If a woman has more than one get (divorce document) or more than one ketuba, can she collect two ketuba payments? Under what circumstances? If one gives a wife a ketuba when one is still a minor and it still married to her when he turns matures or is not Jewish and then converts, the ketuba can be collected as well as the assumption is that when he matured/coverted he intended to continue to be married to her under the conditions of the original ketuba. If there was an amount greater than the basic ketuba, there is a debate about whether or not she can collect that amount. A difficulty is raised against the opinion that she can collect the extra and it is not resolved. The Mishna states that if one had two wives and one wife died before the husband died and then the husband died, the second wife or her heirs have the first claim on her ketuba and then the sons of the first wife can collect. Two versions of an inference from the Mishna is brought – can one derive from here that if one seized property that another creditor was supposed to collect before, we force the one who seized to give it back or not? Three other laws were inferred from our Mishna: 1. in a case where one wife died before the husband died and another after the husband died, the sons of the first one collect their ‘ketuba of male children’. 2. The ketuba of the one wife (collected by her heirs can be considered ‘extra’ to allow the collection of the ‘ketuba of male children’ by the other wife’s heirs. 3. ‘Ketuba of male children’ can’t be collected from liened property. Rav Ashi questions the first two assumptions. Rav Ashi further points out that the first inference (whether or not the ‘ketuba of male children’ can be collected in this case) is actually a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Nanas. Raba claims this is not the root of the debate, but Rav Yosef rejects Rava’s claim and brings another braita that seems to suggest another group of tannaim debating whether or not there is ‘ketuba of male children’ in this case.
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Ketubot 90
אִם גֵּט קוֹדֵם לַכְּתוּבָּה — גּוֹבָה שְׁתֵּי כְּתוּבּוֹת. כְּתוּבָּה קוֹדֶמֶת לַגֵּט — אֵינָהּ גּוֹבָה אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּה אַחַת, שֶׁהַמְּגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ — עַל מְנָת כְּתוּבָּה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה הֶחְזִירָהּ.
if the date of the bill of divorce precedes the date of the marriage contract, she collects payment for her two marriage contracts. She is entitled to the first marriage contract by virtue of the bill of divorce. She is entitled to the second one because she has shown that it was written for her when they remarried. If the date of the marriage contract precedes the date of the bill of divorce, she collects payment of only one marriage contract. This is because it is presumed that one who divorces his wife and remarries her, remarries her with the intention of using her first marriage contract, unless there is a reason to say otherwise.
מַתְנִי׳ קָטָן שֶׁהִשִּׂיאוֹ אָבִיו — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְּימָהּ. גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּירָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְּימָהּ.
MISHNA: In the case of a minor who was married off by his father, the wife’s marriage contract that the minor wrote is valid even after the husband comes of age. He cannot excuse himself by saying that it was drafted when he was a minor, as it is on this condition, the terms of this marriage contract, that he maintained her as his wife upon his maturity. Similarly, in the case of a convert whose wife converted with him, the marriage contract that she had as a gentile is valid, for on this condition he maintained her as his wife.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת — אֵין לָהּ. וְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תּוֹסֶפֶת יֵשׁ לָהּ.
GEMARA: Rav Huna said: They taught that the wife of a minor or convert receives payment only with regard to the main sum of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. However, she does not have the right to receive the additional sum that he wrote in her marriage contract, because this document is not legally binding, as it was written by a minor. She receives the main sum only as a result of an ordinance instituted by the Sages. And Rav Yehuda said: She has even the additional sum.
מֵיתִיבִי: חִידְּשׁוּ — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ. חִידְּשׁוּ אִין, לֹא חִידְּשׁוּ לָא!
The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita: If a minor who came of age or a gentile who converted then introduced an additional sum to the marriage contract, she takes the additional sum that they introduced. The Gemara infers: Yes, the woman receives what they introduced. However, if they did not introduce an additional sum, she does not collect, even if it was written in the original marriage contract.
