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Today's Daf Yomi

October 9, 2022 | 讬状讚 讘转砖专讬 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 95

Today’s daf is sponsored by聽Deborah聽Spinner in loving memory聽of her mother and mother-in-law.
The Mishna discusses a situation where a man is married to two wives and sells his property. If the first wife tells the buyer that she waives her rights to the property for collecting her ketuba, the second wife can collect it from the buyer, then the first wife can collect it from the second wife as she has first rights to the ketuba, and then the buyer can demand it from the second wife (as she waived her rights to) and then the first wife can take the property for her ketuba and it can keep going on like this until the three of them come to a compromise. First, the Gemara questions the language used for the first wife to waive her rights as the same language appears in a discussion regarding a partnership agreement and that same language is not effective. After resolving that, the Gemara raises a contradiction from a Mishna in Gittin 55b where a wife can claim she waived her rights to the land just to appease her husband. Three possible resolutions are brought. One cannot collect from liened property when there is a property in the hands of the debtor to collect from. But what if that property was damaged? Can the answer to this question be derived from Rabbi Meir’s opinion in a braita quoted in the previous discussion regarding a woman who waived her rights to the second buyer but not the first? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak and Rava each reject this comparison in different manners. Rav Yeimar tries to bring an answer from a different seemingly similar situation where the courts rule in general that the land can be collected from later buyers, but his comparison is also rejected. In the end, the Gemara simply rules that it can be done. They quote two rulings of Abaye regarding a woman who received a gift from someone who said “This gift is for you and when you die, it will go to someone else (a named person).” In one case, the husband gets rights to it and not the other person and in the other, the other person does. What is the difference between the cases? The second case seems to go against our Mishna. How can this be explained?

讟讬专驻讗 诪讗讬讬专 讜讗讬诇讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬讻诇讬 诇诪讬诪专 诇讱 讗转 讘专 讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讗转

a document of authorization to repossess liened property of the seller from anyone who purchased property from him from the first of the month of Iyyar and on. Rav Yosef said to him: A purchaser can say to you: Your deed is from the first of Nisan, so that the field that you purchased is rightfully yours and it is the other man, whose deed was dated on the fifth of Nisan, who took it illegally. Therefore, you should take possession of that field rather than repossessing other property.

诪讗讬 转拽谞转讬讛 谞讻转讘讜 讛专砖讗讛 诇讛讚讚讬

The Gemara asks: If so, what is his remedy? The Gemara answers: Let the deed holders write a document of authorization to each other. If the individual whose deed was written on the fifth of Nisan authorizes the other individual to repossess property on his behalf, then he will be able to repossess property sold after the end of Nisan, because regardless of when his deed was written and whose deed was written first, he now has the right to repossess liened property.

诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 谞砖讜讬 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讜诪讻专 讗转 砖讚讛讜 讜讻转讘讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诪讱 讛砖谞讬讛 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪讛诇讜拽讞 讜专讗砖讜谞讛 诪谉 讛砖谞讬讛 讜讛诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讞讜讝专讜转 讞诇讬诇讛 注讚 砖讬注砖讜 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜讻谉 讗砖讛 讘注诇转 讞讜讘

MISHNA: In a case of one who was married to two women and sold his field, and the wife whom he married first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, then the second wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, may appropriate the field from the purchaser as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, the first wife can appropriate the field from the second as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. The purchaser can then appropriate the field from the first wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-脿-vis the purchaser. They continue to do so according to this cycle [岣lila] until they agree on a compromise between them. And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor.

讙诪壮 讜讻讬 讻转讘讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And if the first wife wrote this to him, what of it? Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says to another, e.g., if a field is jointly owned and one partner says to the other: I have no legal dealings or involvement with regard to this field, or: I have no connection to it, or: I have withdrawn from it, has said nothing, as such declarations have no legal validity. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he acquired it from her possession by performing an act of acquisition in order to validate her relinquishing the field, in which case her statement is legally valid.

