Ketubot 85

לא קנה תפסוה אינהו רב פפא מימלח מלוחי רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע ממתח לה באשלא מר אמר אנא קנינא לה לכולה ומר אמר אנא קנינא לה לכולה

has not acquired it. He cannot act to the detriment of others without their consent, and his acquisition harms the other creditors. Those Sages were also owed money by that same man, so they both seized the boat for himself. Rav Pappa steered it with an oar, while Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, pulled it with a rope. This Sage said: I acquired all of it; and that Sage said: I acquired all of it.

פגע בהו רב פנחס בר אמי אמר להו רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו והוא שצבורין ומונחין ברשות הרבים אמר להו אנן נמי מחריפותא דנהרא תפיסנא

Rav Pineḥas bar Ami encountered them and said to them: What of the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: And this, that whoever first takes possession has acquired them, is the halakha provided that the items are arranged in a pile and placed in the public domain, which is not the case with this boat? They said to him: We too seized it from the current of the river, i.e., the middle of the river, which has the status of a public domain.

אתו לקמיה דרבא אמר להו קאקי חיורי משלחי גלימי דאינשי הכי אמר רב נחמן והוא שתפסה מחיים

They came before Rava to ask him who had acquired the boat. He said to them: You are white geese [kakei ḥivvarei], in reference to their white beards, who remove people’s cloaks, i.e., your actions were unlawful from the start. This is what Rav Naḥman said: And this, that whoever takes possession has acquired them, is the halakha provided that one seized them from the debtor while he was alive. In this case, however, the boat was seized after the debtor’s death, when the heirs had already taken possession of it.

אבימי בריה דרבי אבהו הוו מסקי ביה זוזי בי חוזאי שדרינהו ביד חמא בריה דרבה בר אבהו אזל פרעינהו אמר להו הבו לי שטרא אמרו ליה סיטראי נינהו

The Gemara relates another incident: Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, owed money to people from Bei Ḥozai.He sent the money in the possession of Ḥama, son of Rabba bar Abbahu, who went and paid the money that Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, owed, and he then said to the people from Bei Ḥozai: Give me back the document that shows that the person who sent me owes you money. They said to him: The money that you paid us was for side debts, i.e., money from a different debt, which was not written in a document. We accepted the money from you as payment of that debt. We will therefore not return the document to you, as he has yet to pay off the debt listed in the document.

אתא לקמיה דרבי אבהו אמר ליה אית לך סהדי דפרעתינהו אמר ליה לא אמר ליה מיגו דיכולין לומר לא היו דברים מעולם יכולין נמי למימר סיטראי נינהו

This case came before Rabbi Abbahu. He said to Ḥama, son of Rabba bar Abbahu: Do you have witnesses that you paid them? He said to him: No. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: He could have made a more advantageous claim [miggo]. Since they can say: These matters never occurred, i.e., you never paid them anything, they can also say: These are side debts. Therefore, you cannot demand from them either the money or the document.

לענין שלומי שליח מאי אמר רב אשי חזינן אי אמר ליה שקול שטרא והב זוזי משלם הב זוזי ושקול שטרא לא משלם

The Gemara asks: With regard to the payment of the agent, what is the halakha? Must the agent reimburse the one who appointed him for his loss? Rav Ashi said: We see that if the one who appointed him said to him: Take the document from them and give them money, then the agent disobeyed his instructions by first paying the money and must pay back the one who appointed him. If, however, the one who appointed him said to the agent: Give the money and take the document, he does not pay, as the one who appointed him was not particular about instructing the agent to take the document before giving them money.

ולא היא בין כך ובין כך משלם דאמר ליה לתקוני שדרתיך ולא לעוותי

The Gemara comments: And this is not so; Rav Ashi’s ruling is not accepted as halakha. Whether the instructions were given in this manner or whether the instructions were given in that manner, the agent must pay, as the one who appointed him can say to him: I sent you to act for my benefit, and not to my detriment. His right to act as an agent did not extend to a case where it was to the detriment of the one who designated him.