אֵימָא: אַף מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ. וְהָא לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי: חִידְּשׁוּ — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ, לֹא חִידְּשׁוּ — בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם, וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara refutes this proof: Say that this means that she takes even that which they introduced, in addition to the entire amount of her original marriage contract. The Gemara asks: But the tanna did not teach this, and the continuation of the baraita states the opposite: If they introduced a new sum, she takes the additional sum that which they introduced. If they did not introduce a new sum, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. She does not collect the additional sum listed in the marriage document. This provides a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Yehuda, whose opinion is rejected.
רַב יְהוּדָה מַתְנִיתִין אַטְעֵיתֵיהּ, הוּא סָבַר: ״כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת״ — אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא קָאֵי. וְלָא הִיא, אַעִיקַּר כְּתוּבָּה קָאֵי.
The Gemara explains: Rav Yehuda was misled by the language of the mishna and reached an incorrect conclusion. He thought that the phrase: Her marriage contract is valid, is referring to the entire matter, the entire sum of the marriage contract. But that is not so, as it is referring only to the main sum of the marriage contract that was established by the Sages, and not to any additional sum.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ
מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, וָמֵת — הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה. וְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי שְׁנִיָּה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who was married to two women and died, the first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment specified in her marriage contract if there are insufficient funds to pay both, because her document is dated earlier. So too, if the wives died after their husband before they received payment for their marriage contracts, the heirs of the first wife precede the heirs of the second wife in collecting these payments.
נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה, נָשָׂא שְׁנִיָּה וּמֵת הוּא — שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה.
If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife. This is because the marriage contract of the second wife is considered a debt that the estate of the deceased is required to pay, whereas the claim of the heirs of the first wife is based on the stipulation in the marriage contract that male children inherit their mother’s marriage contract. Heirs receive their share of the estate only from property that remains after all debts have been settled.
גְּמָ׳ מִדְּקָתָנֵי ״הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יֵשׁ לָהּ וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה אֵין לָהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִי קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה — לָא מַפְּקִינַן מִינַּהּ,
GEMARA: From the fact that it teaches: The first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment of her marriage contract, and it does not teach simply that the first woman has the right to receive payment of her marriage contract and the second does not have that right, the mishna thereby teaches by inference that if the second preceded the first and seized property in payment of her marriage contract, we do not expropriate it from her, because her rights to the property are not completely canceled.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה — מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה גָּבָה.
The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna the following principle: In the case of a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors who preceded the other creditors and collected his debt, whatever he collected, he has collected, and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.
לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: מָה שֶּׁגָּבָה — לֹא גָּבָה, וּמַאי ״קוֹדֶמֶת״ — לִגְמָרֵי קָתָנֵי, כְּדִתְנַן: בֵּן קוֹדֵם לַבַּת.
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Actually, I will say to you that what he collected, he has not collected, i.e., he must restore the property to the debtor so that the latter can pay the other creditors. And what does the mishna mean when it teaches that the first wife precedes the second? It teaches that the first wife completely precedes the second and is granted exclusive rights to collect the payment of her marriage contract. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 115a): A son precedes a daughter in matters of inheritance. Were she to come first and take part of the inheritance, it would not become hers; the son completely precedes her, so that in cases where there is a male heir, the daughter receives nothing. The same understanding of the word precedes applies in this matter as well.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אִם קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדָהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִי קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה — מַפְּקִינַן מִינַּהּ.
There are those who say that the discussion was as follows: From the fact that it does not teach: If the second wife preceded the first wife and seized property it is not expropriated from her, it proves by inference that if the second wife preceded the first and seized property as payment for her marriage contract, we do appropriate it from her.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה — מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה לֹא גָּבָה.
The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna the following rule: In the case of a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors who preceded the other creditors and collected his debt, whatever he collected, he has not collected, i.e., it is expropriated from him.
לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה — גָּבָה, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא: שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה,
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Actually, I will say to you that what the later creditor collected, he has collected, but since the mishna taught later: The second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first, so that even if the heirs of the first wife seize property, they do not legally acquire it and it is expropriated from them, because they are collecting an inheritance rather than a debt,
תְּנָא נָמֵי: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה.
it taught the first clause as well with the same wording: The first woman precedes the second, without elaborating that the property would not be expropriated from the second if she were to seize it in payment of her marriage contract.
נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן לְאִינְּצוֹיֵי.
§ The mishna taught: If he married the first woman, etc. The Gemara notes: Conclude three conclusions from this statement: Conclude from it that if one of the man’s wives died in his lifetime and the other one died following his death, then the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children and we are not concerned that this would lead to quarreling.
מִמַּאי — מִדְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִים לְיוֹרְשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹנָה, מִיקְדָּם הוּא דְּקָדְמִי, הָא אִיכָּא — שָׁקְלִי.
The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this is correct? From the fact that it teaches: The second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife, it can be inferred that they precede the heirs of the first, but if there are enough funds in the estate for all the claims against it, then the children of the first wife do take their share of the dowry.
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ.
The second point one can conclude from it is that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other. The Sages ruled that each son may claim his mother’s marriage settlement only when the value of the estate exceeds the sum total of the marriage contracts by at least one dinar, so that the biblical laws of inheritance can be fulfilled. Since the marriage settlement collected by the heirs of the second wife is considered a debt owed by the estate, this sum is considered to have been paid equally by all the heirs. The biblical laws of inheritance have thereby been fulfilled, and the sons of the first wife can claim the marriage contract concerning male children even if nothing will be left in the estate after they have collected their payment.
מִמַּאי? מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם מוֹתַר דִּינָר״.
The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this is correct? The Gemara answers: From the fact that it does not teach in the mishna: If there is a surplus of a dinar in addition to the value of all the marriage contracts.
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין לָא טָרְפָה מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתִּין טָרְפָה מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי — לֵיתוֹ בְּנֵי רִאשׁוֹנָה וְלִטְרְפִינְהוּ לִבְנֵי שְׁנִיָּה.
And conclude from it a third point, that when one collects the payment for the marriage contract concerning male children, he cannot seize liened property that his father sold to others, as one can when collecting a debt. As, if it should enter your mind that it can be repossessed from liened property, then let the sons of the first wife come and repossess land already claimed by the sons of the second wife as payment for their mother’s marriage contract, since the land the sons of the second wife took was previously liened, due to the marriage contract of the first wife. Rather, the children of the first wife are viewed not as creditors but as heirs, who cannot repossess property sold by their father.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמַאי ״קוֹדְמִין״ — לְנַחֲלָה קָתָנֵי.
Rav Ashi objects to two of the three conclusions stated above: From where is it known that all of this is correct? Perhaps I could actually say to you that if one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, then no one is entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. And what does the mishna mean when it says precede? It does not mean that if there are enough assets remaining, the sons of the first wife receive the sum of their mother’s marriage settlement. Rather, it is teaching that after the sons of the second wife receive the sum of their mother’s marriage settlement, the sons from both marriages inherit equal shares of the remaining estate.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: ״יוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה״ לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא ״שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה״.
And if you would say that if the mishna is referring to the inheritance of the remainder of the estate, why do I need the mishna to mention the heirs of the first wife; since it is teaching a halakha concerning their inheritance from their father and not their inheritance from their mother, why refer to them as the heirs of the first wife? One could reply that since it taught: The second wife and her heirs, the mishna also taught the parallel phrase: The heirs of the first wife, but no halakhic conclusions should be drawn from this.
וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ — דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: אֵין כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהָכָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא מוֹתַר דִּינָר.
And concerning what you said that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other, this too can be rejected: Perhaps I could actually say to you that one marriage contract does not become surplus for the other, and that the case under discussion here is where there is a surplus of an additional dinar, and the reason why it was not explicitly mentioned is because it is not the subject of our mishna.
״וְאַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ״ — תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: מֵתוּ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ, בֶּן נַנָּס אוֹמֵר: יְכוֹלִין בְּנֵי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה לוֹמַר לִבְנֵי הַשְּׁנִיָּה: בְּנֵי בַּעֲלַת חוֹב אַתֶּם, טְלוּ כְּתוּבַּת אִמְּכֶם וּצְאוּ.
§ The Gemara notes that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, there is a dispute between tanna’im if the sons of the wife who died in her husband’s lifetime are entitled to collect their mother’s marriage settlement. As it is taught in a baraita: If they died, one in his lifetime and one following his death, ben Nanas says: The sons of the first wife can say to the sons of the second wife: You are the children of a creditor, so collect your mother’s marriage contract and leave, and we will inherit the rest of the estate due to the marriage contract concerning male children.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כְּבָר קָפְצָה נַחֲלָה מִלִּפְנֵי בְּנֵי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְנָפְלָה לִפְנֵי בְּנֵי הַשְּׁנִיָּה.
Rabbi Akiva says: When the husband died, the inheritance already eluded the sons of the first wife and came into the possession of the sons of the second wife as an inheritance, i.e., the Sages did not institute the marriage contract concerning male children in a case where one of the wives was alive when the husband died. Consequently, after the sons of the second wife collect their mother’s marriage settlement, the remainder of the estate is divided evenly between all the man’s sons.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין.
The Gemara comments: What, is it not that they disagree about this: One Sage, ben Nanas, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. And the other Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are not entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children.
אָמַר רַבָּה, אַשְׁכַּחְתִּינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רַב דְּיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וְהָכָא בִּכְתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
Rabba said: I found the Sages of the school of Rav sitting and saying: Everyone agrees that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. Here, however, they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other in a case where there is no surplus of an additional dinar with which to fulfill the biblical laws of inheritance. And the same is true with regard to payment made to a creditor, i.e., they disagree whether paying a creditor of their father is a sufficient fulfillment of the biblical laws of inheritance to allow collection of the marriage contract concerning male children.
מָר סָבַר: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב,
One Sage, ben Nanas, holds that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other, and the same is true with regard to payment made to a creditor, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that one marriage contract does not become surplus for the other, and the same is true with regard to the debt owed to a creditor.
וְאָמֵינָא לְהוּ אֲנָא: בְּבַעַל חוֹב כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּהָוֵי מוֹתָר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בִּכְתוּבָּה.
Rabba continues: And I said to them: With regard to payment made to a creditor, everyone agrees that it is considered surplus and fulfills the biblical laws of inheritance, even given the lien attached to it. When they disagree it is with regard to whether a marriage contract can be considered surplus.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: אִי הָכִי, ״רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כְּבָר קָפְצָה נַחֲלָה״ — ״אִם יֵשׁ מוֹתַר דִּינָר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rav Yosef objects to this. If that is so, then why did it say in the baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: The inheritance already eluded them? Rather, it should have said: If there is a surplus of a dinar, since that is the actual focal point of the disagreement.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּאַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
Rather, Rav Yosef said: They disagree with regard to the basic issue of whether the Sages instituted the marriage contract concerning male children in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, as was explained initially.
וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה, נָשָׂא אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה וּמֵת הוּא — בָּאִין בָּנֶיהָ שֶׁל זוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה וְנוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אִם יֵשׁ מוֹתַר דִּינָר — אֵלּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן, וְאֵלּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן. וְאִם לָאו — חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה.
And these tanna’im, ben Nanas and Rabbi Akiva, are like those other tanna’im, who debated this very same point, as it is taught in a baraita: If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the sons of this woman, i.e., the second wife, come after her death and collect payment of their mother’s marriage contract if she did not collect it while she was alive, while the rest of the estate is distributed equally between all the sons. Rabbi Shimon says: If there is a surplus of a dinar, these sons of the first wife collect their mother’s marriage contract, namely, the marriage contract concerning male offspring, and these sons of the second wife collect their mother’s marriage contract, and if not, they divide the entire estate equally among themselves.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — אֵין לָהֶם כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין.