讜讻讬 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 转讬诪讗 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 诇拽讞 诪谉 讛讗讬砖 讜讞讝专 讜诇拽讞 诪谉 讛讗砖讛 诪拽讞讜 讘讟诇 讗诇诪讗 讬讻讜诇讛 讛讬讗 砖转讗诪专 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬

The Gemara asks: And if they acquired it from her, what of it? Let the woman say afterward: I did it only to please my husband, as I saw that he wished to sell the field and I did not want to quarrel with him, but I did not mean it seriously. Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased property from a man, even if he later went back and purchased rights to that property from the man鈥檚 wife, the transaction is nullified? Apparently, the wife can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean it, and that claim is accepted.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav 岣sda said: This is not difficult: This mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that mishna in tractate Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讚转谞讬讗 讻转讘 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诇讗 讞转诪讛 诇讜 诇砖谞讬 讜讞转诪讛 诇讜 讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

As it is taught in a baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him because she did not agree to the sale, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser, and this time his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement promised to her in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, not only is the wife unable to sue the second purchaser after she signed his deed, but she cannot sue the first buyer either since he can say to her: When I purchased the field, I left you a field from which you could have collected, and you brought this loss upon yourself.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇讛 讛讬讗 砖转讗诪专 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬 讗转诐 诪讛 诇讻诐 注诇讬

Rabbi Yehuda says that she can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean to ratify the second sale either; and you, what claim do you have against me?

讜专讘讬 住转诐 诇讛 讛讻讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住转诐 诇讛 讛转诐 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: Is it possible that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, presented the unattributed mishna here in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and presented the unattributed mishna there in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Such a dichotomy is unlikely.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讙专讜砖讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa offered another answer to the question and said: The mishna here is referring to a divorc茅e who wrote a note to the purchaser relinquishing her rights to the field after her divorce, and everyone agrees that her statement is binding, as she cannot claim to have acted in order to please her husband.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讜注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗讬 讗讬转讗 讚谞讞转 专讜讞 注讘讚转 诇拽诪讗 讗讬讘注讬 诇讱 诇诪讬注讘讚 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 讗讞讚 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜讚讛 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讗讞专

Rav Ashi said: It is all in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir states his opinion there only in a case where the husband sold property to two different purchasers, as they can say to her: If it is true that you acted only in order to please your husband, you should have done so with regard to the first purchaser and not just the second. However, in a case where there is only one purchaser, even Rabbi Meir concedes that she can claim to have acted only out of the desire to please her husband. And the mishna here is referring to a case where the husband previously wrote a bill of sale to another purchaser and the wife did not ratify the sale, and the second time he sold a property she did ratify the sale. Consequently, even Rabbi Meir concedes that the woman cannot claim that she acted only in order to please her husband.

转谞谉 讛转诐 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 讝讬讘讜专讬转 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 诪讛讜 讚诇讬讟专讜祝 诪诪砖注讘讚讬

We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Gittin 48b): One does not collect a debt from liened property that has been sold to a third party where there is unsold property available, even if the unsold property is of inferior quality. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the unsold property became blighted and is no longer of sufficient value to pay off the debt, what is the halakha? Would the creditor be allowed to repossess liened property that has been sold to a third party?

转讗 砖诪注 讻转讘 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诇讗 讞转诪讛 诇讜 诇砖谞讬 讜讞转诪讛 诇讜 讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Come and hear a solution to this dilemma based upon the following baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser and his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement specified in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 讟专讬祝 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 谞讛讬 讚讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪砖谞讬 诪专讗砖讜谉 诪讬讛讗 转讬讙讘讬

Now, if it should enter your mind that in a case where the unsold property became blighted the creditor would be able to repossess liened property, then even though she lost her ability to collect her marriage contract from the second purchaser, she should at least be able to collect from the first purchaser, because she never relinquished her right to the property he purchased. Although there was unsold property left at the time that the first purchase was made, that property is inaccessible to her because she relinquished her right to it. Consequently, her inability to repossess property from the first purchaser indicates that it is not possible to repossess liened property in the event that unsold property is blighted.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪讗讬 讗讬讘讚讛 讗讬讘讚讛 诪砖谞讬

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: It is possible to explain that what Rabbi Meir meant when he said: She has lost her marriage contract, is that she has lost her rights from the second purchaser alone, but not from the first.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖转讬 转砖讜讘讜转 讘讚讘专 讞讚讗 讚讗讬讘讚讛 诇讙诪专讬 诪砖诪注 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 诇讜讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讚 讜诪讻专 谞讻住讬讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讜讻转讘 讘注诇 讞讜讘 诇诇讜拽讞 砖谞讬 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诪讱 讗讬谉 诇讜 注诇 诇讜拽讞 专讗砖讜谉 讻诇讜诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇讜诪专 讛谞讞转讬 诇讱 诪拽讜诐 诇讙讘讜转 讛讬诪谞讜

Rava said: There are two responses with which your statement can be rejected. One is that the expression: She has lost, indicates that she has lost her rights entirely, even with regard to the first purchaser. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita: If an individual borrowed from one creditor and sold his property to two purchasers and the creditor wrote a note to the second purchaser saying: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, he has no claims toward the first purchaser either. This is because the first purchaser is able to say to the creditor: I left you a place from where to collect your debt, since when I purchased the land, unsold property still remained in the debtor鈥檚 possession, and therefore you have no claims against me.

