ื›ื ื•ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืฆืœ ืจื•ืคื ื•ืจื™ืคื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ื›ื ืœืจื•ืคื ื—ื›ื ืขื•ืงืจ ืืช ื”ื ื“ืจ ืžืขื™ืงืจื• ื•ืจื•ืคื ืื™ื ื• ืžืจืคื ืืœื ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืœื”ื‘ื


ยง The Sages taught: If a man betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, but there are vows incumbent upon her, and she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, she is betrothed. However, if he betroths her on condition that she has no blemishes, but she does have blemishes, and she goes to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed. The Gemara inquires: What is the difference between a halakhic authority and a doctor? The Gemara explains: When a halakhic authority dissolves a vow, he uproots the vow retroactively. It is as if she had never vowed at all, and therefore she was in fact not bound by vows at the time of their betrothal. But a doctor only heals from here onward. Since she had blemishes at the time of betrothal, she is in breach of his condition.


ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืฆืœ ื—ื›ื ื•ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืืฆืœ ืจื•ืคื ื•ืจื™ืคื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืื“ื ืจื•ืฆื” ืฉืชืชื‘ื–ื” ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจื•ืฆื” ืฉืชืชื‘ื–ื” ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isnโ€™t it taught in a different baraita that if she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, or to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed? Rava said: This is not difficult, for this baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that one follows Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara elaborates: This baraita, which states that if her vows were dissolved by a halakhic authority she is betrothed, is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who said that a man is willing for his wife to be degraded by going to court to have her vow dissolved. That baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that a man is not willing for his wife to be degraded in court. Consequently, even if she went to a halakhic authority and he dissolved her vows, such a solution is unacceptable to her husband, as he did not want her to go to court. Therefore, the betrothal is invalid even after the dissolution of the vow.


ืžืื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืžืฉื•ื ื ื“ืจ ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื ืจืข ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ


The Gemara poses a question: What is this fundamental dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 45b): If a man who divorces his wife due to a vow that she took subsequently regrets his decision and wants to take her back, he may not remarry her. Similarly, if he divorces her due to a bad reputation she has acquired, he may not remarry her. This is because if he were allowed to take her back if the vow is dissolved by a halakhic authority or after discovering that the rumors about her were false, he might say that had he known this he never would have divorced her. Such a statement would retroactively cast doubt on the validity of the bill of divorce and could potentially cause her children from a second marriage to have the status of mamzerim. He is therefore informed that if he divorces her due to a vow or a bad reputation he can never remarry her.


ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื ื“ืจ ืฉื™ื“ืขื• ื‘ื• ืจื‘ื™ื ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืœื ื™ื“ืขื• ื‘ื• ืจื‘ื™ื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื ื“ืจ ืฉืฆืจื™ืš ื—ืงื™ืจืช ื—ื›ื ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื•ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ื—ืงื™ืจืช ื—ื›ื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ


Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to any vow that is known by many people and therefore cannot be nullified, he may not remarry her. If it is not known by many people, but rather is a private matter between them, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: Any vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority, that is, the husband cannot nullify it himself and she needs a halakhic authority to analyze the vow carefully to find an opening that will permit its dissolution, he may not remarry her, for he can claim that had he known the vow could be dissolved he would never have divorced her, thereby undermining the bill of divorce. And with regard to a vow that does not require the investigation by a halakhic authority, which he knows he can nullify himself, he may remarry her. There is no concern that he might impair the bill of divorce, as he knew he could dissolve the vow and yet he chose to divorce her regardless.


ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืฆืจื™ืš ื•ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ืืกืจื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืืœื ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘


Rabbi Elazar says: Both in the case of a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority and one that does not require it, he may not remarry her. Rabbi Elazar said in explanation of his view: They prohibited remarrying a woman who was bound by a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority only due to a vow that does not require such investigation. The Gemara explains the respective opinions: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehudaโ€™s statement? As it is written:


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Ketubot 74

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 74

ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืืžืจื• ื—ื•ืœืฆืช ื•ืœื ืžืชื™ื™ื‘ืžืช ื•ื”ื ื”ื›ื ื“ื›ื˜ืขื•ืช ืืฉื” ืื—ืช ื“ืžื™ ื•ืคืœื™ื’ื™


In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said that even in this case she performs แธฅalitza, but she may not enter into levirate marriage. This dispute seems to hinge on whether, when he engaged in sexual intercourse with her as an adult, he did so for the purpose of betrothal, or whether he relied upon the invalid betrothal performed when she was a minor. But here, this should be considered similar to an error concerning one woman, and yet they disagree.