What, is it not that they disagree with regard to the following: One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are not entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children, and only the second wife’s sons collect their mother’s marriage contract.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין,
The Gemara rejects this: No, it is possible to say that everyone agrees that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children,
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Ketubot 90
אִם גֵּט קוֹדֵם לַכְּתוּבָּה — גּוֹבָה שְׁתֵּי כְּתוּבּוֹת. כְּתוּבָּה קוֹדֶמֶת לַגֵּט — אֵינָהּ גּוֹבָה אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּה אַחַת, שֶׁהַמְּגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ — עַל מְנָת כְּתוּבָּה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה הֶחְזִירָהּ.
if the date of the bill of divorce precedes the date of the marriage contract, she collects payment for her two marriage contracts. She is entitled to the first marriage contract by virtue of the bill of divorce. She is entitled to the second one because she has shown that it was written for her when they remarried. If the date of the marriage contract precedes the date of the bill of divorce, she collects payment of only one marriage contract. This is because it is presumed that one who divorces his wife and remarries her, remarries her with the intention of using her first marriage contract, unless there is a reason to say otherwise.
מַתְנִי׳ קָטָן שֶׁהִשִּׂיאוֹ אָבִיו — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְּימָהּ. גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּירָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְּימָהּ.
MISHNA: In the case of a minor who was married off by his father, the wife’s marriage contract that the minor wrote is valid even after the husband comes of age. He cannot excuse himself by saying that it was drafted when he was a minor, as it is on this condition, the terms of this marriage contract, that he maintained her as his wife upon his maturity. Similarly, in the case of a convert whose wife converted with him, the marriage contract that she had as a gentile is valid, for on this condition he maintained her as his wife.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מָנֶה מָאתַיִם, אֲבָל תּוֹסֶפֶת — אֵין לָהּ. וְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תּוֹסֶפֶת יֵשׁ לָהּ.
GEMARA: Rav Huna said: They taught that the wife of a minor or convert receives payment only with regard to the main sum of one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars. However, she does not have the right to receive the additional sum that he wrote in her marriage contract, because this document is not legally binding, as it was written by a minor. She receives the main sum only as a result of an ordinance instituted by the Sages. And Rav Yehuda said: She has even the additional sum.
מֵיתִיבִי: חִידְּשׁוּ — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ. חִידְּשׁוּ אִין, לֹא חִידְּשׁוּ לָא!
The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita: If a minor who came of age or a gentile who converted then introduced an additional sum to the marriage contract, she takes the additional sum that they introduced. The Gemara infers: Yes, the woman receives what they introduced. However, if they did not introduce an additional sum, she does not collect, even if it was written in the original marriage contract.
אֵימָא: אַף מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ. וְהָא לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי: חִידְּשׁוּ — נוֹטֶלֶת מַה שֶּׁחִידְּשׁוּ, לֹא חִידְּשׁוּ — בְּתוּלָה גּוֹבָה מָאתַיִם, וְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara refutes this proof: Say that this means that she takes even that which they introduced, in addition to the entire amount of her original marriage contract. The Gemara asks: But the tanna did not teach this, and the continuation of the baraita states the opposite: If they introduced a new sum, she takes the additional sum that which they introduced. If they did not introduce a new sum, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. She does not collect the additional sum listed in the marriage document. This provides a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Yehuda, whose opinion is rejected.
רַב יְהוּדָה מַתְנִיתִין אַטְעֵיתֵיהּ, הוּא סָבַר: ״כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶּימֶת״ — אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא קָאֵי. וְלָא הִיא, אַעִיקַּר כְּתוּבָּה קָאֵי.