讛转诐 讗讬讛讜 讚讗驻住讬讚 谞驻砖讬讛 讘讬讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects the attempt to solve the dilemma with regard to collecting from liened property when the unsold property was blighted: There, in the case of a woman or man who wrote to the second purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, it is he who causes a loss to himself by his own direct action of signing away his rights. It cannot be proven what the halakha would be in the case of a blighted field, where the reason he cannot make use of the field is not due to his own action.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi:

讜讛讗 诪注砖讬诐 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚诪讬砖讻谉 诇讬讛 驻专讚讬住讗 诇讞讘专讬讛 诇注砖专 砖谞讬谉 讜拽砖 诇讞诪砖 砖谞讬谉 讜讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讬讛讜 讚专讘谞谉 讜讻转讘讜 诇讬讛 讟讬专驻讗

But it is a daily occurrence that courts permit creditors to collect from liened property in cases where the unsold property became ruined, as in the case of a certain man who mortgaged his orchard [pardeisa] to another person for ten years, thereby allowing the latter to consume the produce as payment of the loan that the owner of the orchard owed him. After five years the orchard grew old and no longer produced as it once did. The creditor came before the Sages to argue his claim, and they wrote him a document of authorization to repossess liened property from those who purchased land from the debtor after the giving of the loan. This proves that if unsold property becomes unproductive, a creditor may collect his debt from liened property.

讛转诐 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚讜 讗谞驻砖讬讬讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讜 讬讚注讬 讚驻专讚讬住讗 注讘讬讚 讚拽讬砖 诇讗 讗讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇诪讬讝讘谉

The Gemara answers: There too, it was they, the purchasers, who brought this loss upon themselves since they know that an orchard tends to age. Therefore, they should not have purchased the land from the debtor because they should have realized that there was a chance that he would be unable to pay off his debt with the fruits of the orchard, and the creditor would repossess the land they were purchasing.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that if unsold property became blighted, the creditor may repossess liened property that has been sold to a third party.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞讬住转 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讗讞专讬讱 讘诪拽讜诐 讘注诇 讻诇讜诐

Abaye said: If a man said to an unmarried woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the woman went and married someone and then died, her husband takes possession of the property and is considered a purchaser, i.e., it is as if the woman sold him the property. And the individual that the man had designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, receives nothing in a case where there is a husband. This is because during the time that the property belongs to the woman it is hers completely, and all transactions she performs are considered valid. Consequently, her husband, who is considered a purchaser, may keep the property after her death.

讻诪讗谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讬专讚 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讻专 讛砖谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇砖谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Abaye rule? The Gemara answers: In accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that if one says: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the first beneficiary entered, i.e., took possession of the field, and sold it, the second beneficiary has the right to repossess that property from the purchasers upon the death of the first beneficiary. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the first beneficiary had the right to use the property, but not to permanently transfer it to someone else. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The second beneficiary has a claim only to that which the first beneficiary left in his possession and did not transfer to anyone else. Abaye ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬讝讛讜 专砖注 注专讜诐 讝讛 讛诪砖讬讗 注爪讛 诇诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬诐 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say so? Didn鈥檛 Abaye himself say: Who is a wily, wicked person? One who gives his fellow advice to sell his property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in order to prevent the second beneficiary from taking possession of the property.