ההיא איתתא דהוו מיפקדי גבה מלוגא דשטרי אתו יורשים קא תבעי ליה מינה אמרה להו מחיים תפיסנא להו אתאי לקמיה דרב נחמן אמר לה אית ליך סהדי דתבעוה מיניך מחיים ולא יהבית ניהליה אמר ליה לא אם כן הוי תפיסה דלאחר מיתה ותפיסה דלאחר מיתה לא כלום היא

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain woman who had a bag [meloga] full of documents deposited with her. The heirs came and claimed it from her. She said to them: I seized the bag of documents from the deceased while he was alive, as he owed me money. They came before Rav Naḥman for judgment. He said to her: Do you have witnesses that the deceased claimed the bag from you while he was alive and you did not give it to him? She said to him: No, I do not have witnesses to this effect. He replied: If so, this is considered a case of seizing property after death, and seizing after death is nothing. As stated earlier, seizing property to recover a debt is effective only when done during the lifetime of the debtor. It is ineffective once he is dead and others have inherited his property.

ההיא איתתא דאיחייבא שבועה בי דינא דרבא אמרה ליה בת רב חסדא ידענא בה דחשודה אשבועה אפכה רבא לשבועה אשכנגדה

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain woman who was obligated to take an oath in order to avoid payment in Rava’s court. The daughter of Rav Ḥisda said to Rava, her husband: I know that she is suspect with regard to taking a false oath. Rava reversed the obligation of the oath so that it fell onto the other party, who now had the option of taking an oath that the woman owes him money and collecting his debt. This is how to act when the court does not trust the one who is obligated to take an oath.

זימנין הוו יתבי קמיה רב פפא ורב אדא בר מתנא אייתו ההוא שטרא גביה אמר ליה רב פפא ידענא ביה דשטרא פריעא הוא אמר ליה איכא איניש אחרינא בהדיה דמר אמר ליה לא אמר ליה אף על גב דאיכא מר עד אחד לאו כלום הוא

The Gemara continues: On another occasion, Rav Pappa and Rav Adda bar Mattana were sitting before Rava. A certain document was brought before Rava to be examined in court. Rav Pappa said to Rava: I know about this document, that it records a debt that has already been paid. Rava said to him: Is there another person who can testify with the Master about the document? He said to him: No, I am the only one who knows. Rava said to him: Although there is the Master here who attests that the document has been paid, one witness is nothing.

אמר ליה רב אדא בר מתנא ולא יהא רב פפא כבת רב חסדא בת רב חסדא קים לי בגווה מר לא קים לי בגוויה

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: And should Rav Pappa not be trusted like Rav Ḥisda’s daughter, who as a woman is disqualified from testimony? Rava replied: I relied on Rav Ḥisda’s daughter because I know with certainty about her that she is always truthful. However, I cannot rely on the Master because I do not know with the same degree of certainty about him that he is always truthful, and I cannot rule on the basis of one witness unless I have complete certainty.

אמר רב פפא השתא דאמר מר קים לי בגוויה מילתא היא כגון אבא מר ברי דקים לי בגוויה קרענא שטרא אפומיה

Rav Pappa said: Now that the Master, Rava, has said that the claim: I know with certainty about him, is a significant matter, i.e., a claim that can be used in court, if a judge knows that someone is telling the truth, although under normal circumstances his testimony would be inadmissible, in this case it does have a certain legal validity. For example, if Abba Mar, my son, about whom I know with certainty always tells the truth, claims that a document that records a debt has already been paid, then I can tear the document on the basis of his word.

קרענא סלקא דעתך אלא מרענא שטרא אפומיה

The Gemara asks: How can it enter your mind that the court can tear a document based on the word of a single witness? Rather, the statement should be that I can weaken the document on the basis of his word, by not allowing it to be used for claiming payment without further proof.

ההיא איתתא דאיחייבא שבועה בי דינא דרב ביבי בר אביי אמר להו ההוא בעל דין תיתי ותישתבע במתא אפשר דמיכספא ומודיא אמרה להו כתבו לי זכוותא דכי משתבענא יהבי לי אמר להו רב ביבי בר אביי כתבו לה

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain woman who was obligated to take an oath in Rav Beivai bar Abaye’s court. The opposing litigant said to the judges: Let her come and take an oath in the town. It is possible that she will be ashamed of her lies and will admit that she is liable. She said to the judges: Write a document of rights for me, so that when I take the oath they will give it to me, and I will then be willing to take an oath in the town. Rav Beivai bar Abaye said to them: Write the document for her.

אמר רב פפי משום דאתיתו ממולאי אמריתו מילי מוליתא

Rav Pappi said: Is it because you come from unfortunate peo-ple [de’atitu mimmula’ei] that you say unfortunate things? Rav Beivai was from the house of Eli, whose descendants were sentenced to die at a young age.