The Gemara explains: Rav Yehuda was misled by the language of the mishna and reached an incorrect conclusion. He thought that the phrase: Her marriage contract is valid, is referring to the entire matter, the entire sum of the marriage contract. But that is not so, as it is referring only to the main sum of the marriage contract that was established by the Sages, and not to any additional sum.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ
מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים, וָמֵת — הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה. וְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי שְׁנִיָּה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who was married to two women and died, the first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment specified in her marriage contract if there are insufficient funds to pay both, because her document is dated earlier. So too, if the wives died after their husband before they received payment for their marriage contracts, the heirs of the first wife precede the heirs of the second wife in collecting these payments.
נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה, נָשָׂא שְׁנִיָּה וּמֵת הוּא — שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה.
If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife. This is because the marriage contract of the second wife is considered a debt that the estate of the deceased is required to pay, whereas the claim of the heirs of the first wife is based on the stipulation in the marriage contract that male children inherit their mother’s marriage contract. Heirs receive their share of the estate only from property that remains after all debts have been settled.
גְּמָ׳ מִדְּקָתָנֵי ״הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יֵשׁ לָהּ וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה אֵין לָהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִי קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה — לָא מַפְּקִינַן מִינַּהּ,
GEMARA: From the fact that it teaches: The first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment of her marriage contract, and it does not teach simply that the first woman has the right to receive payment of her marriage contract and the second does not have that right, the mishna thereby teaches by inference that if the second preceded the first and seized property in payment of her marriage contract, we do not expropriate it from her, because her rights to the property are not completely canceled.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה — מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה גָּבָה.
The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna the following principle: In the case of a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors who preceded the other creditors and collected his debt, whatever he collected, he has collected, and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.
לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: מָה שֶּׁגָּבָה — לֹא גָּבָה, וּמַאי ״קוֹדֶמֶת״ — לִגְמָרֵי קָתָנֵי, כְּדִתְנַן: בֵּן קוֹדֵם לַבַּת.
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Actually, I will say to you that what he collected, he has not collected, i.e., he must restore the property to the debtor so that the latter can pay the other creditors. And what does the mishna mean when it teaches that the first wife precedes the second? It teaches that the first wife completely precedes the second and is granted exclusive rights to collect the payment of her marriage contract. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 115a): A son precedes a daughter in matters of inheritance. Were she to come first and take part of the inheritance, it would not become hers; the son completely precedes her, so that in cases where there is a male heir, the daughter receives nothing. The same understanding of the word precedes applies in this matter as well.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אִם קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדָהּ״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִי קָדְמָה שְׁנִיָּה וְתָפְסָה — מַפְּקִינַן מִינַּהּ.
There are those who say that the discussion was as follows: From the fact that it does not teach: If the second wife preceded the first wife and seized property it is not expropriated from her, it proves by inference that if the second wife preceded the first and seized property as payment for her marriage contract, we do appropriate it from her.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה — מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה לֹא גָּבָה.
The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna the following rule: In the case of a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors who preceded the other creditors and collected his debt, whatever he collected, he has not collected, i.e., it is expropriated from him.
לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה — גָּבָה, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא: שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה,
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Actually, I will say to you that what the later creditor collected, he has collected, but since the mishna taught later: The second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first, so that even if the heirs of the first wife seize property, they do not legally acquire it and it is expropriated from them, because they are collecting an inheritance rather than a debt,
תְּנָא נָמֵי: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָּה.
it taught the first clause as well with the same wording: The first woman precedes the second, without elaborating that the property would not be expropriated from the second if she were to seize it in payment of her marriage contract.
נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּלָת: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן לְאִינְּצוֹיֵי.
§ The mishna taught: If he married the first woman, etc. The Gemara notes: Conclude three conclusions from this statement: Conclude from it that if one of the man’s wives died in his lifetime and the other one died following his death, then the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children and we are not concerned that this would lead to quarreling.
מִמַּאי — מִדְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִים לְיוֹרְשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹנָה, מִיקְדָּם הוּא דְּקָדְמִי, הָא אִיכָּא — שָׁקְלִי.