ื”ืชื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืื“ื ื™ื•ื“ืข ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื’ืžืจ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืœืฉื ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ื™ื•ื“ืข ืฉืื™ืŸ ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื›ื™ ืงื ื‘ืขืœ ืื“ืขืชื ื“ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ืŸ ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื™ื ืงื ื‘ืขืœ


The Gemara refutes this claim: This is not the nature of the disagreement. Rather, there too they disagree over a possible halakhic error: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a person knows that the betrothal of a minor girl is nothing, and consequently, after she reaches adulthood, he decides to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal. Therefore, if the husband dies she may enter into levirate marriage. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that a person does not know that the betrothal of a minor girl is nothing, and therefore when he engages in sexual intercourse with her after she reaches adulthood, he does so on the basis of the initial betrothal, which is not effective according to Torah law, and therefore she cannot enter into levirate marriage.


ืืชืžืจ ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจ ื™ืขืงื‘ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ [ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ] ืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ืื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืื™ืงื ื‘ืจ ืื—ืชื™ื” ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื•ื˜ืขืช ื›ืฉื™ืจื” ืื™ื–ื• ื”ื™ื ื—ืœื™ืฆื” ืžื•ื˜ืขืช ืืžืจ ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื›ืœ ืฉืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ืœื” ื•ื‘ื›ืš ืืชื” ื›ื•ื ืกื”


It was also stated in accordance with Rabbaโ€™s opinion, that there is no dispute with regard to an error concerning one woman: Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akov said that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: One who betrothed a woman conditionally and engaged in sexual intercourse without specifying that he is voiding the condition, all agree that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. Rav Aแธฅa, son of Rav Ika, son of Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akovโ€™s sister, raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita that states: A mistaken แธฅalitza is valid. The amoraโ€™im asked: What is meant by the term: A mistaken แธฅalitza? Reish Lakish said: Any situation when someone says to a man whose married brother died childless [yavam] not well versed in halakha: Perform แธฅalitza with her and by doing so you will thereby marry her. Although he did not intend to release their bond with this แธฅalitza, it is nevertheless effective.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืื ื™ ืฉื•ื ื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื•ืœื ื ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื” ื”ื™ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉื ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื” ื”ื™ื ื•ืœื ื ืชื›ื•ื•ืŸ ื”ื•ื ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ืคืกื•ืœื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชื›ื•ื•ื ื• ืฉื ื™ื”ื ื•ืืช ืืžืจืช ื—ืœื™ืฆืชื” ื›ืฉืจื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื›ืœ ืฉืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ื—ืœื•ืฅ ืœื” ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉืชืชืŸ ืœืš ืžืืชื™ื ื–ื•ื–


Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: I teach with regard to the halakhot of แธฅalitza: Whether he intended to release her through แธฅalitza and she did not intend it, or whether she intended this outcome and he did not intend it, her แธฅalitza is invalid; it will always be invalid until they both intend the appropriate outcome. And you say that in that case, when he intended to marry her and not to release her, that her แธฅalitza is valid? Rather, Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said that in fact, in such a case, the แธฅalitza would be invalid, and the term: A mistaken แธฅalitza, concerns any situation where someone says to the yavam: Perform แธฅalitza with her on condition that she gives you two hundred dinars as payment, and afterward she refuses to give him the money.


ืืœืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืขื‘ื“ ืžืขืฉื” ืื—ื•ืœื™ ืื—ืœื™ื” ืœืชื ืื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื‘ืขืœ ืื—ื•ืœื™ ืื—ืœื™ื” ืœืชื ืื™ื”


The Gemara returns to our issue: Apparently, it can be seen from here that since he performed an action, the halakha views this as though he explicitly waived his condition, for although he stipulated a condition, once he actually performs แธฅalitza the condition is ignored. If so, here too, with regard to a conditional betrothal, since he engaged in sexual intercourse, he has waived his condition, which contradicts Rav Aแธฅa bar Yaโ€™akovโ€™s view.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืจ ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ ืฉืคื™ืจ ืงื ืืžืจืช ืžื›ื“ื™ ื›ืœ ืชื ืื™ ืžื”ื™ื›ื ื’ืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืชื ืื™ ื‘ื ื™ ื’ื“ ื•ื‘ื ื™ ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ


He said to him: Student of the academy, have you spoken well? The reason why the แธฅalitza is valid is not because he waived his condition, but rather because the condition was invalid to begin with. After all, from where do we learn through tradition all the laws of conditions? From the conditions made with the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben. Moses made a condition with the tribes of Gad and Reuben: If they would go with the rest of the nation to fight in the battles for the land of Canaan on the western side of the Jordan, they would receive their inheritance on the eastern side, as they requested (see Numbers, chapter 32).