诪讬 拽讗诪专 转讬谞砖讗 谞砖讗转 拽讗诪专

The Gemara answers: Did he say that the woman should be advised to marry in order to deprive the second beneficiary? He said his ruling with regard to a case where the woman married because it is the way of the world that a woman gets married. She did not do this in order to deprive the second heir of his property; it is merely a consequence of the fact that she did get married that her properties ended up in her husband鈥檚 possession.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诪讻专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讜讗讞专讬讱 诪讬讚 讘注诇 讜诇讜拽讞 诪讬讚 讗讞专讬讱 讜诪讜拽诪讬谞谉 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讘讬讚讗 讚诇讜拽讞

The Gemara presents another statement of Abaye with regard to this subject: And Abaye said: If one says to a married woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and she sold the property and subsequently died, the husband can repossess the property from the purchasers. Because he himself is considered a purchaser, he is the first purchaser in line, and is therefore entitled to repossess property from other purchasers. And the individual originally designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, can repossess the property from the possession of the husband since he had the right to receive the property after the woman. And then the purchaser may repossess it from the possession of the individual designated to receive it after you, since he purchased it from the first beneficiary, i.e., the woman. Finally, the property is established in the possession of the purchaser.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讜讞讜讝专讜转 讞诇讬诇讛 注讚 砖讬注砖讜 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讛转诐 讗讬转 诇讛讜 驻住讬讚讗 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讛讻讗 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 驻住讬讚讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in the mishna: They continue to do so according to this cycle until they agree on a compromise between them? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the mishna, they all stand to incur a loss, as the purchasers paid money for their property and the woman has a monetary claim to collect her marriage settlement. Here, it is only the purchaser who stands to incur a loss, as he paid for the property, while the others received it as a gift.

讗讝诇 专驻专诐 讗诪专 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 注诪讚讛 讜谞讬住转 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讗讞专讬讱 讘诪拽讜诐 讘注诇 讻诇讜诐

Rafram went and stated this halakha before Rav Ashi and then asked him: Did Abaye actually say this? Didn鈥檛 Abaye say: If a man said to a woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the woman went and married someone, her husband is considered a purchaser, and the individual that the man had designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, receives nothing in a case where there is a husband. If the husband is considered to be a purchaser, why, according to Abaye鈥檚 second ruling, does the later purchaser receive the property?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 驻谞讜讬讛 讛讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讞专讬讱 诇讬拽谞讬 讘注诇 诇讗 诇讬拽谞讬

Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case where the husband acquires exclusive rights to the property, it is where the original owner spoke to the woman while she was still unmarried, while here, in the latter case, he spoke to her when she was already married. What he is saying to her by making this statement even though she is already married and her husband is her heir, is that the individual designated to receive the property after you shall acquire the property, and your husband shall not acquire it. Consequently, the husband does not attain rights to this property.

讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 转谞讗 讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转

搂 The mishna taught: And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor. The Gemara explains this phrase based upon what was taught in a baraita: And so too, in a case where one owes one hundred dinars to a creditor and he sells property worth fifty dinars each to two purchasers. If the creditor waives his right to repossess the property from the second purchaser, he can still repossess the property from the first purchaser. The first purchaser can then repossess from the second purchaser, the creditor can repossess that property from the first purchaser, and the second purchaser can reclaim it from the creditor. This cycle continues until they reach a compromise.

讜讻谉 讗砖讛 讘注诇转 讞讜讘 讜砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转

And so too, in the case of a female creditor, i.e., a woman who seeks to collect her marriage contract from her husband鈥檚 estate, and two purchasers who purchased his property from him.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 谞砖讜讬

 

诪转谞讬壮 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛

MISHNA: A widow is sustained from the property of orphans. Her earnings belong to them, and they are not obligated to see to her burial. Her heirs, who inherit her marriage contract, are obligated to see to her burial.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讗讜 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讜讻讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 讜诇讗 住讙讬 讚诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did we learn in the mishna: A widow is sustained, or did we learn in the mishna: A widow who is sustained? There is a difference between the two versions. If we learned in the mishna: A widow is sustained, that means that every widow is sustained by her husband鈥檚 heirs. And the mishna is in accordance with the custom of the people of Galilee, who write a clause in the marriage contract stipulating that it is the widow鈥檚 right to remain in her husband鈥檚 house after his death and to be supported from his estate as long as she does not remarry. And it is impossible for the heirs not to give her sustenance.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讜讻讗谞砖讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讗讬 讘注讜 诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讛

Or perhaps, we learned in the mishna: A widow who is sustained, meaning that not all widows are sustained by their husbands鈥 heirs. And the mishna is in accordance with the custom of the people of Judea, who write a clause in the marriage contract stipulating that it is the widow鈥檚 right to remain in her husband鈥檚 house and be sustained by the heirs until they pay her marriage contract. And if they so desire, they can pay her marriage contract and then they need not give her sustenance any longer.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot: 93-98 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will learn how we divide a limited estate between surviving wives each with a different Ketuva value....