The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this is correct? From the fact that it teaches: The second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife, it can be inferred that they precede the heirs of the first, but if there are enough funds in the estate for all the claims against it, then the children of the first wife do take their share of the dowry.
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ.
The second point one can conclude from it is that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other. The Sages ruled that each son may claim his mother’s marriage settlement only when the value of the estate exceeds the sum total of the marriage contracts by at least one dinar, so that the biblical laws of inheritance can be fulfilled. Since the marriage settlement collected by the heirs of the second wife is considered a debt owed by the estate, this sum is considered to have been paid equally by all the heirs. The biblical laws of inheritance have thereby been fulfilled, and the sons of the first wife can claim the marriage contract concerning male children even if nothing will be left in the estate after they have collected their payment.
מִמַּאי? מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם מוֹתַר דִּינָר״.
The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this is correct? The Gemara answers: From the fact that it does not teach in the mishna: If there is a surplus of a dinar in addition to the value of all the marriage contracts.
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין לָא טָרְפָה מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתִּין טָרְפָה מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי — לֵיתוֹ בְּנֵי רִאשׁוֹנָה וְלִטְרְפִינְהוּ לִבְנֵי שְׁנִיָּה.
And conclude from it a third point, that when one collects the payment for the marriage contract concerning male children, he cannot seize liened property that his father sold to others, as one can when collecting a debt. As, if it should enter your mind that it can be repossessed from liened property, then let the sons of the first wife come and repossess land already claimed by the sons of the second wife as payment for their mother’s marriage contract, since the land the sons of the second wife took was previously liened, due to the marriage contract of the first wife. Rather, the children of the first wife are viewed not as creditors but as heirs, who cannot repossess property sold by their father.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמַאי ״קוֹדְמִין״ — לְנַחֲלָה קָתָנֵי.
Rav Ashi objects to two of the three conclusions stated above: From where is it known that all of this is correct? Perhaps I could actually say to you that if one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, then no one is entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. And what does the mishna mean when it says precede? It does not mean that if there are enough assets remaining, the sons of the first wife receive the sum of their mother’s marriage settlement. Rather, it is teaching that after the sons of the second wife receive the sum of their mother’s marriage settlement, the sons from both marriages inherit equal shares of the remaining estate.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: ״יוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה״ לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא ״שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה״.
And if you would say that if the mishna is referring to the inheritance of the remainder of the estate, why do I need the mishna to mention the heirs of the first wife; since it is teaching a halakha concerning their inheritance from their father and not their inheritance from their mother, why refer to them as the heirs of the first wife? One could reply that since it taught: The second wife and her heirs, the mishna also taught the parallel phrase: The heirs of the first wife, but no halakhic conclusions should be drawn from this.
וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ — דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: אֵין כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהָכָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא מוֹתַר דִּינָר.
And concerning what you said that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other, this too can be rejected: Perhaps I could actually say to you that one marriage contract does not become surplus for the other, and that the case under discussion here is where there is a surplus of an additional dinar, and the reason why it was not explicitly mentioned is because it is not the subject of our mishna.
״וְאַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ״ — תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: מֵתוּ אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ, בֶּן נַנָּס אוֹמֵר: יְכוֹלִין בְּנֵי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה לוֹמַר לִבְנֵי הַשְּׁנִיָּה: בְּנֵי בַּעֲלַת חוֹב אַתֶּם, טְלוּ כְּתוּבַּת אִמְּכֶם וּצְאוּ.
§ The Gemara notes that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, there is a dispute between tanna’im if the sons of the wife who died in her husband’s lifetime are entitled to collect their mother’s marriage settlement. As it is taught in a baraita: If they died, one in his lifetime and one following his death, ben Nanas says: The sons of the first wife can say to the sons of the second wife: You are the children of a creditor, so collect your mother’s marriage contract and leave, and we will inherit the rest of the estate due to the marriage contract concerning male children.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כְּבָר קָפְצָה נַחֲלָה מִלִּפְנֵי בְּנֵי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְנָפְלָה לִפְנֵי בְּנֵי הַשְּׁנִיָּה.