ืชื ืื” ื“ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื™ื” ืชื ืื” ื“ืœื ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ืœื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื”


The Gemara derives the halakhot of contractual conditions from that incident, and these include the rule that a condition that can be fulfilled by means of an agent, as was done there, when Moses transferred responsibility for implementing the condition to Joshua and the Elders, and such a condition is a valid condition. Whereas a condition that cannot be fulfilled by means of an agent as was done there is not a valid condition. Accordingly, since แธฅalitza cannot be performed by means of an agent, the condition is of no effect and the แธฅalitza is valid. There is therefore no proof from here that a husband who performs an action waives his condition.


ื•ื”ื ื‘ื™ืื” ื“ืœื ืืคืฉืจ ืœืงื™ื•ืžื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืฉืœื™ื— ื›ื™ ื”ืชื ื•ืงื ื”ื•ื™ ืชื ืื”


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But sexual intercourse is something that cannot be fulfilled by means of an agent as was done there, in the case of the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben, and yet it is considered a valid condition. If a man says that he is engaging in intercourse with a woman for the purpose of betrothal on condition that a certain stipulation be fulfilled, if that condition is broken the betrothal is invalid.


ื”ืชื ืžืฉื•ื ื“ืื™ืชืงื•ืฉ ื”ื•ื™ื•ืช ืœื”ื“ื“ื™


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of betrothal, there is a special reason for this law, because the different ways of becoming betrothed are juxtaposed to each other. The Torah describes betrothal with the term becoming, as in the expression: โ€œAnd she becomes another manโ€™s wifeโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:2). Betrothal can be performed through the transference of money or an item of value, through a document, or through sexual intercourse. All three forms are juxtaposed with one another. Conditions can be stipulated for betrothal performed via transference of money or through a document, since these methods of betrothal can be fulfilled through an agent. Therefore, a condition may also be stipulated for betrothal through sexual intercourse, although that cannot be fulfilled through an agent.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืขื•ืœื ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืžืœื•ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ื‘ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜


Rav Ulla bar Abba said that Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: In the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan by forgiving a debt she owes him, which does not effect betrothal, and subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her; or one who betroths a woman conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her; or one who betroths a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, in all of these cases, all agree that she requires a bill of divorce from him. Although the initial betrothal was invalid, they are betrothed due to the subsequent sexual intercourse.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื‘ืจ ืื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžื ื—ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ื‘ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ื‘ื”ื ื”ื•ื ื“ืœื ื˜ืขื™ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืš ื˜ืขื™


Rav Yosef bar Abba said that Rabbi Menaแธฅem said that Rabbi Ami said: In the case of one who betroths a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta and subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce from him. This is because it is in this matter that he does not err. He knows that betrothal must be performed with an item worth at least a peruta, and he therefore must have engaged in intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal. But with regard to those other cases, i.e., a loan or a condition, he does err. He engages in intercourse based upon his initial betrothal, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืขื•ืœื ื”ืžืงื“ืฉ ืขืœ ืชื ืื™ ื•ื‘ืขืœ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ื”ื™ืžื ื• ื’ื˜ ื–ื” ื”ื™ื” ืžืขืฉื” ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื” ื›ื— ื‘ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœื”ื•ืฆื™ืื” ื‘ืœื ื’ื˜


Rav Kahana said in the name of Ulla: In the case of one who betroths a woman conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and he subsequently engages in sexual intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce from him, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara relates: This was an incident that actually occurred. A man betrothed a woman conditionally and then engaged in sexual intercourse with her without specification, and the Sages did not have the power to allow her to leave her husband without a bill of divorce, since they could not definitively rule that the betrothal was invalid. Therefore, they forced him to give her a bill of divorce.


ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืžื”ืื™ ืชื ื ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืžืฉื•ื ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื•ื”ื™ื ืœื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืืกื•ืจื” ื”ื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ื•ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืื—ืจืช ืฉืืฃ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉืœื ื ืชืคืฉื” ืžื•ืชืจืช ื•ืื™ื–ื• ื–ื• ืฉืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ื” ืงื™ื“ื•ืฉื™ ื˜ืขื•ืช ืฉืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ื ื” ืžื•ืจื›ื‘ ืขืœ ื›ืชื™ืคื”


The Gemara comments: This statement comes to exclude the opinion of this tanna, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse states with regard to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]: โ€œAnd she was not seizedโ€ (Numbers 5:13), i.e., she was not raped. That is, she is forbidden to her husband since she willingly committed adultery with another man. Consequently, a woman who in fact was seized is permitted to her husband. And you have another woman who, although she was not seized but rather engaged in sexual intercourse willingly, is nevertheless permitted to her husband and is not considered a sota. And who is this? This is referring to one whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as even if her son from this marriage is riding on her shoulders,


ืžืžืื ืช ื•ื”ื•ืœื›ืช ืœื”


she may refuse her husband and go on her way. According to this opinion, the marriage did not take effect at all, despite the fact that they engaged in sexual intercourse, because the betrothal involved an error.


ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ืืฆืœ ื—ื›ื ื•ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืฆืœ ืจื•ืคื ื•ืจื™ืคื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ื›ื ืœืจื•ืคื ื—ื›ื ืขื•ืงืจ ืืช ื”ื ื“ืจ ืžืขื™ืงืจื• ื•ืจื•ืคื ืื™ื ื• ืžืจืคื ืืœื ืžื›ืืŸ ื•ืœื”ื‘ื


ยง The Sages taught: If a man betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, but there are vows incumbent upon her, and she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, she is betrothed. However, if he betroths her on condition that she has no blemishes, but she does have blemishes, and she goes to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed. The Gemara inquires: What is the difference between a halakhic authority and a doctor? The Gemara explains: When a halakhic authority dissolves a vow, he uproots the vow retroactively. It is as if she had never vowed at all, and therefore she was in fact not bound by vows at the time of their betrothal. But a doctor only heals from here onward. Since she had blemishes at the time of betrothal, she is in breach of his condition.


ื•ื”ืชื ื™ื ืืฆืœ ื—ื›ื ื•ื”ืชื™ืจื” ืืฆืœ ืจื•ืคื ื•ืจื™ืคื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ื ื” ืžืงื•ื“ืฉืช ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืื“ื ืจื•ืฆื” ืฉืชืชื‘ื–ื” ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืื“ื ืจื•ืฆื” ืฉืชืชื‘ื–ื” ืืฉืชื• ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isnโ€™t it taught in a different baraita that if she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, or to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed? Rava said: This is not difficult, for this baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that one follows Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara elaborates: This baraita, which states that if her vows were dissolved by a halakhic authority she is betrothed, is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who said that a man is willing for his wife to be degraded by going to court to have her vow dissolved. That baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that a man is not willing for his wife to be degraded in court. Consequently, even if she went to a halakhic authority and he dissolved her vows, such a solution is unacceptable to her husband, as he did not want her to go to court. Therefore, the betrothal is invalid even after the dissolution of the vow.


ืžืื™ ื”ื™ื ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืžืฉื•ื ื ื“ืจ ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื ืจืข ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ


The Gemara poses a question: What is this fundamental dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 45b): If a man who divorces his wife due to a vow that she took subsequently regrets his decision and wants to take her back, he may not remarry her. Similarly, if he divorces her due to a bad reputation she has acquired, he may not remarry her. This is because if he were allowed to take her back if the vow is dissolved by a halakhic authority or after discovering that the rumors about her were false, he might say that had he known this he never would have divorced her. Such a statement would retroactively cast doubt on the validity of the bill of divorce and could potentially cause her children from a second marriage to have the status of mamzerim. He is therefore informed that if he divorces her due to a vow or a bad reputation he can never remarry her.


ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื ื“ืจ ืฉื™ื“ืขื• ื‘ื• ืจื‘ื™ื ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืœื ื™ื“ืขื• ื‘ื• ืจื‘ื™ื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื ื“ืจ ืฉืฆืจื™ืš ื—ืงื™ืจืช ื—ื›ื ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ื•ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ื—ืงื™ืจืช ื—ื›ื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ


Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to any vow that is known by many people and therefore cannot be nullified, he may not remarry her. If it is not known by many people, but rather is a private matter between them, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: Any vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority, that is, the husband cannot nullify it himself and she needs a halakhic authority to analyze the vow carefully to find an opening that will permit its dissolution, he may not remarry her, for he can claim that had he known the vow could be dissolved he would never have divorced her, thereby undermining the bill of divorce. And with regard to a vow that does not require the investigation by a halakhic authority, which he knows he can nullify himself, he may remarry her. There is no concern that he might impair the bill of divorce, as he knew he could dissolve the vow and yet he chose to divorce her regardless.


ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืื—ื“ ืฆืจื™ืš ื•ืื—ื“ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ืืกืจื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืืœื ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘


Rabbi Elazar says: Both in the case of a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority and one that does not require it, he may not remarry her. Rabbi Elazar said in explanation of his view: They prohibited remarrying a woman who was bound by a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority only due to a vow that does not require such investigation. The Gemara explains the respective opinions: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehudaโ€™s statement? As it is written:


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