Ketubot 80

Ketubot 80

רַבִּי אַבָּא, אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב: אֲפִילּוּ שִׁיגְרָא דְתַמְרֵי. בָּעֵי רַב בִּיבִי: חוּבְצָא דְתַמְרֵי מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

by Rabbi Abba that in the school of Rav they say: It is even a cluster of dates stuck together. Rav Beivai asks: If one ate dough made of dates, what is the halakha? Is this considered dignified consumption? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.

לָא אָכְלָה דֶּרֶךְ כָּבוֹד מַאי? אָמַר עוּלָּא: פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ תְּרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי בְּמַעְרְבָא, חַד אָמַר: בִּכְאִיסָּר, וְחַד אָמַר: בִּכְדִינָר.

The Gemara asks: If he did not eat it in a dignified manner, what is the halakha? How much must he eat to be deemed a proper act of consumption? Ulla said: Two amora’im in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, disagree about this matter. One said: He ate the amount of an issar, and one said: He ate the measure of a dinar.

אָמְרִי דַּיָּינֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא: עֲבַד רַב יְהוּדָה עוֹבָדָא בַּחֲבִילֵי זְמוֹרוֹת. רַב יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: אֲכָלָהּ עׇרְלָה, שְׁבִיעִית, וְכִלְאַיִם — הֲרֵי זוֹ חֲזָקָה.

The judges of Pumbedita say: Rav Yehuda took action in a case of a bundle of branches. A husband took them from his wife’s property and fed them to his animals, and Rav Yehuda ruled that this was treated as consumption of her property. The Gemara comments: Rav Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning. As Rav Yehuda said: If one took possession of a plot of land and consumed some of the produce of its trees that was forbidden due to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla] or produce of the seventh year, or a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds, this is considered taking possession of the land, as he was allowed to benefit from the permitted branches.

אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַמּוֹצִיא הוֹצָאוֹת עַל נִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ קְטַנָּה — כְּמוֹצִיא עַל נִכְסֵי אַחֵר דָּמֵי. מַאי טַעְמָא — עֲבַדוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן תַּקַּנְתָּא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא נִיפְסְדִינְהוּ.

§ Rav Yaakov said that Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to one who outlays expenditures for the property of his wife who is a minor girl and was married off by her mother or brothers, he is considered like one who outlays expenditures for the property of someone else. Therefore, if she performed refusal upon reaching maturity, thereby annulling the marriage, he takes the value of the improvement. What is the reason for this? The Sages enacted this ordinance in order that he should not let her property depreciate. If he is not guaranteed reimbursement for his expenses if she refuses him as her husband, he will not attend to the upkeep of her property, causing its value to decline.

הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דִּנְפַלוּ לַהּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי בֵּי חוֹזָאֵי, אֲזַל גַּבְרָא אַפֵּיק שֵׁית מְאָה אַיְיתַי אַרְבַּע מְאָה. בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָתֵי, אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ חַד זוּזָא וּשְׁקַל מִנַּיְיהוּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַה שֶּׁהוֹצִיא — הוֹצִיא, וּמַה שֶּׁאָכַל — אָכַל.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who had four hundred dinars bequeathed to her in Bei Ḥozai, a remote location in Babylonia. The man, her husband, went and took with him six hundred of his own dinars for travel expenses and brought back with him four hundred. While he was coming back he required one dinar, which he took from the money he had collected. He came before Rabbi Ami for a ruling. Rabbi Ami said to him: That which he spent he has spent, and that which he ate he has eaten. He has benefited from one dinar of her money and spent six hundred of his own, and neither amount can be claimed.

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי אַמֵּי: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָאָכֵיל פֵּירָא, הָא קַרְנָא קָאָכֵיל וְהוֹצָאָה הִיא. אִם כֵּן, הָוֵה לֵיהּ הוֹצִיא וְלֹא אָכַל, יִשָּׁבַע כַּמָּה הוֹצִיא, וְיִטּוֹל.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Ami: This applies only where he consumes the produce of his wife’s property, but this one ate from the principal, and it is merely expenditures. He replied: If so, this is a case of one who pays expenditures and did not eat, and the halakha is that in such a case he takes an oath with regard to how much he paid and then takes that amount.

