The Mishna brings different statements a husband can make to relinquish his rights to her usufruct (nichsei melog) property. Which language exempts him from which rights? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees regarding his right to inherit the property upon her death and holds that his right to inherit the property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. Why does it work for him to relinquish his rights by making a declaration, when in the case of a partnership, one who declares they want no share in the property does not relinquish one’s rights as it is likely one said it out of anger or frustration and didn’t actually mean it? How are the cases different? In the partnership case, what if they did a kinyan? Would it be effective? Why in the first case in the Mishna does the husband relinquish his rights only to the extent that she can sell the property? Why not the other rights instead or the other ones as well? Rabbi Yehuda states that to relinquish rights to the proceeds of the proceeds and the proceeds of those proceeds and so on, one needs to be very specific with the language. What aspect of the wording is the part that is critical – the words “proceeds or proceeds” or “forever?” If one only mentioned proceeds or proceeds and not proceeds alone, are the rights to the proceeds relinquished as well? Rav held like Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. What was Rav’s reason?
Ketubot 83
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Ketubot 83
הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה יוֹרְשָׁהּ. אִם כֵּן, לָמָּה כָּתַב לָהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ״? שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה — קַיָּים.
MISHNA: One who writes for his wife in a document the declaration: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, may nevertheless consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies before him, he inherits from her. If this is so, if he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property? The result of this declaration is that if she sold or gave away her property, the transaction is binding, and he cannot claim it.
כָּתַב לָהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה — יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. עַד שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב לַהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן עַד עוֹלָם״.
If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime, but if she dies he still retains the right to inherit from her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce until he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever.
כָּתַב לַהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן בְּחַיַּיִךְ וּבְמוֹתֵךְ״ — אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה — אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם מֵתָה — יִירָשֶׁנָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל.
If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit from her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit from her, because he stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: ״הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ״.
GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: One who says to his wife; he did not teach: One who writes for his wife, as the mishna stated. This indicates that this condition can be stated verbally and does not need to be written in a contract.
וְכִי כְּתַב לַהּ הָכִי, מַאי הָוֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ״, ״וְאֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּהּ״, ״וְיָדַי מְסוּלָּקֹת הֵימֶנָּה״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!
The Gemara asks about the ruling of the mishna: And if he wrote this to her, what of it? How does such a stipulation, written or otherwise, take effect? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says, whether verbally or by written communication, to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or I have no dealings with it, or my hands are removed from it, has not said anything? This is because statements that waive rights without transferring them to another have no legal standing.
אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: בְּכוֹתֵב לָהּ וְעוֹדָהּ אֲרוּסָה, כִּדְרַב כָּהֲנָא. דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: נַחֲלָה הַבָּאָה לְאָדָם מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אָדָם מַתְנֶה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְכִדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים כְּגוֹן זוֹ״ — שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ.
The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna is referring to one who writes such a statement for her while she is still betrothed. Since the property was not yet in the husband’s possession when he wrote this condition, he was able to forgo any rights that he would later receive. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: Concerning an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., he did not inherit it directly but rather through his wife or by means of a gift, the person can stipulate with regard to it that he will not inherit it. In this case, his statement is effective, although one cannot waive a right one already has. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages that was instituted for my benefit, such as this one, one listens to him.
מַאי ״כְּגוֹן זוֹ״? כִּדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״.
The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav said a certain ruling. As Rav Huna said that Rav said that a woman is able say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of the wife, she is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may opt out of the arrangement granting him the right to the produce of his wife’s land.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ נְשׂוּאָה נָמֵי?
The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rava’s opinion that one can waive a right instituted by the Sages for his own benefit is accepted, then even if he relinquished his rights to his wife’s property once she was already married, his stipulation should also be valid. Why, then, was it necessary for Rabbi Yannai to explain that the stipulation in the mishna was made only in the case of a betrothed woman?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נְשׂוּאָה — יָדוֹ כְּיָדָהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: יָדוֹ עֲדִיפָא מִיָּדָהּ. נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם.