Ketubot 95

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 95

讟讬专驻讗 诪讗讬讬专 讜讗讬诇讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬讻诇讬 诇诪讬诪专 诇讱 讗转 讘专 讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讗转

a document of authorization to repossess liened property of the seller from anyone who purchased property from him from the first of the month of Iyyar and on. Rav Yosef said to him: A purchaser can say to you: Your deed is from the first of Nisan, so that the field that you purchased is rightfully yours and it is the other man, whose deed was dated on the fifth of Nisan, who took it illegally. Therefore, you should take possession of that field rather than repossessing other property.

诪讗讬 转拽谞转讬讛 谞讻转讘讜 讛专砖讗讛 诇讛讚讚讬

The Gemara asks: If so, what is his remedy? The Gemara answers: Let the deed holders write a document of authorization to each other. If the individual whose deed was written on the fifth of Nisan authorizes the other individual to repossess property on his behalf, then he will be able to repossess property sold after the end of Nisan, because regardless of when his deed was written and whose deed was written first, he now has the right to repossess liened property.

诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 谞砖讜讬 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讜诪讻专 讗转 砖讚讛讜 讜讻转讘讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 诇诇讜拽讞 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诪讱 讛砖谞讬讛 诪讜爪讬讗讛 诪讛诇讜拽讞 讜专讗砖讜谞讛 诪谉 讛砖谞讬讛 讜讛诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讞讜讝专讜转 讞诇讬诇讛 注讚 砖讬注砖讜 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜讻谉 讗砖讛 讘注诇转 讞讜讘

MISHNA: In a case of one who was married to two women and sold his field, and the wife whom he married first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, then the second wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, may appropriate the field from the purchaser as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, the first wife can appropriate the field from the second as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. The purchaser can then appropriate the field from the first wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-脿-vis the purchaser. They continue to do so according to this cycle [岣lila] until they agree on a compromise between them. And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor.

讙诪壮 讜讻讬 讻转讘讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诇 砖讚讛 讝讜 讜讗讬谉 诇讬 注住拽 讘讛 讜讬讚讬 诪住讜诇拽转 讛讬诪谞讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖拽谞讜 诪讬讚讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And if the first wife wrote this to him, what of it? Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: One who says to another, e.g., if a field is jointly owned and one partner says to the other: I have no legal dealings or involvement with regard to this field, or: I have no connection to it, or: I have withdrawn from it, has said nothing, as such declarations have no legal validity. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he acquired it from her possession by performing an act of acquisition in order to validate her relinquishing the field, in which case her statement is legally valid.

讜讻讬 拽谞讜 诪讬讚讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 转讬诪讗 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 诇拽讞 诪谉 讛讗讬砖 讜讞讝专 讜诇拽讞 诪谉 讛讗砖讛 诪拽讞讜 讘讟诇 讗诇诪讗 讬讻讜诇讛 讛讬讗 砖转讗诪专 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬

The Gemara asks: And if they acquired it from her, what of it? Let the woman say afterward: I did it only to please my husband, as I saw that he wished to sell the field and I did not want to quarrel with him, but I did not mean it seriously. Didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased property from a man, even if he later went back and purchased rights to that property from the man鈥檚 wife, the transaction is nullified? Apparently, the wife can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean it, and that claim is accepted.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav 岣sda said: This is not difficult: This mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that mishna in tractate Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讚转谞讬讗 讻转讘 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诇讗 讞转诪讛 诇讜 诇砖谞讬 讜讞转诪讛 诇讜 讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

As it is taught in a baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him because she did not agree to the sale, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser, and this time his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement promised to her in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, not only is the wife unable to sue the second purchaser after she signed his deed, but she cannot sue the first buyer either since he can say to her: When I purchased the field, I left you a field from which you could have collected, and you brought this loss upon yourself.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇讛 讛讬讗 砖转讗诪专 谞讞转 专讜讞 注砖讬转讬 诇讘注诇讬 讗转诐 诪讛 诇讻诐 注诇讬

Rabbi Yehuda says that she can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean to ratify the second sale either; and you, what claim do you have against me?