יִשָּׁבַע כַּמָּה הוֹצִיא וְיִטּוֹל. אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי: וְהוּא שֶׁיֵּשׁ שֶׁבַח כְּנֶגֶד הוֹצָאָה. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שֶׁאִם הָיָה שֶׁבַח יָתֵר עַל הוֹצָאָה — נוֹטֵל אֶת הַהוֹצָאָה בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה.

§ The mishna states: He takes an oath with regard to how much he spent and takes this sum. Rabbi Asi said: And this applies only if there is enhancement to the property corresponding to his expense. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Is this a stringency for the husband that if the value of enhancement is less he may not reclaim all his expenses, or is it a leniency that if the value is greater he need not take an oath? Abaye said: It means that if the value of enhancement was greater than the expense, he takes the expense without an oath.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, אָתֵי לְאִיעָרוֹמֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: שֶׁאִם הָיְתָה הוֹצָאָה יְתֵירָה עַל הַשֶּׁבַח — אֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאָה שִׁיעוּר שֶׁבַח, וּבִשְׁבוּעָה.

Rava said to him: If so, he will come to deceive, as he can always say that he spent slightly less than the value of the enhancement and thereby receive this amount without having to take an oath. Rather, Rava said: It means that if the expense was greater than the enhancement, he has rights to reclaim the expense only up to the amount of the enhancement, but no more, and even this amount he can claim only by an oath.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בַּעַל שֶׁהוֹרִיד אֲרִיסִין תַּחְתָּיו, מַהוּ? אַדַּעְתָּא דְבַעַל נָחֵית. אִיסְתַּלַּיק לֵיהּ בַּעַל, אִיסְתַּלַּיקוּ לְהוּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: אַדַּעְתָּא דְאַרְעָא נָחֵית, וְאַרְעָא כִּי קָיְימָא — לַאֲרִיסֵי קָיְימָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a husband who engaged sharecroppers to work his wife’s property in his stead, what is the halakha? Does a sharecropper begin work on the land with the intention to work for the husband, so that if the husband departs the property, e.g., if he divorces his wife, they too depart as sharecroppers and do not receive their share of the profits from the land? Or perhaps a sharecropper begins work with the intention to work the land, and the land, as it stands, stands to be worked by sharecroppers? Since their involvement is directly with the land, it makes no difference who hired them, and they would stay on the land.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא בַּר רַב חָנָן: מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהַיּוֹרֵד לְתוֹךְ שְׂדֵה חֲבֵירוֹ וּנְטָעָהּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת, שָׁמִין לוֹ, וְיָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה?

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan objects to this line of inquiry: In what way is this case different from that of one who entered the field of another and planted it without permission? In such a situation one evaluates his expenses for him and the value of his enhancement of the field, and he is at a disadvantage. Therefore, he always receives the smaller sum, whether it is equal to his expenses or the enhancement of the property. In this case too, even if the sharecroppers are viewed as unauthorized occupiers of the land, why shouldn’t they be treated like one who entered another’s field without permission and receive at least the smaller sum?

הָתָם לֵיכָּא אִינִישׁ דְּטָרַח, הָכָא אִיכָּא בַּעַל דְּטָרַח.

The Gemara answers: The two cases are not comparable: There, when one enters another’s land, there is no one else that will exert himself for it, and therefore it is reasonable that the one who invested in this property should at least be compensated for the lesser value. However, here, there is a husband who exerts himself for the land. Since the sharecroppers act in his stead, they are entitled to remain on the land only as long as he is present.

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: חָזֵינַן אִי בַּעַל אָרִיס הוּא — אִיסְתַּלַּק לֵיהּ בַּעַל, אִסְתַּלַּקוּ לְהוּ. אִי בַּעַל לָאו אָרִיס הוּא, אַרְעָא לַאֲרִיסֵי קָיְימָא.