Abaye said: In the case of a married woman, his hand, i.e., his right to the property, is like her hand. Since the husband is considered a partner in her property, he cannot forfeit his ownership by declaration. Rava said: If they are married, his hand is preferable to her hand, i.e., he has more rights to her property than she does. The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rava and Abaye concerns the case of a widow awaiting her brother-in-law [yavam] to perform levirate marriage. If the husband’s rights are greater than the wife’s, then the rights of the yavam can be judged to be at least equal to that of the wife. If the husband and wife have equal rights in her property, then the rights of the yavam are inferior to the wife’s.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, מַהוּ? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִדִּין וּדְבָרִים קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if one not only wrote a declaration relinquishing his rights to his partner’s property, but they also performed an act of acquisition transferring the rights from him? Rav Yosef said: They acquired from him only his promise of: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property. Therefore, the transaction is no more effective than the promise itself. Rav Naḥman said: The transaction is effective and they acquired the land itself from him. Abaye said: The statement of Rav Yosef is reasonable
בְּעוֹרֵר. אֲבָל בְּעוֹמֵד, מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.
in the case of one who immediately objects when the other comes to claim the portion he was promised, saying that he wrote what he did only in order to avoid a quarrel. However, in the case of one who waits while the other takes possession of the land before regretting his decision and requesting its return, the halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself, as he cannot retract his statement at this late stage.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִלְכְתָא, מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: בְּעוֹרֵר אוֹ בְּעוֹמֵד? לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ, לְכִדְרַב יוֹסֵף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי. כְּלוֹמַר: לָא סְבִירָא לִי.
Ameimar said: The halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Do you mean to teach this halakha with regard to one who immediately objects or with regard to one who waits? The Gemara comments: With regard to what opinion is there a practical difference? There is a difference according to Abaye’s explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. However, according to Rav Naḥman, in either case the other retains possession of the land. Ameimar said to him: I did not hear about Abaye’s explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. That is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it. I do not distinguish between these two cases.
אִם כֵּן לָמָּה כָּתַב לָהּ וְכוּ׳. וְתֵימָא לֵיהּ: מִכׇּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיקְתְּ נַפְשָׁךְ! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יַד בַּעַל הַשְּׁטָר עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה.
§ The mishna taught that if a husband says: I have no claim to your property, then he has not relinquished his right to benefit from the produce of the property or to inherit from his wife. The mishna asks: If this is so, and he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, and explains that his statement grants her permission to sell the property if she so wishes? The Gemara asks: And why does the wife not say to him: You removed yourself from everything? He wrote a general statement, which could be understood as a renouncement of all of his rights. Abaye said: There is a principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage. A document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible, to impose only the most limited obligations. Therefore, in this case, the husband is assumed to have relinquished only some of his rights.
וְאֵימָא מִפֵּירֵי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״בּוּצִינָא טָב מִקָּרָא״.
The Gemara asks: And if this is so, why not say that the husband has merely withdrawn his rights from the produce? A gift or sale of the entire land is a significant matter, certainly in relation to the minor value of its produce. Why, then, is his statement not understood as a renunciation of his rights to the produce? Abaye said: There is a proverb that a cucumber in one’s possession is better than a gourd one will have only later. There is an assumption that the husband’s current access to the produce is more important to him than the future ability to sell the field.
וְאֵימָא מִיְּרוּשָּׁה! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִיתָה שְׁכִיחָא, מְכִירָה לָא שְׁכִיחָא. וְכִי מְסַלֵּיק אִינִישׁ נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִמִּילְּתָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, מִמִּילְּתָא דִּשְׁכִיחָא לָא מְסַלֵּיק אִינִישׁ נַפְשֵׁיהּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, ״בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״ — וְלֹא בְּפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן, ״בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״ — וְלֹא לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
The Gemara continues to inquire: And why not say that the husband has withdrawn his rights from the inheritance? This is the least important right of the husband, as he might die before her. Abaye said: Death is common, whereas a sale is not common, as one does not usually sell one’s ancestors’ inheritance. And when a person removes himself, it is assumed that he does so from an uncommon matter. However, a person does not remove himself from something that is common. Rav Ashi said a different reason: The wording of the document is: I have no claim to your property, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to its produce. Similarly, the statement: To your property, means during your lifetime, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to it after your death.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירוֹת וְאֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת? הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ קַרְקַע וְעָשְׂתָה פֵּירוֹת — הֲרֵי הֵן פֵּירוֹת. מָכַר פֵּירוֹת וְלָקַח מֵהֶן קַרְקַע וְעָשְׂתָה פֵּירוֹת — הֲרֵי הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת.