讜专讘讬 住转诐 诇讛 讛讻讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住转诐 诇讛 讛转诐 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: Is it possible that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, presented the unattributed mishna here in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and presented the unattributed mishna there in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Such a dichotomy is unlikely.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讙专讜砖讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa offered another answer to the question and said: The mishna here is referring to a divorc茅e who wrote a note to the purchaser relinquishing her rights to the field after her divorce, and everyone agrees that her statement is binding, as she cannot claim to have acted in order to please her husband.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讜注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗讬 讗讬转讗 讚谞讞转 专讜讞 注讘讚转 诇拽诪讗 讗讬讘注讬 诇讱 诇诪讬注讘讚 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 讗讞讚 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讜讚讛 讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讻转讘 诇讬讛 诇讗讞专

Rav Ashi said: It is all in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir states his opinion there only in a case where the husband sold property to two different purchasers, as they can say to her: If it is true that you acted only in order to please your husband, you should have done so with regard to the first purchaser and not just the second. However, in a case where there is only one purchaser, even Rabbi Meir concedes that she can claim to have acted only out of the desire to please her husband. And the mishna here is referring to a case where the husband previously wrote a bill of sale to another purchaser and the wife did not ratify the sale, and the second time he sold a property she did ratify the sale. Consequently, even Rabbi Meir concedes that the woman cannot claim that she acted only in order to please her husband.

转谞谉 讛转诐 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 谞讻住讬诐 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 讝讬讘讜专讬转 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 诪讛讜 讚诇讬讟专讜祝 诪诪砖注讘讚讬

We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Gittin 48b): One does not collect a debt from liened property that has been sold to a third party where there is unsold property available, even if the unsold property is of inferior quality. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the unsold property became blighted and is no longer of sufficient value to pay off the debt, what is the halakha? Would the creditor be allowed to repossess liened property that has been sold to a third party?

转讗 砖诪注 讻转讘 诇专讗砖讜谉 讜诇讗 讞转诪讛 诇讜 诇砖谞讬 讜讞转诪讛 诇讜 讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Come and hear a solution to this dilemma based upon the following baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser and his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement specified in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 讟专讬祝 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 谞讛讬 讚讗讬讘讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 诪砖谞讬 诪专讗砖讜谉 诪讬讛讗 转讬讙讘讬

Now, if it should enter your mind that in a case where the unsold property became blighted the creditor would be able to repossess liened property, then even though she lost her ability to collect her marriage contract from the second purchaser, she should at least be able to collect from the first purchaser, because she never relinquished her right to the property he purchased. Although there was unsold property left at the time that the first purchase was made, that property is inaccessible to her because she relinquished her right to it. Consequently, her inability to repossess property from the first purchaser indicates that it is not possible to repossess liened property in the event that unsold property is blighted.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诪讗讬 讗讬讘讚讛 讗讬讘讚讛 诪砖谞讬

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: It is possible to explain that what Rabbi Meir meant when he said: She has lost her marriage contract, is that she has lost her rights from the second purchaser alone, but not from the first.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖转讬 转砖讜讘讜转 讘讚讘专 讞讚讗 讚讗讬讘讚讛 诇讙诪专讬 诪砖诪注 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 诇讜讛 诪谉 讛讗讞讚 讜诪讻专 谞讻住讬讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讜讻转讘 讘注诇 讞讜讘 诇诇讜拽讞 砖谞讬 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 注诪讱 讗讬谉 诇讜 注诇 诇讜拽讞 专讗砖讜谉 讻诇讜诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇讜诪专 讛谞讞转讬 诇讱 诪拽讜诐 诇讙讘讜转 讛讬诪谞讜

Rava said: There are two responses with which your statement can be rejected. One is that the expression: She has lost, indicates that she has lost her rights entirely, even with regard to the first purchaser. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita: If an individual borrowed from one creditor and sold his property to two purchasers and the creditor wrote a note to the second purchaser saying: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, he has no claims toward the first purchaser either. This is because the first purchaser is able to say to the creditor: I left you a place from where to collect your debt, since when I purchased the land, unsold property still remained in the debtor鈥檚 possession, and therefore you have no claims against me.