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it, i.e., the original question? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: We examine the matter: If this husband is a sharecropper himself and possesses sufficient knowledge of working the land to perform the task himself, then when the husband departs from the property they too depart, as they are taking his place. If the husband is not a sharecropper, the land is ready for sharecroppers, as the husband would not have performed the work himself. Since the wife was in need of sharecroppers, they are not considered to have acted on behalf of the husband and do not forfeit their share.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בַּעַל שֶׁמָּכַר קַרְקַע לְפֵירוֹת, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן מַאי דְּקָנֵי (לַהּ) אַקְנִי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן פֵּירוֹת לְבַעַל —

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a husband who sold his wife’s land for produce, i.e., rights to the produce were sold to one who agrees to work the land in exchange, what is the halakha? Do we say: That which belongs to the husband he has transferred to others, and therefore the sale of the produce is valid, or perhaps the principle is that when the Sages instituted that the produce goes to the husband,

מִשּׁוּם רְוַוח בֵּיתָא, אֲבָל לְזַבּוֹנֵי — לָא? יְהוּדָה מָר בַּר מָרִימָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה, עָשׂוּי. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.

they did so for the gain of the house, as more food is available when he brings produce home, but in order for him to sell it they did not institute their decree? Two opinions were stated with regard to this issue: Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar said in the name of Rava: What he did is done, i.e., takes effect. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: He did not do anything.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָא דִּיהוּדָה מָר בַּר מָרִימָר לָאו בְּפֵירוּשׁ אִתְּמַר, אֶלָּא מִכְּלָלָא אִתְּמַר. דְּהָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דְּעַיִּילָה לֵיהּ לְגַבְרַאּ תַּרְתֵּי אַמְהָתָא, אֲזַל גַּבְרָא נְסֵיב אִיתְּתָא אַחֲרִיתִי, עַיֵּיל לַהּ חֲדָא מִנַּיְיהוּ.

Rav Pappa said: This statement of Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar was not stated explicitly in Rava’s name. Rather, it was stated from an inference based on an incident that occurred in which a certain woman brought in for her husband two maidservants as part of her dowry. The man went and married another woman in addition to the first. He subsequently brought in to the second wife one of the maidservants to attend to her needs.

אֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, צְוַוחָה, לָא אַשְׁגַּח בַּהּ. מַאן דַּחֲזָא סָבַר מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי. וְלָא הִיא, מִשּׁוּם רְוַוח בֵּיתָא — וְהָא קָא רָוַוח.

The first wife came before Rava and cried about the injustice done to her, but Rava took no notice of her, claiming she had no right to complain. He who observed this incident thought that Rava ruled this way because he holds that what he did is done, i.e., takes effect, and a husband may sell his wife’s usufruct property and use its produce as he sees fit. But that is not so, as the Sages instituted the ordinance that a husband owns the rights to the produce of his wife’s property for the gain of the house, and here the house does gain from his action, as the maidservant also performs work for the house.

וְהִלְכְתָא: בַּעַל שֶׁמָּכַר קַרְקַע לְפֵירוֹת — לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְּלוּם. מַאי טַעְמָא? אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תַּכְסִיף. רָבָא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם רְוַוח בֵּיתָא.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that a husband who sold land for produce did not do anything. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for this ruling? Abaye said: We are concerned that perhaps the land itself will deteriorate over time, as the purchaser has acquired only its produce and has no incentive to take proper care of the land. Rava said: This is because there is no gain of the house here.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אַרְעָא דִּמְקָרְבָא לְמָתָא, אִי נָמֵי: בַּעַל אָרִיס הוּא. אִי נָמֵי, זוּזֵי וְקָא עָבֵיד בְּהוּ עִיסְקָא.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations? The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them is, e.g., land that is close to the town, as one can check at any time whether the land is being cared for properly. Alternatively, the difference involves a husband who is a sharecropper and works the land himself but sold the rights of the produce to someone else. As a sharecropper, the husband retains part of the produce and will also ensure that the land does not deteriorate. Alternatively, the difference concerns a husband who receives money for the produce and does business with it, which provides gain for the house.

מַתְנִי׳ שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים — מוֹדִים בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל שֶׁמּוֹכֶרֶת וְנוֹתֶנֶת וְקַיָּים.

MISHNA: When a married man dies childless, his brother, the yavam, is obligated to perform levirate marriage or release the widow, the yevama, through a ceremony known as ḥalitza. With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam who had property bequeathed to her, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give this property away, and the transaction is valid.