§ The mishna taught that if a husband wrote: To your property and to its produce, he may not eat the produce. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. The Sages taught with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: Which is considered the produce, and which is considered the produce of the produce? If she brought into the marriage for her husband land that produced produce, this is produce. If he sold the produce and purchased land from their sale, and this land produced produce, this is the produce of the produce.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ דַּוְקָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דַּוְקָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דַּוְקָא?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the husband renounces his rights to his wife’s property by writing: To their produce and the produce of the produce forever, is it specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes his statement effective, and it is sufficient if he writes only this phrase? Or, perhaps he must specifically write forever, and that alone is sufficient. Or perhaps it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements.
אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ דַּוְקָא, ״עַד עוֹלָם״ לְמָה לִי? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כֵּיוָן דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, כְּמַאן דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דָּמֵי.
The Gemara elaborates: If you say that it is specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes the statement of the husband effective, why do I need the mishna to include the word forever? The Gemara suggests: This word teaches us that since he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, it is considered as though he wrote to her the term forever, but it does not matter if in practice he omitted this word.
וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דַּוְקָא, ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ לְמָה לִי? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אַף עַל גַּב דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, אִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״ — אִין, אִי לָא — לָא.
Conversely, the Gemara asks: And if you say that he must specifically write the word forever, why do I need the mishna to include the phrase: Produce of the produce? The Gemara suggests: This phrase teaches us that although he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, if he also wrote to her the word forever, then yes, he has renounced his rights. However, if he did not write this, then he has not withdrawn his rights from her property, and he may consume the produce of the produce of the produce.
וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דַּוְקָא, תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, וְלֹא כְּתַב לָהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת הוּא דְּלָא אָכֵיל, אֲבָל פֵּירָא דְּפֵירֵי פֵירוֹת — אָכֵיל, לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״עַד עוֹלָם״. וְאִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״, וְלָא כְּתַב לָהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: לְעוֹלָם אַפֵּירוֹת קָאֵי, לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״.
And if you say that it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements, why do I need two expressions? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to include both phrases, for if he had written for her only: Produce of the produce, and not written for her: Forever, I would say that it is the produce of the produce that he may not consume, but the produce of the produce of the produce he may consume. For this reason, it was necessary to also write forever. And if he had written for her only: Forever, and had not written for her: Produce of the produce, I would say that forever is referring to the produce, i.e., the husband permanently relinquishes his claim to the produce itself, but he retains his right to the produce of the produce. For this reason, it was also necessary to specify produce of the produce.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ, כָּתַב לָהּ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹת״, מַהוּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל פֵּירוֹת? מִפֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, מִפֵּירֵי לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִכֹּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband wrote to his wife: I have no claim to your property or to the produce of your produce, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that he may consume the produce itself? Has he removed himself from the produce of the produce, but from the produce itself, which he failed to mention, he has not removed himself? Or perhaps he has removed himself from all matters, as the produce of the produce includes the produce itself?
פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִכֹּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ. דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִפֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, מִפֵּירֵי לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאַכְלִינְהוּ לְפֵירוֹת — פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת מֵהֵיכָא?
The Gemara answers: It is obvious that he has removed himself from all matters, for if you say that he has removed himself only from the produce of the produce, while from the produce itself he has not removed himself, since he consumes the produce, from where will there be produce of the produce?
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ — הָא דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת כּוּ׳. כֵּיוָן דְּאַכְלִינְהוּ לְפֵירֵי, פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת מֵהֵיכָא? אֶלָּא בִּדְשַׁיַּירָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּדְשַׁיַּיר.
The Gemara answers: But according to your reasoning, the same question could be asked about the case discussed in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce, until he writes for her: Or to their produce, or to the produce of their produce forever. This indicates that if he did not write: To their produce, he would be allowed to consume the produce, just not the produce of the produce. Here too, it could be asked: Since he consumes the produce, from where will he have produce of the produce? Rather, it must be that this is referring to one who left over some of the produce, which he used to purchase land, of whose produce he consumes. If so, here too, this is a case of one who left over some of the produce, from which he acquired land, and it is the produce of this land to which he has no rights. The dilemma is left unresolved.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְלָא מִטַּעְמֵיהּ.
§ The mishna taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he wrote: I have no claim to your property, or to its produce, or to the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he nevertheless inherits from her. This is because his condition is void, as it runs counter to what is written in the Torah. Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a husband inherits from his wife, but not because of his line of reasoning.
מַאי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְלָא מִטַּעְמֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאָמַר: אִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ, דְּאִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, וְרַב סָבַר: תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים, וְקָסָבַר: יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה.