讛转诐 讗讬讛讜 讚讗驻住讬讚 谞驻砖讬讛 讘讬讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects the attempt to solve the dilemma with regard to collecting from liened property when the unsold property was blighted: There, in the case of a woman or man who wrote to the second purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, it is he who causes a loss to himself by his own direct action of signing away his rights. It cannot be proven what the halakha would be in the case of a blighted field, where the reason he cannot make use of the field is not due to his own action.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讬诪专 诇专讘 讗砖讬

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi:

讜讛讗 诪注砖讬诐 讘讻诇 讬讜诐 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚诪讬砖讻谉 诇讬讛 驻专讚讬住讗 诇讞讘专讬讛 诇注砖专 砖谞讬谉 讜拽砖 诇讞诪砖 砖谞讬谉 讜讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讬讛讜 讚专讘谞谉 讜讻转讘讜 诇讬讛 讟讬专驻讗

But it is a daily occurrence that courts permit creditors to collect from liened property in cases where the unsold property became ruined, as in the case of a certain man who mortgaged his orchard [pardeisa] to another person for ten years, thereby allowing the latter to consume the produce as payment of the loan that the owner of the orchard owed him. After five years the orchard grew old and no longer produced as it once did. The creditor came before the Sages to argue his claim, and they wrote him a document of authorization to repossess liened property from those who purchased land from the debtor after the giving of the loan. This proves that if unsold property becomes unproductive, a creditor may collect his debt from liened property.

讛转诐 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚讜 讗谞驻砖讬讬讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讜 讬讚注讬 讚驻专讚讬住讗 注讘讬讚 讚拽讬砖 诇讗 讗讬讘注讬 诇讛讜 诇诪讬讝讘谉

The Gemara answers: There too, it was they, the purchasers, who brought this loss upon themselves since they know that an orchard tends to age. Therefore, they should not have purchased the land from the debtor because they should have realized that there was a chance that he would be unable to pay off his debt with the fruits of the orchard, and the creditor would repossess the land they were purchasing.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讗讬砖转讚讜祝 讘谞讬 讞专讬 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that if unsold property became blighted, the creditor may repossess liened property that has been sold to a third party.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜注诪讚讛 讜谞讬住转 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讗讞专讬讱 讘诪拽讜诐 讘注诇 讻诇讜诐

Abaye said: If a man said to an unmarried woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the woman went and married someone and then died, her husband takes possession of the property and is considered a purchaser, i.e., it is as if the woman sold him the property. And the individual that the man had designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, receives nothing in a case where there is a husband. This is because during the time that the property belongs to the woman it is hers completely, and all transactions she performs are considered valid. Consequently, her husband, who is considered a purchaser, may keep the property after her death.

讻诪讗谉 讻讬 讛讗讬 转谞讗 讚转谞讬讗 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讬专讚 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讻专 讛砖谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇砖谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Abaye rule? The Gemara answers: In accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that if one says: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the first beneficiary entered, i.e., took possession of the field, and sold it, the second beneficiary has the right to repossess that property from the purchasers upon the death of the first beneficiary. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the first beneficiary had the right to use the property, but not to permanently transfer it to someone else. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The second beneficiary has a claim only to that which the first beneficiary left in his possession and did not transfer to anyone else. Abaye ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬讝讛讜 专砖注 注专讜诐 讝讛 讛诪砖讬讗 注爪讛 诇诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬诐 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say so? Didn鈥檛 Abaye himself say: Who is a wily, wicked person? One who gives his fellow advice to sell his property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in order to prevent the second beneficiary from taking possession of the property.

诪讬 拽讗诪专 转讬谞砖讗 谞砖讗转 拽讗诪专

The Gemara answers: Did he say that the woman should be advised to marry in order to deprive the second beneficiary? He said his ruling with regard to a case where the woman married because it is the way of the world that a woman gets married. She did not do this in order to deprive the second heir of his property; it is merely a consequence of the fact that she did get married that her properties ended up in her husband鈥檚 possession.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诪讻专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讜讗讞专讬讱 诪讬讚 讘注诇 讜诇讜拽讞 诪讬讚 讗讞专讬讱 讜诪讜拽诪讬谞谉 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讘讬讚讗 讚诇讜拽讞

The Gemara presents another statement of Abaye with regard to this subject: And Abaye said: If one says to a married woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and she sold the property and subsequently died, the husband can repossess the property from the purchasers. Because he himself is considered a purchaser, he is the first purchaser in line, and is therefore entitled to repossess property from other purchasers. And the individual originally designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, can repossess the property from the possession of the husband since he had the right to receive the property after the woman. And then the purchaser may repossess it from the possession of the individual designated to receive it after you, since he purchased it from the first beneficiary, i.e., the woman. Finally, the property is established in the possession of the purchaser.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讜讞讜讝专讜转 讞诇讬诇讛 注讚 砖讬注砖讜 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讛转诐 讗讬转 诇讛讜 驻住讬讚讗 诇讻讜诇讛讜 讛讻讗 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 驻住讬讚讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in the mishna: They continue to do so according to this cycle until they agree on a compromise between them? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the mishna, they all stand to incur a loss, as the purchasers paid money for their property and the woman has a monetary claim to collect her marriage settlement. Here, it is only the purchaser who stands to incur a loss, as he paid for the property, while the others received it as a gift.

