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Today's Daf Yomi

April 26, 2015 | 讝壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Ketubot 83

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻讜转讘 诇讗砖转讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讗讜讻诇 驻专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讜专砖讛 讗诐 讻谉 诇诪讛 讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐

MISHNA: One who writes for his wife in a document the declaration: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, may nevertheless consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies before him, he inherits from her. If this is so, if he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property? The result of this declaration is that if she sold or gave away her property, the transaction is binding, and he cannot claim it.

讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 驻专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讜专砖讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 注讚 砖讬讻转讜讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 注讚 注讜诇诐

If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime, but if she dies he still retains the right to inherit from her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce until he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever.

讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讘讞讬讬讱 讜讘诪讜转讱 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 诪驻谞讬 砖诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 讜讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇

If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit from her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit from her, because he stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

讙诪壮 转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜

GEMARA: Rabbi 岣yya taught in a baraita: One who says to his wife; he did not teach: One who writes for his wife, as the mishna stated. This indicates that this condition can be stated verbally and does not need to be written in a contract.

讜讻讬 讻转讘 诇讛 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks about the ruling of the mishna: And if he wrote this to her, what of it? How does such a stipulation, written or otherwise, take effect? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says, whether verbally or by written communication, to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or I have no dealings with it, or my hands are removed from it, has not said anything? This is because statements that waive rights without transferring them to another have no legal standing.

讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讜注讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 谞讞诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讚诐 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讛 砖诇讗 讬讬专砖谞讛 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜

The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna is referring to one who writes such a statement for her while she is still betrothed. Since the property was not yet in the husband鈥檚 possession when he wrote this condition, he was able to forgo any rights that he would later receive. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: Concerning an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., he did not inherit it directly but rather through his wife or by means of a gift, the person can stipulate with regard to it that he will not inherit it. In this case, his statement is effective, although one cannot waive a right one already has. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages that was instituted for my benefit, such as this one, one listens to him.

诪讗讬 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讻讜诇讛 讗砖讛 砖转讗诪专 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谞讬 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav said a certain ruling. As Rav Huna said that Rav said that a woman is able say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of the wife, she is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may opt out of the arrangement granting him the right to the produce of his wife鈥檚 land.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 谞砖讜讗讛 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rava鈥檚 opinion that one can waive a right instituted by the Sages for his own benefit is accepted, then even if he relinquished his rights to his wife鈥檚 property once she was already married, his stipulation should also be valid. Why, then, was it necessary for Rabbi Yannai to explain that the stipulation in the mishna was made only in the case of a betrothed woman?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞砖讜讗讛 讬讚讜 讻讬讚讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 讬讚讜 注讚讬驻讗 诪讬讚讛 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐

Abaye said: In the case of a married woman, his hand, i.e., his right to the property, is like her hand. Since the husband is considered a partner in her property, he cannot forfeit his ownership by declaration. Rava said: If they are married, his hand is preferable to her hand, i.e., he has more rights to her property than she does. The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rava and Abaye concerns the case of a widow awaiting her brother-in-law [yavam] to perform levirate marriage. If the husband鈥檚 rights are greater than the wife鈥檚, then the rights of the yavam can be judged to be at least equal to that of the wife. If the husband and wife have equal rights in her property, then the rights of the yavam are inferior to the wife鈥檚.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪住转讘专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚专讘 讬讜住祝

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if one not only wrote a declaration relinquishing his rights to his partner鈥檚 property, but they also performed an act of acquisition transferring the rights from him? Rav Yosef said: They acquired from him only his promise of: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property. Therefore, the transaction is no more effective than the promise itself. Rav Na岣an said: The transaction is effective and they acquired the land itself from him. Abaye said: The statement of Rav Yosef is reasonable

讘注讜专专 讗讘诇 讘注讜诪讚 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

in the case of one who immediately objects when the other comes to claim the portion he was promised, saying that he wrote what he did only in order to avoid a quarrel. However, in the case of one who waits while the other takes possession of the land before regretting his decision and requesting its return, the halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself, as he cannot retract his statement at this late stage.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗诪讬诪专 讘注讜专专 讗讜 讘注讜诪讚 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讻讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讻诇讜诪专 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬