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this statement: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not because of his line of reasoning? What does Rav mean? If we say that Rav agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she dies he inherits from her, but Rav maintains this opinion not because of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s line of reasoning, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, and then Rav must hold that his condition is valid. But that is not so. Rav accepts Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s conclusion, for he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, and for this reason his condition is void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than those of Torah law and decreed that the inheritance of a husband cannot be canceled in any manner.
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Ketubot 83
הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה יוֹרְשָׁהּ. אִם כֵּן, לָמָּה כָּתַב לָהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ״? שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה — קַיָּים.
MISHNA: One who writes for his wife in a document the declaration: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, may nevertheless consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies before him, he inherits from her. If this is so, if he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property? The result of this declaration is that if she sold or gave away her property, the transaction is binding, and he cannot claim it.
כָּתַב לָהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן״ — הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּרוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה — יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. עַד שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב לַהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן עַד עוֹלָם״.
If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime, but if she dies he still retains the right to inherit from her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce until he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever.
כָּתַב לַהּ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן בְּחַיַּיִךְ וּבְמוֹתֵךְ״ — אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ, וְאִם מֵתָה — אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם מֵתָה — יִירָשֶׁנָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל.
If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit from her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit from her, because he stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: ״הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ״.
GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: One who says to his wife; he did not teach: One who writes for his wife, as the mishna stated. This indicates that this condition can be stated verbally and does not need to be written in a contract.
וְכִי כְּתַב לַהּ הָכִי, מַאי הָוֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ״, ״וְאֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּהּ״, ״וְיָדַי מְסוּלָּקֹת הֵימֶנָּה״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!
The Gemara asks about the ruling of the mishna: And if he wrote this to her, what of it? How does such a stipulation, written or otherwise, take effect? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says, whether verbally or by written communication, to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or I have no dealings with it, or my hands are removed from it, has not said anything? This is because statements that waive rights without transferring them to another have no legal standing.
אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: בְּכוֹתֵב לָהּ וְעוֹדָהּ אֲרוּסָה, כִּדְרַב כָּהֲנָא. דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: נַחֲלָה הַבָּאָה לְאָדָם מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אָדָם מַתְנֶה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְכִדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים כְּגוֹן זוֹ״ — שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ.
The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna is referring to one who writes such a statement for her while she is still betrothed. Since the property was not yet in the husband’s possession when he wrote this condition, he was able to forgo any rights that he would later receive. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: Concerning an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., he did not inherit it directly but rather through his wife or by means of a gift, the person can stipulate with regard to it that he will not inherit it. In this case, his statement is effective, although one cannot waive a right one already has. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages that was instituted for my benefit, such as this one, one listens to him.
מַאי ״כְּגוֹן זוֹ״? כִּדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״.
The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav said a certain ruling. As Rav Huna said that Rav said that a woman is able say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of the wife, she is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may opt out of the arrangement granting him the right to the produce of his wife’s land.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ נְשׂוּאָה נָמֵי?
The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rava’s opinion that one can waive a right instituted by the Sages for his own benefit is accepted, then even if he relinquished his rights to his wife’s property once she was already married, his stipulation should also be valid. Why, then, was it necessary for Rabbi Yannai to explain that the stipulation in the mishna was made only in the case of a betrothed woman?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נְשׂוּאָה — יָדוֹ כְּיָדָהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: יָדוֹ עֲדִיפָא מִיָּדָהּ. נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם.
Abaye said: In the case of a married woman, his hand, i.e., his right to the property, is like her hand. Since the husband is considered a partner in her property, he cannot forfeit his ownership by declaration. Rava said: If they are married, his hand is preferable to her hand, i.e., he has more rights to her property than she does. The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rava and Abaye concerns the case of a widow awaiting her brother-in-law [yavam] to perform levirate marriage. If the husband’s rights are greater than the wife’s, then the rights of the yavam can be judged to be at least equal to that of the wife. If the husband and wife have equal rights in her property, then the rights of the yavam are inferior to the wife’s.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, מַהוּ? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִדִּין וּדְבָרִים קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if one not only wrote a declaration relinquishing his rights to his partner’s property, but they also performed an act of acquisition transferring the rights from him? Rav Yosef said: They acquired from him only his promise of: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property. Therefore, the transaction is no more effective than the promise itself. Rav Naḥman said: The transaction is effective and they acquired the land itself from him. Abaye said: The statement of Rav Yosef is reasonable
בְּעוֹרֵר. אֲבָל בְּעוֹמֵד, מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.
in the case of one who immediately objects when the other comes to claim the portion he was promised, saying that he wrote what he did only in order to avoid a quarrel. However, in the case of one who waits while the other takes possession of the land before regretting his decision and requesting its return, the halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself, as he cannot retract his statement at this late stage.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִלְכְתָא, מִגּוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: בְּעוֹרֵר אוֹ בְּעוֹמֵד? לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ, לְכִדְרַב יוֹסֵף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי. כְּלוֹמַר: לָא סְבִירָא לִי.