הא אמר רבא האי אשרתא דדייני דמיכתבא מקמי דנחוו סהדי אחתימות ידייהו פסולה אלמא מיחזי כשיקרא הכי נמי מיחזי כשיקרא

Rav Pappi said that Rav Beivai bar Abaye was wrong to say what he said because of a statement of Rava. Didn’t Rava say: This ratification of judges, which was written on a document before the witnesses had seen and testified about their signature, is invalid, although the witnesses later attested that it was their signatures? Apparently, it has the appearance of falsehood because they affirmed the validity of a document before hearing the testimony. Here too, if the judges wrote a document of rights before the woman took her oath, the document would have the appearance of falsehood, and the court should not write a document of rights for her before she takes an oath.

וליתא מדרב נחמן דאמר רב נחמן אומר היה רבי מאיר אפילו מצאו באשפה וחתמו ונתנו לה כשר ואפילו רבנן לא פליגי עליה דרבי מאיר אלא בגיטי נשים דבעינן כתיבה לשמה אבל בשאר שטרות מודו ליה

The Gemara comments: And this halakha of Rava’s is not accepted because of a statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said: Rabbi Meir would say: Even if the husband found a bill of divorce with names identical to those of his and his wife’s, in the garbage, and he had it signed by witnesses and gave it to his wife, it is valid. Rav Naḥman adds: And the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, except in the case of bills of divorce of women, since the Rabbis hold that the writing of the bill of divorce needs to be done for the sake of the woman getting divorced. But for all other documents, they concede to him that it makes no difference when the document was written.

דאמר רב אסי אמר רבי יוחנן שטר שלוה בו ופרעו אינו חוזר ולוה בו שכבר נמחל שיעבודו טעמא דנמחל שיעבודו אבל למיחזי

The proof of this is that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a document that one borrowed money based on it and then repaid the debt, he may not borrow money again based on it. This is because its lien has already been forgiven. Once the debt has been repaid, the lien resulting from the loan is no longer in force. The witnesses did not sign the document at the time of the second loan, so the lien will not be in effect, and the loan will have the status of one by oral agreement. The Gemara infers: The reason that he cannot reuse the document is because its lien has been forgiven, so that the document is no longer accurate; but as for the fact that it has the appearance

כשיקרא לא חיישינן

of falsehood, as it was written prior to the second loan, we are not concerned. So too here, the fact that the judges wrote the document before the event is not a matter of concern.

ההוא גברא דאפקיד שב מרגניתא דציירי בסדינא בי רבי מיאשא בר בריה דרבי יהושע בן לוי שכיב רבי מיאשא ולא פקיד אתו לקמיה דרבי אמי אמר להו חדא דידענא ביה ברבי מיאשא בר בריה דרבי יהושע בן לוי דלא אמיד ועוד הא קא יהיב סימנא

The Gemara examines cases involving disputes concerning the property of the deceased. There was a certain man who deposited seven pearls [marganita] tied up in a sheet in the house of Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Meyasha passed away without instructing the members of his household on his deathbed, and without explaining to whom the gems belonged. Rabbi Meyasha’s family and the depositor came before Rabbi Ami to discuss the ownership of the gems. He said to them: They belong to the claimant, first of all, since I know about Rabbi Meyasha, son of the son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that he is not wealthy enough to be able to afford such gems. And furthermore, the depositor has provided a distinguishing mark that proves that he is the owner.

ולא אמרן אלא דלא רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אבל רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אימא איניש אחרינא אפקיד ואיהו מיחזא חזא

The Gemara comments: And we said that a distinguishing mark is effective only if the claimant does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exits there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object, and he merely saw it there and was able to provide distinguishing marks.

ההוא גברא דאפקיד כסא דכספא בי חסא שכיב חסא ולא פקיד אתו לקמיה דרב נחמן אמר להו ידענא ביה בחסא דלא אמיד ועוד הא קא יהיב סימנא ולא אמרן אלא דלא רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אבל רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אימר איניש אחרינא אפקיד ואיהו מיחזא חזא

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who deposited a silver goblet in the house of the Sage Ḥasa. Ḥasa passed away without instructing anything about the goblet. They came before Rav Naḥman to discuss the ownership of the goblet. He said to them: I know about Ḥasa that he is not wealthy, and this goblet would not have belonged to him. And furthermore, the depositor has provided a distinguishing mark. And we said so only if the claimant does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exits there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object and he merely saw it there.