Ameimar said: The halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Do you mean to teach this halakha with regard to one who immediately objects or with regard to one who waits? The Gemara comments: With regard to what opinion is there a practical difference? There is a difference according to Abaye鈥檚 explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. However, according to Rav Na岣an, in either case the other retains possession of the land. Ameimar said to him: I did not hear about Abaye鈥檚 explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. That is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it. I do not distinguish between these two cases.

讗诐 讻谉 诇诪讛 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讻讜壮 讜转讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽转 谞驻砖讱 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讚 讘注诇 讛砖讟专 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛

搂 The mishna taught that if a husband says: I have no claim to your property, then he has not relinquished his right to benefit from the produce of the property or to inherit from his wife. The mishna asks: If this is so, and he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, and explains that his statement grants her permission to sell the property if she so wishes? The Gemara asks: And why does the wife not say to him: You removed yourself from everything? He wrote a general statement, which could be understood as a renouncement of all of his rights. Abaye said: There is a principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage. A document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible, to impose only the most limited obligations. Therefore, in this case, the husband is assumed to have relinquished only some of his rights.

讜讗讬诪讗 诪驻讬专讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讘讜爪讬谞讗 讟讘 诪拽专讗

The Gemara asks: And if this is so, why not say that the husband has merely withdrawn his rights from the produce? A gift or sale of the entire land is a significant matter, certainly in relation to the minor value of its produce. Why, then, is his statement not understood as a renunciation of his rights to the produce? Abaye said: There is a proverb that a cucumber in one鈥檚 possession is better than a gourd one will have only later. There is an assumption that the husband鈥檚 current access to the produce is more important to him than the future ability to sell the field.

讜讗讬诪讗 诪讬专讜砖讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讬转讛 砖讻讬讞讗 诪讻讬专讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讜讻讬 诪住诇讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 谞驻砖讬讛 诪诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诪诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞讗 诇讗 诪住诇讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 谞驻砖讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜诇讗 讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara continues to inquire: And why not say that the husband has withdrawn his rights from the inheritance? This is the least important right of the husband, as he might die before her. Abaye said: Death is common, whereas a sale is not common, as one does not usually sell one鈥檚 ancestors鈥 inheritance. And when a person removes himself, it is assumed that he does so from an uncommon matter. However, a person does not remove himself from something that is common. Rav Ashi said a different reason: The wording of the document is: I have no claim to your property, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to its produce. Similarly, the statement: To your property, means during your lifetime, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to it after your death.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗诇讜 讛谉 驻讬专讜转 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 拽专拽注 讜注砖转讛 驻讬专讜转 讛专讬 讛谉 驻讬专讜转 诪讻专 驻讬专讜转 讜诇拽讞 诪讛谉 拽专拽注 讜注砖转讛 驻讬专讜转 讛专讬 讛谉 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转

搂 The mishna taught that if a husband wrote: To your property and to its produce, he may not eat the produce. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. The Sages taught with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: Which is considered the produce, and which is considered the produce of the produce? If she brought into the marriage for her husband land that produced produce, this is produce. If he sold the produce and purchased land from their sale, and this land produced produce, this is the produce of the produce.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚讜拽讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚讜拽讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the husband renounces his rights to his wife鈥檚 property by writing: To their produce and the produce of the produce forever, is it specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes his statement effective, and it is sufficient if he writes only this phrase? Or, perhaps he must specifically write forever, and that alone is sufficient. Or perhaps it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements.

讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚讜拽讗 注讚 注讜诇诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚诪讬

The Gemara elaborates: If you say that it is specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes the statement of the husband effective, why do I need the mishna to include the word forever? The Gemara suggests: This word teaches us that since he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, it is considered as though he wrote to her the term forever, but it does not matter if in practice he omitted this word.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚讜拽讗 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

Conversely, the Gemara asks: And if you say that he must specifically write the word forever, why do I need the mishna to include the phrase: Produce of the produce? The Gemara suggests: This phrase teaches us that although he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, if he also wrote to her the word forever, then yes, he has renounced his rights. However, if he did not write this, then he has not withdrawn his rights from her property, and he may consume the produce of the produce of the produce.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗 转专转讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讗讻讬诇 讗讘诇 驻讬专讗 讚驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讗讻讬诇 诇讛讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 注讚 注讜诇诐 讜讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讜诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗驻讬专讜转 拽讗讬 诇讛讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转

And if you say that it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements, why do I need two expressions? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to include both phrases, for if he had written for her only: Produce of the produce, and not written for her: Forever, I would say that it is the produce of the produce that he may not consume, but the produce of the produce of the produce he may consume. For this reason, it was necessary to also write forever. And if he had written for her only: Forever, and had not written for her: Produce of the produce, I would say that forever is referring to the produce, i.e., the husband permanently relinquishes his claim to the produce itself, but he retains his right to the produce of the produce. For this reason, it was also necessary to specify produce of the produce.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讜 砖讬讗讻诇 驻讬专讜转 诪驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻讬专讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband wrote to his wife: I have no claim to your property or to the produce of your produce, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that he may consume the produce itself? Has he removed himself from the produce of the produce, but from the produce itself, which he failed to mention, he has not removed himself? Or perhaps he has removed himself from all matters, as the produce of the produce includes the produce itself?

驻砖讬讟讗 讚诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讚讗讬 讗诪专转 诪驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻讬专讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讻诇讬谞讛讜 诇驻讬专讜转 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讬讻讗

The Gemara answers: It is obvious that he has removed himself from all matters, for if you say that he has removed himself only from the produce of the produce, while from the produce itself he has not removed himself, since he consumes the produce, from where will there be produce of the produce?

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讛讗 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讻讜壮 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讻诇讬谞讛讜 诇驻讬专讬 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讘讚砖讬讬专讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讚砖讬讬专

The Gemara answers: But according to your reasoning, the same question could be asked about the case discussed in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce, until he writes for her: Or to their produce, or to the produce of their produce forever. This indicates that if he did not write: To their produce, he would be allowed to consume the produce, just not the produce of the produce. Here too, it could be asked: Since he consumes the produce, from where will he have produce of the produce? Rather, it must be that this is referring to one who left over some of the produce, which he used to purchase land, of whose produce he consumes. If so, here too, this is a case of one who left over some of the produce, from which he acquired land, and it is the produce of this land to which he has no rights. The dilemma is left unresolved.

专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇讗 诪讟注诪讬讛

搂 The mishna taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he wrote: I have no claim to your property, or to its produce, or to the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he nevertheless inherits from her. This is because his condition is void, as it runs counter to what is written in the Torah. Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a husband inherits from his wife, but not because of his line of reasoning.

诪讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇讗 诪讟注诪讬讛 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚讗诪专 讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 讜诇讗讜 诪讟注诪讬讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 住讘专 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讜专讘 住讘专 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 讜拽住讘专 讬专讜砖转 讛讘注诇 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this statement: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not because of his line of reasoning? What does Rav mean? If we say that Rav agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she dies he inherits from her, but Rav maintains this opinion not because of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 line of reasoning, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, and then Rav must hold that his condition is valid. But that is not so. Rav accepts Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 conclusion, for he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, and for this reason his condition is void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than those of Torah law and decreed that the inheritance of a husband cannot be canceled in any manner.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Ketubot 83

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 83

诪转谞讬壮 讛讻讜转讘 诇讗砖转讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讗讜讻诇 驻专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讜专砖讛 讗诐 讻谉 诇诪讛 讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐

MISHNA: One who writes for his wife in a document the declaration: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, may nevertheless consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies before him, he inherits from her. If this is so, if he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property? The result of this declaration is that if she sold or gave away her property, the transaction is binding, and he cannot claim it.

讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 驻专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讜专砖讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 注讚 砖讬讻转讜讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 注讚 注讜诇诐

If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime, but if she dies he still retains the right to inherit from her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce until he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever.

讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讘讞讬讬讱 讜讘诪讜转讱 讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转 讘讞讬讬讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讬讜专砖讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 诪驻谞讬 砖诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 讜讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇

If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit from her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit from her, because he stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

讙诪壮 转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜

GEMARA: Rabbi 岣yya taught in a baraita: One who says to his wife; he did not teach: One who writes for his wife, as the mishna stated. This indicates that this condition can be stated verbally and does not need to be written in a contract.

讜讻讬 讻转讘 诇讛 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks about the ruling of the mishna: And if he wrote this to her, what of it? How does such a stipulation, written or otherwise, take effect? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says, whether verbally or by written communication, to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or I have no dealings with it, or my hands are removed from it, has not said anything? This is because statements that waive rights without transferring them to another have no legal standing.

讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讻讜转讘 诇讛 讜注讜讚讛 讗专讜住讛 讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 谞讞诇讛 讛讘讗讛 诇讗讚诐 诪诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇讬讛 砖诇讗 讬讬专砖谞讛 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜

The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna is referring to one who writes such a statement for her while she is still betrothed. Since the property was not yet in the husband鈥檚 possession when he wrote this condition, he was able to forgo any rights that he would later receive. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: Concerning an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., he did not inherit it directly but rather through his wife or by means of a gift, the person can stipulate with regard to it that he will not inherit it. In this case, his statement is effective, although one cannot waive a right one already has. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages that was instituted for my benefit, such as this one, one listens to him.

诪讗讬 讻讙讜谉 讝讜 讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讻讜诇讛 讗砖讛 砖转讗诪专 诇讘注诇讛 讗讬谞讬 谞讬讝讜谞转 讜讗讬谞讬 注讜砖讛

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav said a certain ruling. As Rav Huna said that Rav said that a woman is able say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of the wife, she is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may opt out of the arrangement granting him the right to the produce of his wife鈥檚 land.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 谞砖讜讗讛 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rava鈥檚 opinion that one can waive a right instituted by the Sages for his own benefit is accepted, then even if he relinquished his rights to his wife鈥檚 property once she was already married, his stipulation should also be valid. Why, then, was it necessary for Rabbi Yannai to explain that the stipulation in the mishna was made only in the case of a betrothed woman?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞砖讜讗讛 讬讚讜 讻讬讚讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 讬讚讜 注讚讬驻讗 诪讬讚讛 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇砖讜诪专转 讬讘诐

Abaye said: In the case of a married woman, his hand, i.e., his right to the property, is like her hand. Since the husband is considered a partner in her property, he cannot forfeit his ownership by declaration. Rava said: If they are married, his hand is preferable to her hand, i.e., he has more rights to her property than she does. The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rava and Abaye concerns the case of a widow awaiting her brother-in-law [yavam] to perform levirate marriage. If the husband鈥檚 rights are greater than the wife鈥檚, then the rights of the yavam can be judged to be at least equal to that of the wife. If the husband and wife have equal rights in her property, then the rights of the yavam are inferior to the wife鈥檚.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪住转讘专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讚专讘 讬讜住祝

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha if one not only wrote a declaration relinquishing his rights to his partner鈥檚 property, but they also performed an act of acquisition transferring the rights from him? Rav Yosef said: They acquired from him only his promise of: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property. Therefore, the transaction is no more effective than the promise itself. Rav Na岣an said: The transaction is effective and they acquired the land itself from him. Abaye said: The statement of Rav Yosef is reasonable

讘注讜专专 讗讘诇 讘注讜诪讚 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜

in the case of one who immediately objects when the other comes to claim the portion he was promised, saying that he wrote what he did only in order to avoid a quarrel. However, in the case of one who waits while the other takes possession of the land before regretting his decision and requesting its return, the halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself, as he cannot retract his statement at this late stage.

讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诪讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗诪讬诪专 讘注讜专专 讗讜 讘注讜诪讚 诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讻讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬 讻诇讜诪专 诇讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬

Ameimar said: The halakha is that one acquired from him the land itself. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Do you mean to teach this halakha with regard to one who immediately objects or with regard to one who waits? The Gemara comments: With regard to what opinion is there a practical difference? There is a difference according to Abaye鈥檚 explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. However, according to Rav Na岣an, in either case the other retains possession of the land. Ameimar said to him: I did not hear about Abaye鈥檚 explanation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. That is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it. I do not distinguish between these two cases.

讗诐 讻谉 诇诪讛 讻转讘 诇讛 讜讻讜壮 讜转讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽转 谞驻砖讱 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讚 讘注诇 讛砖讟专 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛

搂 The mishna taught that if a husband says: I have no claim to your property, then he has not relinquished his right to benefit from the produce of the property or to inherit from his wife. The mishna asks: If this is so, and he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, and explains that his statement grants her permission to sell the property if she so wishes? The Gemara asks: And why does the wife not say to him: You removed yourself from everything? He wrote a general statement, which could be understood as a renouncement of all of his rights. Abaye said: There is a principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage. A document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible, to impose only the most limited obligations. Therefore, in this case, the husband is assumed to have relinquished only some of his rights.

讜讗讬诪讗 诪驻讬专讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讘讜爪讬谞讗 讟讘 诪拽专讗

The Gemara asks: And if this is so, why not say that the husband has merely withdrawn his rights from the produce? A gift or sale of the entire land is a significant matter, certainly in relation to the minor value of its produce. Why, then, is his statement not understood as a renunciation of his rights to the produce? Abaye said: There is a proverb that a cucumber in one鈥檚 possession is better than a gourd one will have only later. There is an assumption that the husband鈥檚 current access to the produce is more important to him than the future ability to sell the field.

讜讗讬诪讗 诪讬专讜砖讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讬转讛 砖讻讬讞讗 诪讻讬专讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讜讻讬 诪住诇讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 谞驻砖讬讛 诪诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诪诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞讗 诇讗 诪住诇讬拽 讗讬谞讬砖 谞驻砖讬讛 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜诇讗 讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara continues to inquire: And why not say that the husband has withdrawn his rights from the inheritance? This is the least important right of the husband, as he might die before her. Abaye said: Death is common, whereas a sale is not common, as one does not usually sell one鈥檚 ancestors鈥 inheritance. And when a person removes himself, it is assumed that he does so from an uncommon matter. However, a person does not remove himself from something that is common. Rav Ashi said a different reason: The wording of the document is: I have no claim to your property, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to its produce. Similarly, the statement: To your property, means during your lifetime, indicating: But I am not relinquishing my claim to it after your death.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗诇讜 讛谉 驻讬专讜转 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 拽专拽注 讜注砖转讛 驻讬专讜转 讛专讬 讛谉 驻讬专讜转 诪讻专 驻讬专讜转 讜诇拽讞 诪讛谉 拽专拽注 讜注砖转讛 驻讬专讜转 讛专讬 讛谉 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转

搂 The mishna taught that if a husband wrote: To your property and to its produce, he may not eat the produce. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. The Sages taught with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: Which is considered the produce, and which is considered the produce of the produce? If she brought into the marriage for her husband land that produced produce, this is produce. If he sold the produce and purchased land from their sale, and this land produced produce, this is the produce of the produce.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚讜拽讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚讜拽讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the husband renounces his rights to his wife鈥檚 property by writing: To their produce and the produce of the produce forever, is it specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes his statement effective, and it is sufficient if he writes only this phrase? Or, perhaps he must specifically write forever, and that alone is sufficient. Or perhaps it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements.

讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚讜拽讗 注讚 注讜诇诐 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚诪讬

The Gemara elaborates: If you say that it is specifically the phrase produce of the produce that makes the statement of the husband effective, why do I need the mishna to include the word forever? The Gemara suggests: This word teaches us that since he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, it is considered as though he wrote to her the term forever, but it does not matter if in practice he omitted this word.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 注讚 注讜诇诐 讚讜拽讗 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诇诪讛 诇讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

Conversely, the Gemara asks: And if you say that he must specifically write the word forever, why do I need the mishna to include the phrase: Produce of the produce? The Gemara suggests: This phrase teaches us that although he wrote to her: Produce of the produce, if he also wrote to her the word forever, then yes, he has renounced his rights. However, if he did not write this, then he has not withdrawn his rights from her property, and he may consume the produce of the produce of the produce.

讜讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讚讜拽讗 转专转讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讜诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讗讻讬诇 讗讘诇 驻讬专讗 讚驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讗讻讬诇 诇讛讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 注讚 注讜诇诐 讜讗讬 讻转讘 诇讛 注讚 注讜诇诐 讜诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗驻讬专讜转 拽讗讬 诇讛讻讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转

And if you say that it is effective only if he specifically writes both of the statements, why do I need two expressions? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to include both phrases, for if he had written for her only: Produce of the produce, and not written for her: Forever, I would say that it is the produce of the produce that he may not consume, but the produce of the produce of the produce he may consume. For this reason, it was necessary to also write forever. And if he had written for her only: Forever, and had not written for her: Produce of the produce, I would say that forever is referring to the produce, i.e., the husband permanently relinquishes his claim to the produce itself, but he retains his right to the produce of the produce. For this reason, it was also necessary to specify produce of the produce.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讻转讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讜 砖讬讗讻诇 驻讬专讜转 诪驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻讬专讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband wrote to his wife: I have no claim to your property or to the produce of your produce, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that he may consume the produce itself? Has he removed himself from the produce of the produce, but from the produce itself, which he failed to mention, he has not removed himself? Or perhaps he has removed himself from all matters, as the produce of the produce includes the produce itself?

驻砖讬讟讗 讚诪讻诇 诪讬诇讬 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讚讗讬 讗诪专转 诪驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪驻讬专讬 诇讗 住诇讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讻诇讬谞讛讜 诇驻讬专讜转 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讬讻讗

The Gemara answers: It is obvious that he has removed himself from all matters, for if you say that he has removed himself only from the produce of the produce, while from the produce itself he has not removed himself, since he consumes the produce, from where will there be produce of the produce?

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 讛讗 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 讻讜壮 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讻诇讬谞讛讜 诇驻讬专讬 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 诪讛讬讻讗 讗诇讗 讘讚砖讬讬专讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讚砖讬讬专

The Gemara answers: But according to your reasoning, the same question could be asked about the case discussed in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce, until he writes for her: Or to their produce, or to the produce of their produce forever. This indicates that if he did not write: To their produce, he would be allowed to consume the produce, just not the produce of the produce. Here too, it could be asked: Since he consumes the produce, from where will he have produce of the produce? Rather, it must be that this is referring to one who left over some of the produce, which he used to purchase land, of whose produce he consumes. If so, here too, this is a case of one who left over some of the produce, from which he acquired land, and it is the produce of this land to which he has no rights. The dilemma is left unresolved.

专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇讗 诪讟注诪讬讛

搂 The mishna taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he wrote: I have no claim to your property, or to its produce, or to the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he nevertheless inherits from her. This is because his condition is void, as it runs counter to what is written in the Torah. Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a husband inherits from his wife, but not because of his line of reasoning.

诪讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇讗 诪讟注诪讬讛 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚讗诪专 讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 讜诇讗讜 诪讟注诪讬讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 住讘专 诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讜专讘 住讘专 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 讜拽住讘专 讬专讜砖转 讛讘注诇 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this statement: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not because of his line of reasoning? What does Rav mean? If we say that Rav agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she dies he inherits from her, but Rav maintains this opinion not because of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 line of reasoning, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, and then Rav must hold that his condition is valid. But that is not so. Rav accepts Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 conclusion, for he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, and for this reason his condition is void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than those of Torah law and decreed that the inheritance of a husband cannot be canceled in any manner.

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