Ameimar said: The halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Do you mean to teach this halakha with regard to one who immediately objects or with regard to one who waits? The Gemara comments: With regard to what opinion is there a practical difference? There is a difference according to Abaye’s explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. However, according to Rav Naḥman, in either case the other retains possession of the land. Ameimar said to him: I did not hear about Abaye’s explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. That is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it. I do not distinguish between these two cases.
אִם כֵּן לָמָּה כָּתַב לָהּ וְכוּ׳. וְתֵימָא לֵיהּ: מִכׇּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיקְתְּ נַפְשָׁךְ! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יַד בַּעַל הַשְּׁטָר עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה.
§ The mishna taught that if a husband says: I have no claim to your property, then he has not relinquished his right to benefit from the produce of the property or to inherit from his wife. The mishna asks: If this is so, and he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, and explains that his statement grants her permission to sell the property if she so wishes? The Gemara asks: And why does the wife not say to him: You removed yourself from everything? He wrote a general statement, which could be understood as a renouncement of all of his rights. Abaye said: There is a principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage. A document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible, to impose only the most limited obligations. Therefore, in this case, the husband is assumed to have relinquished only some of his rights.
וְאֵימָא מִפֵּירֵי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״בּוּצִינָא טָב מִקָּרָא״.
The Gemara asks: And if this is so, why not say that the husband has merely withdrawn his rights from the produce? A gift or sale of the entire land is a significant matter, certainly in relation to the minor value of its produce. Why, then, is his statement not understood as a renunciation of his rights to the produce? Abaye said: There is a proverb that a cucumber in one’s possession is better than a gourd one will have only later. There is an assumption that the husband’s current access to the produce is more important to him than the future ability to sell the field.
וְאֵימָא מִיְּרוּשָּׁה! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִיתָה שְׁכִיחָא, מְכִירָה לָא שְׁכִיחָא. וְכִי מְסַלֵּיק אִינִישׁ נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִמִּילְּתָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, מִמִּילְּתָא דִּשְׁכִיחָא לָא מְסַלֵּיק אִינִישׁ נַפְשֵׁיהּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, ״בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״ — וְלֹא בְּפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן, ״בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ״ — וְלֹא לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
The Gemara continues to inquire: And why not say that the husband has withdrawn his rights from the inheritance? This is the least important right of the husband, as he might die before her. Abaye said: Death is common, whereas a sale is not common, as one does not usually sell one’s ancestors’ inheritance. And when a person removes himself, it is assumed that he does so from an uncommon matter. However, a person does not remove himself from something that is common. Rav Ashi said a different reason: The wording of the document is: I have no claim to your property, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to its produce. Similarly, the statement: To your property, means during your lifetime, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to it after your death.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירוֹת וְאֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת? הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ קַרְקַע וְעָשְׂתָה פֵּירוֹת — הֲרֵי הֵן פֵּירוֹת. מָכַר פֵּירוֹת וְלָקַח מֵהֶן קַרְקַע וְעָשְׂתָה פֵּירוֹת — הֲרֵי הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת.
§ The mishna taught that if a husband wrote: To your property and to its produce, he may not eat the produce. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. The Sages taught with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: Which is considered the produce, and which is considered the produce of the produce? If she brought into the marriage for her husband land that produced produce, this is produce. If he sold the produce and purchased land from their sale, and this land produced produce, this is the produce of the produce.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ דַּוְקָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דַּוְקָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דַּוְקָא?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the husband renounces his rights to his wife’s property by writing: To their produce and the produce of the produce forever, is it specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes his statement effective, and it is sufficient if he writes only this phrase? Or, perhaps he must specifically write forever, and that alone is sufficient. Or perhaps it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements.
אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ דַּוְקָא, ״עַד עוֹלָם״ לְמָה לִי? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כֵּיוָן דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, כְּמַאן דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דָּמֵי.