ההוא דאפקיד מטכסא בי רב דימי אחוה דרב ספרא שכיב רב דימי ולא פקיד אתא לקמיה דרבי אבא אמר להו חדא דידענא ביה ברב דימי דלא אמיד ועוד הא קא יהיב סימנא ולא אמרן אלא דלא רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אבל רגיל דעייל ונפיק להתם אימא איניש אחרינא אפקיד ואיהו מיחזא חזא

The Gemara relates another similar story: There was a certain man who deposited silk [metakesa] in the house of Rav Dimi, brother of Rav Safra. Rav Dimi passed away without instructing anything about the silk. They came before Rabbi Abba to discuss the ownership of the silk. He said to them: It belongs to the claimant, first of all, since I know about Rav Dimi that he is not wealthy. And furthermore, he has provided a distinguishing mark. And we said so only if he does not usually enter and exit there. But if that person usually enters and exit there, one can say that a different person might have deposited the object, and he merely saw it there.

ההוא דאמר להו נכסיי לטוביה שכיב אתא טוביה אמר רבי יוחנן הרי בא טוביה

The Gemara relates the story of a certain man who said to those present at his deathbed: My property should go to Toviya. He passed away, and Toviya came to claim his possessions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Toviya has come, and there is no need to be concerned that he might have meant a different Toviya.

אמר טוביה ואתא רב טוביה לטוביה אמר לרב טוביה לא אמר ואי איניש דגיס ביה הא גיס ביה אתו שני טוביה שכן ותלמיד חכם תלמיד חכם קודם קרוב ותלמיד חכם תלמיד חכם קודם

The Gemara adds: If the deceased had said: My property should go to Toviya, and Rav Toviya came forward, it is assumed that this is not the person the deceased had in mind, for he said: My property should go to Toviya. He did not say: My property should go to Rav Toviya. But if Rav Toviya is a person who is familiar with the deceased, then it can be assumed that the deceased called him by his personal name and not by his title because he was familiar with him. If two men named Toviya came forward, and one of them was the deceased’s neighbor and the other a Torah scholar but not his neighbor, the Torah scholar takes precedence. Similarly, if one was a relative and the other a Torah scholar, the Torah scholar takes precedence.

איבעיא להו שכן וקרוב מאי תא שמע טוב שכן קרוב מאח רחוק שניהם קרובים ושניהם שכנים ושניהם חכמים שודא דדייני

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If two men have the same name and one was a neighbor and the other one was a relative, what is the halakha? The Gemara answers: Come and hear the solution from the following verse: “A close neighbor is better than a distant brother” (Proverbs 27:10). If they were both relatives, or both neighbors, or both scholars, there is no systematic way of determining who is entitled to the property, and the decision is left to the discretion of the judges.

אמר ליה רבא לבריה דרב חייא בר אבין תא אימא לך מילתא מעליותא דהוה אמר אבוך הא דאמר שמואל המוכר שטר חוב לחבירו וחזר ומחלו מחול ואפילו יורש מוחל מודה שמואל במכנסת שטר חוב לבעלה וחזרה ומחלתו שאינו מחול מפני שידו כידה

§ Rava said to the son of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin: Come, and I will tell you something excellent that your father would say about that which Shmuel said: Shmuel said that in the case of one who sells a promissory note to another, and the seller went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone, and even the creditor’s heir can forgive the debt. With regard to this halakha, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said: Shmuel concedes with regard to a woman who brings in a promissory note to the marriage for her husband, and she went back and forgave the debtor his debt, that the debt is not forgiven.Why not? Because his hand is like her hand, i.e., the husband shares equal rights to her property, and she cannot unilaterally forgive the debt.

קריבתיה דרב נחמן זבינתה לכתובתה בטובת הנאה איגרשה ושכיבה אתו קא תבעי לה לברתה אמר להו רב נחמן ליכא דליסבא לה עצה

The Gemara relates an incident: A relative of Rav Naḥman sold her marriage contract for financial advantage. In other words, she received a sum of money and in exchange agreed that if she were to be divorced and become entitled to her marriage contract, the money would belong to the purchaser of the rights to her marriage contract. She was subsequently divorced from her husband and died, leaving the right to her marriage contract to her daughter. The purchasers came and claimed the value of the marriage contract from her daughter. Rav Naḥman said to the people around him: Is there no one who can give the daughter advice,