讗讝诇 专驻专诐 讗诪专 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 谞讻住讬 诇讬讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 注诪讚讛 讜谞讬住转 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 讜讗讬谉 诇讗讞专讬讱 讘诪拽讜诐 讘注诇 讻诇讜诐

Rafram went and stated this halakha before Rav Ashi and then asked him: Did Abaye actually say this? Didn鈥檛 Abaye say: If a man said to a woman: My property is hereby bequeathed to you, and after you die it will pass to so-and-so, and the woman went and married someone, her husband is considered a purchaser, and the individual that the man had designated to receive the property after you, i.e., after the woman, receives nothing in a case where there is a husband. If the husband is considered to be a purchaser, why, according to Abaye鈥檚 second ruling, does the later purchaser receive the property?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 驻谞讜讬讛 讛讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 谞砖讜讗讛 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 诇讛 讗讞专讬讱 诇讬拽谞讬 讘注诇 诇讗 诇讬拽谞讬

Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case where the husband acquires exclusive rights to the property, it is where the original owner spoke to the woman while she was still unmarried, while here, in the latter case, he spoke to her when she was already married. What he is saying to her by making this statement even though she is already married and her husband is her heir, is that the individual designated to receive the property after you shall acquire the property, and your husband shall not acquire it. Consequently, the husband does not attain rights to this property.

讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 转谞讗 讜讻谉 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转

搂 The mishna taught: And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor. The Gemara explains this phrase based upon what was taught in a baraita: And so too, in a case where one owes one hundred dinars to a creditor and he sells property worth fifty dinars each to two purchasers. If the creditor waives his right to repossess the property from the second purchaser, he can still repossess the property from the first purchaser. The first purchaser can then repossess from the second purchaser, the creditor can repossess that property from the first purchaser, and the second purchaser can reclaim it from the creditor. This cycle continues until they reach a compromise.

讜讻谉 讗砖讛 讘注诇转 讞讜讘 讜砖谞讬 诇拽讜讞讜转

And so too, in the case of a female creditor, i.e., a woman who seeks to collect her marriage contract from her husband鈥檚 estate, and two purchasers who purchased his property from him.

讛讚专谉 注诇讱 诪讬 砖讛讬讛 谞砖讜讬

 

诪转谞讬壮 讗诇诪谞讛 谞讬讝讜谞转 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛 讬讜专砖讬讛 讬讜专砖讬 讻转讜讘转讛 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘拽讘讜专转讛

MISHNA: A widow is sustained from the property of orphans. Her earnings belong to them, and they are not obligated to see to her burial. Her heirs, who inherit her marriage contract, are obligated to see to her burial.

讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讗讜 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讜讻讗谞砖讬 讙诇讬诇 讜诇讗 住讙讬 讚诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讛

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did we learn in the mishna: A widow is sustained, or did we learn in the mishna: A widow who is sustained? There is a difference between the two versions. If we learned in the mishna: A widow is sustained, that means that every widow is sustained by her husband鈥檚 heirs. And the mishna is in accordance with the custom of the people of Galilee, who write a clause in the marriage contract stipulating that it is the widow鈥檚 right to remain in her husband鈥檚 house after his death and to be supported from his estate as long as she does not remarry. And it is impossible for the heirs not to give her sustenance.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬讝讜谞转 转谞谉 讜讻讗谞砖讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讗讬 讘注讜 诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讛

Or perhaps, we learned in the mishna: A widow who is sustained, meaning that not all widows are sustained by their husbands鈥 heirs. And the mishna is in accordance with the custom of the people of Judea, who write a clause in the marriage contract stipulating that it is the widow鈥檚 right to remain in her husband鈥檚 house and be sustained by the heirs until they pay her marriage contract. And if they so desire, they can pay her marriage contract and then they need not give her sustenance any longer.

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