The Gemara elaborates: If you say that it is specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes the statement of the husband effective, why do I need the mishna to include the word forever? The Gemara suggests: This word teaches us that since he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, it is considered as though he wrote to her the term forever, but it does not matter if in practice he omitted this word.
וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר ״עַד עוֹלָם״ דַּוְקָא, ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״ לְמָה לִי? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אַף עַל גַּב דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, אִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״ — אִין, אִי לָא — לָא.
Conversely, the Gemara asks: And if you say that he must specifically write the word forever, why do I need the mishna to include the phrase: Produce of the produce? The Gemara suggests: This phrase teaches us that although he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, if he also wrote to her the word forever, then yes, he has renounced his rights. However, if he did not write this, then he has not withdrawn his rights from her property, and he may consume the produce of the produce of the produce.
וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דַּוְקָא, תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, וְלֹא כְּתַב לָהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת הוּא דְּלָא אָכֵיל, אֲבָל פֵּירָא דְּפֵירֵי פֵירוֹת — אָכֵיל, לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״עַד עוֹלָם״. וְאִי כְּתַב לַהּ ״עַד עוֹלָם״, וְלָא כְּתַב לָהּ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: לְעוֹלָם אַפֵּירוֹת קָאֵי, לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת״.
And if you say that it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements, why do I need two expressions? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to include both phrases, for if he had written for her only: Produce of the produce, and not written for her: Forever, I would say that it is the produce of the produce that he may not consume, but the produce of the produce of the produce he may consume. For this reason, it was necessary to also write forever. And if he had written for her only: Forever, and had not written for her: Produce of the produce, I would say that forever is referring to the produce, i.e., the husband permanently relinquishes his claim to the produce itself, but he retains his right to the produce of the produce. For this reason, it was also necessary to specify produce of the produce.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ, כָּתַב לָהּ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹת״, מַהוּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל פֵּירוֹת? מִפֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, מִפֵּירֵי לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִכֹּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband wrote to his wife: I have no claim to your property or to the produce of your produce, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that he may consume the produce itself? Has he removed himself from the produce of the produce, but from the produce itself, which he failed to mention, he has not removed himself? Or perhaps he has removed himself from all matters, as the produce of the produce includes the produce itself?
פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִכֹּל מִילֵּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ. דְּאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִפֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ, מִפֵּירֵי לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאַכְלִינְהוּ לְפֵירוֹת — פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת מֵהֵיכָא?
The Gemara answers: It is obvious that he has removed himself from all matters, for if you say that he has removed himself only from the produce of the produce, while from the produce itself he has not removed himself, since he consumes the produce, from where will there be produce of the produce?
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ — הָא דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת כּוּ׳. כֵּיוָן דְּאַכְלִינְהוּ לְפֵירֵי, פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת מֵהֵיכָא? אֶלָּא בִּדְשַׁיַּירָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּדְשַׁיַּיר.
The Gemara answers: But according to your reasoning, the same question could be asked about the case discussed in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce, until he writes for her: Or to their produce, or to the produce of their produce forever. This indicates that if he did not write: To their produce, he would be allowed to consume the produce, just not the produce of the produce. Here too, it could be asked: Since he consumes the produce, from where will he have produce of the produce? Rather, it must be that this is referring to one who left over some of the produce, which he used to purchase land, of whose produce he consumes. If so, here too, this is a case of one who left over some of the produce, from which he acquired land, and it is the produce of this land to which he has no rights. The dilemma is left unresolved.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְלָא מִטַּעְמֵיהּ.
§ The mishna taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he wrote: I have no claim to your property, or to its produce, or to the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he nevertheless inherits from her. This is because his condition is void, as it runs counter to what is written in the Torah. Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a husband inherits from his wife, but not because of his line of reasoning.
מַאי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְלָא מִטַּעְמֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאָמַר: אִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ, דְּאִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, וְרַב סָבַר: תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים, וְקָסָבַר: יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה.
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this statement: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not because of his line of reasoning? What does Rav mean? If we say that Rav agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she dies he inherits from her, but Rav maintains this opinion not because of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s line of reasoning, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, and then Rav must hold that his condition is valid. But that is not so. Rav accepts Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s conclusion, for he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, and for this reason his condition is void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than those of Torah law and decreed that the inheritance of a husband cannot be canceled in any manner.