Rabbi Akiva says: When the husband died, the inheritance already eluded the sons of the first wife and came into the possession of the sons of the second wife as an inheritance, i.e., the Sages did not institute the marriage contract concerning male children in a case where one of the wives was alive when the husband died. Consequently, after the sons of the second wife collect their mother’s marriage settlement, the remainder of the estate is divided evenly between all the man’s sons.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין.
The Gemara comments: What, is it not that they disagree about this: One Sage, ben Nanas, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. And the other Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are not entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children.
אָמַר רַבָּה, אַשְׁכַּחְתִּינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רַב דְּיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וְהָכָא בִּכְתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
Rabba said: I found the Sages of the school of Rav sitting and saying: Everyone agrees that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the first wife’s sons are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children. Here, however, they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other in a case where there is no surplus of an additional dinar with which to fulfill the biblical laws of inheritance. And the same is true with regard to payment made to a creditor, i.e., they disagree whether paying a creditor of their father is a sufficient fulfillment of the biblical laws of inheritance to allow collection of the marriage contract concerning male children.
מָר סָבַר: כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין כְּתוּבָּה נַעֲשֵׂית מוֹתָר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְבַעַל חוֹב,
One Sage, ben Nanas, holds that one marriage contract becomes surplus for the other, and the same is true with regard to payment made to a creditor, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that one marriage contract does not become surplus for the other, and the same is true with regard to the debt owed to a creditor.
וְאָמֵינָא לְהוּ אֲנָא: בְּבַעַל חוֹב כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּהָוֵי מוֹתָר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בִּכְתוּבָּה.
Rabba continues: And I said to them: With regard to payment made to a creditor, everyone agrees that it is considered surplus and fulfills the biblical laws of inheritance, even given the lien attached to it. When they disagree it is with regard to whether a marriage contract can be considered surplus.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: אִי הָכִי, ״רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כְּבָר קָפְצָה נַחֲלָה״ — ״אִם יֵשׁ מוֹתַר דִּינָר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Rav Yosef objects to this. If that is so, then why did it say in the baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: The inheritance already eluded them? Rather, it should have said: If there is a surplus of a dinar, since that is the actual focal point of the disagreement.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּאַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
Rather, Rav Yosef said: They disagree with regard to the basic issue of whether the Sages instituted the marriage contract concerning male children in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, as was explained initially.
וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה, נָשָׂא אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָּה וּמֵת הוּא — בָּאִין בָּנֶיהָ שֶׁל זוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה וְנוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אִם יֵשׁ מוֹתַר דִּינָר — אֵלּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן, וְאֵלּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן. וְאִם לָאו — חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה.
And these tanna’im, ben Nanas and Rabbi Akiva, are like those other tanna’im, who debated this very same point, as it is taught in a baraita: If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the sons of this woman, i.e., the second wife, come after her death and collect payment of their mother’s marriage contract if she did not collect it while she was alive, while the rest of the estate is distributed equally between all the sons. Rabbi Shimon says: If there is a surplus of a dinar, these sons of the first wife collect their mother’s marriage contract, namely, the marriage contract concerning male offspring, and these sons of the second wife collect their mother’s marriage contract, and if not, they divide the entire estate equally among themselves.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין, וּמָר סָבַר: אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — אֵין לָהֶם כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין.
What, is it not that they disagree with regard to the following: One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are not entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children, and only the second wife’s sons collect their mother’s marriage contract.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַחַת בְּחַיָּיו וְאַחַת בְּמוֹתוֹ — יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתוּבַּת בְּנִין דִּכְרִין,
The Gemara rejects this: No, it is possible to say that everyone agrees that in a case where one wife died in his lifetime and one died following his death, the sons of the first wife are entitled to collect the marriage contract concerning male children,