מֵתָה, מָה יַעֲשׂוּ בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ וּבִנְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִין וְהַיּוֹצְאִין עִמָּהּ? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: יַחְלְקוּ יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: נְכָסִים בְּחֶזְקָתָן, וּכְתוּבָּה בְּחֶזְקַת יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל. נְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִים וְהַיּוֹצְאִים עִמָּהּ — בְּחֶזְקַת יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב.

If this woman died, what should they do with her marriage contract and with the property that comes and goes with her, i.e., her usufruct property? Beit Shammai say: Since she was not yet remarried, the husband’s heirs, such as his brothers or father, divide the property with her father’s heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status, and therefore the marriage contract is in the possession of the husband’s heirs, as they are responsible for its payment. As for the property that comes and goes with her, it is in the possession of the heirs of the woman’s father, as it belongs to the woman.

הִנִּיחַ אָחִיו מָעוֹת — יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע, וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת. פֵּירוֹת הַתְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע — יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע, וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת.

If his deceased brother left money as part of his estate, land to be used as a lien on her marriage contract is acquired with it, and the yavam consumes the produce. Similarly, if the deceased brother left produce that is detached from the ground, land is acquired with it and the yavam consumes the produce.

הַמְחוּבָּרִין בַּקַּרְקַע, אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שָׁמִין אוֹתָן כַּמָּה הֵן יָפִין בְּפֵירוֹת, וְכַמָּה הֵן יָפִין בְּלֹא פֵּירוֹת, וְהַמּוֹתָר — יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע, וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת.

If he left behind produce that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says: One evaluates the properties to determine how much they are worth with the produce, and how much they are worth without the produce. And as for the surplus, which is the value of the produce, land is acquired with it and the yavam consumes the produce.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פֵּירוֹת הַמְחוּבָּרִין בַּקַּרְקַע — שֶׁלּוֹ. הַתְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע — כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם זָכָה בָּהֶן. קָדַם הוּא — זָכָה, קָדְמָה הִיא — יִלָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת.

And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his. Therefore, it is not used in the purchase of land, but the yavam may eat it. As for the produce that is detached from the ground, which is not mortgaged to her marriage contract, whoever takes possession first has acquired it. If the yavam takes possession of the property first, he has acquired it and may use it as he wishes, but if she is first, land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce.

כְּנָסָהּ, הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר. בִּלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן.

After the yavam has married her, her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except that the responsibility for payment of her marriage contract is carried out through mortgaging the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam.

לֹא יֹאמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ מוּנַּחַת עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן״, אֶלָּא כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ. וְכֵן: לֹא יֹאמַר אָדָם לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״הֲרֵי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ מוּנַּחַת עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן״, אֶלָּא כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.

Therefore, the yavam may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. He may not set aside a designated sum of money for this payment. Rather, all of the first husband’s property is mortgaged for her marriage contract as long as he has not divorced her. And similarly, in general a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract.

גֵּירְשָׁהּ — אֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּה. הֶחְזִירָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַנָּשִׁים, וְאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּה בִּלְבָד.

If the yavam divorced her after performing levirate marriage, she has only her marriage contract, as she does not retain any rights to the rest of her first husband’s property. If he subsequently remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing but her marriage contract. In this case, the property of her first husband is no longer pledged for the payment of her marriage contract.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁמֵּתָה, מִי קוֹבְרָהּ? יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל קָבְרִי לַהּ דְּקָא יָרְתִי כְּתוּבָּה, אוֹ דִלְמָא יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב קָבְרִי לַהּ, דְּקָא יָרְתִי נְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִין וְהַיּוֹצְאִין עִמָּהּ? אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁמֵּתָה —

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a widow awaiting her yavam who dies, who buries her? Who is obligated to bear the expenses of her burial? Must the husband’s heirs bury her, as they inherit the marriage contract, or perhaps her father’s heirs are obligated to bury her, as they inherit the property that comes and goes with her? Rav Amram said: Come and hear a solution. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a widow waiting for her yavam who dies,